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
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
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

JANUARY

	PAGE
HAS CHRISTIANITY THE MORAL RIGHT TO SUPPLANT THE ETHNIC FAITHS? Henry C. Mabie, Paul Carus, Francis A. Christie	1-30
THE MORAL LEVEL OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES. Friedrich Giesebrecht	31-55
THE CRY "BACK TO CHRIST": ITS IMPLICATION. Albertina Allen Forrest	56-73
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RELIGION OF JESUS. Frank C. Porter	74-94
AFRICA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN LATIN LITERATURE. Benjamin B. Warfield	95-110
THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THEOLOGY. Walter Rauschenbusch	111-127
AN IMMUTABLE ABSOLUTE OR A GOD WHO STRIVES? Henry W. Wright . .	128-130
CRITICAL NOTE. <i>John</i> 5:7, 8. Caspar René Gregory	131-138
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.	139-184
BRIEF MENTION	180

APRIL

SHOULD THE DENOMINATIONAL DISTINCTIONS OF CHRISTIAN LANDS BE PERPETUATED ON MISSION FIELDS? Sidney L. Gulick, D. E. Hoste, Bernard Upward, Ernest W. Clement, Wallace St. John, Robert E. Speer .	185-216
AN ACTUAL EXPERIMENT IN NON-SECTARIAN MISSIONARY ACTIVITY. Leon Arpee	217-227
THE ORIGINS OF ETHICAL INWARDNESS IN JEWISH THOUGHT. Arthur O. Lovejoy.	228-249
THE SPIRIT AND VALUE OF PRUSSIAN RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION. Edward O. Sisson	250-268
PAUL'S HISTORICAL RELATION TO THE FIRST DISCIPLES. Shirley J. Case .	269-286
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>What is Meant by the Divinity of Man?</i> C. M. Mead. .	287-290
<i>Can the Human Character of Jesus be Called Divine?</i> H. W. Wright. .	290-293
<i>Influence of Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures in India.</i> Mlle. D. Menant .	293-307
<i>Martin Luther's Attitude toward the Principle of Liberty of Conscience.</i> John Horsch	307-315
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.	316-367
BRIEF MENTION	367

JULY

THE MOTIVE OF MODERN MISSIONARY WORK. H. Rashdall	369-383
RECENT CHANGES IN THEOLOGY IN THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH. .	384-406
MYSTICISM IN THE EARLY CHURCH. Arthur C. McGiffert	407-427

	PAGE
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF GOD. Herbert A. Youtz	428-453
ACTS VERSUS GALATIANS: THE CRUX OF APOSTOLIC HISTORY. Benjamin W. Bacon	454-474
MODERN ITALY AND PIUS X. Professor Walther Köhler	475-500
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>The Gospels in the Latin Vulgate</i> . Eb. Nestle	501-502
<i>Shebna and Eliakim: A Reply</i> . Kemper Fullerton	503-509
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.	510-552

OCTOBER

ISRAEL OR JERAHMEEL? Henry Preserved Smith	553-368
WHAT MODIFICATIONS IN WESTERN CHRISTIANITY MAY BE EXPECTED FROM CONTACT WITH ORIENTAL RELIGIONS ON THE MISSION FIELD? George William Knox	569-579
WHAT CONCEPTION OF THE SCRIPTURES AND OF SCRIPTURE AUTHORITY SHOULD UNDERLIE THE WORK OF THE MODERN MISSIONARY? William K. McKibben	580-590
PRAGMATISM AND KNOWLEDGE. George Burman Foster	591-596
SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF RUSSIAN CHRISTIANITY. Edward Waite Miller	597-623
REDEMPTION FROM THE CURSE OF THE LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF GAL. 3:13, 14. Ernest D. Burton	624-646
CRITICAL NOTE: <i>The Function of History in Theology</i> . Douglas C. Macintosh	647-652
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.	653-718
BRIEF MENTION	714
GENERAL INDEX	719

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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Number 1

HAS CHRISTIANITY THE MORAL RIGHT TO SUPPLANT THE ETHNIC FAITHS?

REV. HENRY C. MABIE, D.D., SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN BAPTIST MISSIONARY UNION; PAUL CARUS, PH.D., CHICAGO, ILL.; PROFESSOR FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE, A.B., MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS

I have been asked in this paper to answer the question: "Has Christianity the moral right to attempt to supplant the ethnic faiths?"

The influences which have given rise to this query are mainly two; the conception of missions represented by questionable forms of missionary zealotry, and prevalent thought-tendencies in the realm of comparative religion. Of all religions Christianity is recognized as the most missionary. Its aggressiveness proves disturbing to the less missionary ethnic faiths. The right of Christianity thus to disturb other systems is doubted. Ere men are aware, sympathy is engendered for one type of these faiths as against another when the two are viewed as contestants. A spirit of championship then springs up, and a zeal for partisan victory obscures the importance of the truth at stake. If the question were, "Has any form of religion a moral right to *play at religion as a game*," as the situation is sometimes conceived, we should answer: "No!" The real issue involved is vastly deeper and more serious. There is something more than a tournament on.

The fact that the question of the legitimacy of missions prevails in many minds is sufficient reason why it should be squarely faced and met. The answer to it profoundly affects, not only Christian missions, but moral effort of every kind.

It is important at the outset to establish an understanding of terms. To attempt to answer the question propounded in its present form would be to increase a confusion already existing. In the query put to me there are implied at least three grave assumptions. They are these:

1. That the ethnic faiths as they now exist, equally with the Christian, *are of divine origin.*
2. That Christian missionary effort is intrinsically the *assertion of a right*—a right asserted as against other natural rights.
3. That such missionary effort, by first intention at least, seeks to *supplant what is really defensible.*

When we shall have disposed of these erroneous presuppositions and restated the case as its nature requires, we shall have gone far toward answering the question before us.

As to the first element of misconception, although not stated in the question propounded, it is implied that the ethnic faiths have an equal standing with Christianity in the court of comparative religion; and, if so, that they have such standing because of their inherent meritorious qualities—such qualities as meet the real needs of the people now holding them. But this inference is due to a priori considerations and begs the question involved. Such an inference concretely expressed means to say, for example, that Christianity and Hinduism equally arose out of purely natural antecedent causes; that, in the nature of the case, Hinduism is as perfectly adapted to meet the needs of Hindus as Christianity is to meet the needs of Anglo-Saxons; that God is as really the author of one set of adaptations as of the other; that there is nothing more supernatural in Christianity than in Hinduism; and that therefore the attempt of occidentals to enter Asia and to readjust Hindu conditions to Christian ideals is an impertinence and an intrusion. Any such plea entered for the non-Christian religions grows out of hidden premises—premises that are assumed, but are really the very things that need to be proved. Such plea, so common in our day,

is a deduction of the so-called "historical method," just now so much in vogue. It is a corollary of the doctrine of evolution extremely viewed. But a just view of the evolutionary principle warrants no such corollary, and the deduction is an abuse of the historical method, however legitimate that method is within certain limits.

In the view of its champions, the "historical method" is thought to be the one great and decisive medium of knowledge; whereas there are other methods of vastly more worth. One has said of this method:

It assumes to determine what is by what has been; it elucidates the law of man's moral nature by the principles which are supposed to have governed the anthropoid ape; the authority of the Bible by going back to the ghost-and spirit-worship which are supposed to be its real genesis. The nature and value of each present fact is determined by its supposed historic origin and development. But we may reverse the process; interpret the monkey by the man; get light on the value of the Hebrew revelation by its solution of our present problems; . . . look for the Maker's mark not only in the fire-mist, but in the structure of the moral organism. . . . It is often a matter of great advantage not to have to wait for the "historic method" to be perfected and corrected; for example, when a man has an attack of appendicitis, the knowledge of the vermiform appendix as it now is, yields a far more valuable contribution to the solution of his case than the entire history of that organ.¹

And especially, we would add, when the history in question is most hypothetical.

Now, respecting the origin of the ethnic religions, it must at the least be said that they cannot be accounted for by a simple, uniform, upward evolution; their genesis is composite. Even though some or all of them started with elements of truth, they now represent dreadful deteriorations and corruptions of an earlier purity. Doubtless underlying all these religions there are some elements of natural, and hence of true, religion: certain intuitions, suggestions of conscience, and hints of nature conveying much needful knowledge of God. "These not having the law (revelation) are a law (revelation) unto themselves." This form of light is the common property of all men with or without a book revelation; and it emanates from Christ, the eternal Logos. Moreover, this form of light affords even an elementary gospel, as Paul in Rom. 2:4-10 clearly inti-

¹ John Henry Denison, in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* for June, 1906, entitled, "The White Death of the Soul."

mates, however poorly apprehended or appropriated that gospel is. If men had given credence to such early gospel hints as were afforded by Abel's altar or by their own deeper intuitions; if they had so believed as to act on their best belief—for such and such only is faith—they would have been saved in some infantine degree. Among antediluvians, for example, Noah had, as Dr. William Ashmore has said, “no monopoly of gopher wood.” There was a monopoly in unbelief, except as Noah and his family were the shining exceptions to it.

But no truly historic account of the ethnic religions can be just that does not take note of the persistent tendencies of sin to pervert man's original stock of truth. Sin has distorted the elements of primitive religion with which the ethnic faiths started; it has falsified normal conceptions of both God and man. Sin is God-accusing as well as self-justifying; it projects its own perverseness upon God. “I knew thee that thou art an hard man,” said the man in the parable. He really knew nothing of the kind. He himself was the “hard man,” who should have discerned a truer aspect of the divine character. The God of this man's evil imagination was a fiction. Sin has thus been a fruitful means of introducing into all the ethnic religions fearful perversions of an earlier good.

Then official and ecclesiastical traditionalism and self-interest have left their marks upon the ethnic religions. This has been true in Judaism and even in Christianity. Because of the mischievous effects of priestcraft and clericalism, Israel lost her nationality and Christianity early fell from her apostolic estate, and has but slowly recovered. Surely the ethnic faiths have not been exempt from similar deterioration.

If the principle of evolution as a factor has played a part in the development of religious systems and activities, retrogression and degeneracy have played their mischievous part also. “Broken lights” of the true “Sun of Righteousness” which once existed have been put out. Through Brahmin priest, Taoist conjurer, Mohammedan dervish, and African witch-doctor, that “Light which lighteth every man as he cometh into the world,” has been turned into darkness because as abnormal religionists they have cast a shadow on

the sun. Said Christ: "All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers." That which was man's original heritage in the Eternal Word has been stolen away, rendering it more difficult for the redeeming God to do his intended work.

Satanic influence also has entered in to debase the ethnic faith. The long history of man is in line with the biblical account of an irrepressible and tragic conflict between the "seed of the woman," the Son of man, the last Adam, and the old serpent, the devil. It is therefore impossible for us to blind our eyes to the corrupting influence of diabolic agency upon the primeval order.

A day spent in Benares, Canton, or Kyoto amid the temples of idolatry and shame and witchcraft will convince any candid observer that the same Satanic influence which in Bible times animated Jannes and Jambres, Elymas, Simon Magus, and the Sons of Sceva, in modern pagan life also often makes religionists drunk with its sorceries. Let one who doubts read a work by the late Dr. John L. Nevius, a foremost Presbyterian missionary in China, on the demonology of that land. The national symbol of China is a dragon. Chinese Taoism, which once represented a sort of Logos doctrine, has so deteriorated as to be little else but the expression of demonism.

A second implication of the question propounded is that Christian missions in themselves are intrinsically the assertion of a right, as against other natural rights.

To conceive of such missionary effort as springs from the mind of Christ as the assertion of a mere right is to put such effort on too low a plane altogether. Christian missions are not concerned to defend themselves as merely legitimate; they are more than that; they are an outreach of grace in behalf of others; efforts to save men unto God and unto themselves, and not to mere western sectarianism. Said Paul as he came to the Romans, through storm and shipwreck and imprisonment: "For I long to see you that *I may impart unto you* some spiritual gift." Christianity is not competitive; it never exults over another system because it is a rival, nor seeks a victory for victory's sake. It rather yearns over the inadequate system to make good all it fails to do; it reaches beyond the devotee to the personality of the divine ideal of Christ's purchase to render it godlike in being and destiny.

Then as to the third assumption: True Christian missions do not attempt to supplant what in an ethnic faith is in itself good and true. In Confucianism, for example, it discerns between the true and the false, and seeks not to destroy it as a whole, root and branch.

So far as there are in all men elements of natural religion, true in themselves, there is no occasion to displace them. Such residue of natural religion, wherever found, is to be complemented, fulfilled, by "the true light which now shineth." Christianity in its normal exercise acts on the baser elements of other systems as quicksilver acts on pulverized, gold-bearing quartz; it gathers up the particles of gold hidden in the coarser element. In this process the rock is discarded, but there is no contempt of any real worth. As the quicksilver fulfils the quartz for bullion or coin-current, so Christianity brings to its own the truth latent in the ethnic system.

Now, with these unfortunate confusions eliminated, the question remaining to be answered is a very different one from that with which we started, so perplexing to many minds. The real issue amounts to this: *Is Christianity warranted in imparting its divine grace to all mankind, and thus realizing to them the values incipient or hinted in the ethnic systems, even though the process is sure to discard the base and harmful elements incumbering them?* There can be but one answer to such a question—an emphatic: "Yea, verily."

The Christianity of the New Testament is in no conflict with the soul in any land or time who in his light has acted penitently and believingly toward his highest ideal. That in principle is faith, whether exercised by an Abraham, a Plato, or a Spurgeon, by an Enoch, a Socrates, or a George Müller. So far, then, as among religionists of any cult, the faith-principle has existed—doubtless it often exists despite the cult—God has gracious regard for it, as ethnic religionists rarely have, for they have little or no grace to offer.

In so far, indeed, as missionary effort has been prosecuted as a crusade of one religious system as against another with a view to some selfish partisan advantage, undoubtedly such form of mission work has been open to grave objection. Wherever in any human being or society any inherent, natural right exists, Christ respects

that right. It is the thing really implanted by himself; he has therefore no occasion to antagonize it; he would rather conserve and nourish it. If sad abuses have often marred religious effort, this is because of weakness in the agent, and not because the extension of truth in itself is evil. When, for example, Francis Xavier went to the East, and, not content to share his spiritual grace with his fellow-men, proceeded to assert the claim of his imperial master at Rome to temporal power in Japan, he violated actual human rights in the interest of fictitious claims of a usurping master; it naturally resulted that the first proselytes were turned upon and slain by thousands, and Christianity interdicted in Japan for two hundred and fifty years.

In 1899, under severe pressure from France, an imperial decree was secured from the Chinese government conferring on Roman Catholic dignitaries a recognized official status in China. Accordingly, French bishops adopted the rank of Chinese governors, traveled in an official chair with bearers appropriate to that rank, with attendants and outriders, and had a cannon discharged upon their arrival and departure. When this same status was offered to Protestant missionaries, it was promptly declined. Thus they avoided blaspheming the whole principle of rights and committing missionary suicide. Says Mr. A. R. Colquhoun: "The blood of the martyrs is in China the seed of French aggrandizement."

In 1900, Germany, though Protestant, seized the district of Kiao Chao in China as an indemnity for the slaughter of two German priests, and precipitated the Boxer uprising. Is it any wonder that men ask: "What sort of missions is this?"

In estimating this question of rights, there is danger that we may attribute to them a false reality. A custom is not necessarily the expression of a natural right, nor is it a true evolution simply because it is ancient or indigenous to a people. There is a difference even in pagan lands between real and fictitious rights. Would any man in his senses claim that the horrors of Hindu widowhood, or the nameless immoralities of Hindu temples, or the abominations of the caste system, as described by Amy Wilson-Carmichael in her book, *Things as They Are*, or the system of plurality of wives in Mohammedanism, or the sodden polyandry of Tibet, represent

any human rights before God or men? Are these the product of any true evolution? That there are justifiable ways and means whereby good men may seek to remedy these abuses is beyond question.

Respecting any true element in the religion of a pagan the real missionary will say, as did Paul at Athens: "What therefore ye worship in ignorance this I set forth unto you." This element need never be antagonized or minimized; it rather is to be used and built upon. It is because of the existence of this element at the basis of every man's moral nature that Christianity can make a beginning anywhere, at any moment, with any human soul, under whatever system of religion it exists. For example, if in a heathen temple of China or India I behold some poor devotee in sorrow, groaning out a prayer to an idol, I need not check that cry; it represents just what I do when in some dire extremity I pour out my anguish to an invisible sympathy. What I need to do is to know the language of this worshiper; to gain his confidence; so to get into sympathy with him that I can show him his error; to present to him the great divine reality, which the image indeed suggests, while it yet obscures the God for whom he gropes. My mission to that man is to correct and fulfil his prayer. Of course, in so doing elements in this man's religion will be eliminated—yes, even supplanted; but in how different a sense from that contemplated by a mere contentious attack! This better kind of displacement is a wholly legitimate thing—nay, a necessary thing—if health, instead of disease is to prevail. Does displacement in this sense do violence to any thing sacred? True, on the one hand there is an elimination of error; but on the other there is a fulfilment of truth. Every introduction of pure food into the body expels from the circulation baser elements, while it nourishes the vital principle. Then why should he who is the Bread of Life be denied to the spiritually moribund, even though it is certain, in the progress of new spiritual health, that dead tissue will be thrown off? Such changes as those above indicated make possible the ascending order—the true evolution in God's universe.

But we should be dealing superficially with the real issues in this discussion if we did not point out the unique fact that Christianity is more than a school of competitive thought, in the sense that the

ethnic faiths are such—something which people are called upon to believe, merely intellectually believe. Christianity is Christ; and he is more than a school of philosophy, a set of opinions. Christ is the essential reality—the Eternal Word, or Reason—at the heart of the universe. He can be experienced and known in every personal soul, irrespective of race distinction. The world and all things therein were created through Christ—on account of Christ, according to Christ; and they are potentially redeemed to him also. Hence the secrets of life and the world can be interpreted to and understood by those only who are in him. Moreover, Christ as such a reality can be experienced only as something deeper than theoretic beliefs is grasped; only as the whole soul is surrendered to him—intellect, heart, conscience, and will. When man is thus given up to Christ in a vital way, by the divine Spirit, Christ authenticates himself to the human spirit in a wondrous way. He thus approves himself as the final need of man as man. Accordingly he can indwell man, in consonance with many racial peculiarities. Mozoomdar complained that the Christ who had been introduced to India by western missionaries was an Englishman or a Yankee, whereas he was an oriental Christ, and more apprehensible by him on that account.*

Dr. Charles Cuthbert Hall's ground-theme in his current course of lectures in the East is "the adaptation of the oriental mind (as mystical) to the experience of Christ"—a matter which probably needs to be more regarded in wise missionary endeavor.

But we do this matter of the extension of Christianity scant justice if we pause with its defense only and merely justify its rights. There is a deep imperative in it. What is this movement of foreign missions? In its simplest form, it is putting down a high type of man alongside a lower one: the planting of such a man as Moffat among the Bechuanas of South Africa, or Paton among the cannibals of the new Hebrides, or Griffith John among the Chinese. Such a personality is a reconstructive force and placed where he is needed. He translates and unfolds the Christian Scriptures to men whose light hitherto has been but as starlight to sunlight; he unveils hitherto hidden relations between the redeeming God and his creatures, who need more than all else to know him, his person, his character,

* For such an apprehension, see introduction to Mozoomdar's *The Oriental Christ*.

his grace; he puts the languages of rude tribes into writing—one hundred such languages within a century—and creates new literatures; he brings back the shattered polyglot tribes of men to a better Shinar than that which once witnessed the confusion of Babel. The missionary puts into the hands of men schools, hospitals, and industries. He affords sane treatment to disease, relief to the opium vice, and works a gradual cure of the “open sore of the world.” He abates the evils of Hindu widowhood, gathers thousands of children into orphanages, and unbinds the crippled feet of numberless innocents. All this is more than proselytism, mere sect-making.

Should any think that the work of missions is an arbitrary forcing of issues upon the peoples of heathendom, let him hear Mr. Chester Holcombe, for twenty years connected with the diplomatic staff of the United States in China. In a recent article on the missionary enterprise he thus writes:

To talk to persons who choose to listen; to throw open wide the doors of chapels where natives who desire may hear the Christian faith explained and urged upon their attention; to sell at half-cost or to give the Bible and Christian literature freely to those who may care to read; to heal the sick without cost; to instruct children whose parents are desirous that they should receive education—surely none of these constitute methods or practices to which the word “force” may be applied, under any allowable use of the English language. . . . There is no difference between the work of pioneer preachers in the Far West, that of “settlement workers” in the slums of great cities, or of eloquent pastors of wealthy and fashionable churches in the Back Bay district of Boston, or Fifth Avenue in New York, and that done by missionaries in China. . . . The work is absolutely identical in character and method, differentiated from the others only by simple forms of presentation in order to reach the more effectively minds wholly unfamiliar with the truths presented.

Even as I write, this paragraph of a letter sent from twenty native Christians in the interior of Africa is before me:

We are those who went astray, but the Lord did not leave us. He sought us with perseverance, and we heard his call and answered. Now we are his slaves. We had three teachers. One is in Europe; another has gone to Ikau; and this one who stays with us shortly goes to rest in Europe. With whom shall we be left? It is good that you should send us teachers who cause us to be full of the words of the Father. We have a desire to hear your teachings of Jehovah God; and we have a desire to see you in the eyes, but we have not the opportunity; we shall have it in heaven.

Does this sound as if missionary effort had wrought any wrong to this people so recently out of fetishism and cannibalism?

If we today have no right to plant in India, China, and Africa the seeds of intellectual and moral renewal, then our ancestors, who were pagans in the forests of North Germany, about the lagoons of Holland, and on the moors of Britain, were in egregious error when they set in operation the forces which translated and printed the Bible, founded the universities, promulgated the Magna Charta, brought on the Reformation, and induced the successive migrations from Europe whereby the New World was discovered, peopled, and refashioned into the great, free republic that it is.

The truth is, the Christ of the universe cannot be himself and fail to do what is involved in his gracious incarnation; nor can his people be themselves as indwelt by him and not extend this incarnation and re-enact his gracious deeds. To deny the legitimacy of Christian missions is to deny the right of holy and gracious sovereignty in God, and to invalidate the legitimacy of all best things in life and history; and that is to legitimize their opposites—to assert the rights of sin and deify its prince.

The final question, then, is not whether the Christian church may force arbitrary changes upon a people, but whether, through moral suasion, it may introduce ideas, principles, and potencies that will inevitably bring about wholesome changes for which a people itself in the end will be grateful. Can anyone question the benignity of present endeavors in China to overcome the worst by the better? And is not China increasingly friendly to such results? If not, why has the queen dowager abolished the examinations of the old style, and introduced instead the new western education? Why has she discouraged foot-binding, promulgated a sabbath rest-day, and taken steps toward the abolition of the opium curse? Is Chang Chi Tung, author of *China's Only Hope*, less a patriot because, discerning that the vitalities of western nations are largely due to the Christian Bible, he has issued a decree encouraging the 58,000,000 in Hupeh and Hunan, over whom he rules, now to study the New Testament? He at least has discovered that the Christian book is more than an ethnic book; that it is *pan-ethnic*; that it is uniquely human, and so, of course, that it is a Mongolian book. If so, then

any displacement it may work will result in the betterment of China. Of course, all this involves overthrow, but legitimate overthrow of the infantine by the mature, of the false by the true, of the heathen by the Christian. For this purpose the world and all its dispensations were made, that through turnings and overturnings the true destinies of mankind may be realized.

The ideal of all we plead for is concretely presented in the New Testament picture of our Lord's transfiguration. This transfiguration is really the archetypal form of that characteristic work of redemption wherein mankind and all that belongs to him are to be transformed into the same glory which Christ himself exhibited in the holy mount. The scene is best understood when viewed in contrast with another scene; viz., that in the plain, just following it.

Two types of sonship are presented: That of Jesus in the glory ensuing upon his full acceptance of his impending cross, concerning which the Father, speaking right out of the blue, exclaimed: "This is my Son, my chosen"—"the ideal potentiality I cherish for all men, what I mean by sonship." The other type is seen in the child of a broken-hearted earthly father whom the disciples through default in prayer had failed to heal. This was a son of the natural man—the limited human father—plus all the damage sin and the demon had wrought in him. He was "lunatic," torn by the spirit, fallen at the Savior's feet "as one dead;" he "wallowed, foaming." There he lay, a devil's masterpiece—sin in the death-process. The acme of distress uttered itself in the father's cry: "I beseech thee, look upon my son; for he is mine only child"—literally, mine "only begotten;" the same word that describes the relation of Jesus to his father. How different the fatherhoods and how unlike the sonships in these contrasting pictures! Now, all this may be regarded as a dramatization of the task of Christ's successors in this sinful world. This task is naught less than to take human souls stricken and damaged by sin, and to begin to transfigure them—to *change* them from prostrate, sin-cursed, earthly sonship to radiant, glorified, heavenly sonship like Christ's own, idealized in that mount.

This transfiguration was not for Christ alone. He is but "the first-born of many brethren." The transfiguration was for all men and for all theirs. It is for the poor Indian fakir, the crazed, super-

stitious Chinese Boxer, the gross South Sea cannibal, the barbarous African savage, and the just as needy, though polished, Anglo-Saxon agnostic. This transfiguration amounts to *salvation*—Christian salvation, the only salvation worthy of God and of ourselves. Moreover, this salvation can never be adequately known or consciously realized apart from that wisdom and power which are lodged in the cross of Christ and its gospel. To bring such a salvation to men the Christian church not only has the right, but is bound, in the appropriate "times and seasons," to go everywhere upon this planet where the Redeemer himself would come. This warrant and duty are the charter of the Christian church; the right to love where others hate, to cherish where others neglect, to bless where others curse, to offer felicity in this world and the world to come where others consign to darkness and despair. This is the right divine, *the redemptive right to communicate the grace of Christian missions.*

BOSTON, MASS.

HENRY C. MABIE

MISSIONS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

Before I begin to speak of missions, I shall make a few general comments on the standpoint from which I purpose to treat the subject. I shall not assume the attitude of a defender of any special religious system, sectarian or non-sectarian, Christian or non-Christian; nor shall I act as a judge who pronounces a verdict on the claims of the different faiths. I shall speak as a scientist in the same way as a botanist would contemplate the struggle for existence in the flora of a country, or a zoölogist would ventilate the problem of the competition among and the distribution of the several animal species on the face of the earth. And, taking this standpoint of an impartial observer, I have come to the conclusion that missions are an essential part of church life, for the religion which makes no propaganda for its faith is dead.

Competition is a highly important factor in the world of animated nature. The strong survive, and the weak go to the wall. The strong are not always the best, nor are they necessarily physically strong. They are the best adapted under definite circumstances; yet a close observation of nature and the history of the development

of life teaches us that, in the long run and over the widest area as our field of observation, we may expect that the best will maintain themselves in spite of all the advantages and temporary victories of the vicious and immoral. Therefore, in consideration of the important part for good or evil played by religion, we should respect the religious spirit and look upon it as highly commendable. Competition is good for life, although it frequently entails hardships and eliminates the weak. Competition acts as a sieve in which the best are selected for survival. It is a test in which the qualities of living creatures are tried and those which are found to be wanting are discarded. Competition is hard for those who run the race, but it is indispensable for procuring the final victory of the best; and this is true not only in the domain of physical life, but also and especially in the intellectual and moral field.

It may appear odd to a religious believer that religion, too, needs competition, and that competition alone can bring out the good qualities of a superior faith; but this is also the maxim of Christ, who purposes to let the wheat and the tares grow until the harvest, when the tree would be recognized by its fruit.

A consideration of the course of events teaches us that finally the thinking part of mankind will come to an agreement as to the nature of religious truth, and in this sense there will be but one religion over the entire world. To be sure, there are certain peculiar idiosyncrasies which produce a difference of needs in the satisfaction of religious wants. There are sentimental people who need a sentimental religion; there are others who want artistic forms and elaborate rituals; still others prefer Puritan simplicity and an absence of all ceremony, which savors to them of idolatry and primitive paganism. These are mere externalities, and the choice of one or the other will always be a matter of temperament and personal preference. Not so the kernel of religion, which is the truth contained in these different forms. Differences of form will be respected, but they will not be treated as essentials.

Such, in my opinion, is the aim of the religious life of mankind, and it is intrinsically foreordained in the nature of things; yet, in order to actualize this consummation devoutly to be wished, it is desirable that those faiths which cherish the confidence that they

possess the truth should show their zeal for working out and spreading their conception of truth—and this is done by missions.

The religious development of mankind passes through definite phases, which repeat themselves in different countries among nations that are otherwise radically different. This is not the place to enter into an explanation of the laws of religious phenomena; for, in the first place, they are in their general outlines well established, and, besides, the dissensions which may prevail on the subject in details are unimportant for our present investigation. The oldest phase has been called animism, a belief in the spiritual nature of man's surroundings. Animism changed to polytheism, a belief in spiritual beings who were both good and evil. Polytheism again is unified into monotheism; and monotheism passes in its turn through the phases of dualism and monism, and is at present tending to establish a new phase which we may call a scientific world-conception. This new view which is now knocking at the door is often supposed to leave no room for religion, and this is especially the view of free-thinkers who identify religion with religious superstitions, proposing that it would be best for mankind to get rid of religion. This view prevails mainly among the Romance nations where the Roman church holds unbounded sway; and Guyot has become the spokesman of this class by announcing "the irreligion of the future." However, in countries which have been favored by competition between the different churches there is dawning on mankind a new interpretation of the religious question which modifies religious traditions to such an extent that religion may find room in a scientific world-conception. Whenever this is done, even the most radical thinkers grant to religion a central and most prominent place in the scientific conception of the world.

It is a common practice among liberals to denounce missions as an impudence, and missionaries are accused of intruding their own private views concerning religion upon strangers; but, though the author professes to be as liberal as anyone of them, he cannot, from his point of view, join in the general hue and cry, but claims that these objections are based partly on a wrong conception of the significance of missions, and partly (in so far as they are justified) only point out some wrong methods pursued by Christian mission-

aries in non-Christian countries. In the latter case their accusations form no argument against the principle of missions.

Between the sixth and eighth centuries Christianity spread rapidly over all those nations of Europe which are now the torch-bearers of civilization. The first decisive step was taken by Pope Gregory the Great, a missionary genius, whose methods were based on a profound, or perhaps an instinctive, appreciation of psychological conditions. Pope Gregory advised his missionaries to replace the old religion by preserving its external form and giving it a new interpretation. He practically left the old institutions unchanged except in their names. He did not touch the inveterate habits to which people had become accustomed, but he christianized and assimilated them. Pope Gregory says in a letter preserved by the venerable Bede:

Because they [the Anglo-Saxons] are wont to slaughter at the feast of the devils [i. e., of the pagan gods] many oxen and horses, it is decidedly necessary to let these feasts be continued and have another *raison d'être* given them. On kirmess and on the commemoration days of the holy martyrs, whose relics are preserved in those churches which are built on the spots of pagan fanes, a similar feast shall be celebrated; the festive place shall be decorated with green boughs and a church sociable shall be held. Only the slaughter of animals shall no longer be held in honor of Satan, but in praise of God, and the animals shall be slaughtered for the sake of eating them, and thanks shall be given for the gift to the Giver of all goods.³

Here we have the reason why so many of the old pagan religions have been preserved and transferred, as it were, into Christian institutions; but the result is that Europe was rapidly christianized.

From the standpoint of comparative religion I venture to say that the pagan religion of the Saxons as well as of all other Teutonic nations would in any case have changed by natural processes into a religion similar to Christianity. Their polytheistic creed was in a state of decay, caused by a rationalist movement which had prepared them for a monotheistic universal religion. We have poems preserved in the *Edda* and other mythological books of the North in which the gods are ridiculed with no less satire than we find in the free-thinking authors of the later days of classical antiquity, where we can trace the progress of monotheism with greater clearness.

³ *Historia ecclesiastica Britannorum*, Vol. I, chap. 30.

The introduction of Christianity only hastened this process for the benefit of the Teutons, who were thus enabled to make rapid progress. They had reached the stage in which their ancient faith had become antiquated, and a faith like the Christianity of the ninth century, a universal monotheistic religion, representing God as an emperor and Jesus as a king and God's vicegerent on earth, would naturally take its place.

Incidentally I will add here that China is in a similar condition at present, and China might have become Christian not less rapidly than the North of Europe during the eighth and ninth centuries. The spread of education and a certain freedom of thought have prepared the Chinese mind for the acceptance of a monotheism which would find embodiment in such a religion as Christianity. They have assimilated Buddhist ethics, which are quite similar to the moral maxims of Christianity; but they have not yet, at least not the large masses of people, overcome the superstitious element in the belief of their divinities, and many irrational practices of the popular Taoist faith. China, in passing into a phase represented by dogmatic Christianity, may, however, work out a kindred religion on the basis of Buddhist traditions, because Christianity has become offensive to them, solely on account of the unwise and sometimes positively immoral behavior of the Christians, the policy of Christian nations as well as the demeanor of individuals. Christianity would have the advantage of being ready-made and possessed of sufficient concreteness to suit the needs of a religious heart, while a new analogous religion would presumably remain hazy.

Why has not China embraced Christianity? My answer is simply this, that our missionaries have been blundering in a most inexcusable way, instead of following the old traditions laid down by Pope Gregory.

Since Christianity became victorious in Europe and has existed there practically alone, it has become ossified and has ceased to be as broad as it was in the days before it had triumphed over its rivals, simply because it has ceased to have the benefit of competition with them. There are missionaries who go out in the right spirit, but they appear to be in the minority. The majority have, as a rule, a contempt for the paganism of the country which they intend to

convert, and the result is that they offend unnecessarily and only stir animosity against the foreign faith. Pope Gregory adapted Christianity to conditions, utilizing the institutions of pagans and giving them a new and a Christian interpretation; while we find, on the contrary, that Christian missionaries of today in China are bent on making the Chinese into Europeans or Americans. They are frequently hostile to any adaptation of the Christian faith to Chinese view-points, and insist that converts should give up their Chinese traditions. At least that has been the practice among missionaries, and Rev. Hampden Du Bose mentions it as one of the main difficulties of missionary work.

The Chinese are distinguished among the nations for their reverence of their ancestors. They have annual family festivals, at which the head of the family acts as a kind of priest. It is not uncommon that the family trees of simple folks are older than the oldest aristocracies of Europe, and there is no reasonable doubt that "these registers are kept with great care and may be considered reliable." There is not the slightest reason why this institution of what has been termed ancestor-worship should not be imbued with a Christian spirit, and some means be found by which a Christian convert could attend the family festivals without doing violence to his conscience; but this is not so. We quote literally from Du Bose:

Should a man become a Christian and repudiate ancestral worship, all his ancestors would by that act be consigned to a state of perpetual beggary. Imagine, too, the moral courage required for an only or the eldest son to become a Christian, and call down upon himself the anathemas, not only of his own family and friends, but of the spirits of all his ancestors. When we preach against this form of paganism, it seems as heathenish to the Chinese as if at home we taught a child to disobey his father and despise his mother. It forms one of the subtlest phases of idolatry—essentially evil with the guise of goodness—ever established among men.

Our civilization is undoubtedly superior to others, especially in methods of warfare (and that counts more than culture and morality in international politics), and Christian missionaries not only feel this superiority of the race to which they belong, but also emphasize it and make a show of it which is naturally offensive. Our favorite missionary hymn, so poetical and impressive, describes the beautiful Buddhist island of the Indian Ocean in these words:

What though the spicy breezes
Blow soft o'er Ceylon's isle,
Though every prospect pleases,
And only man is vile;
In vain with lavish kindness
The gifts of God are strown,
The heathen in his blindness
Bows down to wood and stone.

The declaration that "only man is vile" has created more bitterness among the natives and hostility to Christianity than the author anticipated.

Professor Edward G. Browne, the well-known specialist of Persian literature, and our most reliable interpreter of Babism and Behaism says:

How is it that the Christian doctrine, the highest and noblest which the world has ever known, though supported by all the resources of western civilization, can only count its converts in Mohammedan lands by two's and three's, while Babism can reckon them by thousands? The answer, to my mind, is plain as the sun at midday: Western Christianity, save in the rarest cases, is more western than Christian, more racial than religious.

Another hindrance to the success of missionaries is their method of tearing down and disparaging the religion which they come to replace. By being unfair they simply antagonize, and make themselves liable to be regarded as enemies of the country. Du Bose, for instance, speaks of Buddha as "the night of Asia," and is so one-sided in his characterization of Lao Tze that he translates this cognomen of one of the most venerable sages of mankind by "Old Boy," and adds: "The wild-western appellation 'old coon' is not inappropriate." What can we expect of a missionary who is not only unfair in judging some of the noblest and most intellectual leaders of mankind, but becomes positively vulgar in speaking of them? Ingersoll's attacks on Christianity are certainly not more offensive to Christians than the language of Du Bose must be to an educated Chinaman, and Du Bose, I am sorry to say, still belongs to the better class of missionaries. He is a faithful Christian, and also quite scholarly; for his writings prove that he is very well informed on the subjects which he discusses. But we can expect no good results of the work of a man who lacks in fairness and gentlemanly behavior.

The opinion is quite common that Christianity has from the beginning been discriminated against as a foreign faith by the Chinese authorities and has always been hated by the people. This is not the case. Buddhism is also a foreign faith; so is Mohammedanism; and yet they are both unmolested.

In the sixth century the Nestorians reached China and found no difficulty in having Christianity recognized as one of the legitimate religions of the country. Emperor Tai Tsung received Nestorian preachers at his court, had the Christian doctrines explained to him, and ordered their chief books to be translated. The Nestorian monument erected in 781 A. D. is still extant, and Marco Polo tells us of Presbyter John's empire among the Kara Kitai Tartars. His dominion came to an end in 1203, when he succumbed to the great conqueror, Jenghis Khan. Marco Polo further mentions the great interest which Kublai Khan took in Christianity, and the desire he showed to have his subjects converted to this dominant faith of the West.

Christianity is the strongest religion on earth, if measured by the power, wealth, and influence of its adherents; but it has one weak spot, which is its antagonism to science and a scientific world-conception. The same or similar drawbacks are more or less noticeable in all religions, but they are specially obvious in Christianity for the very reason of its strength during the period of its dogmatic development. Buddhism suffers less from the same drawback, and will therefore be the most formidable rival of Christianity. In the struggle between different religions I predict a final success for that faith which will be most ready to learn from the other, to assimilate the good of it, to adapt itself to new conditions, and to adopt the maturest truth that science has to offer. The final result is fore-ordained: he wins in the race who reaches the goal, and the goal of our religious growth is truth—truth grasped by the head, felt in the heart, and actualized with the hand.

The most advanced representatives of Christianity, under the influence of higher criticism and generally the culture of the age, resulting from a better familiarity with the natural sciences, are just on the verge of abandoning the old dogmatisms and surrendering all opposition to science. This will considerably modify the tenets

of Christianity; yet, for all that, it may and it will preserve the traditional spirit of devotion, of religious earnestness, and of moral endeavor. It will prove to be a change from childhood to maturity, and, if seen in this light, result in a new, a deeper, and a truer interpretation of the same facts that have confronted mankind since the beginning.

Without entering into particular details, I propose here briefly to touch upon the most significant incident in the recent history of missions in China. During the middle of the nineteenth century there appeared a man by the name of Hung Seu Tseuen at the door of an English Episcopal mission and demanded admittance as catechumen. It is incredible that he was refused on the plea that they were overcrowded with applicants. The man was a simple schoolmaster, and the missionaries who refused to give him instruction saw nothing extraordinary in his personality; and yet he was destined to become the leader of a Chinese Christianity which played such an important part in the Tai Ping rebellion. Hung Seu Tseuen had been converted to Christianity by reading the Gospel of Matthew, and he was mainly struck by the impressive Sermon on the Mount. Being refused at the European mission, he baptized himself and began to preach Christianity on his own responsibility. He was discharged and persecuted, but he continued to preach and made a deep impression on the people. By seeking new residences he only spread his views, and he was soon surrounded by converts ready to defend his person and resist the authorities that would persecute him. In one village they defied the police and routed a detachment of soldiers sent against him, so that he and his followers were forced into a war with the established authorities. The rebellion spread, and he gained more and more adherents every day. His men fought, like the soldiers of Cromwell, with gun in one hand and prayer-book in the other. They were fanatics, and remained victorious even against superior forces. When the rumor that the Tai Ping rebels were Christians reached the European settlements, it was refused credence, and Thomas Taylor Meadows, Chinese interpreter in Her Majesty's civil service wrote:

My knowledge of the Chinese mind, joined to the dejected admissions that Protestant missionaries of many years' standing occasionally made of the fruit-

lessness of their labors, had convinced me that Christianity, as hardened into our sectarian creeds, could not possibly find converts among the Chinese, except here and there perhaps an isolated individual. Consequently, when it was once or twice rumored that the large body of men who were setting imperial armies at defiance "were Christians," I refused to give the rumor credence. It did not occur to me that the Chinese convert, through some tracts of a Chinese convert, might either fail to see, or (if he saw them) might spontaneously eliminate, the dogmas and congealed forms of merely sectarian Christianity, and then, by preaching simply the great religious truth of One God, and the pure morality of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, obtain numbers of followers among people disgusted with the idolatry and the immorality that they and those around them were engulfed in. As we have seen above, this was actually the case with Hung Seu Tseuen.

The Tai Ping rebels took one city after another, and were finally in possession of whole provinces. Hung Seu Tseuen ruled in Nankin under the name Tien Wang, or "Heavenly King," and the imperial throne of China was tottering. There was, indeed, a strong probability that a Chinese Christian emperor would replace the Mongol pagan dynasty. But history is sometimes stranger than fiction, for at this juncture England came to the rescue and proposed to show her friendliness for the established authorities. General Gordon was sent to China, and with his arrival the cause of the Tai Ping rebels declined, until they were finally defeated. In spite of a promise made them that their lives should be spared at the moment of surrender, the leaders were executed by the Chinese mandarins, before Gordon's protests could save them. The latter, however, on account of this breach of promise at once tendered his resignation, and the queen of England expressed her gratitude to the gallant general, in a personal letter, for his efficient service which led to the suppression of this great Chinese-Christian movement.

In justification of the British policy it has been claimed that the Tai Ping rebels were not true Christians, but their books proved that they believed in God the Father, Creator and Ruler of the universe, and in Jesus Christ, his Son, our elder brother; and they looked upon the Sermon on the Mount as the foundation of their code of morality.⁴

Missionaries, in order to be successful, should not go with the

⁴ For a translation of the Tai Ping canon see the *Open Court* for January, 1902, pp. 59-63.

ostensible purpose of converting people, nor should their labors be measured by the number of converts; they should go to take pagans information concerning Christianity, and acting, as it were, as ambassadors of a foreign faith. Yet even in doing this they should not exhibit an intention to teach, but, on the contrary, should show a desire to learn. Instead of avoiding pagan priests, the representatives of Buddhism, Taoism, Mohammedanism, or of any other faith, they should approach them in the spirit of inquiry and ask them for information of their own religion, which will gladly be given, and only when a mutual interest has been established, they should, when requested, in return give them information as to their own Christian doctrines and ideals.

First the missionary must take an interest in the pagans and their beliefs. He must respect an honest faith of a different kind. Thereby alone can he lay the foundation for a mutual sympathy that naturally will be productive of a friendly exchange of thought. When they have thus been prepared, and not before, the missionary should reveal to them the message which he has come to proclaim. This policy would no doubt meet with better success, and would find a friendly and grateful response. It would change the character of missionaries from aggressive revolutionists to that of friendly visitors. They would cease to be destroyers of the old faith and the old morality, and would become helpful friends who have come to compare the best which two different nations can offer in thought and moral aspirations. There is no need of maligning Buddha, Lao Tze, or Confucius, but simply to add to the ideals of other religious systems the good that Christianity has to offer.

The rules which ought to be observed by all of us are well set forth by Rev. George T. Candlin, of Tien-tsin, a Christian missionary to China who personally and in friendliness met the Buddhist and Confucian delegates from eastern Asia on the platform of the Parliament of Religions. He writes:

We must begin by giving one another credit for good intentions. I do not see why we may not commence at once by the leading representatives of the various faiths who were present at Chicago, including all the distinguished representatives of Christianity, with Mr. Mozoomdar, Mr. Dharmapala, Mr. Vivekananda, Mr. Ghandi, the Buddhists of Japan, the high-priest of Shintoism, and our friend Mr. Pung, entering into direct covenant with each other:

1. Personally never to speak slightly of the religious faith of one another. This, I understand, does not debar the kindly and reverential discussion of differences which exist, or the frank utterance of individual belief.

2. Officially to promote among their partisans, by all means in their power, by oral teaching, through the press, and by whatever opportunity God may give them, a like spirit of brotherly regard and honest respect for the belief of others.

3. To discourage among the various peoples they serve as religious guides all such practices and ceremonies as, not constituting an essential part of their faith, are inimical to its purity, and are the strongest barriers to union.

4. To promote all such measures as will advance reform, progress and enlightenment, political liberty, and social improvement among the people of their own faith and nationality.

5. To regard it as part of their holiest work on earth to enlist all men of ability and influence with whom they are brought into contact in the same noble cause.

To these articles I can heartily subscribe myself, I do not see why others may not.

In applying the principle enunciated in the beginning of this article, that competition in religion is good, I would go one step farther and advocate not only to send missionaries to non-Christian countries, but, vice versa, also to encourage non-Christian missionaries to be sent to Christian countries. Let the pagans, especially those who represent the highest faiths which non-Christian religions have produced—such as Buddhism, Parseeism, and Mohammedanism—send representatives to us, who, not unlike the delegates to the Parliament of Religions, would give us direct, reliable information concerning their doctrines and their moral principles; and, when they have lived some time among us, let them go back to their own people and tell them what they have seen and heard, and how they have been received among Christians. If devotees of other religions are too poor to carry on such missionary propaganda, it would even be advisable for Christians to pay the traveling expenses and support such non-Christian delegates in Christian countries. If they have something good to tell us, if they have a message which we should heed and which would help to broaden us, the better for us; and if not, they would certainly carry back to their homes seeds of truth that will take root and bring forth a rich harvest of spiritual blessings.

CHICAGO, ILL.

PAUL CARUS

WHAT HAS CHRISTIANITY TO OFFER TO ORIENTAL
NATIONS?

The future will be an era of foreign missions, but the form of the motive and the methods employed will change. The motive in the past has worn the form of a pity aiming to rescue individual souls from an eternal suffering. The method of conversion required the pagan to repudiate the organized conceptions and traditions which served as the background of his personal existence, and to adopt, abruptly and completely, the system of conceptions in which, by virtue of a tradition descended from Israel and from the Graeco-Roman age of the church, the missionary's own religious experience was environed. There will be, in the first place, a modification of the motive. The very ardor and assurance of our faith in divine fatherhood forbid us to hold the view that those who fail to know the manifestation of his love in Christ are the objects of his wrath. Nevertheless, powerful motives and irresistible impulsions necessitate the work of foreign missions.

Every modern man of normal seriousness adheres to his religion because it is universal religion, universally true, universally valid. If we remain obstinately divided in denominations, it is not because we love to differ and cherish division, but because the truth for all souls seems to involve necessarily our denominational form. Whenever men begin to distrust that identification of form and substance, a movement of interdenominational sympathy or consolidation begins. In these perplexed days there are many who admit that not every element of Christian doctrine and practice has universal validity, but they adhere to Christianity nevertheless, because in, with, and under that which is historically relative there are elements that have finality, elements that grip and compel the human soul with the sovereignty of ideal obligation, universally imperative for man as man. It is, indeed, today's special task for the Christian theologian that he shall assist society to a sure analysis of Christian history and Christian experience, in order that these universally sovereign elements may be clearly recognized amid the transient and accidental accretions. We ask for truth to reign over us, not as pleasantly suited to the taste and custom of our local neighborhood, but because it is truth for man as man, that which ought to be

always and everywhere and by all men believed, the form of truth which the universal Will imposes upon all the finite wills of his human manifestation. We may be content to allow or eager to advocate a revision of the historic expression of Christianity, but it cannot cease to be the universal religion for all who yield to its spell. By virtue of this very universality of validity and compelling power, the Christian truth will hereafter, as it now does, impel its disciples to convert all nations.

There is the less need to argue this assertion since we are concerned with a truth that demands more than the mere assent of the reflective reason. The Christian verity that God is a loving Father is not a proposition abstractly held before our reflection. It is a thrilling experience of the character of the Will that is sovereign over us, that will not let us go, that claims us ever for his purposes. It confers a mission on us. It gives into our hands a pilgrim staff and bids us seek the Fatherland. The Christian truth is messianic truth. Historically, Christianity was born from the messianic idea which gave Israel its significance. The Scriptures from which it has nourished itself form one Bible by virtue of the messianic interest binding together the old and new dispensations. Christianity allied itself to the universal state in order to transform the social system into a City of God. The papacy became a theocracy in order that it might accomplish the church's duty to conform the social life to the religious ideal. We who have a free church in a free state simply attempt the same purpose by methods of persuasion in place of methods of coercive authority. Divine fatherhood and Christian brotherhood are not mere truths for spiritual delectation or inactive truths of contemplative moments. They are dynamic ideas that tell us what kind of men we should be and what kind of society we should have. Nor do they simply tell us; they propel us. Now, the messianic ideal which is inseparable from the central truths of Christianity dictates a society whose principles and spirit are not of private and local application, but are universal in their demands on men. The Christian life is the life which means to realize the life of the kingdom of God, and this sovereign principle of all Christian history will release no Christian from missionary duties at home or abroad. At home our present distresses combine with our com-

pulling ideals to urge us into missionary work. The strife of industrial classes and the inequalities of condition which breed inequality of spiritual attainment rouse the Christian conscience to more intense effort for a social system that shall be conformed to the image of the kingdom of God. It is a similar case in our relations to foreign peoples. Just when Christian feeling is reacting with a more fervid horror against war, a new problem for humanity looms up in the Orient. The Asiatic peoples are roused to a new self-consciousness and a militant ambition. We confront the problems of a humanity divided in hostile social systems with menace of hatred and war, and these social systems differ as Christian and non-Christian. To hostilities of race and commercial interest there is added the deep-rooted alienation of religion. Human civilization is perhaps to depend in large degree on the establishment of a spiritual unity for these divided segments of humanity. The method of conquest would be the surrender of all religion. There is, therefore, a new demand for missions from the new situation. The dynamic compelling sovereignty of that idea which mixes itself with life in Christian lands, the messianic vision of the kingdom of God, constrains us to win the Orient to occidental life—not as our life is in its low given status, but as it is in its own ideal conception of itself as a christianized humanity. The catholicity which came to Christian consciousness in the earliest missionary period is an inextinguishable element of Christianity. We hold truth for the soul only on terms of catholicity of value. We surrender to a conception of life only on terms of making it the universal life. Strong and irresistible motives for foreign missions remain.

But the methods will change, and the necessity of a change can be illustrated by the contrast of ancient and mediaeval missions. Christianity won the Graeco-Roman world by stating itself in terms of general history. It viewed Jesus not simply as the elect agent of the messianic kingdom, but as the vehicle of the Logos who was the principle of all history. Christianity claimed the souls of men by becoming for them the very meaning of that wisdom which had poured upon the spirit both of Hebrew prophets and of gentile sage. It was the essence and ideal significance of all the tradition that made the formative conditions of their personal lives. It is inconceivable

that a civilization of matured culture could have been won by any other method.

To the Germanic peoples, on the other hand, Christianity came as a total civilization that overwhelmed comparison and made the traditions of their own raw, unformed lives insignificant and feeble. Our Saxon forefathers were converted in masses, and with a marvelous alacrity they substituted for their own dim historic background the story of man that was found in the Bible. For their own wild morals they substituted a discipline in a code of Christian virtue. They were children, and they were converted by a process only possible for children. The Greek pagan was persuaded, brought to insight and conviction; the German pagan was converted.

The peoples of India and of Asia are not children. They have an established civilization which will not be lightly discarded at foreign suggestion. Their culture, their social or technical organization spring from a life of ancient and remembered grandeur, from a rich past which yields them idealizing influence and confers a dignity upon them. This whole system is permeated and shaped by religious conceptions which have not lost validity for them. Religious belief appeals to Scriptures that have ethical worth and metaphysical profundity—Scriptures from which we ourselves obtain gleams, brilliant though broken, of that which is the master-life of all our seeing. There, too, God has not left himself without witness, though the eastern appreciation of the truth may be confused and darkened by elements historically contingent to Asian localities and Asian transient conditions. It is plainly impossible to expect that India and China can discard this rich background and suddenly think their religious experience in terms of European history and European thought. There can be no abrupt conquest of an oriental mind like the conquests made by Augustinus in Kent or by Boniface at Geismar. We must use the sane and rational process of the early Alexandrian school. Believing that the Light has fallen on all nations, it is our duty to rescue our oriental brother from the bewildering confusion of his religious ideas by a sympathetic effort with him to analyze and simplify and conceive in more universal terms of thought, in order that what the analysis may reveal as essential substance may be appreciated as having kinship to that

which our own faith presents in purer and higher form, or else that it may be by the contrast exhibited as error. This is a propaganda which first of all seeks to comprehend the oriental, and wins his adhesion to our form of faith through the necessitation of his own insight.

This is but the extension abroad of the method which we use for the conversion of one another at home. We compare our varying versions of history and doctrine, and we labor first of all to understand our neighbor's position, entering into its intent and spirit with our utmost sympathy, and then we argue that what our neighbor means and intends obtains its best expression and fullest power in our form of apprehension. It is an excellent feature of this process that we inevitably drop from our own view that which is merely personal and contingent, and succeed thereby both in apprehending and in presenting our own faith in greater objectivity and in the simplicity of its essentials. So a sympathetic foreign mission would result doubtless in the speedier release of the vital essence of our own faith from accidental incumbrances that are only obstacles to its claim of catholicity. More important still, we shall be performing a critical work on the oriental faiths which the oriental man has not yet learned to do, and we shall be aiding him to a right comprehension and right valuation that will, first of all, act as a solvent and unifying force for eastern sects and thus facilitate the ultimate reconception of their common traditions in the light of Christianity. We of the West have learned or are learning a method of dealing with the phenomena of religion. It is a critical, scientific method. The method dominates our schools of theology, and its results are already apparent in the generation of sympathy and unity between men who were once confessionally sundered. More and more, also, this method permeates popular intelligence. Men neglect the traditional forms of expression and the divisive accidents. They drive for the substance that is permanent and unifying. A Hindu scholar assures me that our best service to India would be to send thither teachers who will domesticate with them this art and method of ours, in order to rescue them from their otherwise capricious and random use of their own inheritance of thought. The remark surely indicates that there can be no suc-

cessful work to win the intelligence of such lands except by sharing with them our new and priceless achievement of the scientific history of religion and the philosophic results to which it leads. The practical intention of this argument is that, in addition to the medical missions and the general educational work which our human altruism will never allow us to abandon, we shall carry a propaganda of scientific religious study to the homes of the religions that are asked to discover their fulfilment in Christianity. In particular it means a generous and sympathetic co-operation of study and discussion with every oriental movement that enters upon the path of conscious kinship with our Christian world. What more effective and more rational way could be devised for the universalizing and christianizing of Indian life than an adequate co-operation with the Brahmo Somaj in the establishment of a school of religion where—without the interference of the motive of denominational extension—the man of India and the man of Europe should together study universal religious history, and win the common ground which must result from the application of a common method to the facts? This is, indeed, the project which the leaders of the Brahmo Somaj desire to accomplish, and for which they should receive a generous American assistance. I have met many Japanese in America who were accounted Christian. I have noted that the conversion had not been such a complete case of substitution as missionaries have expected. They had not really surrendered that sum of memories that makes the soul of Japan. They were in reality simply trying in individual fashion to make some synthesis of Christian theism with their Japanese inheritance. This is the natural way, and the missionary way should be natural. *Gratia naturam non tollit, sed perficit.*

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THE MORAL LEVEL OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES

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The Old Testament, especially the morality of the Old Testament, has from the beginning been the subject of uneasy discussion in the church. One need only read Diestel's *Geschichte des Alten Testaments in der christlichen Kirche* to realize what infinite distress certain statements and stories of the Old Testament caused the church fathers. The very naïve account of the doings of the patriarchs; the ingenuous moral judgment exhibited about their exceedingly questionable manipulations with their immediate kindred; the manifest indifference of the narrators to their laxities; the lack of finer moral feeling that seems to pervade the stories of Israelite warfare; the massacre of masses of the heathen inhabitants of Palestine which elicits only commendation from the Old Testament historians; the fanatical hatred for the heathen as enemies of God which makes its appearance in the later prophetic and post-prophetic writings—all this does, indeed, seem to reduce the moral value of the Old Testament to a rather low plane. It seems to justify the judgment, which has only recently found renewed expression,¹ that the Old Testament can lay no claim to inspiration at all. With a zeal which savors of special pleading, certain passages are singled out in which the hostility toward the heathen who are outside of the theocracy and destined to destruction, or the contempt for wealth, finds its most emphatic expression, in order thereby to prove that such passages cannot possibly be of divine origin. We are warned that the appeal to the limitations of knowledge on the part of the biblical writers, which is so constantly used to explain their errors in matters of history and natural science, will not serve in the realm of morals. God cannot have revealed what is immoral. Writers who fail us in the domain of ethics were evidently not filled with God's spirit. Thus men hope

¹*Hibbert Journal*, October, 1905.

to strip the Old Testament of its dignity off-hand. But if the Old Testament is once divested of its majesty, it will be easy, so they calculate, to prepare the same fate for the New Testament. The most intimate connection exists between the two. The New Testament refers to the Old in innumerable passages, and appeals to the authority of the Old to confirm its own. I shall first present several general arguments against this mode of procedure.

I. It is certainly unfair to judge any complex deposit of spiritual life by the lowest elements represented in it. To mention only a few examples: If philosophy were rated only according to the writings of Epicurus, or the productions of Haeckel or Nietzsche, and treated as a science viewing man as a mere creature of pleasure and sanctioning the brute or the worst passions in man, such a judgment would be repudiated by philosophers as a flagrant injustice; for the philosophy of men like Plato, Spinoza, Kant, and others has abundantly proved that it has the profoundest comprehension precisely for the highest duties of man. The same thing is true of the history of religion. If anyone, in defining religion, should take his canons from fetishism or the lowest grades of animism, he would justly be sent to Christianity or Buddhism in order to learn from the highest forms of religion what religion really is and to form his judgment on them.

II. It is an outworn point of view in theological science to treat the Scriptures as a manual of dogmatics or ethics, from which isolated passages can be selected at random to serve as proof-passages for dogmatic or ethical assertions, without any regard for their larger and more intimate context. A minimum of scientific prudence demands of an investigator that he attempt to understand perplexing utterances of the Old Testament in their inner connection.

III. Anyone who has even a superficial acquaintance with the Bible knows that the consciousness of a divine election of the Jewish people is fundamental for its general religious conceptions, and that this is not only characteristic of the Old Testament, but is also conceded concerning the religious heroes of the New Testament, Christ and Paul. Now, is it permissible simply to disregard so fundamental a conception or to treat it as a mere fancy? Is it not possible rather to justify this faith from the theistic point of view as a religious necessity and as a rational conclusion from the history of the Israelite

nation, such as we know it? But if this is possible, then perchance many things that cause us to stumble in the Old Testament may be comprehended as a necessary outcome of this justifiable consciousness of Israel.

a) A consciousness of superiority based on religion is not ethically objectionable when it inspires single personalities, and in their case need not have any questionable moral consequences. The pre-eminent ethical personalities of the prophets—for instance, of Isaiah or Jeremiah—testify to this, for the consciousness of their high calling did not undermine their personal simplicity and ingenuousness. The highest exemplar of humility was Jesus himself; in the same connection in which he expresses his exalted relation to the world he also emphasizes his meekness and lowliness. On the other hand, it is certain that this personal immunity from pride is endangered in a measure as soon as that consciousness of religious superiority prevails in larger communities. It is clear that it is thus endangered because it is naturally difficult to raise all the individuals of a religious community to that exceptional moral elevation. This fact is demonstrated by the atmosphere of spiritual pride prevailing in sectarian religious bodies. They are usually filled with a strong consciousness of exceptional election, in contrast to the larger religious bodies, and their spiritual pride has become almost proverbial. The conditions of Judaism furnished the natural soil for such an ethical tendency. A certain fanaticism is almost characteristic of this religion.

b) The naïve pride of Israel in its earlier period was of a somewhat different nature. That was essentially national. Yet that too was based on the fact that the people had fused in a national unity through their common religion, or had been unified by a prophet sent of God. This direct intervention of God manifestly intensified the natural sense of independence in the people, but it had no occasion at first to evoke any undesirable moral effects. The saving act of Jehovah for the people was realized at first mainly by its beneficent effects in the founding of the national life. It had culminated in a miraculous demonstration of the power of the God of Israel, which proved him to be the mightiest among the gods. This powerfully quickened the faith of the people in him, and called out a joyful surrender of Israel to the increased service of its glorious God. That

was the religious attitude for a long time, and was to remain so; for antagonism against the enemies of the nation, who in that age were usually regarded as also the enemies of Jehovah, is characteristic of the Yahweh-religion.

But, on the other hand, the ethical element must not be underestimated even at this stage of religion; else it would be incomprehensible how during the prophetic period righteousness could have been recognized as the essence of Yahweh's character. A mere God of power who hurls himself upon his enemies in the terrible events of nature, and proves himself their judge and victor, does not become a God of justice and judgment who is deeply concerned for the prevalence of wrong on earth. Indeed, we shall not go too far if we assert that, in the older history of Israel down to Amos, on page after page there are examples of the righteous ruling of God which are in contrast to the description just given of a strongly national religion, and mitigate and balance it. We only need to turn to the first chapter of the Yahwist, and we encounter the fall of the protoplasts who would be as God and had to be thrust back by him into their proper bounds. In the same way he punished the arrogance of the sons of God and the sins of the contemporaries of Noah. We feel that wrong is not indifferent to him, but that, on the contrary, he is the source of all good and all right, and that, if men fear him, they may look to him for all blessing.

If we view them more closely, we find too that his favorites were not quite so unworthy of his blessings as they are represented, and that those who were visited by his wrath really deserved punishment. Thus, the hardening of Pharaoh's heart is a judgment, and one well deserved; for the history of nations is something continuous, and it was the duty of Pharaoh to know what his people and his dynasty owed to Joseph and his wisdom. Not to know in such a case is guilt, even if the narrator at first shows no intention of construing it as guilt. As the narrative goes on, Pharaoh certainly appears guilty. On the other hand, Abraham, even in the oldest sections of the Yahwist, is an honest and upright character, undefiled by the vice of gluttony (Noah), of adultery, murder, theft, or even by the subtler sins of coveting the better portion of property (Lot and Abraham, Gen., chap. 13). His conduct is noble toward his allies (chap. 21), generous toward his

relatives (chap. 24), and by his steward, who is very sympathetically described in Gen., chap. 24, as a devout and unselfish man, Abraham is highly respected and even revered. In the Elohist he is even called a "prophet." At God's command he offers the most costly sacrifice (chaps. 20 and 22). In sections of later origin God admits him to his punitive councils as a matter of course, and he boldly checks the arm of God when it was descending in righteous wrath (chap. 18). In the Priest Codex (chap. 17) he "walks with God" and is admonished to lead a blameless life, evidently in recognition of his actual ethical character. It is true he is lacking in chivalry toward his wife and her slave, according to our modern conception; but that is precisely the question: to what extent we may impose our modern conceptions on that age. Moreover, it is worthy of note that, according to the law then existing,² Hagar could lay no claim whatever to equality with Sarah. The reluctance of Abraham to expel her is evidently meant to express the nobility of the patriarch's character (Gen. 21:11ff.). It is overcome only by the injunctions of God himself. The relations of Israel to Esau appear in a less favorable light from the point of view of a strict moral code, but Israel in various other respects is treated as the representative of the national idea; for instance, in his relation to his father-in-law. Consequently, that antagonism of Israel toward the alien nations, to which reference has been made, is most plainly felt in his case. For the following age I would only mention the way in which the sins of the brothers of Joseph are visited upon them, the moral purity of Joseph toward his master and his mistress, the sternness with which the rebellion of the people is punished in the Mosaic age and the quality of the Mosaic law (see below). We can comprehend that this God of patriarchal history continues to vindicate his right to rule over Israel as time goes on. Thus, the crime of Abimelech is terribly avenged on the house of his fathers, and the divine law of retribution is demonstrated to the sinner by the surviving brother Jotham in most drastic and vivid fashion (Judg., chap. 9). In the same way our sympathy is profoundly enlisted in the fate of the rising Saul, and his later inability to bow before the divine oracle revealed by the priest with the passive obedience demanded by God. This readiness to yield to his personal inclinations and

² See Joh. Jeremias, *Moses und Hammurabi*, p. 14.

desires was to cost him a kingdom, and his nature was not capable of overcoming in this conflict. We should prefer perhaps to call this a psychological conflict in which the character of the king broke down, rather than a glaring dereliction of duty. The whole story moves our aesthetic rather than our ethical nature. Yet the stern emphasis on the commandment of God, and the majesty with which God demands the surrender of personal desires even from his chosen servant, are very manifest. No exception is made; not even the leader of the people is permitted to evade the demands of God. The delicate psychological characterization of the personality of David has long been noted. On the one hand, his personal charm and human nobility captivate us; on the other hand, we are warned by the dangers in his character which he did not succeed in overcoming. His pliable yielding to his favorite sons enmeshes him in the most distressing situations, from which he escapes only with utmost peril. He allows himself to be led astray by a beautiful and gifted woman, not only into sensual lust, but even into crime. But at that point Jehovah makes his sovereign rights so emphatically felt that here too Israel has no cause to blush before the heathen nations. The more so if we remember that in other nations the moral law ruled only in poetry, while in Israel this powerful king bowed before the prophet in deep contrition. In the same way Jehovah triumphs over his adversaries in actual history. He vanquishes Ahab and Jezebel, who had arbitrarily trodden the right of their neighbor under foot and had ventured to seize the property of their subject. He triumphs over the sensual service of Baal which they had fostered. His prophets are the leaders of the opposition party which humbles kings.

But even in those periods of history where his rule and judgment are not so mightily manifested we still have the impression that the faith of his people clings to him. Evidently that is the effect of the saving act by which he had brought the nation out of Egypt. That experience was the basis of that ethical consciousness of the people which lifted Israel to such incomparable moral dignity: If man sins against man, God decides. God is the fixed point in the universe; he will vindicate the right; he is the great authority which puts an end to all the fluctuations of human opinion and to all human disputations. If there were no such God, the whole universe would totter. It is

enough to know that he has revealed himself as the Guardian of right and the Protector of the weak in the great turning-points of history. Even if in many cases he merely watches over human history in general, yet he is capable of emerging from his secrecy. He knows that every imagination of the human heart is only evil continually, and hence he makes allowance for the wickedness of man in his scheme of the universe. On the basis of this faith we even find a certain eschatological hope taking shape; the paradise of yore and the promises of the patriarchs guarantee that the circle between the beginning and the end will some day be completed, and that the just and good God must rule in history even if in single cases it does not so appear. Paul was right; not without reason does faith play so great a part in the life of Abraham. His faith does not exclude, but includes, the fear of God. Whoever stands ready to appeal to God as the highest authority in cases where he needs such an authority, will be ready to submit his own actions to this authority and its claims.

This was the authority on which the authority of the priestly Torah in Israel was based. It was fundamentally legal, but in many directions it blended with the domain of ethics and presupposed the developed and keener conscience of the people and its leaders.

Of course, no one who has even a slight acquaintance with the history of civilization will be surprised that the moral consciousness in the Old Testament had not yet risen to the sphere of pure ethics. It is another evidence of unfair judgment that the Old Testament is blamed because Moses or the priests did not abolish slavery. It is a well-known fact that Christianity too did not begin its history by abolishing slavery. On the contrary, the New Testament takes its existence as a legal institution for granted. Only in the sphere of love does Paul allow no distinction between bond and free. The saying of Jesus, "Who made me to be a judge or divider over you?" was taken as the canon of action. The spirit of love which he preached bids us renounce our rights completely, and proposes to transform the world from within; but it does not preach the abolition of existing rights. Closely connected with slavery was the paternal power over the children. The father had a right to kill his child and sell it into slavery. That was the legal basis underlying the sacrifice of Isaac. Evidently certain passages of the law

about the offering of the first-born have to be understood from that point of view. The prophet Ezekiel doubtless understood them thus. But on this point progress is very manifest in prophetic thought. Even in the law of Sinai these legal regulations seem like half-comprehended reminiscences of a bygone and more brutal time. The law permits or commands the redemption of the child by the sacrifice of a clean animal (sacrifice of Isaac), and in this case command and permission are identical. We must regard it as a serious degeneration of religious life that the sacrifice of children began to prevail once more under heathen influence just before the collapse of the kingdom in Jerusalem. But Jeremiah and Ezekiel voiced the most emphatic prophetic protest against this evil custom, so that no one has ventured to blame the Old Testament for its existence.

In regard to marriage, Christ simply declares that, according to the divine institution, it is indissoluble, unless one of the two has already dissolved it in fact by adultery, and that the prophet Moses had introduced divorce by a mere letter of divorce issued by the husband only on account of the hardness of heart of the people. In the same way the apostle Paul seems to raise no question about the superiority of man in marriage as it then existed in law, although from the higher ethical point of view he regarded man and woman as equal in Christ, just as he regarded the slave and the free as ideally equal.

Consequently, it is nonsense to demand of the Old Testament what even Christianity was unable to accomplish directly, but has accomplished only after centuries and in connection with a long development of civilization. It is a historical fact that the entire thought and feeling of nations are revolutionized very slowly, step by step. Hence it is not strange that a small nation such as the Jews were, living in the midst of a great world and sharing with it the general conceptions of law, should have allowed slavery and marriage to continue on the same theoretical basis as in the other nations of antiquity. We have a right to expect only a mitigation and gradual moralizing of the institutions actually in existence. And of such a process we do have traces even in the older historical periods. Between Eliezer and Abraham there is a fine relation of mutual trust (Gen., chap. 24), just as between Potiphar and Joseph (chap. 38). The fact

that Abraham found it a sore task to expel Hagar is proof of ethical relations existing between the two. Probably the relation of master and concubine, which was fundamentally a mere property relation, often assumed some moral quality. A human being is not a mere chattel even when the law so regards it. There are several examples of happy marriages in the Old Testament in which love equalizes the legal inequality of man and woman. We need only mention Elkanah and Hannah, Jacob and Rachel, and Ezekiel at the death of his wife (chap. 24). Even Adam and Eve may be cited here, though the joyous words of Adam (chap. 2) when he first saw Eve are meant to represent the first upwelling on earth of man's love for woman: "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother and shall cleave unto his wife." Forever memorable are the tender efforts of Hosea to win back the love of his faithless wife, and so are those words of gentlest affection which King David uttered on the death of his friend Jonathan: "I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan; very pleasant hast thou been unto me; thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of woman." These expressions of ethical passion were founded on human nature, but they are not thinkable without some finer culture of the heart; and when we realize their significance we shall see that the law of slavery and marriage must have been less harsh and oppressive in actual life than we should be inclined to imagine on the basis of the Mosaic law as we have it.

We cannot deny that the slave was the property of his master; he is even called his "money." We cannot deny that the husband or his father "purchased" the bride from her father; that the wife had no claim on the fidelity of her husband; that he committed no sin against her by his fornication, and thus could not commit adultery; while, on the contrary, he had an absolute right to his wife and to her fidelity, and could deliver her to capital punishment if she committed adultery. There is, indeed, frequent mention of adulterers in the Old Testament, but they had committed adultery against another husband by seducing his wife. In the same way the owner of a slave remained unpunished if he inflicted physical injuries on his slave, in case the slave did not die for a day or two; for he had merely dam-

aged his own property. Yet, in the face of all these undeniable moral defects, we may point out that even in the Hebrew laws recorded in the Book of the Covenant some elements are not lacking to corroborate the views stated above. For instance, it is forbidden to impose perpetual slavery on a *Hebrew* slave from the outset. After six years he was to have his choice whether he wanted to be free or preferred slavery. Only if he chose the latter did slavery become perpetual. If slavery had been as terribly severe as is commonly supposed, it is unlikely that any slave should have elected to remain with his master in perpetual slavery; he would have preferred freedom under all circumstances. This surmise is the more likely because in several passages of the law we catch glimpses of a hireling class.

In order to characterize the spirit of the Law of the Covenant which is traced back to Sinai, I quote here the following passages from the codex:

A sojourner shalt thou not wrong, neither shalt thou oppress him. If thou afflict them at all and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their cry. If thou lend money to any of my people with thee that is poor, thou shalt not be to him as a creditor; neither shall ye lay upon him interest. If thou at all take thy neighbor's garment to pledge, thou shalt restore it unto him before the sun goes down; for that is his only covering, it is his garment for his skin; wherein shall he sleep? And it shall come to pass, when he crieth unto me, that I will hear; for I am gracious. (Ex. 22: 21.)

Thou shalt not lend thy hand to the wicked to become a witness and helper of his violence. Thou shalt not side with the multitude to do evil, neither shalt thou speak in a cause in favor of the multitude to wrest justice. Favor not a great man in his cause and wrest not the right of thy poor man in his cause. If thou meet thine enemy's ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou seest the ass of him that hateth thee breaking down under his burden, thou shalt forbear to leave him. Thou shalt surely release it with him. (Ex. 23: 1.)

It is worthy of notice how deeply religious the Hebrew sense of right is. Everywhere God defends the violated right and champions the helpless suppliant. It is impossible to overlook the deeply ethical traits of these legal prescripts.

It is true that similar mitigations of rigid law can be quoted from the Babylonian law of the Codex Hammurabi: the redemption of prisoners (sec. 32); remission of rent in case the harvest failed (sec. 48); protection of the debtor slave from ill-treatment (sec. 116)

limitations of the right of taking pledge (an ox was not to be taken away from the field as pledge) (sec. 141). A debtor slave was to be manumitted as early as the fourth year (sec. 117); on that point the Codex Hammurabi seems to be even more humane than the Mosaic law (see above); but sec. 117 is limited to a case where a man is compelled to sell his wife and his children into slavery for debt while the Sinaitic law applied to all Hebrew slaves without exception, and therefore in fairness it had to protect the interests of the master more completely. The compensation for physical injury done to a slave by his master, as fixed in Ex. 21:26, is certainly the highest conceivable; if he lost an eye, or only a tooth, he had to be manumitted; while the Codex Hammurabi provides no punishment for the master in such a case. On the other hand, if the slave of another man was injured, the Codex Hammurabi allowed to the owner a fine equal to half of the purchase price. Here too the only point considered is the damage done to the property of another.

In the same way the legislation of the Pentateuch is superior in the following cases: If a man was killed by an ox that was not wont to gore, the animal was to be stoned, but the owner of the ox was to be quit (Ex. 21:28); in the Codex Hammurabi (sec. 253) neither the ox nor the owner was to suffer any consequences. According to Ex. 21:29, if the ox was wont to gore, both the animal and the owner were to be put to death; according to the Codex Hammurabi (sec. 251) the owner was to pay a fine of half a pound. According to Ex. 21:30, if a man servant or a maid servant was killed by an ox that was wont to gore, a fine of thirty shekels of silver had to be paid and the ox was to be stoned; on the other hand, according to Codex Hammurabi (sec. 253) a fine of twenty shekels was to be paid and nothing more. Oettli justly remarks in connection with this passage: "The ox, therefore, according to the Pentateuch was to be stoned just as if it had gored a freeman. Thus, when it was set over against brutal animal force, the life of the slave was not valued lower than that of the freeman." In a similar way it is certainly characteristic that according to the law of Sinai the rape of a virgin had to be atoned by compulsory marriage, which included the customary purchase of the bride. On the other hand, the Codex Hammurabi does not provide for this case at all; sec. 130 deals only with the rape of a maid-child

which had already been sold to a man as his future wife. In that case the violator was to be executed. But this was a case of a double crime: the forcible violation of another man's marriage and the rape of a child. It is evident that the Hebrew legislator safeguarded woman more completely, and this sets a new jewel by the side of the mild slavery laws. That the Codex Hammurabi is inclined to take the side of the possessor follows also from secs. 15, 16, and 19, where the unconditional extradition of a fugitive slave to his owner is demanded. On the other hand, in the Prophetic Law (Deut. 23:15, 16) we find the kindly command not to extradite a fugitive slave. The Priest Codex (Lev., chaps. 25, 39 f.) goes even farther. According to this law Israelites are not to be viewed and treated as slaves at all in the stricter sense of the word, but as hirelings and sojourners. Here the stricter idea of chattel slavery breaks down at least in regard to Hebrew fellow-countrymen.

On the other hand, I am not inclined to lay great stress on the fact that the Codex Hammurabi in certain cases of marital disturbances allows love to triumph over strict property rights by permitting a woman to follow the man of her heart. For we must infer from the Babylonian law that prostitution was rife, so that fathers even sold their daughters to a temple as prostitutes. Clearly under such loose conditions love-affairs could more easily originate, and these would in turn necessarily influence the law of marriage. The fact that we have no trace of such conditions in the Old Testament rather redounds to the glory of Israel.

If we turn back to *ancient Israel*, the strong influence exerted by the ethical conception of God on the legislation, customs, and history of the people from Sinai onward is unmistakable. Humane feelings play an important part in the public sentiment of the people. Simeon and Levi were dispersed through Israel on account of their harsh wrath and malignant ferocity. The nation as a whole denied them full civic standing and a share at the council-fire. The tribe fathers of Israel appear as kindly and humane men. They rule their family circle gently, and not infrequently they are tyrannized by their more tempestuous spouses. In spite of occasional exceptions, we get the impression of a noble state of civilization in family and society. These exceptional cases are usually felt at the time to be out of the ordinary;

for instance, the human sacrifice of the daughter of Jephthah (Judg., chap. 11), or the brutal abuse of the Levite woman from Bethlehem in Gibeah (Judg., chaps. 19-21). The law has regard for the economically and legally weak. Womanly honor especially is respected and protected even in the case of a slave-woman. On this point Israel must be conceded a decided superiority over the Codex Hammurabi.

Only on one point, apparently, did the conscience of the people fail to act, and that is the more striking and strange because this failure seems to be the direct outcome of the Israelite idea of God. We refer to the undeniably cruel customs of war, especially the custom of devoting to the deity, and massacring individuals and sometimes masses of individuals. It is true that the kings of Israel are commended on this score, as if their enemies, the Arameans, had regarded them as mild and humane, and as if others had trusted to their clemency. But—and that is precisely the strange part of the matter—this clemency finds no approval with the prophets; they condemn it as weakness and half-heartedness. "Thou shouldst have smitten five or six times; then hadst thou smitten Syria till thou hadst consumed it," the prophet Elisha says to the king. The sympathetic smiting of the king was lacking in holy wrath, and that lack would avenge itself. The king ought not to have allowed the Aramean prince to escape, another prophet tells him; Jehovah had put his enemy into the hands of Israel; to give him his freedom was a violation of duty.

These perplexing facts continue to confront us even if we relegate the extermination of the heathen inhabitants of Palestine by Joshua, as narrated in the Book of Joshua, to the realm of legend, because later on in the Book of Judges we are told of large remnants of the Canaanites who were preserved at the time of the conquest. The facts are further confirmed by the warfare waged by other neighbors of Israel as recounted on the stone of the Moabite king, Mesa, in many passages of the Book of Kings, and especially in Amos. We may be reminded that the Arameans, Moabites, Ammonites, and Edomites were formerly nomads, and that such massacres may be a recrudescence of the institution of blood-revenge. Nevertheless, the fact persists that Yahweh himself was the impelling power demanding the institution of the ban, and that Yahweh received these bloody

hecatombs in Israel exactly as the god Chemosh received them in Moab. It is equally certain, as we have pointed out above, that the furious fanaticism of which these demands are the product long ruled in Israel, so that even the hearts of prophets could be set on fire by it, as in Isa. 63: 1 f. On the other hand, we must also remember that even tender and cultured and truly Christian minds, such as Ernst Moritz Arndt, proved liable to similar passions. The similarity of feeling is all the more striking because for the German poet too the French incarnated the power and principle hostile to God. When he called Germany "the Holy Fatherland" and spoke of "the German God," he took the phrases in deepest seriousness. These passionate invectives were certainly not the climax in the *Christian* life of the poet; they rather mark the culminating point of other feelings. Yet these feelings were by no means ignoble. For the Mohammedan too death in the Dschihad immediately opens the gates of paradise. Thus we can understand that when the ancient Israelite had the consciousness of devoting himself wholly to God and his cause, that excluded ignoble private feelings of revenge in "the wars of Yahweh" and fanned that sublime enthusiasm which the prophets sought to kindle.

Two very important points demand immediate attention here, and we shall have to touch on them in a preliminary way. Doubtless the most enthusiastic of all the prophets was Amos. He wrote about one hundred years after Elisha, yet he is severest of all in condemning all bloodthirstiness and cruelty, whether committed against Israel or by Israel. And two hundred years after Amos the spirit of prophetism had so far matured that in Deutero-Isaiah there is no trace of fanaticism. On the contrary, he was able to regard Israel as the sacrifice demanded by God on behalf of the heathen nations and their sins. Both ideas are not so very far apart; ardent love for Israel's cause is the impelling motive in each. Yet surely this is sublime: instead of rebelling against the counsels of God which delivered Israel up to the heathen, to accept them humbly, and thus to evolve from the narrow national religion of the older times the grand idea of universalism. And when we take up the Book of Jonah, what has become of the old prophetic wrath against the heathen as a rejected mass? It is simply held up to ridicule in the person of

Jonah, the pedantic, who is constantly offended and at odds with God and the world.

As indicated above, when we reach Amos and his successors, the so-called literary prophets, we enter the real sanctuary of Israelite religion. With them righteousness is everything. In it and through it God rises above his people by allowing them to be crushed by the heathen. Their conviction was that Israel's prerogative over the heathen did not consist in the fact that God was indifferent to its moral conduct; but just because it is the chosen people, God visits upon it all its sins (Amos 3:2). The prerogative of the people therefore involves the special responsibility of the people. *Noblesse oblige*. Whoever stands as high as Israel must look to his conduct. From this high point of view the naïve treatment of the patriarchs in the older period as the pet children of God appears like an obsolete stage of religion. The conceptions which the rising nation formed in view of all the great things which it had seen and yet hoped to see, were meant by the divine counsel to find their correction in the experiences of history. The rod was ready which was to remind the spoiled darling of God of his duty. And the most important point must not be overlooked: the nation actually permitted itself to be taught and trained. Its best and noblest spirits succeeded in comprehending the ways of God, and were not driven by the events of the times into tearful despair: "How shall Jacob stand? For he is small." At the altar of the moral ideal they offered the greatest sacrifice of which antique man was probably capable: "The end is come upon my people Israel; I will not again pardon him any more" (Amos, chap. 7, 8). It is not fair to depreciate this judgment of Amos concerning the impending disasters of the time by calling it a mere prophetic intuition, a sort of instinctive premonition of the approaching end of Israel, and then explaining the ethical justification of this catastrophe as a theodicy developed after the event (Smend). When we read the utterances of the prophets, we feel the wrath of God against the sins of the people bursting forth in such elementary force, and with such unmistakable passionate indignation, that, on the contrary, we get the impression that this was an unaffected ethical excitement sweeping through the mind of the prophet. Other investigators, equally unprejudiced (Marti), have called this prophetic conviction

the greatest miracle of Israelite history. It will have to be conceded that only an inspired man could speak thus. Flesh and blood did not reveal this to Amos, but God alone. Here we have that proof of spirit and power which Paul demanded and was ready to furnish. God's inspiring thoughts mount before us like mighty mountains, steep, impossible to scale. It is called a wonderful scene when Scipio Africanus the Younger on the ruins of Carthage, thinking of the future ruin of his own city, broke into weeping and recited the Homeric words:

The day shall come in which our sacred Troy,
And Priam, and the people over whom
Spear-bearing Priam rules, shall perish all.

The contrast between the proud victor and the humiliated city is indeed deeply moving. It is wonderful that at this moment he had such a vision of his own country prostrate under the foot of an unknown enemy that he was not able to master his emotion. And yet what a difference between Scipio and the Old Testament prophet! With Scipio a moment of emotion which turned the soldier into a prophet; with Amos a clear outlook and a conviction firm as a rock, which lasted through a lifetime, nay, through many generations, and was maintained in the face of the bitterest enmity, though it carried the prophet into suffering and death. With the one man a deeply moving vision of the futility of all human power and greatness; with the other man a true valuation of the moral forces which issue from God and truly sustain the world, or in case they repudiate themselves hurl it into the abyss.

When we take a large survey of the writings of the prophets from Amos to Jeremiah, it may seem strange to us that the coarser violations of right are mentioned so often; that the great men of the nation are characterized as thieves, robbers, murderers, and adulterers; and that in comparison the finer questions of ethics are so rarely touched upon. But we must not forget that at any rate the Northern Kingdom was in an unprecedented state of anarchy in consequence of the desperate political situation. One insurrection followed another. Even in its foreign relations the state oscillated back and forth without definite policy. In its internal affairs law and order were almost forgotten. Similar conditions prevailed in the last decades of the Jewish

kingdom. But it must certainly be counted as the immortal merit of these men of God that they did not merely point out the jagged culminations of this ruin, as manifested in the bloody revolutions and the general contempt of order, but that they seized the evil at its deepest roots and called for a reformation of the innermost life of the people. Thus Amos saw the root of the trouble in the pride which had caused the people to forget God. Hosea emphasizes the fascination of sensuality, the intoxication of wine and sexual lust which captivated the people. Isaiah laments that they refused to obey his call for conversion and inward tranquility. He and Hosea insist on active help to the weak and sincere exercise of love. All of them deplore the incessant greed for property. Micah summarizes his demands in the celebrated words: "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what Jehovah doth require of thee, namely to do justly, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God." It has been justly emphasized that this is an attempt to formulate what is truly in accordance with the nature of man, so that here prophecy begins to feel its mission as an ethical lawgiver. Jeremiah bids his countrymen plow new ground, and—a much more personal demand—to circumcise the heart. Jeremiah was farthest advanced in the comprehension of the ethical question, for he does not look for the means of rescue in any reform of external conditions—as, for instance, in a change of political policy—but sees the cause of evil in the heart of man. He follows the ancient wisdom of Genesis in discovering the root of evil in the heart, which is deceptive and weak, so that men can no more change themselves than the Ethiopian can change his skin. That lifts the ethical question to an altitude where it emerges directly in Christianity. God himself must solve the dark riddle of the human breast. He must write his law on the inward parts of the people. He alone searches them and rules them. From him they may hope for help and find it. In Jeremiah for the first time in the Old Testament we see the veil lifted which covers the soul of man. He is the predecessor and leader in those struggles of the soul which cut down to the marrow; those struggles which the pious souls of later Judaism were to continue and which are to engage our attention farther on. That he was not always victorious in them we know from his own confessions. This makes his assurance all the more valuable

to us in our judgment of him, that in the sight of God and his enemies he was ready to vindicate his innocence and sincerity. His declaration shows what in his own judgment was the fundamental tendency of his life. Above all it shows what he regarded as valuable and morally desirable—namely, the sacrifice of all personal vengeful desires to the service of God's cause, and the surrender of his own love for his people, however hard that surrender might be, if the holy judgment of Yahweh was in question.

Ezekiel is a less gentle and finely developed character. He occasionally mocked at the vain attempts of Judah to escape the divine judgment. But he too, like Jeremiah, had earnestly reflected on the fact that the heart of the people needed regeneration, if Israel in the future was to be well-pleasing to God, and had considered how this could be brought about. He too sought to formulate his moral ideals. His book contains a little moral code describing the ideally just man. We must not be surprised if this code contains some ritual elements—as, for instance, prohibitions about the eating of blood and the regulation of intercourse with the unclean. The really significant fact is that the humane demands are voiced once more: he that does not oppress his neighbor, but readily returns his pledge, does not burden himself with stolen goods, gives his bread to the hungry, clothes the naked, does not lend his money on usury, withdraws his hand from wrong, and judges aright between the people—he is just and he shall live, saith Jehovah.

It is not out of the way to call the legislation of Deuteronomy essentially a moral code, so earnestly does it champion the disinherited and oppressed and seek to make their life better at the cost of those who are more fortunate. Where the Deuteronomic Law calls on the courts to take more stringent action—as, for instance, in the case of a young wife charged with fornication before marriage, or in the case of a young man guilty of wasting his substance or walking disorderly—the real purpose is to soften the severity of one-sided paternal power. It is assumed that the community will be more impartial than the father, who is likely to be filled with wrath by the accusations brought against his children. Of course, it is also desired to vindicate the good name of the falsely accused young wife as publicly as possible. The great historical influence exerted by

prophetism has found expression in this legislative code. The humane points of view of the older legislation are everywhere emphasized and underscored in Deuteronomy. Thus the possessor of a slave who is to be dismissed after his six years of service is required to donate him an ample equipment, evidently in order to make the economic struggle for existence as easy for him as possible. Everywhere we encounter the tendency to champion the cause of the propertyless. The much-discussed law, Deut. 15:1 f., is one evidence of this tendency. According to that interpretation of this passage which is preferred by the most eminent exegetes, every debt was to be remitted completely in the sabbath year, which was to recur in a fixed series every seventh year. This law was ideal in its conception; possibly it was too liberal toward those who are inclined to get into debt rashly; but, on the other hand, it was evidently exceedingly beneficial as against the calculating usurers who were plotting the ruin and enslavement of needy debtors. The lot of women also was mitigated as far as possible. Before a captive could become the concubine of her master, she was to have time to mourn for her slain relatives and to familiarize herself with her new conditions. Newly married men were to be free from military service for one year. Here, too, we feel the kindly consideration of the lawgiver for the young happiness which he sought to protect. The law in regard to strayed domestic animals, to which reference has been made, is extended by the provision that if the owner of the animal lived at a distance or was unknown, the finder was to shelter the animal until the owner came to inquire for it, and was then to return it. The same procedure was to be followed in case of any other loss. If anyone found a bird's nest with young birds or eggs on which the mother was brooding, only the young were to be taken; the mother was to be given her liberty, in order that the finder might fare well and live long. Similar in spirit was the concern for the threshing ox that was not to be muzzled. This precept caused the apostle to inquire: "Is it for the oxen that God careth?" He interpreted it allegorically—of the support which the church owed him for the preaching of the gospel.

We pass now to the prophets of the post-exilic time. Here a wonderful revelation is in store for us as we enter into the didactic literature. In the Book of Job the poet confronts us with the profoundest problem:

"How are we to explain the sufferings of the righteous prevailing in the world?" The historical truth of the story, in the stricter sense of the word, does not concern us here. The question is simply: What did the poet intend to describe? Now, if there is any poetical truth in the poem, if the poet really comprehended and formulated his problems seriously, we shall have to believe him, and believe it with our whole soul, that Job had honestly striven to fulfil the moral duty of man as he conceived and comprehended it. Yahweh himself testifies to it in the presence of Satan. There is none equal to him: he is pious, and fears God, and there is no evil in him. The tragic conflict of the book consists in this, that the hopeless suffering of leprosy should come upon such a man. Only if we enter without mental reservation into the intentions of the poet can we understand the poem. The dialectic problem of the poem is created by Job's ever-renewed and unshakable assertion of his innocence, with which he contradicts the insinuation of his friends, who are ready to ascribe a secret sin to him in order to be able to maintain the justice of God. A poet who took this question seriously in hand and bore down on this problem with all his strength, evidently knew what he was doing. By chapters 29 to 31 he wanted to avoid every misunderstanding. No weak God satisfying himself with the half-hearted efforts of man, no man who is easily satisfied and content with a superficial judgment on his efforts, are here made to confront each other. "Perfection" and "the fear of God" were to have their full and weighty meaning as Job in this connection stood up before God and called on his holy eyes to pierce through his whole life in order that thus he might render account to him of his manner of living. Here, then, we shall be able to detect what the poet expected of himself or of any other man to whom he would be willing in truth to accord the title of a righteous man. On the other hand, we shall also have to limit our expectations. Job is described as a nomad, a wealthy Bedouin prince, and we cannot expect that the ideal of righteousness here described will be very spiritual. We may simply expect a description of the honest and upright life of a devout man engaged in profitable occupation. That is in the main the kind of character pictured. But there are some traits which surprise us and transcend the ordi-

nary conception of the moral life existing in ancient Israel. Job's confession in the retrospect of his life (chap. 31) is instructive.

The first thing that strikes us is the strong emphasis on the duty of love and humanity. In this regard the poet appears as a true disciple of the Mosaic law and of the prophets; for they too constantly appealed to the conscience of the powerful men of their times by emphasizing these duties. We encounter here the well-known figures; the widow, the orphan, the man-servant, the maid-servant, the slaves in general, the alien, and even the traveler, such as we should expect to meet in Bedouin life. But these traits are not wanting in heathen ethics in its nobler strains. We reach higher qualities when we learn that Job has not rejoiced in his wealth, has not boasted and bragged of it. His deepest motive is based on religion: he would have no idol by the side of his true Lord to possess his soul. We seem to catch here a note of the Sermon on the Mount: "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." There is another direction in which we also transcend the ordinary morality of the Old Testament; we are told that Job had refrained from any malicious pleasure at the fall of his enemy. He did not curse him, as is so often done in the Old Testament; in noble humanity he had not taken pleasure in his disaster, but had maintained his own equanimity. It is true, this is not love for the enemy. The expression, "I did not excite myself" (31:29) is chosen with purpose and care, yet here too we can easily recognize the religious motive. Job himself had experienced how futile human happiness is. Even before he was stricken with leprosy he was an example to his friends. The fear of God had kept him from unmanly and irreligious triumph. The same aristocratic and self-restrained pride had also saved him from other passions, reprobated by the highly developed sense of decency among Orientals. For a personality so highly developed as his it almost goes without saying that he was not tempted to improper action in relation to the wife of his neighbor; the more because this was directly forbidden and would have kindled a consuming fire which would have burned to hell (a very delicate psychological remark). Finer and more surprising is Job's claim that he had kept himself from casting a lustful look even on the unmarried. Taken in connection with the beginning of the

poem, this seems to prove that monogamy had triumphed completely (there is another trace of this in the chapter), so that an impure gaze was liable to lead to terrible consequences for a married man, as indeed verse 2 indicates with fair clearness. On the other hand, it is significant that Job says nothing here about fidelity toward his own wife. His chastity, then, was not dictated simply by fidelity, but must probably be regarded as a requirement of the truly religious man who is expected to master every passion. Here again we catch strains which remind us of the Sermon on the Mount. The Old Testament even furnishes us utterances parallel to the beatitudes, which emphasize the blessedness of those who are pure in heart and promise that they shall see God. The poet of the seventy-third psalm calls those blessed whom God can never forsake, however often it may appear differently: "Surely God is good to Israel, even to such as are pure in heart." The phrase denotes here a specifically religious virtue. We are reminded of passages in the Books of Kings praising some ruler for having followed Yahweh "with an upright heart," without half-heartedness in religious service. Yet the pure conduct reveals the state and bent of the heart. The poetic praise of the pure heart alludes to the frequent prophetic lament that the people honored Yahweh with their mouth and drew near to him with their lips, but were far from him in their heart; or as Jer. 12:2 expresses it, "Thou art near in their mouth and far from their heart." These complaints about divided hearts occur even more frequently in the Psalms with reference to those who depart on crooked paths. They are contrasted with those who are upright in their hearts. These passages turn their edge against hypocrisy, the quality which thinks one thing and says another, and which wears a face that does not correspond to the heart. And this brings us to the profoundest virtue of the moral life—the virtue which is rooted in a perfectly developed personality, a personality that unifies all its thinking and all its aims before the eyes of the all-knowing God, and then from this all-embracing point of view so fashions its life that nothing can escape from co-operation in this moral task. Hence we can understand that the poet, after describing the apparent external privileges of the godless, breaks out into the lament: "It is in vain then that I cleansed my heart and washed my hands in innocence; for

all the day long am I being plagued and chastened every morning." These asseverations, which reveal the innermost life of the man, become all the more important if we remember that they were uttered face to face with a hostile world, in which God apparently was allowing wrong to win, and to win triumphantly. What strength of character was necessary to charge God with allowing his pious ones to perish in misery and giving them up to their enemies, though he knew well that they were walking in sincere and heart-searching holiness! Out of the pressure of this dilemma wells up that wonderful confession at the close of the psalm. The psalmist protests that he feels God to be his highest good, even though his flesh and his heart should fail him; he avows his firm conviction that God will never forsake him. In the height of this struggle the impossibility is realized of separating ethics from religion. Now, where in any heathen people has the ethical demand for complete purity of heart and character been discussed with such elevation and clearness, and with such total absence of any apparatus for the dialectic splitting of motives? Of course, only a few of the religious men of the Old Testament were as close to God as the poet of this psalm, and yet similar passages are not rare. The poet of the thirty-second psalm also makes complete forgiveness of sins dependent upon the sincerity of the sinner, who must acknowledge and confess his faults. The fifty-first psalm is inspired by the conviction that God takes pleasure in secret truth, and it prays for secret wisdom. On the basis of this conviction and conscious of his natural defilement, the psalmist prays for the creation of a clean heart within him, and the substitution of a new and contrite spirit in place of his untrustworthy spirit. The frank lament about the uncleanness of the heart and the untrustworthiness of his own spirit is psychologically of great importance when contrasted with the joyful assertion to the contrary in Ps. 73. Alongside of Ps. 73 we may range Ps. 24, vss. 3 ff. It is not of equal depth. To the question, "Who shall ascend into the hill of Yahweh, and who shall stand in his holy place?" the pious man is able to reply joyfully and without painful inner struggle: "He that hath clean hands and a pure heart; he that hath not lifted up his soul unto falsehood and hath not sworn deceitfully. He shall receive the blessing from Yahweh and be found righteous with the God of his salvation." This passage and Ps. 11:7,

"The upright shall behold his face," seem to have furnished the material for the passage in the Sermon on the Mount to which we have referred. The demand for purity of heart in the Old Testament, which was formerly referred only to sexual matters, has deepened as we have considered the passages in question. The whole machinery of the inner world of man in its most delicate movements lies open before the eyes of the all-knowing God. Now, we understand that in the thirty-first chapter of Job, which furnished the starting-point of our discussion, even the secret desire for idolatry aroused by the glorious lights of heaven, even the secret kiss of the hand in reverence for the splendor of the moon, are repudiated by Job and condemned as an apostasy which would practically be equivalent to idolatry. Note also what has been said above concerning the mere trusting in Mammon and the inner malicious pleasure at the disaster of an enemy.

In conclusion, let us give a short sketch of Israelite life as we may picture it immediately before the Christian age from the sources contained in the Hagiographa and the Apocrypha, and from the judgment of the heathen nations who were then in contact with Israel. First of all we must emphasize as characteristic of Israel the purity and devotion of family life. This was attested by other nations. According to Prov., chap. 31, the wife stands faithfully by the side of her husband, educating the children and presiding as mistress over the whole house. Both of them are striving to gain property, but without restless anxiety, protected by the blessing of God, which is better than anxious worry. They scorn no form of work. This gives the picture its simple middle-class coloring. The value of work is fully recognized. The Book of Ruth is of great value in this connection. Goethe justly praised its simplicity and the purity of its conception of life. We can even quote the Canticles here, for modern investigation has recognized ever more clearly that it consists of wedding-hymns, and thus deals with wedded love. And yet there is no philistine narrowness; the horizon of the Israelite embraces the entire world from the religious point of view. He gets his own edification from the services of God on Mount Zion, which gather the Jews from all parts of the world. He feels that he belongs to a great fraternity which enlarges his sympathies far beyond the narrow limits

of his four walls. But in the same way he is able to realize the value of the heathen nations in their significance for God and his kingdom. In Hellenism we encounter traits of noble humanity which esteem man as man. Under the category of wisdom the spiritual life of Israel is enriched with new and valuable attainments. In general we have here a highly developed civilization. This raises the life of Israel to a higher sphere and infuses into the literature of the times a certain character of gentleness and sympathy. There is a fondness for the idyllic. If this age was willing to keep its eyes open to the large affairs of the world, it was evidently capable of comprehending Christianity with all the mighty tasks which it was to set before mankind.

At the outset we were apparently forced into a defensive attitude, but this has gradually changed into the posture of attack. The Old Testament, which at first dealt with the external life of the people, gradually, under the influence of history and under the guidance of its inspired leaders, focused its attention on the innermost questions of national and individual life with profound earnestness. More and more it turned its gaze to what is truly valuable in man, and then more and more deepened its problems, and finally did not fear to ask the question of all questions: How can man become a truly moral character?

THE CRY "BACK TO CHRIST": ITS IMPLICATION¹

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A writer on the ethics of intellectual life² holds that the "simple desire to get at the truth, irrespective of all other considerations, merely for the truth's sake, appears to have been a virtue more common in ancient than in modern times;" and that the decline of this particular virtue—the love of truth—is largely due to the repressive influence of the Christian church. Another writer, in a later number of the same magazine,³ extends the statement a little by saying that this repressive influence is traceable to all religious systems—for example, the Judaic, Moslem, Christian—which rest upon the tradition of a sacred book with the conception of inviolable texts. I am not here interested in the charge from a moral standpoint; but another side of the question—the relation of the conception of inviolable traditions to intellectual honesty—does offer some interesting possibilities. How far is it detrimental to actual growth, whatever the motive may be, to have the idea of inviolable perfection in the past? Without attempting to answer this question, because the answer in any other field is at once evident, I desire to suggest some reasons for ceasing merely to manipulate expressions about the old and fundamental centers without examining and estimating these fundamental values. It will be remembered how a certain philosopher, at the very beginning of the critical period, pointed out the importance of examining the very foundations of knowledge before considering particular expressions. So here, may it not be true that, after learning this or that particular "liberal" fact, we use it in a dogmatic way and keep the dogmatic standpoint?

¹ A paper read by the late Mrs. Forrest before the Campbell Institute at its meeting at the University of Chicago in June, 1900.

² Fowler, "The Ethics of Intellectual Life and Work," *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1899.

³ Robertson, "The Ethics of Opinion Making," January, 1900.

To believe in inviolable texts and persons and ideals is to assume the fundamentally dogmatic attitude.

It may be objected at the start that nobody now believes in inviolable texts. This is incorrect. To the ordinary preacher these are the most sacred possession, and to reject them is "on all fours with outraging a temple or a holy of holies." But, however this may be with the ordinary preacher or the ordinary sectarian editor, this view is not prevalent enough to be made the ground of a charge against scholarly Christian men.

But, granting this, has the whole point been taken from the statements which I have quoted from recent writers? I think not. Another aspect of the same position, and one more characteristic of religious writers since the removal of reverence for texts, is the tendency to limit real intellectual freedom by the erection of an *inviolable personality*. Modern criticism has made it easy for anyone to say what he wishes, provided it is true, concerning the incompleteness of the Bible as the statement of an absolute and closed system. We have gone so far that he may do this and be a perfectly respectable member of a generally orthodox church. But when it did break into our consciousness that these writings were not what we had thought them to be, the bent of our minds—that is, the attitude which regards as inviolable what seems to sum up our ideal—was so well fixed that, when we caught at something else as the real core of the Bible, it at once assumed these same proportions. Men tended spontaneously to retain their old point of view, the same logical level, simply shifting their objective line of defense. So we have two very interesting events occurring at the same time: the movement of criticism, which tends to take all special sanctity out of the language of the Bible, and the movement represented by the cry "Back to Christ," which tends (I say tends, for not all theologians take the extreme position I am discussing) to set up in its place a sacred personality with all the inviolability, absolute perfection, eternity, etc., that had formerly attached to the Bible narrative, and still earlier to the institution of the church.

Now, all of this late appeal to the personality of Jesus as against the text of the Bible is very wholesome, in so far as it emphasizes the fact that a living personality is greater than the written record

of it by more mediocre men, and shows that a flood of new light comes into the character of Jesus when once we have shaken ourselves free of the personal equation in the written accounts. It is scarcely so, however, when we take this newly illumined conception as the apogee of all possible intellectual, moral, and spiritual development. To leave the matter there is to precipitate again all the agitation concerning the inviolability of any historically determined conception or personality. That which those of the schools call the *historical standpoint* renders this unavoidable. The discussion is bound to be precipitated, because it is precisely this historical principle which has been pleaded as ground for easily leaving the sanctum of inviolable texts.

We should note, however, that to some theologians the cry "Back to Christ" means simply *back to Christ as a beginning point*, implying that we can rightly interpret a developing system only by understanding it genetically. This, of course, is precisely the historical method, and cannot be the point of this criticism. But we are well aware that this does not exhaust the kinds of interpretation that are put upon this cry. Indeed, it can hardly be called a representative interpretation of this theological movement. To most who use the expression it means an attempt to make Christ, instead of the Bible, the center and the beginning and the end of the theological system.

What "Christ" means is almost taken for granted. Of course, it is admitted that he may have been partly misunderstood, and so the conception may have to be modified; but, on the whole and essentially, he is the divine *Messiah* in the traditional meaning of that term. If this view is criticized, it is immediately replied that the meaning given to Jesus is that which comes directly from the New Testament narrative; and that the significant feature of this new tendency is the use of the gospels instead of the epistles, in order to know Jesus from his own pronouncements rather than from the conceptions of him which others later developed. This, it seems to me, indicates the fallacy, from the scientific point of view, of the cry "Back to Christ." It is the tendency to identify the historic record with the interpretation of it. No account is taken of the local determination of certain conceptions; it is enough that their

historicity as records is proved. With that proof the meaning of the records is absolutely and inviolably established. Therefore it seems fair to say that, on the whole, the cry "Back to Christ" means, first, that Christ, instead of the Bible, is made the center of theology; and, second, that the Christ of the new theology is the Christ as traditionally conceived. It is in these senses that I shall endeavor to treat the movement.

For convenience we may call the method of defense and apology adopted the scholastic method. It is a method which rests on inherent evidence; which always keeps on the level of the narrative itself, refining and elaborating within that, but never getting outside and determining the very narrative by some larger situation. The scholastics conceived everything absolutely. This is also a pre-evolutionary method. The method which conceives nothing absolutely, nothing apart from its relations, is the historical method. In science it appears as the doctrine of evolution. Just as in biology no structure—for example, the spinal column or a circulatory system—is *mere structure*, but rather is the index of a functional adjustment; so in history no philosophical or theological system, nor any historical character, can be treated in isolation as so much objective fact. The system or the person is the structural side of the functional tendencies of the age. If we take a cross-section of a movement, we get the objective fact or personality, but on its living side this is not true.

In the light of certain established results of modern science, such a position as I have stated seems inadequate. Natural science has been playing havoc with our accepted traditions, and nowhere more than in this field. It is of importance as well as of interest to consider religious history and dogmatic history after the same fashion as any other history. The fundamental concepts of modern science are a great deal more than empty phrases; and I am not sure but theology must sit at its feet a good while before it attains to the systematic statement which the present needs demand. Is the point taken out of the charge against theology when we have given up the notion of absolute and inviolable texts? Is it not rather the very attitude of having anything inviolable (in the sense of undeveloping) which is inimical to actual freedom of intellectual life? It is

small matter that this or that particular fact is overthrown, if the standpoint itself still persists.

Now, applying the historical method, which is the most natural and scientific of explanations, to the theological attitude represented in the cry "Back to Christ," we may ask how far our conception of Jesus has remained back at the pre-evolutionary standpoint while our notions of the Bible as record have advanced with the progress of science. How far are we still setting off our intellectual holy of holies in the realm of religion, and crying to all save our personal prejudices, "Thou canst not enter here"? Is real religion hurt by making all sorts of changes in its conceptions? What is religion, in the last analysis, but one phase of man's attempt to put meaning into the universe? And does it not become his highest religious duty to make this interpretation as nearly perfect and accurate as possible? Does the traditional Jesus fail in any respect to satisfy this intellectual requirement? These are some of the questions which suggest themselves as soon as one has thrown off the scholastic yoke and taken on the historical method.

By far the greater number of theologians have no inclination to regard the nature and mission of Jesus differently from the standard orthodox conceptions of the church. So much historical value can be traced to his character that it seems like wiping out this value to reconstruct the interpretation of the character. There is such a strong tendency to hang to traditions which have grown pleasant to the imagination. It is a part of the scholastic method to accept what we have always accepted before, and, because of the laws of mental habit, to accept without questioning. This traditional doctrine of the church regards Jesus as essentially different in origin and nature from other human individuals. The traditional theologian is careful to state that to give him any human connection, to make him a part of God in nature, required a remarkable miracle. Because of his peculiar divine origin and nature, he was able to work what are called miracles. Then, after death, he, as the same individual, arose from the dead, keeping his earthly body—since it was not in the tomb—but spiritualizing it so that it could be seen or not seen as he chose. These may be considered the essential common elements in our general Christology. Along with these essentials may be held very

different conceptions in detail as to what was the really valuable work of Jesus. The point is that in some way this conception of the divinity of Jesus must be preserved.

Some conception of divinity might be entirely in line with the immanental corollaries of modern science; but to be orthodox we must believe in divinity after the old transcendental pattern. Everybody knows what this is. There are two separate universes to begin with. One has the values; the other has the means or materials. The miracle of the resurrection and of redemption is nothing more than an effort to get from one universe to the other. However naïve we may think the story of the Garden of Eden, it at least represents an attempt to begin with a unity out of which dualism arose. Still more striking is the doctrine—still on the miraculous plane—that Jesus has made a union so complete that it cannot be broken. But when we search for any essential, organic unity, there is none. It is a unity of miraculous power which is able to hold jarring and inconsistent elements together. Now we all know that modern science is, above everything else, trying to find an inherent and essential unity—a real explanation.

In this hunt for truth and unity there are certain theological *idols of the cave* which must first be disposed of. The first tendency is to identify the historical Jesus with absolute perfection. It is considered a compromise of an almost atheistic sort to regard him as historically placed and determined, and inspired by his general social environment. Along with this goes the hyperbole that he could not have been of use and of precisely the same use without the catastrophic and irregular inception of his work. This feeling is strengthened by the fact that the orthodox Christian can point to his historical success; and all the success of the succeeding centuries is read back into the original character. The first idol, then, to be overthrown is the prejudice against conceiving truth as itself a changeable and growing thing. Or, better perhaps put positively, truth is not a name for any *thing* or *fact*. It stands for an attitude; therefore, what truth is changes from year to year. The best vindication a principle can have is that it is adjustable, and therefore living and growing. This view of truth which I am combating is a tradition which hangs over us longest. For truth to have no permanent habi-

tation, for it to be impossible for us to put our fingers on it and say, "There it is forever and ever," seems to leave us in the air. But this is only because the terminology of growth and development is not ingrained into our thinking. Even if we think of development at all, it is a movement between two objective and static points, and we keep our eyes on these points. There is always a gap between the first and last of these which has no particular meaning of its own. And so it comes to pass that many intelligent critics are still at the old logical standing-ground, holding that the incorporation of our highest, best, most eternal, most powerful, most infinite must be a *Being*—that is, an unchanging and unchangeable existence—because it is the essence of finiteness to change.

In theory, modern science begins where this discussion leaves off. If we can once image the evolutionary process from its beginning—here and there appearing a new species more highly constructed, and all the time a more complicated and richer environment coming to our consciousness—if we can get this in its very living ongoing, we easily see how the objective world, how this or that particular thing, both in its beginning and in its end, is a part of the movement. To consider these facts by themselves is to leave out of account the very activity which has made them into objects of consciousness at all.

I am sure that Christian theology would gain much if it would leave off this external and scholastic way of looking at its problems, and undertake the more fundamental method of explanation without fearing that it will lose some *form* of value that would be more than replaced by the breadth and depth of the new *content*. Even in a body of persons devoted to open-minded and critical study these prejudices still linger. While they are not so numerous with such persons, they have just as damaging an effect upon the historical sense as some of those older prejudices which we boast of having outgrown. Confess now; how many of us have been as willing to apply the results of modern biological and psychological science to the supernaturalism of the New Testament as to apply historical methods to the Old?

Another of these *idols* is a tendency born of carelessness. It is the tendency to read the Bible, especially the part that relates to the

life and teachings of Jesus, with preconceptions of a thoroughly dogmatic and uncritical character. Unless we get rid of these, going back to Christ cannot mean going back to the real Jesus, but to an interpretation of him that was worked out in an uncritical age. If we are students and not apologists, is it not possible, is it not necessary, to take the personality of Jesus without claiming for it immunity from the usual methods of critical study, and without reading into it at any point the prejudices arising from our early training?

The next consideration in connection with the *method* of such a study is that the results of higher criticism are by no means the end of the matter. They are simply the beginning-point, the data of which the psychologist or theologian or somebody else makes use. From one standpoint the higher criticism is the least feature in biblical interpretation. So much of the historical criticism as attempts to place the writings by dates and writers is wholly preliminary. After that we have to make the *meanings* of those writings historical and not absolute. "It is not a question what meaning the writers ascribed to a passage, but what we are justified in ascribing." Is the statement a true one, or is it one so locally determined that it has none but a historical interest for us? Whatever else it may do, the higher criticism of the Bible, by simply proving the historicity as record of the particular passage, cannot succeed in establishing as reality that which has been generally accepted. At best, it means only that such and such persons meant such and such things at such and such times. The next step is to see whether their meaning was true. An illusion is just as true objective record as is true reality. Therefore it is not theoretically impossible that the biblical critic may prove the historicity of something that, from the standpoint of philosophy or psychology, is illusion or superstition. The error of many higher critics is not in the application of their method as such, but in the fact that they tend to apply it to the composition only, and not to the content.

If we could divest ourselves of prejudice, it would seem most natural to regard everything from the same fundamental standpoint; but many cannot easily bear to acknowledge to themselves that their intellectual, moral, and religious verities are not things and persons the same eternally in a metaphysical sense. To regard realities as

processes and not things, movements and not persons, seems like playing a game with ourselves. Yet, I take it, this is precisely what we have to face. If we are to use the word "authority" at all, it cannot be in the external sense; and to most persons it then becomes an inadequate term to fit the case. Whatever airs of liberality we may assume, we remain logically in the old position, unless our fundamental principles in theology are consistent with those of science in general. According to some, the word of knowledge is one thing and the word of faith another; but the latter must constantly be coming back to the former to get its cue.

This statement on the side of general theory may seem unnecessarily long. There are two reasons for making it long. In the first place, if we see the significance of the general standpoint and method, the particular applications come as a matter of course. In the second place, while it seems to me that my statement of the fundamental principles and implications is sound and in line with the best results of modern thought, very many other persons are much better fitted than I am to apply them in a critical and detailed study of any New Testament problem.

But now, to come within closer range, we must see that the implication in the cry "Back to Christ" is unscientific and unavailing for a lasting interpretation, unless we construe it more loosely than the average theology does; that what we want, to quote Professor Pfleiderer, is not to return to the old, "whether it be called Athanasius or Paul or Jesus, but to clothe the spirit of Christianity, its religious-ethical principle which lay as a compelling force at the basis of all preceding developments, in the fitting and intelligible form of our age, regardless as to how far this new form may be separated from the old one." The demand is made upon modern theology that it shall make itself a living and consistent part of the whole attempt to get reality, instead of setting up a reality of its own with its own categories.

From the point of view of two theses I desire to consider the subject more in detail. (1) To go back to more primitive ideals in order to use them in their original form as a statement of our present values is inconsistent with the very idea of historical development and with the philosophy of our own experience. It is impossible

to return to the Christian standards of the first century, because these very standards have been growing all the time. (2) There are inconsistencies in the teaching of Jesus and in his own conception of himself which make it undesirable to go back to him in any absolute sense.

The first of these has been implied in my introduction. It only remains to apply it a little more explicitly to theological conceptions. According to this principle, the essential character of truth is progressive development. To stamp a thing as fixed is to announce that it is dead. The old idea, that in order to have a stable universe we must have a fixed, unchanging God with his hand on the lever, was, as we have seen, a part of the general misconception that reality was some kind of substance in a material sense. The evolutionary method knows no absolute outside of the progressive development. The only thing that abides is the general movement itself. We cannot hold to any static conception of history.

The method of our own growth is through conflicting impulses. This is the only basis upon which we can get a scale of values. To revert to the ever-suggestive biological conception, we find a very apt illustration of this point in the idea of growth as constant readaptation. This always includes the old, the stock in trade, on the basis of which the adaptation takes place. But of course it is the old in connection with the present situation; and there never was a situation precisely like this one. Applying the conception to history, we see that every event is partly old and partly new. It no longer stands out unique and absolute, to be studied by itself. But this is making the event as event subordinate or relative.

There are many who feel that no shock is given to intellectual consistency by assuming in general a continuous social growth, and then puncturing it all along with special creations in order to account for values that seem to them larger than those of normal experience. We want one consistent working theory of the universe. If that is not adequate to account for these apparently supernatural events, we may make over the hypothesis; but it is a little too naïve to work two different hypotheses at the same time. For any scientific progress, it is necessary to presuppose a uniformity of process. The first assumption is that there are no interventions *ab extra*; that the events

follow immanent, not external, laws. To say the least, there is a *prima facie* case against any explanation of historical events which allows a distinct break in the continuity. The movement was forward before the time of Christ, and it is still forward.

We are as little likely to go back to the first century for our ideals as to conform our civilization to that brought to light by archaeological discoveries. If we stop to think, we see that we could not go back to Christ alone, if we wanted to do so, without limiting our experience about one-third. Our religion is not the national religion of Jesus. To be accurate, it is the Jewish-Graeco-Roman religion, fused under the influence of the great personality of Jesus by the amalgamation of the nations. We cannot tell whether our present theology is more Jewish, more Greek, or more Roman. This is certain, however, that the religion of Jesus would have been useless for us, had it not received additions at the hands of Graeco-Roman philosophy and polity. But, aside from this, it is inconceivable that any principle could apply itself to three or four different civilizations and remain itself intact, unchanged, and independent.

As an illustration of the inadequacy of any formal principle when left to itself, take the history of the development of Christian brotherhood. The fundamental doctrine of Jesus was that through the common sonship of a common father we have a common brotherhood of man. But this enunciation must have remained in the form of an aspiration and without lasting stimulation, had there been no effort to work out, specify, and define the activities through which this brotherhood was to be realized. This was not done by Jesus, but by the mingling of these Jewish-Christian aspirations and sentiments with the intellectual forms of the Greek philosophy and their application to the practical problems of mediaeval Europe. After that, we do not have the statement of Jesus pure and simple, but it and the Greek philosophy and the general activity of the Middle Ages have grown together—and to our advantage. If asked *how* the harmonization or identification of the interests of men was to be brought about in the face of existing antagonisms, Jesus could only answer *that* the interests were identical. So the world of his teaching stood off as an ideal world absolutely apart from the real world in which his disciples had to live. Jesus did not have the intellectual medium

at hand to express in objective terms the values which he felt so deeply, but only subjectively. This intellectual machinery was more nearly the product of the Greek mind. A sheer sentiment must be short-lived, unless definite lines of activity can be laid out through which it can be expressed and experienced. When the condition of the world rendered practical Christian conduct impossible, the ceremonies of the church became all-important as *means* by which the *values* could be obtained. Today we get our religious *feel*, so to speak, almost entirely in connection with concrete activities, not in quiet meditation. So long as we can only meditate, the feeling is unmediated. Through Greek philosophy and other agencies, mediation has been secured; that is, we have been enabled to appropriate in terms of experience a value which, left where Jesus left it, could be expressed only in terms of sentiment. We are accustomed to think of the Hebrew strain in our religion as everything, because it entered as a kind of interloper into the old and tried Graeco-Roman civilization and inoculated it with new inspiration and zeal. But as students of history we know that we owe about as much to the Greek and Roman organization of thought for what we call our Christian civilization today.

This is only one illustration of the real nature of historical growth. It is not a hypothesis taken out of the air; it is an actual, living thing. And just because growth is a reality, it is a contradiction in terms to talk about going back to a more primitive conception. History is simply the external side of the constant readaptation which men's minds are always bringing about. We do not go back to the mastodon for the best expression of structural adaptation. For the best development of the whole the mastodon hands on his best features to a later form. So historically, unless there is retrogression—in which event our outcome would have to be pessimism—there is a constantly growing superiority in intellectual expression and practical activity; and the best service a historical period or personality can render is to mingle its advantages with the whole, rather than keep them apart from and above the ongoing process. Of course, this must be done, whether we like it or not; for society makes use of the past *for the sake of* the present and future. The historical or evolutionary hypothesis throws new and valuable light on any peculiar or highly devel-

oped type by relating it to the whole process that has led up to it. Instead of being conceived as injected from some other world, it is produced by some act of special creation for the sake of the future; it is seen to be of use for the future simply because it sums up in a peculiarly effective way the valuable forces that have been operating thus far. Put philosophically, the value does not have to come from some other world or in some unnatural way, because this whole process itself has developed all the values we know anything about.

This brings us to my second thesis. Just because history knows continuously the *better*, any part of the old taken absolutely and itself shows limitations and inadequacies. This, I think, holds of Jesus. I believe that one may say this without taking the meat out of the movement represented by the New Testament and the church. Indeed, from the standpoint of historical criticism it may appear that it is putting the best known value into it.

In order to show how thoroughly one may acknowledge the process and importance of the movement represented by Jesus and the prophets without accepting the traditional view, let me quote the following from Professor Pfeiderer:

The prophets appear no longer as media of supernatural oracles, but as men whose works and words are perfectly explicable from their character regarding their connection with the conditions of their age and environment. They stand, indeed, in a certain respect above their contemporaries, so far as they contest the morality of thought and action of the latter, and hold before them higher ideals of piety and morality; yet these ideals were not communicated to them from without by supernatural revelation, but sprang from their own spirit as products of an especially powerful and happy religious-moral nature, which, under the influence of historical relations, had been so developed that they saw clearly what was perverted in the thought of others. . . . Especially do the evils of the time, the folly and blindness of the masses, the injustice of rulers, the perversion of religion in unfruitful ceremonialism, work upon the souls more finely attuned to stimulus and spur; the feeling of the evil stirs their moral judgment or conscience to the criticism of the existing situation, and out of the criticism there grows for them the new ideal which impresses itself upon them as the truth which has power to save from the corruption of the time; and while they first raise themselves to this ideal, they also win power and courage to draw others toward it. Thus they become the proclaimers of a higher truth which, over against the preceding error, appears as something wholly new, as a revelation from above, which is, indeed, nothing else than a higher development of the impulse toward truth and righteousness that is a natural quality of the human mind. That

circumstances of the time co-operate as conditioning factors in the development of the individual aptitudes of the pioneer heroes appears very evident from the fact that these men, with all their pre-eminent greatness, ever remain, in many respects, children of their age, the limitations of which they never quite break through.⁴

This seems to me true also of Jesus. In spite of his pre-eminence in moral and spiritual sensitiveness, even above that of the prophets, we can see his national limitations. There is no reason to think that he ever meant his teaching for more than the Jewish nation. That many interpreted him so is evidenced by the fact that Paul stood alone for the universalization of his teaching, in the face of great and bitter odds. It is also true that the conceptions of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man had been developed within the Jewish system. Jesus, as a prophet of the Jews, saw death in the formalism of the Pharisees and struggled for a reinstatement of the spirit of his national religion. It would be interesting to show the difference between Paul's theology and that of Jesus and any of the other apostles, and then to show how far this was the necessary outcome of his attempt to carry the gospel beyond national limits.

But it is the Jewish supernaturalism which entered in such a lively way into Jesus' conception of himself that shows particularly his national and historical limitations. It is also just here that the inadequacy of his statements as final appears. It was precisely a part of the philosophy of his period to give expression to the general feeling that the rational or spiritual side of man was a gift from heaven, while the physical was allied to the lower orders. From the time of the author of the story of the Garden of Eden to the philosophy of the eighteenth century, men persisted in thinking that the best and truest and most real lay behind them. This, as I have said above, was because they held reality to be a substance. The ideal of perfection of knowledge and goodness was conceived as best represented in those human beings who had most directly emanated from this world-ground. The generations since the creation have simply carried us farther from these divine qualities. Waiving the psychological problems involved in this assumption, it is sufficient here to notice how thoroughly this position is implied in Jesus' conception of

⁴ "Evolution and Theology," *New World*, September, 1898.

himself, and how wide is this view from our present-day philosophical point of view.

On the basis of the doctrine of emanations and of the independence of the individual's soul in the midst of its physical surroundings it was quite essential for Jesus to emphasize his divine origin even more than that, his identity with the world-ground. "I and the Father are one," he said, meaning something very different from the identification which any individual might claim with the world-ground. And again: "Who hath seen me hath seen the Father." This was not an insignificant part of his teaching; without it he felt that he would have been false to his mission. His mission, in brief, was this: He had come directly from God; and, as a more direct emanation, as an emanation different from the ordinary, he was by that much, more powerful, more eternal, more perfect. The more proofs he could give of his identity with God, the more successful did he think his mission would be. It is evident, of course, that Jesus never claimed for himself half that has since been claimed for him. For instance, the omniscience and omnipotence which were commonly claimed for him by the extreme conservatives he never claimed for himself. But he certainly claimed that he was given an objective proof of his supernatural origin. He was ever responsive to the demand for a sign that he was divine. And the gospels tell us of his every important move of his early life. Throughout he uses miracles as a sign of his peculiar sonship. Peter's challenge, "I will be thou, bid me come unto thee on the water," is immediately accepted by him. He heals the sick man in order that men may know that he has power to forgive sin. When messengers come from the discouraged John the Baptist, he lays most weight upon the evidence of his healing miracles. And can we explain the agony of Gethsemane and on the cross except on the theory that he had relied upon some supernatural intervention to save him?

My only purpose in mentioning these few of the many illustrations is to show that Jesus was a Jew. How would a Jew of that time judge divinity? By all the categories of the Old Testament, it would be by some supernatural phenomenon. Divinity was announced by remarkable healings and other supernormal transformations with

the physical world—by turning the usual order of the world upside down.

We started by trying to come to a clear conception of the implications in the acceptance of the modern scientific standpoint. First of all, we must understand that it can know no caprices in human experience. I know that this may seem like the older rationalistic argument against miracles, and that churchmen think it is answered. The rationalist's position is doubtless out of date, but the main thing he contends for still remains. *Superrationalism*, in the usual meaning of that term, is a contradiction within experience. The doctrine of evolution has taught us far more than the sheer facts it has explained. It has got us in the way of judging values from the teleological standpoint. As we consider the teaching of Jesus, we realize that it is not these supernaturalistic elements which he emphasized as of first importance, but the convincing teaching of brotherly love that moves the Christian world today. In fact, would it not be true to say that, if someone were to come as a Messiah today, expressing himself in the light of modern thought, he would not try to state himself as begotten of God in the substantial sense? It would be in some spiritualized way; and his insight into human experience would be his proof. The modern mode of thought finds no particular value in a supernatural Christ; and in the preaching of Jesus from the ordinary pulpit there is already much that recognizes this fact. We do Jesus as a historical phenomenon an injustice, to cling to the form in which he stated his truth, to the exclusion of the real principle which has lived and been transmuted into new forms.

The demand for miracles and the supernaturalistic in general as vouchers for truth belongs to the more primitive mind. Anthropology teaches that with primitive peoples supernaturalism plays a large part because so much of experience seems subject to caprices which lie beyond the savage's control. Gradually one phenomenon after another is taken from the supernatural sphere and placed in the natural. At one time the sun and moon, the woods and streams, the wind and thunder, were matter for religious and mythical decoration. Now almost no realm remains but that of death and the spirit life. These still preserve their importance because the experiences themselves are not so nearly within our rational control. Nobody

now believes that God in anger makes thunder, because we know the causes of thunder; but the state after death we do not know, and so tend to believe almost anything about it. The myth-making desire finds free scope here. But what if the Society for Psychical Research should bring these phenomena within the range of scientific treatment?

To remain at the old supernaturalistic standpoint in order to get the values of experience is to reject all that breadth and depth of meaning which is our intellectual legacy. It is but a piece of the same supernaturalism to insist on the Jewish Messiah and the transcendental Jesus as our religious basis. All progress has been away from the legendary and mythological elaboration of the simple teaching of Jesus. If he is divine in any modern sense, it is not so much because he is a resurrected and exalted Messiah as because he was a consciousness morally and spiritually sensitive to the imperfections of his time, and by that fact a prophet of a truer and better order. To use Lyman Abbott's expression, we do not believe that Jesus was divine because he arose from the dead, but we believe he arose from the dead because he was divine. And even so we want to define both resurrection and divinity.

I could go on and mention other limitations. There is the command to the rich young ruler to give all his property to the poor, which can scarcely be recognized as authoritative. A few Christians have undertaken to obey it literally, but with no advantage to the religious life. And how do we stand on the gospel of non-resistance? One writer who has selected that as the core of religion is called a "crank" by most Christians. Then there is a strong probability, as Professor Shailer Mathews tells us, that even the conception of human brotherhood was not so universal as we have usually supposed. The brotherhood of mankind comprised only those who had been born anew; and these were probably thought of only as Jews.

But it is not my purpose here to find all possible limitations in the intellectual outlook of Jesus. I simply desire to point out that there are limitations; and thereby to show the necessity of regarding Jesus as historically conditioned. If it is urged that such passages should be taken symbolically instead of literally, I reply that this is simply to fall back on the legal fiction again. It is an attempt to hold the forms after we know that they are outworn. This saves us from

too abrupt a break. That is all. I do not say that the motive is not honest and holy. But the method is not above criticism, when we have regard for the exact truth. He can hardly be called a serious student who is unwilling to apply his critical judgment all along the line.

Is there any inherent inconsistency in the application of scientific *method* to moral and religious values? Why is it hard for us to conceive of fundamental values as unfolding and developing throughout history? It should suffice us to know that we can never get wholly away from the old, though the particular forms are secondary. As to motive, it is not likely that we shall ever surpass Jesus; but in the objectification of that motive we must go far beyond him. We may go back to Christ for stimulus and to get our direction, but we are not making use of these unless our definite social programmes—the content of our teaching—go nineteen centuries beyond him. To understand the development of the horse, we go back to *Eohippus*; but we do not breed to that type. To understand man, we go back to *Dryopithecus*; but we do not take him as our standard of physical or mental perfection. So we go back to Christ to understand the direction of the highest moral development; but his truest teaching is but formal: modern man must develop the content. On the whole, the cry "Back to Christ" is unscientific and pre-evolutionary. It shows an ambition which has the same psychological roots as the return to the Bible as a written record to be kept intact as verbally inspired. As over against this attitude, the modern scientific attitude would preserve the values of the old, perhaps find a new and deeper significance in them, but would never reach a static ultimatum. In the words of Paul, who did more than any of his contemporaries to distinguish between the form and the content: "If that which passeth away was with glory, much more that which remaineth is in glory."

THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE RELIGION OF JESUS

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That the Christian religion ought to become again the religion of Jesus is the conviction of very many in our day. Who that believes in Christianity and hopes for its dominance over mankind does not long first of all for unity among Christians? And of all movements toward unity what one seems so natural, so much in accordance with reason, and so full of promise, as the movement back from all the differences of opinion and of organization to which rival sects owe their existence, to the simplicity that is in Christ? Yet this very movement, entered upon by many with enthusiasm, seems now to be leading to new differences and disputes, and there is danger that the watchword, "I am of Christ," may again be uttered in a divisive spirit, over against tendencies that may still be characterized by the old party phrases, "I am of Peter," "I am of Paul," "I am of Apollos." There are those to whom the Christian religion is so far identified with the church that any return from the present to the past is excluded. "I am of Peter," the founder of the Christian church. There are those to whom Christianity means the divinity of Christ and the atoning significance of his death, so that to go back of the death and exaltation to the earthly life of Jesus means to go back from the gospel to its incomplete preparations. "I am of Paul," the seer of the exalted Christ, the interpreter of the crucified one, the Christian theologian. There are those also who seek to be men of their own time, who attempt in each age to adopt the current knowledge and philosophy and in its terms to restate the Christian truth, to interpret the word in accordance with the Christian principle. "I am of Apollos," the Christian philosopher and man of letters. It is not my purpose directly to combat these various objections to the effort to return to Christ—those, for example, of Loisy, the Catholic; or of Kähler, the confessional theologian; or of Pfleiderer, the philosopher; or—more recently, and shall we say unexpectedly?—those of Wellhausen, the

historian, who finds in the death of Jesus rather than in his life the most definite cause and explanation of the historical origin of Christianity. I do not wish to controvert these objections, because every one of them is valid against some form of the movement to return to Jesus, and also because the proper motive and aim of that return is the recovery of a simpler and more rational form of Christianity, which will promote the unity of Christians and not create new divisions. Certainly the movement back to Jesus should not be undertaken in a way to give offense, but rather to remove it. It should not erect new walls of partition, but should break the old walls down. It should not alienate but reconcile. So only can it be a true return to him whose mind is contained in the command that men love one another, and in the prayer that his disciples be one; to him who preached peace to near and far, and would have all, however they may differ, work together for the building-up of one holy temple in Christ, one spiritual habitation of God among men. If unity cannot in the end be promoted by this return, let us not attempt it. But, on the other hand, if the unity of Christians one with another, and of all good people under the Christian standard, is not to be furthered in this way, then what other way is left for the pursuit of this goal so much to be desired? If objections are valid against some forms in which the return to Christ has been urged, can it not still be so conceived and attempted that objections may fall away? Is it not possible so to lift up the banner, "I am of Christ," that all Christians shall at last be impelled to exclaim: "If you are of Christ, so also are we?"

The various criticisms of the movement back to Christ may perhaps be reduced to three: its impossibility as a historical task; its inadequacy, because the Christian gospel is not given in the words of Jesus, but only in his death; and its inconsistency with the principle of development. To these three criticisms, for each of which a strong argument can be made, the most effective reply would be a statement of the religious teachings of Jesus of such a sort that the criticisms would not apply to it, or be valid against it. Cannot such a statement be made? Is it not possible so to undertake the return to Jesus that it shall not make Christian faith depend on the necessarily uncertain results of historical research in the peculiarly difficult

region of gospel criticism? And then, in the things that may be accepted with confidence as teachings of Jesus, do we not find the gospel as well as a new law; the full gospel, and not only a stage preparatory to it? Perhaps Paul did not find the gospel in the earthly life and teachings of Jesus; but John, it would seem, did. Perhaps we may not be able to find our Christianity in the teaching of Jesus in just the way in which John found his there, yet we may follow his example and do in our way what he did in his, may see in the earthly Jesus the manifest grace as well as the truth of God. May not the third objection also somehow vanish at sight of that which Jesus most surely taught? May we not find that a real return to him signifies, not a retrograde, but a forward movement; not any sort of bondage to a letter, but the liberty of the spirit?

What, then, did Jesus most surely teach? Leaving aside sources that are less secure and matters that are most in dispute, what are those things that the simple reader of the gospels finds, and that the critical student does not question? Perhaps we cannot do better than ask of Jesus the two questions which Professor James formulates as the questions about which different religions divide. All religions agree, he says, that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand, and that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers. They differ as to the nature of the higher power, and as to the manner of our relation to it. What then, in the view of Jesus, is the name and nature of the divine help which may come to man's aid, to reinforce his better against his worse nature, and to enable him to overcome the wrongness of the world? And then, how can man avail himself of this help; what relation exists or may exist between him and the divine helper? It is Professor James who says that these are the two questions we must ask if we would understand a man's religion. I have not selected just these questions because it is easy to come to an agreement about Jesus' answer to them. It must be evident, however, that it is easy; that men can hardly go far apart in their interpretation of Jesus on these two points. And if these are the really important points about which we need to know his teaching in order to understand his religion, we may start upon our study with a favorable presumption, so far as the first of the three objections to our effort is concerned—the objec-

tion that we cannot return to Jesus because the recovery of his teachings is historically impossible.

I. What, then, according to Jesus, is the divine power from which saving help comes to us in our efforts to overcome or escape the wrong that is in and about us, and to make the right prevail? The power is God, and the reign of God as Jesus knew it is not only in heaven, but here on earth, and not only in a future age, but already real and prevailing. Here and now Jesus saw and experienced the invisible but irresistible power of goodness. If it seemed small, it was speedily to grow to evident greatness. We can trust the presence and the power of the saving, healing forces of goodness here and now, and can work with them and leave them to work in confidence and hope, sowing our seed and watching the earth bring forth of itself blade and ear and grain. Nature should reveal to us the helpful and saving power of God in the world. It is he that feeds the birds and clothes the lily and the grass of the field. Without his thought no sparrow falls to the ground. The very hairs of our head are numbered.

The best name of this God who thinks good and does good to the least of his children is "Father;" and the nature of his fatherhood is most manifest in his love for the most undeserving among his sons and in his joy in the recovery of the lost. The great difference between Jesus' knowledge of God and that of his contemporaries was that they thought God a Father of the chosen nation, the righteous people, one who loved those who loved him and should give, and in the end did give, his best gifts to those who best deserved his favor. That he did not always seem to do this, that the wicked sometimes prospered and the righteous suffered, was the great inconsistency, the great offense to faith which the Jews struggled to explain, for which they almost blamed God. The task of religion was, they thought, to deserve God's favor and earn his help. The task of theology was to explain the frequent apparent failures of God to act in accordance with his nature and his pledge.

Jesus, too, saw that God does not deal with men as they deserve; but he had a different explanation of this from any that the Jewish theologians had hit upon—an explanation that he found in human nature and in his own heart. Fathers do not give gifts to their children because they have earned them. They give because they love.

They are not less righteous because they do not give according to the measure of strict justice; for love knows another and better way than the legal to make righteousness prevail. What Jesus saw in God's dealings with men was not the failure or the mysterious concealment of righteousness. He saw a wonderful forbearance, a suffering patience toward wrong, a non-resistance of evil, through which sin, even though for a time it increased, would yet at last be conquered and brought to an end. That love was the motive and salvation the end of God's forbearance toward evil Jesus knew because he saw love working in just this way to just this end in the human heart at its highest, and because he felt and knew its nature and its ways in himself. It is God's way to give more than is deserved. It is his way to rejoice most in the recovery of the lost. Human life contains many illustrations of this, but the truest one is that which fatherhood furnishes. The father's forbearance with sin, the father's joy in the return of the lost son, reveal the inner nature of the power which bears with sin, that sin through its very excess may be brought to an end. The long-suffering of the divine love is the power of salvation. It is thus Jesus interpreted the fact, so trying and inexplicable to the Jewish mind, that God's gifts are freely given to all, that he makes his sun rise on evil and good, and sends rain on just and unjust. God does not love those only who love him. Far from showing a failure of justice or a limitation of power in God, this conduct reveals his highest quality and sets our highest ideal.

II. This carries us over to Jesus' answer to the second of our questions. How are men to avail themselves of the divine power that helps and saves them, and in what sort of relation to it do they stand? There are two sides of this matter. One is the evident inference that, if God like a father gives good gifts to us, we like children are to receive them with humility, gratitude, and trust. But there was in Jesus' view another side not so evident. If God like a father gives help and blessing beyond desert and without reckoning to us, we as sons, godlike, must give, and so give, to others. The imitation of God, and of this quality in God, his forbearance toward sin, his undeserved and unrequited love, his desire to save and his joy in salvation, is the task of men. God's love should call out this love in us; and, if it does not, if having freely received we do not

freely give, if having been forgiven much we will not forgive our fellows, then we lose the gift of God and fail of salvation. For our imitation of God is not only his gift, but our duty. It is not only produced in us by him, but is also a condition without which we are incapable of receiving his loving work in us. We have no right to pray, "Forgive us our debts," without adding, "as we forgive our debtors." "Love your enemies," Christ commanded, in contrast to that which was said to those of old, "that ye may become sons of your Father," whose sun and rain are for evil and good alike. "Ye therefore shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect."

In Jesus' own life we see what these two things mean—trustful, childlike worship of God, who gives us all according to our need, and an eager, sonlike imitation of God in his forgiving, long-suffering, and redeeming love. Of the first of these, the trust of Jesus in the saving help of God, we read but little, yet feel that we know much. From the temptation and its conquest at the beginning on to Gethsemane and its acceptance of the strange will of God, and the cross, we know that through all the soul of Jesus rested in constant trust and in prevailing peace upon the Eternal. But that of which we read most is Jesus' imitation of God. This was conscious and purposeful, the law and gospel of his life. That which most distinguished Jesus' life as a religious teacher, and in the eyes of other teachers most condemned it, was his free and friendly association with publicans and sinners. It is hard for us to imagine how strange this seemed and what offense it gave. It was strange not only to pharisaical ideals, but to those of antiquity in general. It was in answer to complaints against this new way of his that Christ appealed to the human joy in the finding of the lost, and through this to the joy in heaven over the recovery of sinners. The example of God was his justification.

But such an idea of God was as hard for the men of his time to accept as was such a manner of life. God was first of all the Holy One, apart from all that was unclean, and man, they thought, should separate himself from sinners. By many words Jesus sought to impart his own feeling, and to help men recognize in this the true nature of God. "The physician," he said, when men first called his course in question, "does not go to the well, but to the sick; so I

come, not to the righteous, but to sinners." But is the true religious life physician-like? It seemed self-evident to Jesus, and so it seemed to us in the light of his life; but it was a wholly new ideal. Thus such was God's mind toward men, and that we are to be like him in this, no one had clearly seen before. These poor, sinful, unsharpened, herded people, Jesus said, are both more needy and more ready to receive help than others. Their response is quickest. They love mercy because they have been forgiven most. The rich and well-fed do not come to the feast, but the poor flock in with eagerness. God would give to those who know their need and cry for mercy, not to those who recount their merits and claim his gifts. But more convincing, more revealing, than any words were the deeds of Jesus. The Pharisees who looked on from without could not confess that there was any godlikeness here; but the disciples—unassuming common men—saw Jesus heal the sick and cast out demons and forgive sins, they saw the love in his face and the answering love in those to whom he ministered, and so they gradually believed and knew that such love was goodness itself and revealed the very God.

How could they, how can we, say too high things of him who first saw this truth, and so spoke and lived it that, however we may fall short of it, we can no longer doubt or deny? He saw it in nature, in birds and flowers, and in common life; but no one could see it there who did not already know it in his inmost soul. There is the source of his faith; and so he is the source of our faith. We see that what he said of God is true of himself, and then we know it to be true of God.

But the disciples' calling was to be as their Master. What was the Master's own life interpreted and demonstrated—man's twofold response to the fatherhood of God—that the disciples were to make their own. They too were to receive God's gifts with childlike trust and thankfulness, and they were to become sons by likeness to the Father, and that most of all in self-denying ministry to others. This was the religion of Jesus; this his account of the way of salvation; and how full and free a salvation it was and is! Childlike trust in the Father saves us from that anxiety, which seemed to Jesus so serious questioning of God's fatherhood. One who cares for the grass and the sparrows will care for us. Anxiety has two roots, and both are

off by a real faith in the Father: one is too high a valuation of outer things, as if one's life consisted in them; the other is the fear, the superstition let us call it, that the power that rules over what we call chance and fate is an indifferent or a malicious power. It is only a step from anxiety to covetousness, from distrust of God to trust in riches. One fears for the things that money will buy, food and clothing, and looks to money to save him from his fear, putting it truly in the place of God as the savior from the ills and wrongs he most dreads. So that to Jesus covetousness seemed idolatry, for he put mammon over against God as the alternative object of man's worship and service. Over against the fear of poverty and the love of riches Jesus urged the trustful worship of God. Nothing less can save men from this false fear and this false trust, so debasing to the spirit, so hostile to the higher life of man.

The freedom of salvation, the graciousness of the message of Jesus, appears on this side of it, where God the Father is viewed as a giver of good gifts to his children. But his message has its side of severity also, and we meet that when we turn to his enforcement of the duty of likeness to God. The law of love is the beginning and end of that godlikeness which, if we would become sons, we must attain; and how severe a law is the law of love as Jesus urged it! "Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you, that you may become sons of your Father." No teacher ever set a higher or harder ideal, and none ever urged it in a more uncompromising way. This is not a higher holiness for the few; it is the only way to sonship, the only way to God and life. It is this or nothing. Jesus will accept no substitute. It is all of this, and he will allow no half measures. That from which men are saved by this way is selfishness, and this is simply the proper name of sin. One who is not saved from this is not saved from the central wrong and dominating evil of the world; he is not saved at all.

Let me try to suggest by way of reminder some of the things so easily remembered, so hardly obeyed, which Jesus found necessary to man's imitation of God, to the fulfilment of the law of love. Of course, the first thing is a life of helpful, saving ministry to others. In a sense, indeed, this is last as well as first. One is to set about the hard task of saving himself, by forgetting himself in the self-denying

service of those who are in need. When Jesus first called the disciples, he said to them: "Come after me and I will make you fishers of men." He did not promise to serve them, but to teach them the art of service. He did not offer them salvation, but a chance to save others. He sent them forth to heal the sick, and help and save the poor and sinful. He was distressed when their faith failed before an evil power. His joy was great when some returned and said that the demons were subject to them. Then he knew that God's salvation was sure, for others could do his work with him and after him.

But if men are to serve and save their fellow-men, there must be no barrier between them; and how many and high the barriers were Jesus knew well. Barriers of sect and caste Jesus tried to avoid by choosing his followers from among the common people; and by his own example he taught them not to shun the lowliest or the most despised. As we naturally receive children with welcoming goodwill, without suspicion or prejudice, so should we—unnatural, alas, though it is—receive all.

Religion cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the love and service of men. The sabbath law is not valid when it conflicts with the one law that it is right to save and not to destroy. The laws of purity must not check one's foot or hand from helpful ministries. Still less can temple gifts or offerings excuse the neglect of the common obligations of humanity, or be given a place before one seeks reconciliation with the man whom he has wronged.

There are many tempers and actions that raise barriers which contradict love and make true service impossible. Anger, impurity, untruthfulness, secrecy, the judging of one another, covetousness and jealousy, the desire to rule—Jesus pronounced stern judgment on them all; and how persistent they were and are! The most subtle and hard to reach was the last—ambition to rule. Because it seemed to be a Jew's divine right to rule over the nations, and because this belonged to the very essence of the messianic hope, the disciples clung to it tenaciously. It was near the end of Jesus' life when James and John asked for the first places in the coming kingdom; and perhaps nothing but Jesus' death could have brought about some understanding of the truth of his words that he that would be really first must suffer and serve, be last of all and minister of all.

Still further, a man may not only lose or limit the capacity for helpful service, but may even give actual offense and lead his fellows into sin. This contradiction of love called forth our Lord's most terrible denunciations. What woes he uttered against those who would not enter into life themselves and prevented those who would from entering! With what passion he spoke of those who caused others to fall! "Get thee behind me, Satan," he could even say to Peter, when his words were a temptation. "It is impossible," he said again, "but that occasions of stumbling should come, but woe unto him through whom they come. It were well for him if a mill-stone were hanged about his neck and he were thrown into the sea, rather than that he should cause one of these little ones to stumble."

But there are not only obstacles to get out of the way and offenses to avoid, there are difficult positive graces to gain, if one would succeed at all in the imitation of God. Love cannot exist without service, but service can be undertaken without love, as a work to be done for its reward. So undertaken Jesus gives it no praise or promise. To have cast out demons and done mighty works was not a passport to the kingdom of heaven. The will of God is the decisive thing. God's ministry has certain wonderful qualities which ours must have if we are to work out our title to sonship. Untiring forgiveness and patient forbearance are special marks of the divine love. They must be ours since they are God's, and for the added reason that we are ourselves weak and faulty and have no ground for assumption. Not as judges must we offer help to our fellow-men; not saying, "Let me cast out the mote out of thine eye," unconscious of the beam in our own. There must be no aggressiveness and violence. That is not love's way and God's way. We must often sow our seed and leave the result with the seed and the soil. Patience and faith are as needful in one who would save his fellows as energy and goodwill. After all, it is God who saves; we only through him, in his name. Wisdom is needed too. To give pearls to swine is no more loving than it is wise. The new patch on the old garment, the new wine in the old wine-skins, all such rash and disastrous efforts at remedying the wrongs of men, love's insight will avoid. Above all we must not resent and resist wrongs done to us. To do so would be to assert ourselves instead of forgetting ourselves; it would be to

open or widen a breach between us and another over which no helpful ministry can pass; it would be ungodlike. Resistance to personal wrongs satisfies us, but by bearing them we may gain the wrongdoer. In many such words Jesus teaches the hard lesson of the conquest of self. He does not try to make the lesson easy. The self-sacrifice must be full and free, so far as love requires it. To leave parents and friends, to renounce calling or property, may be demanded of some if they are to serve their fellow-men in love. Yet sacrifice for its own sake Jesus never valued; nor did he call men to a sorrowful service, for love does not wear the garb or have the heart of sorrow.

When Jesus is enforcing the requirements of a godlike love, we feel, and should feel, that his ideal is too high for us. None is good save one, that is God. Who then can be saved? The answer of Jesus was: With men it is impossible, but with God all things are possible. All things are possible with God, and yet it is God who has made salvation impossible if it consists in man's unhelped effort to lift himself up into the divine likeness.

But is it, then, man's unhelped effort after likeness to God that Jesus teaches? The expression is very un-Christlike, and suggests that we have in using it somehow slipped away from his meaning. He does, indeed, set the ideal high. None is good save God. Ye shall be perfect as your Father is perfect. But the ideal is love, and the love of God is not only over against us as an unattainable ideal; it is toward us as a giving and saving energy. We love because he first loved us. We do not save ourselves by loving, but God saves us by his love from our one great evil and wrong, an unloving and self-loving heart. He saves us by his love unto a love like his. So we come back again from the imitation of God's love to a trustful acceptance of his love.

The wonderful thing about Jesus' teaching is this very inseparable, inevitable union in it of the highest, hardest ethical duty and the freest and most generous grace. Strive to enter in; many shall strive and shall not be able. Fear not, it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom. We understand his thought best, not when we put it in formal theological propositions, which can never get beyond self-contradictory or wholly one-sided formulas, but when

we look at his own life, and when we look into our own hearts. True faith in God as Father unites in an inner harmony the recognition of him as a supreme law, and the experience of his gracious gifts of forgiveness and moral quickening. It is especially the experience of the divine love as a ruling power of love within us that contains the clue to this union of opposites that makes up the Christian religion. Love is a force morally renewing and vitalizing, mighty in its effects, which cannot be found by searching, but which flows into the soul, as self-assertion and self-interest flow out; and this happens only at the vision and before the presence of God the Father. Yet, though all is received, all is also achieved. We are not passive recipients of a gift. Jesus never discouraged, but always demanded our utmost moral effort. What he required can be called either the acceptance in humility and trust of a divine gift, or the manly undertaking with the whole heart of a divine commission. His promises are to the children, the meek, the trustful; but also no less to those, and only to those, who do the will of the Father in heaven. It is hard to put in words, without apparent contradiction, the significance of love as at once the law of life and the way of salvation. Even Jesus could put it only in paradoxes; but his life is not a paradox. There all is clear, harmonious, and convincing. And our own experience of the meaning of love lifts us above the sense of contradiction.

Love is indeed a law, and a high and hard one; no other is half so hard, but no other is hard at all if this is obeyed. The law of love is the only law that can put all stress on the disposition; for this disposition cannot remain inactive, cannot but put forth all manner of positive and useful activities. The law of love is the only law that can put all stress on deeds, for it cannot be obeyed in act unless it is first a thing of the heart. Deeds of true love are the only deeds that cannot be hypocritical or insincere. The law of love is the only law for whose fulfilment the reward of blessedness can be promised without danger that it will then be observed for the sake of the reward. For the law itself is a denial of selfishness, and one who obeys it for himself does not obey it at all.

Most full of light and meaning is Jesus' dealing with this question of reward. He states the great paradox: "Whosoever would save

his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake (my way, for my cause) shall save it;" but he does not leave us with a paradox. "It is more blessed to give than to receive:" there is the solution of the enigma. The Jews obeyed their law for the sake of securing a part in the blessedness of the world to come; and that they called salvation. But the law of love is one that carries the blessedness in it, and does not simply gain it as wages at the end. Indeed the law of love not only brings joy in the obeying of it, but cannot be obeyed at all except by one who rejoices in it. It cannot be taken up as a burden; or if one approaches it so, resolving to deny himself and take up his cross, he finds the yoke easy and the burden light. Instead of a new labor harder than any other, he finds rest for his soul. Love is the deep source and unfailing spring of joy. One who has drunk of its waters will seek no other to quench his thirst. So in Jesus' view, in contrast to Judaism and to much or most Christianity, the way to salvation is already salvation itself.

It is hard to state the moral demands of Jesus so that they shall not seem to mean an ascetic renunciation of self and of the world. But Jesus did not mean this. The very fact that he cared to heal disease proves it; still more the larger fact that he did not wish to save his disciples out of the world, but to save the world from evil. This is not the devil's world, but God's; and the proof of this fact is the fact that we men have the power to make it God's world by our being and our doing in accordance with his will. "If I by the spirit of God cast out demons, then is the reign of God come upon you." Yet Jesus taught no shallow optimism. He never denied the reality of evil and sin. That God is in his world, that the world as God made it is good, is proved by the fact that we can make it more and more good by working with God and for him.

The difference between the self-denial that Jesus taught and asceticism is world-wide. Asceticism, however severe its chastisements and deprivations, is selfish after all, for it undertakes present austerities for the sake of a greater future happiness. But self-denial is the denial of self. It does not put a future before a present enjoyment, but it puts another's good before our own. Such self-denial is not a denial of one's true self; it is, even if unconsciously, better if unconsciously—a higher assertion of self, an assertion and

realization of the higher self, an act of larger freedom and greater joy. So, though Jesus would have us work for the help and salvation of others, we are working for ourselves at the same time, working out our own salvation. The sacrifice is justified by the gain. We have but sold what we had that we might buy a field that has a greater treasure in it, or a pearl of greater worth than all we now possess—as anyone would do. We have lost something of self only that we may find ourselves. Jesus dares to put the reward plainly before us, knowing that by the way of love we can work for the reward, and yet seek not our own.

We do indeed gain our own by the way of love, but it is not only our own that we gain. Love is a joy that cannot be possessed in isolation; and the salvation that love effects means a perfect community as well as a perfected individual. If God helps us that we may help others, if Christ calls us to follow him that we may bring others to follow with us in the one way of joy, the way of loving ministry, then at last, and more and more, all will be serving one another, and a society not only of peace and happiness, but of mighty efficiency, must arise. Oneness of love does not mean oneness of talent and of task, a monotonous uniformity. Jesus knew, and Paul, fully in his spirit, expressed the thought, that diversity of calling was the characteristic work of the unifying spirit of love. Mutual love cannot but encourage and increase the individual diversity which selfishness too often represses, and must therefore lead to an ever richer and more varied human life, full of all kinds of activity and accomplishment, all in harmony and all for the building up of the community in righteousness and peace and joy. The principles of this larger salvation, this coming of God's reign on earth, Jesus fully revealed. The responsibility for its realization, after all the centuries, still falls upon us.

But the religion of Jesus looks and tends not only toward the goal of a society of men living together as brothers, each contributing in deed and character to the good of all; it looks and it tends also toward the goal of fellowship with God in the world to come. Jesus believed beyond doubt and without fear in a divine salvation, not only from sickness and sin, but from death. The life of love is an eternal life. The hope of heavenly blessedness Jesus set unmistakably before

us, and if he said little about it—or much indeed, but not many things—I think it must have been because to him the difference between the two worlds was not so great as to other men. The same God, the Father, is there as well as here, and therefore we need have no anxious fears for that morrow. The joy that rewards and blesses the ministry of love is here as well as there; it is more blessed to give than to receive; and no other joy than this that may now be ours can be set before us, for this is already such joy as there is in heaven, it is the joy of God. True we have much to hope for. What is ideally true now must then be fully actual. What we inwardly assent to, though it does not yet appear, must have, as it were, outward form and vindication. It is now true that if one would be greatest he must be least of all. Then the truth must be manifest; the first shall be last and the last first. It is now true that blessedness belongs to the poor in spirit, to the meek, to the merciful; the childlike are already the kings among men; God's kingdom belongs to them; but then the lowly shall be exalted. Yet the nature of their glory must be then what it is now. We can have no higher hope than that love, which now remains often a law over against us, may become more and more fully a power within us, our true selves, so that we may be fitted for a freer, larger service, and so for a deeper and more divine joy.

Shall we now close this review of things most certain in the teachings of Jesus, the things to which we may hope for a return in our own time, and that as a unifying and not a divisive movement in our Christianity, without asking what Jesus taught regarding himself and the significance of his own person, his life and death and exaltation and coming? We know what the beliefs of Paul and the earliest Christianity were in this direction, but we face grave difficulties when we seek to discover the thought of Jesus about himself. Opinions differ too widely for us to look for agreement here. The mighty spirit of the apostolic age has at this point created a barrier between us and the mind of Jesus which historians have not succeeded in breaking down. It was inevitable that the religion of the Father should become the religion of the Son. Just how far Jesus anticipated and intended this we cannot say. That God intended it we cannot doubt, though there are forms of it which it is not too bold to say that God did not intend. Yet even in this difficult region

we can, I think, be reasonably sure of some things, and they are things that reconcile us to the remaining uncertainties. We may be sure that Jesus would not have men come only to him, but rather by him to the Father. We may be sure that he would not have them think that they are saved by him from God, from his wrath, or from his justice. We may be sure that he would not have us put his suffering in the place of our self-devotion, his cross in the place of ours, even though it is only his death that perfected and translated into a divine power his message of God's fatherhood. We may be sure that he would not have the worship of him take the place or stand in the way of following in his steps, as he followed in the steps of his Father.

Jesus was certainly conscious of having a true knowledge of God the Father, and gave himself up to living among men and for them the godlike life, which he knew, and knowing could not but love; or shall we say, which he loved,—such was his nature—and loving could not but know, strange and momentous though the knowledge was. What it meant we have seen—a life of self-sacrificing ministry unto death, not for reward, not in the measure of men's merit, but for the joy of seeking and finding the lost, for the blessedness of blessing, for the very consciousness of oneness with the Father. What men must think of God Jesus told them in words and deeds. What they were to think of himself he seems to have left largely for them to decide after his departure from them. Failure and even perversity seem to attend the effort to uncover the thought of Jesus about himself, as if we were on a wrong path even when we speak of the self-consciousness of one whose peculiarity among men was that in a true sense he was unconscious of self, conscious only of God and his love and of man and his need. The tempter had indeed tried to make him think of himself, but he had repelled him by thinking the more of God. Anxiety for bread and life, ambition for power, and all forms of self-concern, he had put from him because they were a denial of God. Men often tried to make him think of himself by praise and by blame, by high expectations and by misunderstanding and accusation. But he would not confuse the following of him and calling him Lord, with doing the will of God; and he would not put weight upon words spoken against him; it was God's cause that

he could not hear maligned, God's spirit which it was an unpardonable sin to blaspheme.

Jesus, we well know, is greater because he so humbled himself, and made himself of no reputation, and took upon himself the form of a servant. He is more our Savior because he so completely set forth God as our Savior. We can say the more of him because he said the less of himself. Our danger is not in too great trust in him, too high a faith, too adoring a worship. But Jesus was not pleased with those who followed him outwardly and called him Master, but did not do the will of the Father. Personal ministry, however natural as an offering of love, he did not seek and did not greatly prize. It was in a ministry like his own to others' needs that he wished service from men. The worship that he could accept was offered, not to him, but to others in his name. To those who so followed in his way as he followed in the way of God he would say: "I was hungry, and ye gave me to eat; I was thirsty, and ye gave me to drink; I was a stranger, and ye took me in; naked, and ye clothed me; I was sick, and ye visited me; I was in prison, and ye came unto me. Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me."

In this region, then, where much is uncertain, may we not say at least this, that the teaching of Jesus is given no radically new direction by what he said of himself; that his religion does not become something different because of the place of his person and death in it, but remains still just that which he made it by his words and deeds, and by the purpose and spirit of his life? It is because I wish in this essay to avoid, as far as possible, matters of controversy that I leave aside the questions—great though their interest is—concerning the value then and the value now of the interpretations of Christianity by Paul and by John. The indispensable worth of these interpretations for their times I do not myself question, and hence I would reverently recognize the hand of the divine providence in their production. The present value of the spirit that breathes through them, and that found in them for the time the most appropriate embodiment, we must rate very high indeed. But the valuations that different minds will put upon those great creations of religious experience and reflection, the letters of Paul and the gospel and epistles of

John, are bound to go widely apart; and it is unfortunate to make our Christian religion rest on various foundations, and not on one cornerstone. It must surely be agreed that it is in the region we have more fully traversed that the surest things in our Christian foundations are to be found; and it will surely in the end be recognized that in these clearest teachings of Jesus we find what is newest, most characteristic, most fundamental in the Christian faith.

That these are the surest things and most free from the charge of historical uncertainty scarcely needs to be argued. What Jesus thought and taught about himself, and what were the sources and what was the value of the thoughts of Paul and of John about him, we can make out, if at all, only by difficult historical researches and by careful reflection. We must restate and elaborate in words of our own, and each in his own way, the evidence of the documents on such questions. On the other hand, the teachings of Jesus which we have reviewed cannot be put in any other words so clear and strong, so self-evident and persuasive, as the words of Jesus in the gospels. The advantage of this fact is obvious, and the fact is added proof that we are on a path that may lead learned and unlearned, bond and free, in harmony toward one goal.

But if the first objection, that of historical uncertainty, is not valid against this return to Christ, does it also escape the other objections stated at the outset? The second was that the Christian gospel is not given in the teachings of Jesus, but only in his death and resurrection. But the teachings of Jesus, we have found, do contain the gospel. His teachings are by no means only a new law, but reveal and impart no less the divine grace and salvation. If the Sermon on the Mount were only a law, the old and still current Jewish objection to it would be valid. It is, they tell us, not a practicable law. It is ideal to the point of impossibility. To love one's enemy is not a possible law. The highest and best law is the Old Testament precept not to do harm, but rather to do good to one's enemies. To resist not evil, to turn the other cheek, is a precept of weakness or of fanaticism, and would be only disastrous in its results. The Jewish Golden Rule, "What thou hatest do to no one," is a truer and more useful law than the positive formulation of it by Jesus. Now, it is true that the Jewish law can be embodied in statutes

and enforced by the courts, while that of Jesus cannot. It is only when we see that it is not in ~~that~~ sense a law that the law of Jesus justifies itself to reason and conscience. The teaching of Jesus is not law, but gospel. It is a revelation of the Father and a summons to sonship. His new law cannot be—was not meant to be—observed in the legal way, as a thing commanded, or with the legal motive, to secure a promised reward. His impracticable precepts were meant to create an atmosphere, to illustrate an attitude toward God and man and life. In spite of its ~~triteness~~ and the danger of cant in its use, we must constantly fall back upon the word “spirit,” in contrast to “letter,” as the best expression for the character of his speech; and the spirit of his words, even ~~when~~ they have the form of command, is full of grace and abounding in life. The gospel of the divine fatherhood, of forgiveness and newness of life, is fully given in the words of Jesus. That his death and resurrection were necessary in order to give power to his gospel, and send it forth conquering, may easily be believed; but it is more important to assent to its truth than to agree as to the means needed to ~~make~~ it prevail.

One objection remains. The return to Christ, it is said, is inconsistent with the principle of development, with that growth and change that are as essential to life in religion as in all things human. This objection relates to the yoke which it is feared the return to Christ will put upon the intellect, as the second objection was the fear of putting a yoke upon will and conduct. Here again the objection would be valid if the return to Christ meant bondage to the letter of his words. But this would be no true return to him. What religion requires, and what we find when we draw near to Jesus, is not an intellectual definition of God and duty, but an experience that awakens in us our dulled sense of God, a person who calls forth in us a living trust and sends us forth upon our duty with a compelling motive and a glowing heart. It is vision and power, not knowledge and rule, that we need and find. If the return to Jesus means for us, not the knowledge that God is a Father, but the living realization that he is our Father and we his sons; if it means, not the declaration that love is the supreme law, but the experience of love as a power conquering sin, arming for service, sending us upon its own tasks with joy; then it will not be open to the charge that it

checks progress and restrains the onward movement of human thought and life.

It is surely unnecessary to defend the return to Christ against those who declare that it means the obligation to adopt all the ideas which he may have shared with his age and which the progress of knowledge has left behind—ideas regarding the constitution of the world and the order of nature, the origin of the Old Testament books, and the course of Israel's history; or even conceptions as to the time and mode of the future coming of the kingdom of God. There could be no more unpardonable perversity than that of one who could set forth the current ideas of Jesus' time about angels and demons, about first things and last things, about history and sacred Scriptures; and then affirm that, since Jesus shared these views, they make up that teaching of his to which we are bidden to return. To all this it is enough to reply that it is not the science of Jesus, but his religion, to which a return is urged. It should not be too hard for us to apply such distinctions to the Bible, and even to the words of Jesus, as we make either consciously or instinctively, in our reading of other books, distinctions between form and substance, between symbol and reality, between the temporary and the abiding, between the explanations of science and the value-judgments of religion.

The truth of the gospel which Jesus taught does not depend on the fact that he taught it. Its power is indeed incomparably heightened by his example in life and death. For us its most convincing demonstration is its embodiment in him. But we ourselves are divinely taught to love one another. Our higher nature responds to a religion in which love is exalted and set upon the throne of God, and made for man that duty which is liberty as well as law. We need the Christ, not to overrule us against our nature, but to enable us to know our better selves and to trust our higher nature. We need him to enlist our purest emotions on the side of our highest ideals. We need him to call forth our enthusiasm for the reign of God and righteousness, to kindle our joy in self-denial. We are not in danger of putting too strongly our need of his primacy and leadership, of his example and command. We need him as the revealer of God and of eternal life, although what he reveals lies

hidden in the depths of our own heart. We need him as redeemer, although the redemption he brings is God's eternal redemption, proceeding out of his unchanging nature.

May we not say, then, that it is only against misconceived efforts to return to Christ that objections have force? It is God whom Christ revealed, whose will he declared and did. To the vision of God, to obedient, trustful, communion with God, to the oneness of love with God, to eternal life with God, he would show his disciples the way. The only right ground on which the summons to return to Christ can rest, is the conviction that we may still best return to God through him. And those who seek and find God in Christ will not find the way blocked by historical difficulties. They will not find that he is unable to lead them all the way to God, nor will they find that the God to whom he leads them is one whose greater works are in the past. The God of Jesus Christ is one who works even until now; one who not only was, but is and is to come.

AFRICA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIAN LATIN LITERATURE

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In bringing his sketch of the African provinces to a close, Theodore Mommsen magnifies their significance for the history of Christianity. He represents the part played by Africa in the development of Christianity as very distinctly a leading one. He even seems to intimate that it was in and through Africa that Christianity received its character as a world-religion: it had its origin, no doubt, in Syria, but it was only through the translation in Africa of its sacred books into the popular language of the world-empire that it was given a world-wide mission.¹ There is some exaggeration here; and were the meaning that the universality of Christianity was a contribution to it of North Africa, the exaggeration would be gross. To Christianity, as to the heaven with which its author compared it, expansion belongs as an inherent quality; and the instrumentalities by which its dissemination was accomplished lay at its hand apart from any gift which North Africa could bestow upon it. With far more insight, though without the advantage of writing after the event, the author of the Book of Acts points to its establishment in the imperial city as giving the promise of its extension throughout the world.

Nevertheless, the possibility of such an exaggeration is a striking indication of the great part which was actually played by North Africa in the history of Christianity. In Africa rather than in Rome the roots of Latin Christianity are actually set. It is from African soil, enriched by African intellect, watered by African blood, that the tree of western Christianity has grown up until it has become a resting-place for all the nations of the earth. If we abjure speculation upon what might have been on this or that supposition, and give attention purely to what actually has been and is, we must needs confess that there is a true sense in which North Africa is the mother of us

¹*Römische Geschichte*, Vol. V (2d ed.), p. 657; English translation, Vol. II, p. 373.

all. Christianity is what it is today, in all its fruitful branches at least, because of what North Africa was a millennium and a half ago, and because of what was done and thought and felt there. The very language in which it still defines its doctrines and gives expression to its devotion is of African origin; and the doctrines and aspirations themselves bear ineffaceably impressed upon their very substance the African stamp.

The great part played by North Africa in fixing the type of western Christianity was of course no mysterious accident. It was the natural result of the dominating influence of Africa in the Roman world² throughout the period when Christianity was establishing itself in the West and fitting itself for its world-wide mission. This dominating influence was manifested in every sphere of life and was fairly symbolized by the ascension of sons of Africa to the imperial throne—not merely in such shadows as Didius Julianus and Albinus, Macrinus, Aemilianus, and Memorius, but in a founder of a dynasty like Septimius Severus. The senate is spoken of by Fronto³ as in his day crowded with Africans, and at the same period the consulate appeared almost their peculiar possession.⁴ It was, however, in the domain of the intellectual life that African dominance had become most apparent.⁵ The eagerness with which letters were cultivated in the country of the Atlas, from the earliest days of the settlement of the provinces, is attested by the allusions which Roman writers make to the African taste for books and oratory. Horace tells us⁶ that whenever the first vogue of a poem was over in Rome, the booksellers had but to pack off "the remainders" to Ilerda or Utica; the Spaniard and African took them up with avidity. Similarly Juvenal, despairing of Rome where employment went by favor, advises barristers who had brains to sell, to betake themselves to Gaul, or "rather," says he,

² Cf. Gregorovius, *Hadrian*, English translation, p. 90.

³ *Epist. ad amic.*, ii (p. 201, ed. Naber; p. 214 ed. Niebuhr).

⁴ Cf. Monceaux, *Les Africains*, p. 347.

⁵ "The Roman province of Africa had for centuries taken a leading place in the literature of the imperial period; and from Hadrian to the beginning of the third century it had set the fashion even for Italy."—Norden, in Hinneberg's *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, volume on "Die griechische und lateinische Literatur und Sprache" (1900), pp. 38 f.

⁶ *Epist.*, i, 20, 13.

to "Africa, that nurse of advocates."⁷ The term he employs may bear a tinge of contempt in it, like Carlyle's "gentleman of the attorney species;" but the fact attested is that the art of speech and the science of pleading were cultivated in Africa with especial zeal and met there with their appropriate reward. Such assiduity in the pursuit of letters could not fail to bear fruit; and after awhile, when Latin literature was languishing in Rome, it was from Africa that new life came flowing in.

There is a somewhat remote sense, indeed, in which Africa may be said to have been midwife to the birth of all Latin literature worthy of the name. It was certainly to the stimulus given to the national life by the Punic wars that the first great impulse to write in Latin must be traced.⁸ But the only direct contribution of Carthage to that flowering of undefiled Latinity—the elegant and even exquisite Terence, whose delicate handling of the language became the model and despair of all subsequent stylists—was of course only one of those remarkable accidents with which the history of letters is filled. Meanwhile this primary impulse, having blossomed in the great republic and fruited in the Augustan age, had in the early years of the Christian era run hopelessly to seed. Rome was once more, so far as literature was concerned, a Greek city; and continued life was infused into specifically Latin literature only by fresh sap flowing in from the provinces. The language of culture in Africa too was at this epoch chiefly Greek.⁹ The extensive compilations of King Juba, whose half-century's reign centers at the birth of Christ, were made in that language. Cornutus, Fronto, Apuleius, Tertullian, the Emperor Severus, all were Greek as well as Latin authors. There is extant even a single piece of Apuleius, composed partly in Greek and partly in Latin. Something similar occurs in the *Passion of Perpetua and Felicitas*, which has come down to us in both Greek and Latin, leaving the scholars divided as to which form is original, many holding

⁷ *Sat.*, vii, 147-49: *nutricula causidicorum Africa*.

⁸ Cf. Simcox, *Latin Literature*, Vol. I, p. 11.

⁹ Monceaux (*Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne*, Vol. I, p. 51) would bid us be cautious lest we overstate this. Cf. also Norden, in Hinneberg, as cited, p. 376; and Leclercq, *L'Afrique chrétienne*, Vol. I, pp. 90 f. On the general subject of the use of Greek in the West, see Harnack, *The Expansion of Christianity*, etc., Vol. I, pp. 19, 20, n. 1; Vol. II, pp. 380, 381; and for Africa, Vol. II, p. 412.

that both are original,¹⁰ or that parts of the original were in each tongue.¹¹ But the traditions of Greek culture were already slowly dying out in Africa, as indeed this bilingual habit itself testifies. While lettered Rome remained still essentially Greek, a vigorous Latin literature was already growing up at Carthage. It was not yet quite ready, however, to enter upon its wider career.¹²

African rhetors and jurisconsults had begun to invade Rome, no doubt, from the days of the Caesars. Lucius Annaeus Cornutus of Leptis, for example, taught the Stoic philosophy at Rome under Claudius and Nero, and earned the loving admiration of pupils like Lucan, and above all Persius, whose panegyrics of his dear master quite touch the stars.¹³ Shortly afterward his fellow-countryman, the rhetorician Septimius Severus, won equal affection and praise from pupils as well worth having, such as Statius and Martial. He is said to have acquired a perfection in the use of the Latin tongue (as it was spoken in Rome—that “native speech of the Quirites” which Apuleius professes to have found beyond his reach),¹⁴ to which his imperial descendants could never attain. At least Statius declares of the rhetorician that no one would have believed he had drawn his origin from barbarous Leptis or had passed his youth away from the collines of Romulus, and greets him as an Italian of the Italians, to whose appearance and speech, or even mental habits, clung not the least taint of provincial ways.¹⁵ It is recorded of the emperor, on the other hand, that he never learned to speak Latin without a strong Punic accent, and of his sister that, when she came to visit him at Rome, he was constrained to send her back to Leptis because of the mortification her abominable Latinity caused him.¹⁶ Only a little later the place that had been filled by Severus was occupied by another African, P. Annius Florus, a man of apparently indefinitely

¹⁰ Hilgenfeld, von Gebhardt, Harnack (1893).

¹¹ Monceaux, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 83.

¹² Cf. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, Vol. II, pp. 594, 597.

¹³ Cf. Oldsmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, p. 53.

¹⁴ At the beginning of the *Metamorphoses* (the *Quiritium indigenam sermonem*).

¹⁵ *Sil.*, iv, 5, 45: *Non sermo poenus, non habitus tibi, | Externa non mens: Italus, Italus.*

¹⁶ *Spartianus, Sever.*, 15 and 19.

less genius, but of no less lofty reputation. The combined careers of these celebrated teachers cover the period from Claudius to Hadrian; and meanwhile the Africans had conquered for themselves also the leading place in the more serious study of law. Hadrian's great jurist, Salvius Julianus, the author of "the perpetual edict," was from Hadrumetum; the high tradition which he established was carried on by his pupil, Sextus Caecilius Africanus, likewise an African; while he found no unworthy rival in Pactumeius Clemens from Cirta.¹⁷

All this was, however, but the prelude of what was to come. The real hegemony of Africa in Latin letters begins only in the second third of the second Christian century. It was from Spain, not from Africa, that in the first Christian age new life flowed in to invigorate the languishing stem of Latin literature. Seneca, Lucan, Tacitus, Martial—these are all Spanish names; and the whole literature of the period bears the stamp of the Spanish character. But as the middle of the second century approaches, the supremacy passes finally from Spain, and what to the Roman ear seemed the *stridor punicus*¹⁸ began to fill the world. No name of the first repute, it must be confessed, adorns the annals of secular Latin literature under the sway of African influence; it is a period of literary decay. At the opening of the period the chief writers that meet the eye are Cornelius Fronto, the tutor and friend of Marcus Aurelius, and Sulpitius Apollinaris, the grammarian, about whom gathered a crowd of fellow-Africans, among them perhaps Aulus Gellius himself, while off in Carthage Apuleius was introducing a new genre in literary form. Its single poet worthy of the name, Dracontius, sings the swansong of the African influence at the end of the period, at the court of the Vandals. Mommsen reproaches it with not having produced throughout the whole of its dominance "a single poet deserving to be remembered,"¹⁹ and its prose tradition was but little higher. The only great poet of the age—Claudian—was, like the African Terence

¹⁷ Cf. Monceaux, *Les Africains*, pp. 74, 345, 346.

¹⁸ The phrase is Jerome's (*Epist.*, 130, 5), but he refers by it to the voice and speech, not to a literary manner. On "African Latin" cf. F. Skotch in Hinneberg, as cited, pp. 433, 434.

¹⁹ *Roman Provinces*, E. T. Vol. II, p. 373.

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of an earlier time, one of those happy accidents, sprung from other blood and formed in other molds. The most important prose-writer of the age—Ammonius Marcianus—was also Greek in origin. The mass of writers who jostle each other through these years were mostly “schoolmasters turned authors,” over all whose work the “trail of scholasticism” runs; rhetors who, though become writers, still mouthed it in their pages with balanced cadences and elaborately constructed rhythms, in which the sense too often was neglected in straining after effects of sound. It is thus not a very attractive literature which Africa contributed to the secular Latin world. But for a period of at least two centuries it constituted all the Latin literature that existed; and throughout this whole period it not only flourished luxuriantly, but commanded the unbounded admiration of men. To those who lived under its spell it did not suffer in comparison with the literature of the Augustan age itself. Septimius Severus may have made it the reproach of his rival aspirant to the purple (Clodius Albinus, an African like himself—and like Apuleius) that he found in the *Golden Ass* his favorite reading;²⁰ but this suggests an exceptional, perhaps not even an honest, judgment. The men of the time sincerely admired the literature of the time and felt themselves living in the heyday of literary art. Carthage seemed to them to have earned a right to the title of second mother of Latin letters. Even Augustine, with the utmost naïveté, declares that the two cities, Rome and Carthage, stand side by side as sources of the stream of Latin letters.²¹ The bad poets of the day looked upon one another as touching the summit of literary accomplishment. “This at least is certain, Luxorius,” said one to another with charming directness, “you have outdone all the ancients.”²² In one of his delightful letters,²³ Apollinaris Sidonius tells us that, if a manuscript were found lying by a lady’s chair, it was pretty sure to prove to be a treatise on religion; if by a gentleman’s, on eloquence. He adds: “I do not forget that there are some writings of equal literary excellence in both branches,

²⁰ Capitol., *Vita Albini*, 12 (cf. Boisier, *L'Afrique romaine*, p. 241).

²¹ *Ep.*, 118, 9, near end (Migne, XXXIII, 468). Cf. Norden, *Kunstprosa*, Vol. II, 592; Crutwell, *Latin Literature*, p. 546.

²² *Anthologie* (Riese), 87: *certum est, Luxori, priscos te vincere.*

²³ ii, 9; cf. Hodgkin, *Italy and its Invaders*, Ed. 1, 1880, Vol. I, p. 319.

that Augustine may be paired off against Varro, and Prudentius against Horace." Here, to be sure, we are introduced to the great Christian writers who adorned the time; and into their writings a new life had been infused, by virtue of which a really great literature was produced under African influence. But the main point is nevertheless illustrated: the characteristics of the literature of the age were the characteristics of the age, and the men of the age found themselves expressed in it and sincerely admired it.

It was in the midst of this period of African dominance that Christianity began to find a voice for itself in a western tongue. In its earliest stages western Christianity had been Greek. With the single exception of that of the African Victor (188 or 189-99), the names of all the Roman bishops up to the death of Callistus in 223 are Greek. The earliest Christian writers in the West wrote in Greek—Clement, Hermas, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and their contemporaries. The change came so swiftly that it can scarcely be spoken of as a transition, and the change was wrought at the hands of the Africans. Latin Christian literature burst upon the world with the suddenness of a tropical sunrise in the burning tracts of Tertullian. Jerome tells us, to be sure, that before Tertullian, Victor and Apollonius wrote in Latin. Such exceptions, even were they substantiated, would only prove the rule. Jerome, however, seems to be in error as regards Apollonius; and the literary product of Victor, who was himself an African, was in any case insignificant. The learned world was startled a few years ago, it is true, by the suggestion that an interesting tract, *Against Gamblers*, which has been preserved among the works of Cyprian, was really the composition of Victor, and in that case probably the earliest Christian Latin writing which has come down to us. The suggestion has not, however, been verified; the tract seems pretty clearly post-Cyprianic in date, and although its provenience cannot be said to be determined with equal certainty, it may very well be African in origin.²⁴ A much more striking exception would be furnished by the *Oclavius* of Minucius Felix, who also was an African, could we suppose it, as many do, to have been produced during the lifetime of Fronto, say about 181 A. D. This

²⁴ Harnack (*Chronologie*, Vol. II, pp. 370-87) now allows its post-Cyprianic origin, but still holds it to be Roman.

much-admired tract is written with all of Fronto's "virtuosity" in the handling of the Latin language, and is crowded with archaisms, bookish allusions to the poets—Vergil, Horace, Lucretius—and reminiscences of the old Greek and Latin Sophists. Its true character is given it, however, by its skill in the new sophistical artifices which characterize all the literature of the African period, and which it never relaxes even in the warmest glow of its Christian indignation. It certainly would fitly enough stand at the head of that series of great but somewhat artificially written Christian writings which are the glory of the Latin literature of the African period, of which it would be an unworthy example only in its somewhat traditional contents and its undeveloped theology. But every internal consideration justifies Jerome's assignment of its origin to a period later than Tertullian.²⁵ In whatever way such questions may be settled, however, in any event the great stream of Christian Latin literature takes its rise in the height of the African influence, and in any event from apparently African-born writers; and thus in any event it must be accounted the gift of Africa to the world. If we see its rise, as apparently we must, in Tertullian, we add merely that this Christian African literature not only rose out of African influences and through African-born agents, but sprang up also on African soil.

From the end of the second century Christianity was the ferment of all cultural and literary development, and the poverty in great names of the secular literature of the period is offset by the richness in them of the Christian literature, from its very origin. For the stream of Christian Latin literature does not begin as a little rivulet which only gradually grows to a river; it bursts out at its source as a great flood. Its earliest examples set for it at once the highest of traditions. Their authors were of course, however, men of their times, imbued with the literary taste of their times. There are exceptions among them, no doubt, as there are exceptions among the secular writers of the period. Lactantius is a shining exception. The noble calmness of his truly classical Latinity knows no rival in the literary product of his day, whether in Christian or heathen circles.²⁶ Hilary of Poitiers is an equally shining exception; and indeed the writers

²⁵ So Massebieau, Monceaux, Neumann, Funk, Harnack.

²⁶ Cf. Norden, *Kunstprosa*, Vol. II, p. 582.

of Aquitaine at large were justly famous for their command of the "Roman speech." No Latin of any age is superior in chaste elegance to that of Hilary at his best.²⁷ But, taken as a whole, the same false taste ruled the great Christian which ruled the small heathen writers of the age. The finically embroidered diction which had been introduced by the Greek Sophists, Gorgias, Hegesias, Himerios—the so-called Asianism or "new rhetoric"—had conquered also the Latin world.²⁸ As it has been pungently expressed,²⁹ the reigning canon of beauty in style had become that "article of faith of all barbarism, that a man must tattoo himself in order to be handsome." Apuleius remains, of course, the supreme example. In him an incredible bombast unites with a painful fastidiousness: alliterations, paronomasiae, assonances, homoioteleuta, balanced clauses, rhythmic terminations, and rhymed endings, simply riot through his pages, in which, as it has been justly said, "a style celebrates its orgies which has degenerated into a mere bacchanalian dance of phonetics."³⁰ But it was not for nothing that the great Christian writers of the African period had all been rhetors before they became theologians, and had received their rhetorical training in the "new style." There is nothing in the way of virtuosity in the use of language in Apuleius which may not, without much searching, be matched in Tertullian. All the fiery impetuosity of that *ardens vir* did not carry him beyond the fashionable artifices; and at his worst—his contemporaries would have said at his best—his style is indistinguishable from that of Apuleius. The same is true, each in his measure, of all the other authors of the period. It is true of Minucius Felix and Cyprian, though of course the graceful elegance native to the one, and the unctious suavity of the other,³¹ modify their use of the rhetorical devices common to all. It is true of Ambrose and of the Gallic writers who adorn the age at a little later time. It is true even of Jerome, whose taste was markedly pure and who knew how to recognize the "Asian tumor" in others, and unsparingly ridiculed the contemporary fashion. Augustine himself, who even in the matter

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 583.

²⁹ By Bernays.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 587.

³⁰ Norden, *loc. cit.*

³¹ *Beatus Cyprianus*, says Cassiodorus, *velut oleum decurrens in omnem suavitatem*. Norden says he is the first Latin writer who has *unction*.

of style towers so much above his age as almost to redeem it, nevertheless never emancipates himself from the traditions of his rhetorical school. In his greater works, where the gravity of the matter absorbs his attention, the wretched artifices, especially word-plays,³² which constitute the signature of the "new style," may retire somewhat into the background. But they are absent from none of his compositions, and in his more popular pieces, where he is most at his ease and is thinking more of the effect he is producing, they obtrude themselves in painful abundance. He knew well enough the beauty of simplicity, but, as he himself would have said, *facilius est errorem definere quam finire*. His pages are studded with such turns of speech as *cetera onerant, non honorant*,³³ *dic "habeo," sed "ab eo,"*³⁴ *o munde immunde*,³⁵ *est enim severitas quasi saeva veritas*.³⁶ If Apuleius can scarcely be opened without exposing the most astonishing examples of elaborate trifling with sequences of sound, and in the matter of balanced clauses and rhyming endings at least—"the sprightly dance of the Asian cola," as it has been called³⁷—Tertullian even surpasses Apuleius, and Augustine will provide us with examples of precisely the same artifices of which we must at least acknowledge that Apuleius and Tertullian might have envied him them. Apuleius may give us such sequences as this:

aut ara floribus redimita,
aut quercus cornibus onerata,
aut fagus pellibus coronata.

Tertullian may provide us with untold numbers such as this:

tot perniciēs
quot et species,
tot dolores
quot et colores;³⁸

or, taking a wider sweep, as this:

quam nec nationibus comparaverat,
ne consuetudine deputeretur,

³² Cf. Hoppe, *Syntax und Stil des Tertullians*, p. 149: "Augustine makes use of all the artificial devices which Tertullian employs, and of the 'play on words' in even greater measure than Tertullian."

³³ *Sermo*, 85, 5: *h* is silent in Augustine's mouth.

³⁴ *Sermo*, 94, 14.

³⁵ *Sermo*, 105, 6.

³⁶ *Sermo*, 171, 5.

³⁷ Usener: *der rasche Tans asianischer Kola*.

³⁸ *Scorp.*, I.

quam absens iudicaret
 ne spatium reus luceretur,
 quam advocata etiam domini virtute damnaverat,
 ne humana sententia videretur.³⁹

But it is Augustine who writes, almost as if by force of habit, thus:

eo nascente superi novo honore claruerunt,
 quo moriente inferi novo timore tremuerunt,
 quo resurgente discipuli novo amore exarserunt,
 quo ascendente coeli novo obsequio patuerunt.⁴⁰

Such flowers of speech, with their elaborate assonance, balance, rhythm, and rhyme, cannot, of course, be transplanted into other tongues. Take, however, only the one item of rhyme, and how would it sound in English prose to be constantly tripping upon passages like this: "When He was born, to heaven a new honor was given; when away he was torn, all hell with new terror was riven; when He arose, the disciples with new love were affected; when He ascended, the angels were to new service subjected"?⁴¹ It strikes us with a shock to observe that the very martyrs in the mines cannot return their thanks for supplies sent by charity to their necessities without lapsing into the literary preciosity of the times.⁴²

Despite their common preoccupation with such rhetorical devices, however, the greatest possible difference in tone and spirit obtains between the heathen and Christian writers of the period. In the

³⁹ *Pud.*, 14 *fm.* Many other examples are given by Hoppe, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁴⁰ *Sermo*, 199, 2, *ad fm.* (Migne, XXXVIII, 1028). Norden, *Kunstprosa*, adduces other examples.

⁴¹ English Euphuism (like, no doubt, Spanish Guevaraism before it) which, as Mr. Morley (*English Writers*, Vol. VIII, pp. 316 f.) points out, was "an outcome of the revival of the study of Demosthenes and Cicero, and of the Greek and Latin works upon the art of speaking," can scarcely be looked upon as anything else than a revival of Asianism. John Lyly would not be inaptly described as an English Apuleius; and Dr. Landmann's description of his style would stand very well for a characterization of that of Apuleius: "a peculiar combination of antithesis with alliteration, assonance, rhyme, and play upon words, a love for the conformity and correspondence of paralleled sentences, and a tendency to accumulate rhetorical figures, such as climax, the rhetorical question," etc. (*Der Euphuismus*, etc., Giessen, 1881). Some interesting remarks on what may similarly be thought "the Asian rhetoric" in Arabic prose—the so-called *Al Saʿa* or *Al-Badʿa*—may be found in Lady Burton's edition of R. F. Burton's *Arabian Nights*, I, xiv; VI, 338.

⁴² Cyprian's letters, *Ep.* 77, 3.

case of the one this bizarre rhetoric entered into—or, perhaps we may say, constituted—the very essence of their work; they wrote in a true sense for its sake. In the case of the other, it was a mere accident of form, marring the dignity of their presentation indeed, but never concealing the earnestness of their purpose, or destroying the vigor or inherent eloquence of their product. In other words, Latin literature was fast sinking to the level of a mere rhetorical exercise when Christianity entered in with regenerating breath and once more recalled it to serious concernment with the matter of discourse. We may perceive the revolution even in the brutal pages of Arnobius, or perhaps we may more pungently say even in the polished periods of Minucius Felix. We do not need to go beyond Tertullian, however, to observe the whole contrast in its most striking manifestation. We have noted how deeply imbued Tertullian was with the artificial rhetoric of the day. His treatise on *The Mantle*, for example, almost outdoes Apuleius himself and has been described as simply “an oratorical debauch in which are prodigally expended all the resources of rhetorical invention.”⁴² Nevertheless, Tertullian never made rhetorical effect his chief object in writing, nor was the machinery of rhetorical artifice, however freely employed, ever permitted to put shackles upon either his thought or his passion. He even speaks shamefacedly of lapses into rhetorical devices as unfitting in the bearers of such a message as Christians had committed to them, and due merely to the exigences of debate. “We rhetoricise, just as we philosophize,” he says, “only on the provocation of the heretics.”⁴³ Despite its frequent artificiality of form, accordingly, his speech remained ever a speech of flame, and before the intense energy of his expression the rhetorical framework continually gives way. It has been justly pointed out⁴⁴ that the Latin language was never carried to a higher pitch of passionate expression, or made the vehicle of a fuller, richer, or more poignant emotional life, than in the hands of this most subjective and individual of all Latin writers. He strains the capacity of the language to the breaking-point in his determination

⁴² Boissier, *L'Afrique romaine*, 259.

⁴³ *De res. carn.*, 5: *ita nos rhetoricari quoque provocant heretici, sicut etiam philosophari.*

⁴⁴ Norden, *Kunstprosa*, Vol. II, pp. 610, 611; cf. Hoppe, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

to give full vent to the intensity of his feelings. With the utmost license he coins new words, imposes new senses upon old ones, crowds Latin forms into Greek idioms, elevates, intensifies the implications of terms and constructions alike—until there emerges from his hands what is really a new tongue, that Christian Latin of which he more than any other single author is the creator.⁴⁵ It was a veritable miracle that he wrought, and we need not wonder that it was not accomplished without some violence and recklessness. In a period of decadence the Latin tongue acquired in the hands of this linguistic genius a power of adaptation in giving expression to ideas hitherto unknown to it, such as it scarcely was able to exhibit in its most flexible period, when Cicero sought to popularize in it the Greek philosophy.⁴⁶

Speaking broadly, Christian literature differentiated itself from the heathen, indeed, precisely as the literature of content from the literature of form. The heathen literature of the time was ruled by the maxim of art for art's sake. The maxim of the Christians was truth for truth's sake. In theory at least, the Christians were ready to carry their distinctive principle, indeed, to absurd extremes. From the first they defended the proposition that a sober and homely dress alone comported with the great truths they had to communicate; and they professed fear lest the meretricious charms of form should distract attention from the tremendous import of the matter. Here too the only suitable adornment seemed to them to be the inner adornment inherent in the beauty of naked truth. It was their constant contention, therefore, as Gregory the Great expresses it in his unmeasured way,⁴⁷ that it were an indecency to straiten the words of the heavenly oracle even under the rules of Donatus. Like the Master himself, they urged, the message should be without form or comeliness. So fanatical a theory, of course, could not be reduced to practice; and they who gave it its most extreme expression, like Gregory the Great himself—whose whole rhetorical form is cast in

⁴⁵ Cf. Harnack, *Chronologie*, Vol. I, p. 667; and Norden in Hinneberg, p. 389. The latter says: "His style is without moderation like his nature; he breaks through the traditional forms instead of adjusting himself to them; but it is just in this that his greatness lies in this sphere too; he was the creator of a Latin ecclesiastical language."

⁴⁶ So Hoppe, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴⁷ *Moral.*, *præf.* I.

the Asian mold—were the last to attempt to put it into practice. Men wrote, if they wrote at all, to be read; and to be read they needed to write more or less in accordance with the canons of the art they affected to despise. At first, no doubt, a real simplicity of speech came naturally to the lips of Christians. The writers of the New Testament and the Apostolic Fathers are comparatively innocent of conscious rhetorical art,⁴⁸ and the popular sermons, particularly in the West, preserved for a considerable period more or less reminiscence of this early relative stylelessness. But already the Apologists, addressing heathen rather than Christian readers, began inevitably to write more after the fashion in vogue among the heathen. After them the barriers were broken down; and every device known to heathen rhetorical art became the ordinary medium of expression for Christians also. These unmeasured expressions of contempt for form which characterize the whole series of Christian writers must be read, therefore, only as a natural reaction of mind against the equally unmeasured riot of rhetoric which marked the times. And the reaction went only far enough to supply a much-needed corrective of the rage for superficial ornament; and secured only that the matter should not be lost in the form. Its effect was not to separate the Christian from the heathen as a mass of formless writers standing over against the formed. Its effect was only to infuse earnestness of purpose into their literary product, to recall attention from the externals of speech to its burden, and to save Latin literature from rotting down into a mere idle song of an empty day.

Certainly no personality could be imagined better fitted than Tertullian, by training, natural gifts and temperament, to break out the channel for this new literature of substance in the West. In him Chris-

⁴⁸ How important it is to exercise caution in speaking thus even of the New Testament writers may be learned from F. Blass, *Die Rythmen der asianischen und römischen Kunstprosa* (Leipzig, 1905), in which he endeavors to show that not only the Epistle to the Hebrews but the epistles of Paul are written under the rules of the Asian cola (cf. also his *Textkritisches zu den Korintherbriefen* in Schlatter and Lütgerts *Beiträge zur Förderung christl. Theologie*, Vol. X, No. 1 [1906], pp. 51-63; and J. Dräseke, in *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftl. Theologie*, 1906, Vol. I, pp. 133f.). On the other hand, compare the review of Blass by A. Deissmann in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, April 16, 1906; No. 8, pp. 231f. (also, more briefly in the *Theolog. Rundschau*, Vol. IX, No. 5 [June, 1906], pp. 227f.).

tian Latin literature attained the summit of its greatness at a leap.⁴⁹ And it was fortunate in the successors which it gave to Tertullian, who worthily carried on the tradition begun by him. For a full century, they were all, like Tertullian, Africans. Until the opening of the fourth century, with the exception of the Greek, Irenaeus, there existed no Christian literature at all in Gaul;⁵⁰ and, with the exception of Novatian (who wrote in the middle of the third century), no Latin Christian literature in Italy. The great Christian writers, in the meantime—Cyprian, the suave ecclesiastic, and Lactantius, the “Christian Cicero”—and the small ones too—Minucius Felix the elegant, Arnobius the inelegant, and Commodian the first Christian poet—were all alike Africans of the Africans. Nor did the scepter depart from Africa when a Christian Latin literature had sprung up elsewhere. Pannonia furnished the first Latin Christian commentator in Victorinus of Petau, and the greatest of all Latin Christian men of letters in Jerome. Gaul in Hilary of Poitiers gave the world a rare theologian. Italy offered in Ambrose the typical ecclesiastical statesman of all time. Spain in Juvenus and Prudentius opened up the stream of Christian Latin poetry. But Africa still held the palm in philosophy in the person of Victorinus, and in Augustine⁵¹ set the capstone on Christian Latin literature as she had laid its foundations in Tertullian. From Tertullian to Augustine—the two hundred years which stretch between constitute the period of African supremacy in Christian Latin letters—the names themselves mark the supremacy of Africa in Christian thought. They are the names of the two greatest forces in western theology; and perhaps we should

⁴⁹ Cf. the somewhat varying estimates of Tertullian by Monceaux and Hoppe. Norden (Hinneburg, p. 38) strikingly says: “Passion which knew no measure is stamped on his nature; hardly any other fanatic has known as he knew how to hate; he almost never spoke in tones of love, that most beautiful fruit of Christianity; therefore we cannot love him, however much we may admire him.”

⁵⁰ Monceaux, *Cyprian*, p. 132.

⁵¹ Norden (Hinneberg, p. 391) appreciatively says: “Yes, we dare to say it, Augustine was the great poet of the ancient church, though, just as little as Plato, does he write in verse. These two belong together as the great poet-philosophers of all time.” Cf. the eulogy of Eucken, *Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, 2d ed., pp. 216 f., beginning: “Augustine is the single great philosopher on the basis of Christianity. All the results of the past and all the suggestions of his own time he takes up into himself in order to create of them something new again.”

omit the qualification "western." What western Christianity is today is largely what Tertullian and Augustine have made it—Tertullian as the initiator, Augustine as the consummator. The whole history of Latin Christian thought runs up to and down from Augustine as its water-shed. All that precedes him was preparation for him; all that follows him only registers the effects of his labors. And Augustine was but the ripe fruitage of African theology. After him the *studium* might well depart to Gaul, as it did, while Africa lay crushed under the heel of the Vandal.⁵² But it carried to Gaul with it only African problems; and the whole history of Christian thought in the West for the next thousand years is determined by the efforts of the church to adjust itself to African Augustinianism—efforts which did not cease until Augustinianism was cast finally out of the old church and created a church for itself in what we know as the Reformation.⁵³

⁵² Cf. Norden, *Kunstprosa*, Vol. II, p. 587.

⁵³ Cf. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Vol. V, p. 3.

THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES ON THEOLOGY

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The rise of history to a dominating position in the theological curriculum and the present powerful influence of historical studies on scientific theology are both of recent origin.

In the Middle Ages systematic theology inhabited the house and exegesis camped on the doorstep. In Wycliffe's time the exposition of the biblical books was left to the immature bachelors of theology. When the professors chose their hours for lectures, the exegetical lecturers had to take the leavings, and their pet-name was "bulls of Abraham and asses of Balaam." In Luther's early days a young man entering on an academic career had to serve as *baccalaureus ad biblia* for two semesters, and was then promoted to the higher task of expounding the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard. The Revival of Learning began a change. The new passion for the literary and historical study of the classics reacted on theology. It, too, began to con its classics, the Greek and Hebrew Bible. Polemical necessities further forced the exegetical studies on Protestants. They needed authorities wherewith to confront the ancient testimony which the councils, the Fathers, and the scholastic doctors bore to the doctrines and institutions of the papal church, and so they summoned the still more ancient and hallowed witnesses of the biblical books. Every Protestant preacher had to become an expert on the Bible for fighting purposes. Theological teaching at the great school of Geneva under Calvin and Beza consisted mainly in the exposition of the Bible. Today the study of theology is pre-eminently a study of the Bible. In our seminaries the biblical departments predominate in the composition of the faculties and in the proportion of hours devoted to them. A revolution has thus taken place in the study of theology since the Reformation. Systematic theology

still occupies the parlor, but the Cinderella of exegesis has moved from the kitchen-stoop into the house and occupies most of it.

History came in when exegesis entered; for our study of the biblical books, after all, is simply the study of the supreme historical records concerning that ancient religious life out of which Christianity grew, and that new religious life which it produced. Yet the enthronement of biblical studies through the Reformation did not immediately involve the supremacy of history in general. The high theories of inspiration set the biblical books apart from all other historical records. They were divine; all other records were human. The apostles had an infallible teaching authority. What was taught and practiced while they presided over the church was true and authoritative; whatever came after was human frailty and error. Thus the apostolic age was cut off from all subsequent church history as *sui generis*. Today every phrase of the New Testament is studied with reverent care; of the literature immediately succeeding the apostolic books most ministers probably barely know the names, and few have ever read them. Men bring to the seminaries a deep reverence for the Bible—in theory at least—and a desire to study it. As for church history, that is one of the disciplinary crosses which the inscrutable counsel of boards and faculties imposes on those who mean to be “scholarly preachers.” It is with a start of genuine surprise that students wake up to find that history is actually interesting and may possibly play a really important part in their theological training.

In popular estimation church history, at least in the more radical group of Protestant bodies, stands now where exegesis stood before the Reformation. It still needs a plea on its behalf. The purpose of this paper is to show that history holds an essential place in the total of theological sciences, and that it irrigates and fertilizes all other departments of theology.

Theology is now commonly divided into four groups of sciences. Exegetical theology comprises all studies that deal with the Bible. Historical theology includes all of the history of religion not fenced off by exegetical theology. Systematic theology systematizes our religious comprehensions according to logical and speculative methods; its three main departments are apologetics, ethics, and

dogmatics, which latter we often call "theology" for short. Practical theology in homiletics, liturgics, and pastoral theology turns to practical use the scientific material worked out in the other three departments. We are to consider, then, how the study of history, by the information which it imparts, and by the methods of work and the habits of mind which it cultivates, enlarges, vitalizes, and balances each of these other great realms of theological study.

All recent developments in the biblical sciences have taught us how intimate and organic is the relation between the biblical books and the contemporary life in which they originated. We could as well hope to understand the foot of a camel apart from the sands of the desert, or the foot of a heron or crane apart from the mud of the creek-bed, as to understand Jeremiah apart from the international politics of western Asia, or Paul apart from the cosmopolitan life of the Roman Empire. Every really valuable biography interprets the man through his ancestry and his material and spiritual environment; otherwise he remains like Melchizedek, "without father, without mother, without genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life"—a mysterious waif picked up on the ocean of life. In the same way a biblical book gets its significance only in connection with its historical environment. Its interpretation will be the more penetrating and fruitful, the more the interpreter knows of contemporary history.

On the most important questions of historical criticism of the New Testament no one is competent to speak unless he knows the second century as well as the first. How can he judge either for or against the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles unless he knows the process by which the organization of the church developed? How can he pronounce either for or against the genuineness of John's gospel unless he knows the literature and history of the Gnostic drift? It is not enough to know when and where the first allusions or direct quotations from a book appear in patristic literature. He must have a vivid and trained feeling for kindred or divergent modes of thought, for the changing points of approach, for the questions that were living or dead issues in the year 150 or 100 or 75. In important questions of textual criticism also it is essential for a New Testament scholar to know what currents of Christian thought

flowed and eddied about a given text in the early generations, cutting away its uncomfortable edges, or leaving a sedimentary deposit of later thought to settle and cement in the cracks and nooks of the text.

Human life is continuous, and a subsequent period of history is always the most valuable interpreter of an earlier period. Imagine a naturalist studying a pollywog. He might conclude that the broad tail of the pollywog was ever to be its chief means of locomotion; but the later development of the animal shows him that this great organ is to dwindle and disappear. On the other hand, he finds four insignificant buds on its body, and might slight them in his attention; but an older pollywog teaches him that these are to be the powerful legs of the frog. We are apt to measure the force and influence of an idea or institution by the space which it occupies in the New Testament. But in fact the fundamental convictions which a writer shares with his public are often treated most briefly because they need no discussion, while side-issues are discussed at length because they badly need fortifying. It is natural for us to assume that the theology of Paul dominated the thought of the apostolic age, because it dominates our New Testament both in bulk and in force. But the study of subsequent Christian literature shows us that, while his themes of thought and his leading terms and phrases continued to attract the attention of thoughtful Christians, his most essential convictions—for instance, on law and grace, on the need of the atoning death, and on the future of Israel—exercised surprisingly little influence on the generations immediately following him. As Harnack wittily puts it: "Only one gentile Christian understood Paul, Marcion—and he misunderstood him." But such an observation in post-apostolic thought must modify our conception of the ruling ideas in apostolic times. On the other hand, there are allusions in the New Testament which we are likely to overlook unless we know from church history how important these ideas and facts became in later Christianity. For instance, the references to the hostile power of magic and sorcery encountered by Christian missions; the allusion of Paul to a baptism for the dead; the casual expression of a vivid belief in the reality and power of demons—these are traits of first-class importance in the religious physiognomy of that age. The line of interest has shifted so completely in modern Christian

thought that great tracts of the New Testament lie dim and blurred on the outskirts of our field of vision, unless church history teaches us to focus them. Thus we glide lightly over Paul's discussion of the charismatic gifts and over the expressions about the speedy return of the Lord, and hardly realize that here we feel the very heart-throb of primitive Christianity. It is astonishing how long biblical scholarship was blind to the most important inner struggle of the apostolic era, the conflict between Jewish and gentile Christianity. It is a dead issue to us, and so we failed to see the footprints and the broken armor marking where the battle raged.

I appeal to anyone who has ever given a careful reading to the early Fathers, whether he has not returned to his New Testament with eyes open to things he never saw there before, and with a deeper realization of its value. When we have been in contact with the ethical legalism and the sacramental superstitions of the Fathers, we feel the glorious freedom and the pure spirituality of Paul like a mighty rushing wind in a forest of pines. When we have walked among the dogmatic abstractions of the Nicene age, the Synoptic Gospels welcome us back to Galilee with a new charm, and we feel that their daylight simplicity is far more majestic and divine than the calcium light of the creeds.

Thus the study of ancient church history vivifies New Testament interpretation and acts as a corrective in it. In turn New Testament studies become most living and helpful where they verge into history. The history of New Testament times, the life of Christ, the life of Paul, the history of the apostolic age, lie on the border between exegetical and historical science. The biblical theology of the New Testament is the first and fundamental chapter in the history of doctrine. It now follows the same method of investigation with striking results. Unless exegesis works up the material for such a historical summarizing and digesting of its results, it is likely to lose itself in fruitless minutiae, cutting out tidy proof-texts for theology and pretty sermon texts for homiletics, but never gaining a living comprehension of the Bible which it claims to expound.

When we pass on to consider the effect of historical study on systematic theology, it is easy to see that work in church history gives a student an easy familiarity with the terms and the funda-

mental issues in speculative theology. There is not a question in dogmatics and ethics which is not traversed again and again in the history of doctrine.

Moreover, the perspective is different and new. In systematic theology doctrines are treated according to their relative importance in the systematizing of truth. In history they are treated according to the influence which they have actually exerted in religious life. For instance, systematic theology has to give full space to the proofs for the existence of God, and it touches very lightly the doctrine of angels and demons. In practical Christian life the existence of God has needed little proof, while the belief in good and evil spirits has been of vital importance in Christian piety until very recently.

Systematic theology usually sets forth the erroneous views as a dark foil to the true view. They are mere dead timber to be cleared away. When heretical views are thus detached from the men who held them and the times which produced them, they seem mere vagaries and aberrations. When history sets them in their environment, they light up with life and warmth as honest efforts to find the truth or necessary attempts to guard against an overstatement on the other side. Thus the historical study of doctrine gives not only familiarity and freshness, but a human breadth of sympathy and intimacy of insight into the whole round of speculative thought. Historical and speculative theology supplement each other in the most valuable fashion.

In the history of doctrine we see the doctrines in the making. In all study of life we comprehend the adult forms only by following their beginnings. There is no biology without embryology. We even push our quest beyond the forms of life now existing and interrogate the rocks for the extinct ancestry of the living forms. The study of the embryo applies the historical method to the individual organism. The study of the fossils applies the same historical method to genera and classes, and even to the development of all life. The doctrine of evolution is a daring hypothesis and generalization drawn from this historical method, and whatever its fate, its fertilizing influence in modern thought cannot be gainsaid.

Now, the same method is being applied more and more to the sciences dealing with human life. No one can philosophize fruit-

fully without knowing the history of philosophy. The science of political economy was doctrinaire and misleading until it began to employ the historical method. History has been regenerated within the last hundred years by the scientific determination to understand events and institutions through their genetic processes.

It is clear that theology needs the historical method of approach. Whatever is now in theology has slowly come to be in it. If we examine only our present doctrinal convictions, we see them side by side, like points on a line. When we comprehend their origins we add another dimension, and when we have two dimensions we have perspective. Without history theology is like one of the pictures on the Chinese fans, without perspective. How can we understand the formulation of a doctrine philosophically, unless we understand it in its causes?

The sense of continuity and development bred by historical studies is one of the most necessary equipments for a theologian. It is interesting to imagine how the course of Christian history would have been changed if the leaders of the early church had only had a modern training in history. Higher education in the Roman Empire was almost wholly literary and rhetorical. History was mainly read to get themes for rhetorical exercises and pretty oratorical illustrations. The church fathers, who were trained under this system, were almost devoid of the historical sense. Heathen and Gnostic writers made very serious attacks on the inferior morality of the Old Testament. We today should concede, as a matter of course, that much of the Old Testament records the ethical and religious conceptions of a primitive people, but we should point with admiration and awe to the fact that the development of this people was wonderfully toward the light. We should see its divineness, not in what the Jewish religion was at any given time, but in what it was coming to be all the time. The church fathers had no such conception of the upward slant in religious history, and they had no adequate reply to the Gnostic challenge. The expedients employed to vindicate the Old Testament and to silence their opponents were deeply influential in the development of the church, and their effects continue to this day.

History is a renovating and reformatory influence in theology.

In the nature of things, dogmatic theology is slowest of all departments of theology to change. It has always striven to make its fundamentals immutable by creeds and formulated dogmas, just as a builder strives to make the foundations of a great structure unshakable. Systematic theology embodies the net results of all theological studies. It is the capitalized hoard of all their earnings, and just as economic capital hates to see its securities depreciate, so theology dislikes to discover that some golden candlestick which it has long lighted in honor of its Lord, is only plated and that the brass is wearing through. It is pathetic to watch the consternation of the scholastic theologians of the sixteenth century, when their venerated authorities were flouted by the men of the new learning, and the textbooks which they had laboriously learned to expound were dumped into the gulf of oblivion with a splash. The most solid dogmas of the church were called in question, as if they were mere hypotheses, and they were challenged to prove them from the Greek and Hebrew Scriptures, in which, alas, they felt as much at home as a cat in a strange garret. When the Reformers appealed to the Bible and the early Fathers against the scholastic theology, they simply appealed to the original historical sources against the legendary and falsified history of the church. They cried to history to come and help them renovate theology.

The conservative instinct is strong in all human life—in politics, in social life, in educational institutions, in scientific thought—and its strength is justified. But it is doubly and trebly intensified in religion. What is merely old in religion is hallowed by religion. For instance, the Roman church still uses the Latin in its liturgy. It was the living language when the church was young, and the church clung to its sacred phrases when Latin became a dead language. The organization of the early church was largely an ecclesiastical duplication of the political organization of the civilization within which it originated. The hot and plastic life of the church ran into the molds of organization furnished by the Roman Empire. The empire has crumbled into dust; the church has sanctified its duplicate of the organization, surrounded it with a hundred conservative safeguards, and declared it an essential and immutable part of its existence. Political conservatism worked in clay; religious conser-

vatism worked in brass. Similarly, Catholic theology today is a renovated mediaeval scholasticism. Protestant theology originated in a revolutionary break with the past, and thus at the outset it shook off most of the incubus of the past with one sweep. It originated simultaneously with modern intellectual life and is wide open to its influence. But the tenacious conservatism which religion breeds by teaching awe and reverence for holy things will always persist. It secretes a kind of calcareous shell within which it may shelter its holy life; but unless, like the chambered nautilus, it finds ways also of moving its life into more spacious chambers, it will be cribbed and strangled by the very safeguards that were meant to protect it. If theology values its mission, it must keep open to reformatory influences. It must always embody the best thought of its age, or its age will seek religion outside of theology.

Whence, then, are the influences to come for this incessant and quiet renovation? They come to theology at large mainly from contemporary secular life. They come to systematic theology in particular mainly through exegetical and historical studies. By exegesis and history speculative theology can keep in contact with the facts of religious life and can correct its speculations. The doctrines of natural science, too, have to be kept constantly subject to revision through observation and laboratory experiment. Theology has no chemical test-tubes and gelatine cultures with which it can experiment to test its doctrines. Its experiments on individuals would take a lifetime to show results; its experiments on nations and churches, centuries. History is the only laboratory of theology.

The scientific study of history is also the best method for training the scientific temper and the critical faculty in theologians; and the critical faculty is absolutely necessary. When God put eyes in our head to examine our food, and sensitive touch in our finger-tips to handle it, and set the nose right above the mouth to smell of it, and the taste papillae on our tongue to judge of it before it goes down irrevocably, he put the divine indorsement on criticism, low and high. The critical judgment is to the soul what the senses are to the body. It sits at the entrance-gate to our mind and scrutinizes the ideas that seek to enter. Woe to those who would drug the watchman at the gate. Neither ancient nor mediaeval civilization had

any real natural science nor any training in historical criticism, and consequently both the Fathers and the scholastics were very dogmatic and amazingly credulous.

Thus history contributes to systematic theology familiarity with its material, freshness of perspective, human sympathy with its thinkers, biological comprehension of its origins, self-reformatory impulses, and the training of the critical faculty.

We have spoken of exegetical and systematic theology. Let us now inquire what historical theology contributes to practical theology.

Here at first sight we are disappointed. A student approaches the study of church history with a fine hope of being stocked with telling illustrations for his sermons; but he is quite as likely to find that church history robs him of his choicest historical illustrations. How Constantine saw a vision of the cross with the legend: "In this sign conquer;" how Julian the Apostate dashed a handful of his blood toward the sky and cried: "Thou hast conquered, Galilean;" how Luther climbing the Scala Santa at Rome on all fours, heard the words: "The just shall live by faith," and how he threw his ink-bottle at the devil—these are some of the most cherished possessions of homiletics; and when church history tells a student that all of these are almost forsaken of historical proof, he may well cry mournfully to his professor: "You have robbed me of all the history I knew." If a man wants to beg for the old clothes of anecdote to cover his intellectual nakedness, he will do well to give scientific historians a wide berth, and knock at the door of the short-cut pulpit commentaries which collect the facts that aren't so for the benefit of the thinkers who can't think.

Church history could indeed furnish illustrations of immense force—illustrations that would be more cogent than any argument. It could proclaim in tones of thunder that sin will wreck both men and nations; that light is sown to the righteous, but that when men or churches say to the Lord, "Depart from us," not even the Almighty can do anything for them. But such use of historical material which will be both spiritual and scientific is possible only when the hearers are familiar with the main facts thus lighted up and interpreted. If the great historical names are as strange to them as the Man-

churian villages in the late war, such use of history is very difficult. A preacher must have complete control of information and much literary skill to sketch an unknown historical situation with rapid strokes. In our country the level of historical knowledge in our audiences is low. For many people the Crusades are almost the only familiar tract in the landscape for a thousand years, between the migration of the nations and the voyage of Columbus. As higher education rises among the people, real history will become both available and indispensable to the preacher.

But if history does not furnish as much ready-made sermon material as one might expect, it certainly has unrivaled power to quicken and discipline the mind and character of the preacher.

A biblical preacher must be able to make the situations and the men of the Bible live again, so that we may feel the passionate heart-throb of David, or divine what happened in that darkened chamber at Damascus where Saul the Pharisee saw the convictions of the past crumble away and a new world, with a crucified Messiah as the center, rising from the ruins. It takes wide sympathy and knowledge of human life thus to make dead life live again. A vital comprehension of present-day life is the prime requisite; the study of history is next to it. If a man has learned to think himself into the heart of any historical situation he can do it by so much better with the Bible; for all human life is essentially the same.

History broadens the sympathies and counteracts sectarian narrowness. Sectarianism is part of original sin. A priest of the old historical churches is quite as likely to have it as a pugnacious advocate of a young and microscopic denomination. But it always narrows. When a man says, "I am of the party of Paul," he really means: "What Peter and Apollos say is no concern of mine." Hence Paul insists on a catholic communism in spiritual possessions: "All things are yours." The study of religious history makes us see the pernicious untruth of many a doctrine, and the essential love for truth and the nobility of purpose of many of the men who held it. It helps us to obey Carlyle's wise exhortation: "When you find a lie, kill it tenderly as though you loved it."

A man accumulates wide observation and ripeness by the time he is too old to make much use of it. History gives a man something

of the wisdom of age while his powers are young: It is easy to mark a man who has traveled and lived in the large currents of the world's life. Similarly it is easy to mark the preacher who has historical breadth. If he lacks it, we may approve all that he means to say and yet have to disapprove all that he does say, because it is so crude and ill-balanced.

Our conceptions of history deeply influence our practical efforts for the moral advancement of mankind. In our dealings with individuals, in evangelism or education, we are guided by our working theories of psychology. We have our simple scheme of how human nature works and how it can be improved. If our scheme is seriously defective or false, we shall not only fail to handle our human material aright, but we are likely to do actual damage to it. For instance, I never understood the intimate connection between physical adolescence and the moral and religious awakening until I had left the pastorate, and I now look back with deep regret to the neglected opportunities of intelligently helping the young in their moral and religious crises. Similarly, in dealing with human life on a larger scale we are guided by our working scheme of the social life of humanity. We have our private philosophy of how humanity lives and how it can be turned to good or evil. This philosophy is decisive in our own efforts for humanity, and in our judgments about the efforts of others and about contemporary social movements. If, now, our conception of the forces and methods by which moral progress is achieved is seriously defective or false, we shall waste our own efforts and misjudge the efforts of others who possibly know better than we. With the best intentions we are likely to hinder real progress by all the authority we exert. False views of history may turn the moral leaders into moral hamperers.

Let us take an illustration. The popular conception is that great religious reformatory movements are due to purely spiritual forces. Thus Wycliffe and Huss opposed the papacy and spread evangelical doctrines. Luther boldly challenged the Roman church when he nailed up his Ninety-five Theses. He translated the Bible and appealed to the religious spirit of Germany; and so the Reformation was begun. The motive power was religious; social and political life played a part only in so far as the religious revival stimulated

them for good. This is the popular construction of history, and it is largely misleading. The fact is that Wycliffe began as a patriotic Englishman to oppose the papacy, which was then a mere tool of the French, with whom England was at war. His reformatory influence on Christian doctrine was possible only in the conjunction of political and social forces then existing in England, and was almost effaced when that conjunction changed. Luther's Theses were not a ringing challenge of the Roman church, and a break with his church was then far from his mind. They were a halting and uncertain protest against a prevalent abuse within the church. The Reformation was in full swing in Germany before the translation of the Bible began to appear. Luther had no clear conception of the importance of that step when he began to translate it. The Reformation did not begin as a protest against false doctrine, but as a revolt against corruption and graft in the church, and against the financial and political exploitation of Germany by a foreign power. The doctrinal rift opened slowly. It was the result rather than the cause of the Reformation. With the supporters and with the opponents of the Reformation political and social motives played quite as strong a part throughout as the religious interest. The Anabaptist movement was the most purely religious of all the movements, and that was stamped out because the social classes within which it spread did not command enough political power to protect it. Any theory of religious and moral movements which separates them from the patriotic and social movements of the nations is wholly contradicted by history. The more we comprehend history, the more we see the organic and inseparable unity of all life. Yet many religious leaders are today acting and judging on the basis of that false conception of religious history.

Take another illustration. The popular idea is that before Constantine Christians were perpetually persecuted by the blood-thirsty Roman government; that they were all heroes and died gladly and in masses; and that the age of first love and purity continued till the union of church and state corrupted the church. This glowing spirit of sacrifice is then contrasted with our present Laodicean worldliness and selfishness, and the theory is deduced that the world is getting worse and must continue to get worse till Christ

returns. This theory deeply influences the fundamental attitude of many of our most earnest Christians toward all our larger moral movements. Their practical action is based on a theory of history, and the pathetic fact is that this theory is in turn based on a legendary interpretation of the facts. The Roman government was not a cruel and consistent persecutor. Christianity had existed for more than two centuries before the empire made any general and determined effort to suppress it. The persecutions before 250 were sporadic rioting and harrying by mobs and local officials, more like occasional race riots in our country. Only twice in three centuries did the government for a few years really exert its force, and then the number of those who faltered and denied was far greater than the number of those who confessed Christ. The writings of Cyprian and Dionysius show these great bishops in two of the most important centers of Christianity, Carthage and Alexandria, gazing with bleeding hearts on the scattered wreckage of their churches. The question what to do with those who had denied Christ was the critical question of the day. Heathen Rome was a very indifferent persecutor compared with Christian Rome. No heathen persecution equaled the deluge of blood in which Catholic and Protestant governments together killed out Anabaptism. The church was not pure and evangelical up to the conversion of Constantine. The hierarchy, the sacramentalism, and the superstition of Catholicism were in full bloom several generations before Christianity became the state religion.

I have stated these simple historical facts at such length merely to point out that inaccurate knowledge of history inevitably creates a legendary interpretation of the course of history, and this legendary theory will again inevitably warp our comprehension of present-day conditions and frustrate our saving purposes. A doctor must understand the organic life of the body and the causes of disease, if he would help the body back to healthful functioning. If his theory of disease is prescientific, his remedies are likely to be old-wives' nostrums. A doctor who does not know his business and pretends that he does know, is one of the most insidious enemies of society. Religious teachers are to be the moral physicians and health officers of humanity. It has been the tragic guilt of untold religious men that they have loved men and earnestly sought their salvation, and yet have misled and harmed humanity.

The study of history is a profound incentive to action. There is nothing else that so makes a man realize that he must work while it is day because the night cometh when no man can work. When the spring is here, he must be up to sow his seed. When the tide is rolling in, he must cross the bar. When the Reformation was rising like a tide, entire nations were like fleets weighing anchor and setting sail for the land of Truth. For a while it looked as if all Europe north of the Alps and Pyrenees would become Protestant. After one generation the tide turned and the Catholic reaction set in, holding its own and reconquering disputed territory. Since then no nation as such has become Protestant. That historical opportunity had gone by. It had been missed largely through the selfishness, cowardice, and dogmatism of Protestants. It seems a certainty to me that something similar will happen on the foreign mission field. There will be a revival of heathen religions through the vitalizing contact with Christian missions. There will be violent heathen reactions much more serious than the Boxer movement. It is a life-and-death question for us how far and how thoroughly we can occupy the territory before this inevitable reaction sets in. The decay of the Roman Empire and its splendid Mediterranean civilization is full of inexpressibly serious warnings for our great republican empire and for all the Christian civilization planted around the seven seas. It was injustice and exploitation, the separation of the people from the land, the massing of proletarian population in the cities, the despotic centralization of political power, official greed and corruption, which corroded the structure within; civil anarchy necessarily followed; and finally the barbarian tribes beat down the enfeebled shield-arm of the legions and great Rome died. After Marcus Aurelius the history of the empire reads like the chart above the bed of a patient in the advanced stages of tuberculosis; the rise and fall of pulse and temperature alternate more swiftly and the line forms a more terrible zigzag; to the trained eye that tells that the point of recovery has been passed, and henceforth the course is to be downhill. No sermon could speak to me with such abiding and compulsory power, bidding me to be up and doing before our own country is beyond the point of recovery.

Finally, history aids practical theology by deepening reverence and awe, if a man is at all religious. As our historical comprehen-

sion grows, the sweep of movements and purposes grows wider before our eye. Our little scheme of salvation undergoes successive enlargements, just as when we study astronomy and our imagination launches out from this tiny planet to navigate the inland sea of our solar system, and then out into the stellar ocean where distances are reckoned by light-years. We realize the marvelous potential of human life in leaving its permanent impress on humanity. We see "how weak an arm may turn the iron helm of fate." But we also see that history never moves as men intend. The real result of great movements is usually quite different from the purposes of those who engineer the movements. There is a larger purpose behind the human master-minds. The great players are themselves but pawns on a vaster chessboard. We hoist the sails, but another holds the helm. All this makes a man humble and trustful, and that means religious. At the same time a sense of continuity grows on the student of history. Life is not a drift of sand with chance ups and downs. There is law and unity in history, and an awful justice; and it takes only the vision of faith to see how "behind the dim unknown standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above his own."

Thus history enlarges, vitalizes, and balances all other departments of theology. Its influence has already been great; it is safe to predict that it will be still greater in the future. Modern history is only about a hundred years old; its mission is only begun.

We rightly insist that our theological education shall be practical. Our seminaries must educate successful preachers and pastors. But if our studies aim at nothing but immediate success, they are already condemned to frustration and pettiness. When lawyers know only how to win cases, they become pettifogging defeaters of justice. In fact, the common ignorance of history on the part of lawyers has been a prime cause for legalized injustice. The greatest minds, those who give the most fruitful impulses to special sciences, are usually those who know far more than their specialties. For a century past the work of France, England, and America in theology has largely consisted in assimilating and popularizing the work done in Germany. Germany is the teacher of the nations in modern science, as Greece was the teacher of art and philosophy in the ancient world. She has come to this high intellectual rank partly because she has protected

the freedom of thought and teaching, and partly because she has applied and perfected the historical method of inquiry. America patents more inventions than any other nation, but no American has yet been awarded one of the Nobel prizes for science. The man who prides himself on being "a practical man" is often merely "penny wise and pound foolish." There is a crying need for larger and richer scholarship in our ministry.

For the individual there is no clear self-consciousness without memory. If I did not remember my past and understand in some measure how I have come to be what I am, I should be incomprehensible to myself. History is to the race what memory is to the individual. It can understand its present and forecast its future only in the measure in which it really comprehends its past. The only safe form of prophesying is to prolong the curve of the past. History and prophecy are organically related. The noblest historical books of the Old Testament were the product of prophetic influences. Prophecy is an essential function of the Christian church. Its guiding spirits must interpret the past, judge the present, and thus prophesy the moral future.

"History is not the light, but it bears witness to the light." The light becomes visible only when it impinges on some concrete body and lights that up. When the white light of God's truth breaks on the life of men and nations, then we see the color and the splendor, and we know that God is in his world. When God revealed himself, it was not by communicating abstract propositions or systems of doctrine. The fundamental fact in the Christian revelation was that the Word became flesh. Therewith Truth became History. Christianity was first a single life, then a collective life, then a stream of historical influences, and always a healing and saving power. Let us not reverse God's process. Let us not be rationalists and turn the flesh into words and history into dogma. The future of Christian theology lies in the comprehension of Christianity in history. The future of Christianity itself lies in getting the spirit of Jesus Christ incarnated in history.

AN IMMUTABLE ABSOLUTE OR A GOD WHO STRIVES?

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The facts are so patent that one who has thought at all concerning the conditions of human life can scarcely fail to agree that the world of our experience is surcharged with contradictions; that it is a theater where conflicting forces continually clash; and that, so far from being complete or perfect, its incompleteness and imperfection constitute one of its leading characteristics. But from this fact taken as a premise two different lines of thought may be followed out which lead to opposite conclusions. Either, on the one hand, we may argue from the imperfection and incompleteness of our world to its unreality and illusoriness, since it is a demand of thought that reality shall be self-consistent and all-complete. Or, on the other hand, we may argue from the same premise that Absolute Reality is also imperfect and incomplete, since our knowledge of the real is derived solely from our experience and the world of our experience.

Of these two conclusions the former is the more satisfactory from the theoretical standpoint. It seems a presupposition of our thought that the reality whose determination is the aim of all our thinking is an entirely harmonious and absolutely perfect unity. This logical demand must be satisfied even at the expense of admitting that the world of our experience, because it does not comply with it, is illusory and unreal. But this conception of an eternally perfect and complete reality set over against a world which because of its incompleteness is only "appearance," is far from satisfactory to the moralist. For it takes all meaning out of that moral struggle which from the point of view of ethics constitutes the heart and core of human life. If the world in which man acts and strives is illusory and unreal, the ends and ideals which he seeks to attain must also be devoid of permanent significance or absolute worth. None of the values which we recognize in the field of morality can have their ground in Absolute Reality, because they exist in connection with, and in fact spring

directly from, that element of conflict which condemns this present world as vain, and divorces it utterly from the eternally complete and absolutely perfect real.

The line of thought suggested as the second alternative is therefore much to be preferred from the ethical standpoint. Granted that reality is unfinished and faulty, the sphere in which we act and strive is still the only real one for us—possesses, in fact, the only kind of reality that we have any acquaintance with. Hence our actions may count as real forces, and we may hope by our efforts to give genuine assistance in the completing and perfecting of this reality. We may believe that those ideals to which we attach supreme worth are influential agents in this process by which it is completed and perfected. What if we even conclude that reality must, by a necessity of its nature, remain unfinished and imperfect? There are degrees of incompleteness and imperfection, and whatever makes the world one degree more harmonious and consistent possesses real value.

Turning to the field of religion, it is interesting to note that an important doctrine in the teachings of Christianity is in fundamental agreement with this second conception of an Imperfect Reality. Perhaps the most original feature in the Christian system is the revelation which it claims to make of the nature of God—that suffering and self-sacrifice enter into the life and being of God, the Absolute Reality. Certainly no element of Christian belief has exerted greater influence over the moral and religious life of mankind. It has appealed to the imagination of men in all ages, has touched their emotions and affected their conduct. If the truth of such a belief is to be judged by its practical value, certainly this idea deserves a place high in the scale. But this conception of a suffering, self-sacrificing God has also been a source of difficulty to Christianity. To many the idea is on its face irrational and absurd. Having in mind the two contrasting lines of thought suggested by the fact of a discordant and contradictory world, we can see plainly why such a doctrine should have both theoretical difficulty and practical value for any religion venturing to affirm it.

There are grave, if not insurmountable, intellectual difficulties in the conception of a suffering or self-sacrificing God. The very expression seems self-contradictory. The conception of God as the

Absolute carries with it by a necessity of thought ideas of infinite power and complete self-sufficiency. Indeed, Christianity has not hesitated to attribute these qualities to Deity. But to reconcile these attributes with experiences of pain and self-sacrifice is a difficult, if not impossible, task. Christian theology has attempted to avoid the difficulty by dividing the conflicting qualities between different persons of the Godhead. But as long as the unity of the Absolute is preserved, this is, of course, no solution of the theoretical problem. A serious intellectual difficulty remains, which is probably the reason why the Christian conception of God fails to satisfy many minds, suggesting to them a being impotent and unreliable.

The practical value of the conception in question is as easy to recognize, however, as its theoretical defects. If reality itself is imperfect, if suffering and self-sacrifice are required of God himself, man feels that he has the benefit of divine comradeship in his own experiences of pain and self-surrender. From this comradeship which he supposes to exist he draws inspiration for the battle of life, believing that he is working together with God and that he will receive from the Infinite strength and support in the time of trial. From it he also derives consolation in times of pain and sorrow, feeling that he has the sympathy of a God who has likewise suffered. Moreover, this conception of God leads the believer to put a new interpretation upon his experiences of suffering and self-sacrifice. He is not compelled to think that such experiences which result from the discord and conflict in which human life abounds are simply evidences of the unreality and unmeaningness of all things earthly. Rather, since they are a prominent characteristic of the life of God, the Supreme Reality, he may hope that through their very agency he is arising to as high a degree of reality, to as great a fulness of life as he is able to attain.

CRITICAL NOTE

I JOHN 5:7, 8

The discussion of this text, the spurious character of which is beyond doubt, has of late taken a new turn. It is true that Kölling in Breslau did cast a shadow upon Protestant theology by defending the three heavenly witnesses in his book of 1893, but no one seems to have been troubled by his decision. It is the Roman Catholic church that has now taken up the question.

So far as the Greek text is concerned, the well-known decree of the Council of Trent of April 8, 1546,¹ leaves Roman scholars free to determine what they please, provided they let the Latin text alone. But in these modern days no one would dream of making such a fine distinction between the Greek and Latin text as to consider anything tenable in the Latin that had been rejected as not genuine in the Greek text. The question then came before the Roman Inquisition, and was settled by it on January 13, 1897. Here are the minutes:

Feria IV, die 13 Jan. 1897.

In Congregatione generali S. R. et U. Inquisitionis habita coram Eñis ac Rñis D.D. Cardinalibus contra haereticam pravitatem Generalibus Inquisitoribus, proposito dubio:

“Utrum tuto negari aut saltem in dubium revocari possit, esse authenticum textum S. Ioannis, in epistola prima, cap. 5, vers. 7, quod sic se habet: ‘Quoniam tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in coelo: Pater, Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus, et hi tres unum sunt?’”

Omnibus diligentissimo examine perpensis, praehabitoque D.D. Consultorum voto, iidem Eñi. Cardinales respondendum mandarunt: *Negative*. Feria vero VI, die 15 eiusdem mensis et anni, in solita audientia r. p. d. Adessori S. O. impertita, facta de suprascriptis accurata relatione SSmo D. N. Leoni PP. XIII, Sanctitas Sua resolutionem Eñorum patrum adprobavit et confirmavit.

J. CAN. MANCINI, S. R. et U. I. Not.

Wednesday, January 13, 1897.

In a general Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, held in the presence of the Most Eminent and Reverend Cardinals, the Inquisitors General touching heretical depravity, the following doubtful question was presented:

“Whether it may be safely denied, or at least called in doubt, that the text

¹ Gregory, *Textkritik des Neuen Testaments*, p. 616.

of St. John, in the first epistle, chap. 5, vs. 7, which reads as follows: 'For there are three that bear witness in heaven: Father, Word, and Holy Spirit, and these three are one' is genuine?"

After having weighed everything in a most diligent examination, and taking a vote of the Counselors, the said most Eminent Cardinals declared that the reply was to be given: *Negatively*. On Friday, the 15th day of the same month and year, in a regular audience granted to the Reverend Father the Assessor of the Holy Office, after an exact report on the above to Our Most Holy Master Leo XIII the Pope, His Holiness approved and confirmed the decision of the Most Eminent Fathers.

CANON J. MANCINI,

Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition.

The untutored mind, whether Roman or not, would at once say that that was a clear settlement of the question. To the question whether the passage can safely be denied to be genuine, or at least be called doubtful, the congregation replied that the question was to be answered in the negative. It is pertinent, of course, to observe that the denial or the doubting referred to is not something that takes place in the open market every day, is not in the least a popular question. The congregation knew perfectly well that the passage was rejected or called doubtful only by textual critics, and the congregation settled that it could not with safety be rejected or called doubtful, and Pope Leo XIII confirmed their decision. I take it for granted, however, that this opinion of the Pope does not come within the series of cases in which he is regarded as infallible. We must pass on; but I cannot omit to call attention to the extraordinary conduct of the Congregation of the Inquisition, which has such learned men at its back, and which nevertheless in the year 1897, only eight years ago, permitted itself to be advised on a textual question by men ignorant of, or incapable of judging of, the text-critical work of the last fifty years.

But if an untutored mind should suppose the decision to have settled the question for our Roman friends, should think that the solemn settlement by the Inquisition, confirmed by the Pope, precluded further open discussion of the genuineness of the text, Cardinal Vaughan appears upon the scene to correct the false impression. In a public letter^a to Wilfrid Ward, Vaughan wrote:

I have from an excellent source that the decree of the Holy Office on the passage on the 'Three Witnesses' which you refer to, is not intended to close the discussion on the authenticity of that text. The field of Biblical Criticism is not touched by this decree.

^a I do not know where it was printed; I quote from the *Revue biblique* (Paris, 1898), p. 149, words that Vaughn confirmed to the unnamed writer of the article.

It is hard to see what else is touched by the decree, yet we may well rejoice at this assurance that biblical criticism at all events, is not. As a matter of fact, various Roman scholars have since 1897 said expressly, or suggested by pointed implication, that they considered the passage spurious. When Michael Hetzenauer³ stood up for the passage, a prominent Jesuit reprimanded him sharply and ridiculed him.⁴ August Bludau, professor in Münster cleared up a number of points in the history of this passage in a series of interesting articles full of important matter. In *Der Katholik*⁵ he treated of the beginning of the controversy about the genuineness of this passage in the sixteenth century, and dealt further with the sixteenth century in the *Biblische Zeitschrift*,⁶ turning to the writings of the Anti-Trinitarians and of the Socinians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and to Richard Simon, in *Der Katholik*.⁷ Cardinal Vaughan's "excellent source" of information cannot have been far from the chair of his Holiness the Pope. The present pope will, we may surely trust, be just as faithful to the truth and be still more liberal toward theological science.

Karl Künstle, extraordinary professor in the University of Freiburg in the Breisgau, has been busy for some time with the literature against Priscillian in the fifth and sixth centuries. He will soon publish *Antipriscillianiana: Dogmengeschichtliche Studien und Texte aus dem Streit gegen Priscillians Irrlehre*. In the course of this work his attention was drawn to the very uncertain state of the patristic testimony for the three heavenly witnesses in the Latin Bible. He accordingly took this question in hand, having also the advice of Bludau and of the learned Benedictine Odilo Rottmanner in Munich, and he has now issued a most excellent little book, *Das Comma Ioanneum: Auf seine Herkunft untersucht*.⁸ This is a masterpiece of historical and literary criticism.

Künstle sums up rapidly (pp. 1-5) the facts about the earlier church. He shows that this passage was not known to the Greek Eastern church, being found neither in properly Greek manuscripts nor in the old Eastern versions; and he rejects rightly Anton Baumstark's view⁹ that Jacob

³ *Textkritik*, pp. 989-91.

⁴ In the *Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland*, Vol. CXXIV, (Munich, 1899), pp. 102-14.

⁵ Vol. II (Mainz, 1902), pp. 25-51, 151-75.

⁶ Vol. I, (Freiburg in Breisgau, 1903), pp. 280-302, 378-407; Vol. II, (1904), pp. 275-300.

⁷ Vol. I, (1904), pp. 29-42, 114-22.

⁸ Freiburg im Breisgau; Herder, 1905 (v+64 pages, 8vo.; M. 2).

⁹ *Oriens Christianus* (Rome, 1902), pp. 3 ff.

of Edessa (died 708) quoted it in his commentary on the liturgy. He adds the circumstance that it is lacking in the Fulda manuscript which Victor of Capua corrected in Rome in 546, in the Amiata manuscript of the early eighth century, in the Harley manuscript of the eighth century, in all the manuscripts written at Tours between 801 and 850, and in the Luxeuil Lesson-Book of the fifth or sixth century. And, finally, he observes the fact that neither Hilary of Poitiers, who in his book *De Trinitate* gathers together all possible Scripture passages in proof of the doctrine of the Trinity, refers to this verse, nor Lucifer of Cagliari, nor Ambrose, nor Jerome, nor Leo the Great, nor Gregory the Great.

After proving, as it seems to me, that neither Tertullian, nor Cyprian, nor Augustine, nor Facundus of Hermiane refers, as it has been alleged that they did, to this passage, Künstle takes up Priscillian, with whom, as we have seen, he has been especially occupied. In the year 380 Priscillian wrote an apology, *Liber apologeticus*, addressed to the bishops assembled in the synod of Saragossa in Spain. At the end of the introduction to this apology he wrote something like a confession of his faith, and in connection therewith said that it was Christ who was, is, and is to be. Referring then to the resurrection he quotes John by name:

Sicut Johannes ait: Tria sunt quae testimonium dicunt in terra: aqua, caro et sanguis; et haec tria in unum sunt. Et tria sunt quae testimonium dicunt in coelo: pater, verbum et spiritus; et haec tria unum sunt in Christo Jesu.

As we see, he puts the heavenly witnesses after the earthly ones, and his text is not at all the usual text. But the best Latin manuscripts—that is, of course, the best of the manuscripts that really contain this text—agree in the main with Priscillian. At the same time, the differences that some of these texts show are very interesting. Take, for example, the palimpsest in the cathedral of Leon, a manuscript of the seventh century. It reads:

Quoniam tres sunt qui testimonium dant in terra, spiritus et aqua et sanguis. Et tres sunt qui testimonium dicunt in coelo, pater et verbum et spiritus sanctus; et hi tres unum sunt in Christo Ihesu.

Künstle gives then all the older manuscripts, and shows that they have the heavenly witnesses second, and that they agree in other ways with Priscillian. The earliest manuscript that he could find for the order of the verses that we have was No. 7 in the Mazarine Library at Paris, and it is of the eleventh century. It reads:

Quoniam tres sunt, qui testimonium [*dant?* misprint?] in coelo, pater, verbum, et spiritus. Et tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in terra, caro, sanguis et aqua; et hi tres in nobis unum sunt.

Then (pp. 12-15) the author treats of the connection in which the quotation stands in Priscillian, and shows how he in his confused sentences combines phrases that seem to be entirely orthodox with clear heresy. The curious thing, then, is that this text, which is so loudly claimed by those who wish to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by it, is really used, so far as appears, for the first time by a man who totally opposes three persons in God. For Priscillian the foundation of the faith is the belief in the absolutely *one* God. He is, as Künstle calls him, a Unionite, and those who speak of Christ as a different person from the Father are to him Binionites.

He is only willing to recognize absolutely *one* God without distinction of persons. This—thus constituted—God is for him Christ; Priscillian teaches a thorough Panchristism. The classical proof-passage for this doctrine is for him the so-called *Comma Ioanneum*. He finds in it, not only a proof of his doctrine of the absolute unity of God, but also a presentation of Panchristism.

What a strange circumstance!

Several of the sources that contain the three heavenly witnesses have an apparent or a real connection with Africa, so that it would have been easy to suppose, before the discussion in hand, that the words were of African origin. Our author shows, however, that Pseudo-Vigilius (of Tapsus) *De Trinitate*, that the Pseudo-Augustinian *Speculum*, that the creed of the African bishops of 484, and that the Pseudo-Fulgentius (of Ruspe) *De Fide Catholica*, all seem to be directly or indirectly Spanish or influenced by Spain. Of course, when the passage has got so far as that, it is not strange that Fulgentius of Ruspe and Cassiodorus are acquainted with it; but it is very odd that neither of them seems to have an extraordinarily high opinion of its value for the doctrine of the Trinity. After referring to the *Testimonia Divinae Scripturae* that were probably written by Isidore of Seville, and to the letter of the Spaniards Etherius and Beatus to the Adoptionist Elipandus in the year 785, Künstle shows that the old creed found by Caspari, in the Codex Ambrosianus I, 101 *sup.*, and the Jew Isaac who sued Pope Damasus in 372, were probably of Spanish origin. He then takes up a brief creed, given by Hahn (p. 278), which he thinks perhaps contains the earliest traces of the passage. It begins with the apparently orthodox statement: "Pater deus, filius deus et spiritus sanctus deus. Haec unum sunt in Christo Jesu." But then he continues heretically:

Tres itaque *formae*, sed *una potestas* [not, as Hahn has it, "substantia"]. Ergo diversitas plures facit, unitas vero potestatis excludit numeri quantitatem, quia unitas numerus non est.

That would agree precisely with Priscillian's heretical claim that Father, Son, and Spirit were not *persons*, but merely *traditional forms*. And, besides, directly after the words just quoted, the writer says: "Sic itaque unus deus, una fides, unum baptisma;" which are the words that Priscillian uses in his first essay to prove the absolute unity of God, that permits of no distinction of persons. It may be observed, in passing, that K nstle is inclined to attribute the Pseudo-Hieronymian preface to the catholic epistles to Peregrinus, the orthodox theologian who took up Priscillian's work. The conclusion of all this points to Spain as the home of the spurious passage.

Of course, it is important to know how the verse came to be in the earlier manuscripts of the Bible in which it is found. K nstle goes through the whole list (pp. 30-45), and makes it plain that Spain is responsible for the verse. An interesting side-light is thrown upon the verse by J. P. P. Martin's researches in the National Library at Paris, in which there are in all 258 Latin manuscripts, ranging from the ninth to the sixteenth century, containing First John. Twenty-one of them do not have this passage, and their age is shown from the following classification of the 258 manuscripts: Of 10 from the ninth century, the passage is wanting in 7; of 4 from the tenth century it is wanting in 3; of 5 from the eleventh century, it is wanting in 3; of 15 from the twelfth century it is wanting in only 2; of 118 from the thirteenth century, it is wanting in only 5; of 106 from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, it is wanting in only a single one. And all manuscripts up to the tenth century that contain the passage are either from Spain or were influenced by Spanish Bible texts.

The process by which the passage grew is well sketched by K nstle as arising from the effort to explain the words "Quoniam tres sunt qui testimonium dant: spiritus, aqua et sanguis; et tres unum sunt." Some explained them anthropologically, and in one author as well as in a note in two manuscripts the words "in nobis" are added after "tres unum sunt." This explanation seems to have been of very limited acceptance. Others took the words christologically, and a large number of manuscripts show the favor that this view found, for they add after "unum sunt" the words "in Christo Jesu." The general view was, however, the one that made them refer to the Trinity. Perhaps some grammarian started the change by putting in the neuter plural of the numeral, because the notions mentioned were things, not persons, and writing on the margin: "Tria sunt, quae testimonium . . . et tria unum sunt." The probability is that Priscillian was the first one to give the whole passage in its full form, and that the form we quoted from him above. It is likely that Priscillian

brought the words into the Latin Bible himself; and his orthodox continuator, Peregrinus, who was probably Bacharius, and probably half a friend of Priscillian's, may well have been the most active dispenser of the new passage in his "edition" of the text.

We began by a reference to the decision of the Inquisition about this passage. Künstle's view, that the words are spurious, is plain. It is now interesting to observe that he does not suppose himself to be in conflict with that decision. He says (p. 56):

The result here reached does not stand in contradiction to the decree of the Holy Office of January 13, 1897; for that only intends to say: "The verse 1 John 5:7 contains a dogmatically evidential proof for the trinitarian notion of God in the sense of the evangelist John."

For this view he refers to Hoberg.¹⁰ Similarly Chr. Pesch¹¹ declares:

The position of this text for centuries as a part of the Vulgate, and the thence resulting use of it in the liturgy, theological textbooks, sermons, etc., give the words the power of proof in dogmatics, without the least regard to the question whether St. John wrote them or not.

That seems to a Protestant like a complete reversal of the sense of the Inquisition decree. But we may be glad that these Roman scholars can look at it in that way. Laurentius Janssens, the rector of St. Anselmo in Rome, says that the decree is merely of a disciplinary nature; that seems very much like saying something, but says nothing at all. Janssens says that the authenticity of the words cannot be proved from manuscripts, nor from their use by the Fathers, nor from the context, nor by a theological argument. That would seem to be pretty plain; and nevertheless he merely in a general way warns against using them as an argument—which is rather hard upon the Inquisition as interpreted by Künstle—especially with opponents who do not think the words genuine; and closes by refusing to decide upon their authenticity. Janssens is a scholar, and he sees perfectly well that the words are spurious, and he shows that he thinks so; but he will not say so directly because of that ill-advised, warped decision of the Inquisition. Aloys Schaefer's *Introduction to the New Testament*¹² may have been printed before the Inquisition decree, to which he does not refer. He says that this passage is not genuine, and he declares that a Romanist scholar who says it is not genuine does not thereby come into conflict with the decree of the Council of Trent in the year 1546. It is nice that he

¹⁰ *Oberrheinisches Pastoralblatt*, 1899, p. 45.

¹¹ *Theologische Zeitfragen* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1900), p. 57.

¹² Paderborn, 1898.

thinks so, but the vast body of Roman scholars has usually taken the opposite view. Mangenot, another eminent Romanist, discusses the passage well in Vigouroux's *Bible Dictionary*,¹³ but concludes, evidently with a view to the Inquisition:

Taking the thing from a purely critical point of view, there remain difficulties to be solved on both sides, although the arguments unfavorable to the authenticity seem to predominate.

He says that the decree of the Holy Office was meant to put an end to the discussions upon the authenticity of this passage, and that every Catholic should submit to this "disciplinary decision" and stand up for the passage. The Capuciner Hetzenauer, mentioned above, insists that the decision of the Inquisition compels the acceptance of the words as from John.

Clearly, our Roman brothers are coming out to the light of modern science. They are immensely learned, they are numerous, they have grand libraries at their command, many of them have leisure granted them for research—if they will only say plainly what they find in their researches, without fear of ecclesiastical rebuke, Christian theology will move forward rapidly.

There are well-meaning Christians all over the world whose eyes are unable to stand the full glare of facts.

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¹³ Vol. III (Paris, 1903), pp. 1193-97.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

RECENT LITERATURE ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

The school of Saint-Sulpice at Paris has demonstrated in many ways its thorough and effective educational work. The Hebrew Grammar of M. Touzard¹ is distinctively elementary in character. Its construction is such as to pave the way for beginners in the language. The chapters, sections, subsections, and the emphatic and important words in the text are everywhere printed either in bold-faced type, italics, or capitals to make a striking presentation of the items to be fixed in the memory. This gives the page an uneven appearance, but it tends to clearness and perspicuity—an all-important element in a textbook. As soon as the student has mastered some of the elements of the language, he is given exercises of a practical kind. And when he shall have reasonably completed this abridged book, he is led into the secret of analyzing and explaining in full, easy texts of the Hebrew Bible. The principles enunciated in this grammar are based in the main on the large grammars of Gesenius and König, adapted, however, for use in such schools as that in which the author is professor. It is refreshing to find that so enthusiastic a teacher as M. Touzard evidently must be, has put his matter in so strikingly unique a literary form. Such a work does much to popularize and render easier a language too often maligned as difficult and uninteresting.

The fifth edition of Strack's *Einleitung* appeared in 1898. Only a few sections of this sixth edition² contain new matter. The fourteenth presents a "brief" of the Decalogue, the Book of the Covenant, and the second Decalogue in Ex. 34:11-26; and the eighty-third gives a summary of the explanations of the rabbinical data that appear in the text of our modern Bibles. It seems evident that the author looks with more favor on the modern view of the Pentateuch than he did in his earlier works. As in former editions, the one feature of especial value to the student of the Old Testament is the comprehensive character of the bibliographies attached to each chapter. If we wish to pursue the subject of any chapter beyond the limits of this book, we know just which way to turn, and what to use. The

¹ *Grammaire hébraïque abrégée*. Précédée de premiers éléments accompagnés d'exercices à l'usage des commençants. Par J. Touzard. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. xxiv + 395 + 40 pages. Fr. 5.

² *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Von Hermann L. Strack. Sechste, neubearbeitete Auflage. München: Beck, 1906. viii + 256 pages. M. 4.

lack of an index leaves this book incomplete and discounts its value for the student.

The apology for the publication of another book³ on introduction "is that the great majority of works on this subject are from the negative standpoint, while most of the others are too brief to be of much value, and substitute ridicule for argument." "The present volume has arisen primarily from the need of a conservative textbook which covers the whole range of the subject" (Preface, p. 5). These statements give us the view-point of the author. In all the prominent questions touching his theme he is extremely conservative. In Part I, "General Introduction," on "the Canon" and "the Text," he is a faithful disciple of the late Professor William Henry Green, and follows his well-beaten paths. The Old Testament canon was closed, "if not by Ezra, at least in his time, and not much later than 400 B. C." The section on the "Text" is rather uneven, in that it, for one thing, attempts a classification of the Semitic languages, which seems out of place in a popular work on Introduction. "The Pentateuch in General" is handled somewhat in detail, and always to the detriment of the modern view. Modern arguments are quoted and answered seriatim to substantiate and corroborate the traditional view. And his conclusion is that the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch presents difficulties that are mole-hills as compared with the mountains that stand in the way of acceptance of the modern view. The part on "Special Introduction" is built strictly on traditional lines, including the unity of Isaiah and that of Zechariah. The dates of some of the Old Testament books are (B. C.): Pentateuch, 1300; Joshua, 1200; Job, 1000; Song of Solomon, 1000; Daniel 605-539; Chronicles, 450. A brief bibliography follows, though we fail to find a reference to Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica*, our newest and best Hebrew text. We are still more amazed that a modern textbook should be published without an index of any kind. This is inexcusable.

Another volume from the prolific pen of Kent⁴ is on the market. It is a bad year for him that does not see the issue of one or more volumes. No wonder, when such a subject as this can be disposed of "within the all too brief limits of a Christmas vacation" (p. x). The express purpose of this volume is to stimulate an interest in the Old Testament on the part of "the rank and file of the Christian church." Any and every conscientious and competent effort in this direction will naturally receive a hearty welcome

³ *Old Testament Introduction. General and Special.* By John Howard Raven. New York and Chicago: Revell, 1906. 362 pages. \$2 net.

⁴ *The Origin and Permanent Value of the Old Testament.* By Charles Foster Kent. New York: Scribner, 1906. xii+270 pages. \$1.25.

from all Old Testament scholars and be given every possible furtherance. The present volume is worthy of high commendation. The historical element, as might be expected, is the predominating one in the discussion; indeed, the second half of the title finds little justification in the contents of the book. It is one thing to show how certain ideas have come about; it is an entirely different thing to estimate those ideas with a view to determining to what extent they represent abiding truth. This latter work is the task of the philosopher, the theologian; Kent is a historian, and a good one. He has here told, in brief compass and in such a way as to interest the average man, the story of the origin and development of the Old Testament writings as he conceives of it. The work is well done, and it is well worth the doing. An intelligent understanding of this process is the first essential for any man who would receive from the Old Testament right conceptions of God and of his methods of operation in the spheres of history and religious instruction. This book perhaps lacks the charm of style and the closely articulated structure necessary to secure for it the widest reading and to enable it to hold the reader's interest, but it is packed full of information and will do good wherever it goes.

Eighteen years of experiment in the effort to give an orderly view of the development and significance of the Bible "lies behind this little book."⁵ It has been prepared to meet the needs of four classes of students: (1) the college student, (2) the graduate student in oriental history, (3) the student of theology, and (4) the general student of the Bible—a rather hazardous attempt one would say, at first thought. The book covers both the Old and New Testaments, and is divided into four parts: (1) Hebrew literature and history, reaching from the beginning to the fall of Jerusalem (586 B. C.); (2) early Jewish history and literature (586–168 B. C.); (3) later Jewish history and literature (168 B. C.–135 A. D.); (4) early Christian history and literature. The outlines are not a mere skeleton, but are put into narrative form, and within this narrative some of the best literature for study is referred to by mention of specific page or chapter. The critical position is that taken by Kent in his volumes on the Old Testament. The work is amply supplied with colored maps covering the different periods of the history. If there is one point in which the work does not come up to the standard laid down by the authors, it is that of answering the requirements of the graduate student. Otherwise, by a wise use of the literature assigned and a classification of the material thus procured, there is little doubt that the book will prove very useful and helpful in filling the blanks in many students' minds which should be occupied by biblical history.

⁵ *Outlines for the Study of Biblical History and Literature.* By F. K. Sanders and H. T. Fowler. New York: Scribner, 1906. xv+233 pages. \$1.25 net.

Good commentaries on Leviticus and Numbers adapted to the needs of the average Bible reader have long been lacking. Genung has prepared commentaries⁶ that seem to supply the need. Being intended to reach a large public, they are of course free from undue technicality either in the sphere of linguistic interpretation or in that of literary analysis. The existence of different strata within the narrative is affirmed and emphasized in the introductions, but in the commentary proper little reference is made to the different sources. The commentator rightly emphasizes the necessity of understanding and appreciating the message of the books as they now stand—a fact overlooked by most modern interpreters; but yet, can the text in its final form be thoroughly understood apart from the long series of processes through which it assumed that form? The archaeological side of the commentaries is likewise weak, and notably so in contrast to the fine work on this aspect of Numbers by G. B. Gray in the "International Critical Commentary." For example, no careful student of archaeology would rest content with the explanation of the Nazirite's vow as due to the desire to honor God and his work "by letting himself be as near as possible as God made him." The author's attitude toward the date of the Levitical legislation is conservative and sane. Granting the late exilic or post-exilic, origin of the present form of the law, he still rightly insists upon the existence of much of the ritual of P in the pre-exilic age. The prophetic codes of Exodus chaps. 20–23, and of Deuteronomy may not be considered as exhaustive exponents of the priestly practices which must have grown up in connection with the various sanctuaries of Israel. Leviticus presents us with the final precipitate of this earlier process, upon which the Covenant and Deuteronomic codes had acted in part as decomposing reagents. It is an encouraging sign of the times to find the publishing society of a great conservative denomination putting its imprint upon books so permeated by, and in sympathy with, the historical spirit and point of view as are these two commentaries.

"The aim of the present small volume⁷ is to explain the Revised Version of the Book of Job in such a manner as to make the poem intelligible to an ordinary educated reader. . . . For this purpose the notes have been made as succinct as possible; the book has been divided throughout into paragraphs, with the argument prefixed to each; passages which seemed

⁶ *The Book of Leviticus* (xvi+108 pages) and *The Book of Numbers* (xii+144 pages). By G. F. Genung. ["An American Commentary on the Old Testament."] Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1906. \$2.

⁷ *The Book of Job in the Revised Version*. Edited with Introduction and Brief Annotations. By S. R. Driver. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906. xxxvi+133 pages. 2s. 6d. net.

likely to occasion difficulty from the causes indicated above have been explained, especial care has been taken, where there were alternative readings, to inform the reader, as far as was possible, which was to be preferred, and, in a limited number of cases renderings or readings beyond those given in the Revised Version have been mentioned, if they appeared to be probable and to improve the sense." Commentaries and handbooks on Job are many; but anything from the pen of Canon Driver is always a welcome addition. The purpose of this commentary, as stated above, has been admirably attained. By the aid of a clearly indicated analysis, with summaries of the logical divisions of each speech inserted in the text itself, the poem is enabled to speak for itself and allowed to make its own impression on the mind of the reader. The notes show insight and scholarship, and give evidence by their relative paucity and brevity of the exercise of the splendid quality of self-restraint. The result is a commentary in many respects better suited to the needs of the average layman than any previously existing. Of especial value are the glossary of uncommon and obsolete words in the Revised Version of Job, and the section of the introduction discussing the value of the marginal readings of the Revised Version. For scholars the book is of significance as a prophecy of Canon Driver's forthcoming volume on Job in the "International Critical" series. As such, we are interested to learn the author's present views on the great debatable points in the Book of Job. The book is conceived of as built upon the basis of an old tradition concerning a pious Job; the date of composition is placed in "the century which began with the return from Babylon in B. C. 538;" the character of Job represents the suffering godly Israelite of this period; the only important addition to the original poem is Elihu's contribution, though the dissertation on wisdom (chap. 28) is looked upon with doubt; and in 19:25 ff. Job is accredited with a positive belief in the future life. These are essentially the positions held by Canon Driver ten years ago, when the sixth edition of his *Introduction* appeared. Hence it is not likely that there will be any material departure therefrom in the more technical volume for which we hope.

A new point of view is the *raison d'être* of another volume on the Psalms.⁸ The standard commentators, such as Delitzsch, Olshausen, Perowne, and Kirkpatrick, are said to be governed "to a large extent by their prepossessions in favor of traditional theology." Our author claims to treat the psalms "freely as documents of religion in its historical setting, apart from the after-thoughts of theology, and from the meaning read into them

⁸ *The Book of Psalms: with Introduction and Notes.* By W. F. Cobb. London: Methuen, 1905. xviii + 420 pages. 10s. 6d.

by Christian writers." The Introduction canvasses briefly a few of the preliminary questions considered in every study of the Psalter, such as form, content, and date of the psalms. In view of the purpose of the work, we are somewhat puzzled with this statement: "The data it [the Psalter] supplies for a critical fixing of the dates of authorship are scanty, and for the most part doubtful" (p. xii). But farther on (p. xv) we find a determination or affirmation that, "though external evidence is wanting, the internal evidence is strong enough to warrant the exclusion of all our existing psalms from the pre-exilic period." This "exclusion" is based on the assumption that "the Psalter, in whole and in detail, is imbued with the spirit of post-exilic piety," and that prior to "the exile Jehovah was chiefly worshiped after the manner of the Canaanites." Hence the Psalter could not have arisen in that period. The prepossessions of the author in favor of his theory are quite as striking as anything we have recently seen in the discussion of the Psalter. That the exile and immediately thereafter was the great productive period of psalms we do not deny, but to say that it was the one age of piety, and that in the pre-exilic period there was not enough of it to produce psalms, is a gratuitous assumption, and one that will quite as much warp the exposition of those poems as some of the so-called prepossessions of modern Christian scholars. The translations of the psalms vary slightly, and with some distinct improvements, from the Authorized or Revised Versions. The "notes" are terse, to the point, and quite out of the ordinary. They reflect more particularly the ideas of Cheyne and Duhm, with occasional helpful quotations from Perowne, Kirkpatrick, and others. The attempt to explain the Psalter "as documents of religion" in their historical setting is only partially successful, and that partial success is largely due to the determination of dates for which the evidence is scanty. The author's use of illustrations from Jewish literature, from philosophy, comparative religion, and history, gives the volume a refreshing flavor that is both interesting and instructive.

The Old Testament prophet was pre-eminently a man who dealt with the ethical, the social-ethical side of life. His office was to unite the people in the worship of Jehovah as one God. In the early period of the kingdom this religion of Jehovah had peculiar strength. The prophet was not a creator of religion, but a reformer. He was a speaker for God. His eloquence stood in strange contrast to that of a demagogue. He had a special, a personal call, that seemed to make of him a distinct personality, one who spoke with absolute confidence that what he said would come to pass. His life was thrown among and with the people upon whom he impressed his character and his teachings. With this preliminary sketch

of a prophet the author⁹ proceeds through each prophetic book, and delineates with reasonable care and precision the social-religious force of each prophet in view of the circumstances or the environment in which his activity made itself felt. The treatment of each several prophet is conservative, yet progressive, and wide-awake to the advances in modern scholarship in prophetic fields of research. We must say that we are somewhat disappointed at the meagerness of the treatment of the prophet in the very sphere in which the theme of the volume would lead us to expect the fullest development. Aside from this lack, Kleinert has given us a useful and concise summary of the chief teaching of the prophets.

The historical theories of Winckler, that pervade the third edition of Schrader's *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, do not pass without a protest on the part of his own countrymen. Kùchler's licentiate dissertation,¹⁰ presented to the University of Berlin, handles without gloves his theories of Old Testament prophecy, taking as a good concrete example Isaiah. He shows that the prophet, while alive to all political movements, was rather incidentally or accidentally a prophet. His primary, first, and uppermost purpose was religious. Kùchler designates Winckler's theory of a southern land of Muşri different from Egypt as a fantasy of some scholars, without any basis in fact. By arguments that are fairly conclusive he brushes it entirely aside as one would a cobweb. The whole brochure bristles with the spirit of investigation, of fairness, and of good judgment.

The modern critical view of the Old Testament has been sharply attacked in Germany. The first onslaught of Möller appeared in 1899 under the title *Historisch-kritischen Bedenken gegen die Graf-Wellhausensche Hypothese von einem früheren Anhänger*, with a foreword by von Orelli. In 1903 he put out another work, entitled *Die Entwicklung der alttestamentlichen Gottesidee in vorexilischer Zeit*, which discussed the critical position with especial reference to the biblical theological field. The province of the present work¹¹ covers in part the literary-critical, and in part the biblical-theological, phase of the Old Testament study. The sub-title of the book appears in Möller's vigorous protest against the "cancerous infection" that appears in the two great series of commentaries

⁹ *Die Propheten Israels in sozialer Beziehung*. Von Paul Kleinert. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. v+168 pages. M. 450.

¹⁰ *Die Stellung des Propheten Jesaja zur Politik seiner Zeit*. Von Friedrich Kùchler. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 57 pages. M. 1.60.

¹¹ *Die messianische Erwartung der vorexilischen Propheten: Zugleich ein Protest gegen moderne Textzersplitterung*. Von Wilhelm Möller. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. iv+398 pages. M. 6.

edited respectively by Nowack and by Marti. The arbitrariness with which they handle the Hebrew text, in the matter of emendations, interpolations, excisions, and the like, draws the most direct fire of the author. On the biblical-theological side his objects of attack are the works of Marti and Volz, especially the latter's work, *Die vorexilische Jahweprophetie und der Messias*. The discussion takes up somewhat in detail all the passages which he regards as messianic in Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. The conclusion of such a discussion is, of course, predetermined. The basis of Möller's and of his opponents' arguments not being one and the same, they reach entirely different conclusions. Such work will never harmonize the current differences until the authors agree to start from a common basis. Möller's book is an interesting and instructive piece of work, that to him and all who agree with his school of thought is wholly conclusive; but to the other group of scholars, who will not concede Möller's presuppositions, it quite misses the mark, and is exceedingly inconclusive.

The prophecy of Habakkuk has received much attention of recent years, and, to judge from Duhm's commentary,¹² the end is not yet. The *raison d'être* of this commentary is found in its wide departure from all of its predecessors in three important particulars. Previous interpreters, with an occasional exception, have agreed in assigning chap. 3 and other portions of the prophecy to a date later than that of the original oracle. This original oracle has been unanimously assigned to the years immediately prior to the exile or to the age of the exile itself. The only peoples connected with the situation of the prophecy have been the Hebrews, the Babylonians, or the Assyrians, and the Persians. Duhm finds the prophecy to be a unity, places its author as a contemporary of Alexander the Great, and finds the problem of the prophet occasioned by Alexander's rapid conquest of western Asia. The grounds for this interpretation of the book are found in the following facts: (1) The tyrant nation of which Habakkuk speaks must be one that appeared upon the stage of history wholly unexpectedly to the Hebrews (1: 5), for the prophet is full of astonishment at their coming. The Chaldaeans, however, had long been known to the Hebrews, and after the overthrow of Nineveh certainly no one could be surprised at their achievement of world-dominion. (2) The nation is described as "terrible," "dreadful," etc.; but the Chaldaeans were never so described by the prophets till after the fall of Jerusalem. The nation is also "hasty" and famous for fast riding; but the Chaldaeans were slow in their movements

¹² *Das Buch Habakuk: Text, Übersetzung und Erklärung* Von Bernhard Duhm. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 101 pages. M. 2.80.

and not noted as horsemen. (3) The prophet represents the conquest by this people as extraordinarily ruthless and arousing the indignant protest of all peoples; but one who had felt the Assyrian power in his youth, and had experienced the Egyptian sovereignty about 608 B. C., would not consider the Chaldaean yoke so unusually heavy. (4) The conquerors march from the west toward the east (1:9), and not vice versa as the Chaldeans did. (5) The social, commercial, political, literary, and religious background of the book is too far advanced for so early a period as 604 B. C. The hypothesis is attractive, if for no other reason than that its establishment would put an end to the apparently unceasing process of dissection and elimination now going on within the Book of Habakkuk. The last commentator prior to Duhm leaves to the original Habakkuk only seven verses out of the three chapters, and assigns the remainder to various periods. The language in which the tyrant is denounced fits Alexander the Great splendidly even in its minute details (2:12, 15). The most serious obstacle to the identification of the tyrant with the Chaldeans is furnished by the occurrence of the name כְּשָׁדִים in 1:6. But this has been already regarded by other interpreters—e. g., Lauterburg—as an interpolation; while Duhm boldly emends it to כְּחִיִּים, supposing that the change to כְּשָׁדִים was made at a time later in the Greek age when the Jews had forgotten the initial terrors of Alexander's campaigns, and had not yet come to know that the Greeks were capable of surpassing even the Chaldeans in cruelty and oppression. Duhm's view will command attention and win adherents, and, whether finally successful or not, will force all students to a re-examination of Habakkuk, and so help forward the work of careful interpretation.

The treatise on the ark of Yahweh by Dibelius¹³ was presented as his doctor's thesis at Tübingen. It is slight praise to say that it far surpasses the average doctor's thesis in value; it is indisputable evidence of its author's scholarship and creative capacity. The task attempted is one that has attracted many previous workers in the last half-century, and the problem is still unsolved. What was the original character and function of the ark? The problem exists, of course, only for those who cannot accept the traditional account of the ark in Exodus as representing the real facts. The majority of investigators may fairly be said to have held on to the view that the ark contained stones, though differing widely as to the

¹³ *Die Lade Jahves. Eine religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung.* Von Martin Dibelius. ["Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments," herausgegeben von W. Bousset und H. Gunkel, 7. Heft.] Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906. viii + 128 pages. M. 3.60.

character of the stones; some contending for meteorites, others for oracle-stones, and still others for images of the deity. Dibelius takes up the view of Reichel¹⁴ and Meinhold¹⁵ that the ark of Yahweh was an empty, portable throne, made of wood and in the form of a chest supported upon mythical figures called cherubim, and upon this the deity was conceived of as seated. Dibelius goes over the whole ground afresh, and in the light of the criticisms urged against Reichel and Meinhold. The contention seems to be clearly made out from the early Old Testament narratives, and finds abundant support in analogies from the religions of related peoples. It is, perhaps, pressing language too hard to maintain that because Yahweh came to Samuel in the temple at Shiloh, he was evidently not thought of as shut up *in* the ark; and that because he came and *stood*, therefore he had previously been sitting or lying down upon the ark. But the argument is sufficiently strong not to be weakened materially by such slips as these. This result is of great value as establishing the presence of an imageless Yahweh-cultus in Israel in the early days, and especially in the temple of Solomon. Dibelius' view, however, that the ark originated in Canaan under Babylonian influence and was taken over from the Canaanites by Israel, is at best only a hypothesis, as he himself confesses. But it is a hypothesis that runs contrary to all the traditions of Israel concerning the origin of the ark and of the Yahweh religion, lacks positive corroboration at any definite point, and is clearly opposed by the fact of the implacable hostility of Yahweh and Yahweh's representatives to the cultus of Canaan, for Yahweh and the ark are inseparable. The work as a whole is admirably done and must be reckoned with by all students of this subject.

In a treatise on Hebrew marriage and family law¹⁶ Engert has made use of all the good literature dealing with the subject and its related themes. The work is rather an orderly presentation of results already worked out in the various phases of the subject by preceding scholars, than a distinct contribution to the sum of existing knowledge upon this topic. The discussion is organized under five headings: (1) the origin of the people of Israel; (2) forms of marriage and the family, viz., the matriarchal and the patriarchal; (3) laws of marriage and divorce; (4) the legal rights and

¹⁴ *Über die vorhellenischen Götterkulte* (1897), pp. 23 f.; and *Theologische Arbeiten aus dem Rheinischen wissenschaftlichen Predigerverein*, Neue Folge, V, pp. 28 ff.

¹⁵ "Die Lade Jahves," in *Theologische Arbeiten aus d. Rheinischen u. s. w.*, Neue Folge, IV; and in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1901, pp. 593 ff.

¹⁶ *Ehe- und Familienrecht der Hebräer*. Von T. Engert. ["Studien zur alttestamentlichen Einleitung und Geschichte," herausgegeben von Carl Holzhey, III. Heft.] Munich: Leutner, 1905. vi + 108 pages. M. 2.40.

relations of the various members of the family; (5) the origin and significance of mourning customs. The treatment of the subject is free and scholarly, absolutely devoid of theological bias, and in its conclusions at one with the most progressive thinking of modern biblical scholarship, notwithstanding the fact that it carries the *imprimatur* of the official representative of the Catholic church. It can be heartily commended as a useful manual summarizing the present views with reference to the origin and significance of family customs and laws in Israel.

Löhr's pamphlet¹⁷ seeks to trace the beginnings and development of the idea of the responsibility and worth of the individual in the Old Testament. The method is first to state fully and clearly the fundamental conception of social and religious solidarity that prevailed in early Israel. For this purpose a practically complete citation of all the Old Testament materials reflecting this conception is furnished. On the basis of this it is shown that Israel's interests gathered around three social centers—viz., the nation, the town, and the family. In the varying relations of life one or the other of these was always the unit to be considered. The interests of the individual are wholly subordinate to those of the larger whole. Starting from this point, Löhr then proceeds to show the slow growth of the individualistic idea at first within the limits of these larger units, and at length breaking over and transcending these limits. Essentially the same results are presented here as are to be found in the article upon the same subject in Vol. X of this *Journal*,¹⁸ to which reference may be made for the reviewer's own treatment of the subject. The two articles supplement each other admirably; Löhr gives an almost exhaustive statement of the facts, Smith lays emphasis more especially upon the underlying causes, though this phase of the subject is not ignored by Löhr. The latter does well to insist upon the presence of strongly individualistic elements in the religious life of comparatively early times. Exception may perhaps be taken to his proposition that the consciousness of family solidarity is based upon the worship of the dead. The two things go together, it is true, but on which side, if either, the causal element is to be found is not to be determined off-hand. Anthropological, sociological, and economic factors should also be given more consideration. But minor weaknesses of this sort do not detract from the essential worth of the study as an illuminating and scholarly help to the understanding of the religion of Israel.

¹⁷ *Sozialismus und Individualismus im Alten Testament: Ein Beitrag zur alttestamentlichen Religionsgeschichte.* Von Max Löhr. [Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, X.] Giessen: Töpelmann, 1906. 36 pages. M. .80.

¹⁸ John Merlin Powis Smith, "The Rise of Individualism among the Hebrews." *American Journal of Theology*, April, 1906, pp. 251-66.

There are many attempts in these days to popularize the modern view of the Bible. The substance of Mrs. Houghton's book¹⁹ has been given many times as popular lectures, and is now, in a revised form, first put into permanent form. It is very evident from the beginning that the authoress has done wide reading, though not as much up-to-date as one should wish. Some of the themes of her chapters indicate the scope of her treatment. "The Day-Book of the Most High;" "Folklore in the Old Testament;" "The Poetry of the Old Testament;" "Heroes and Heroism;" "Eastern Light on the Story of Elisha;" "Love-Stories of Israel;" "A Parable of Divine Love;" and "Secular Faith." The discussions of these and the remaining themes of the book are not such as convey to the reader an entirely satisfying idea of "Hebrew life and thought." They are rather a congeries of disconnected lectures on themes related to the Old Testament. One is disappointed that he finds no attempt at the unity of purpose, except to entertain the reader, indicated in the title of the book. We are glad to find that each lecture has a definite purpose, and some of them are admirably treated. But the reader is not carried along through successive chapters until he gains a full and rounded conception of the life and thought that was prevalent in the Old Testament. Whatever views one finds of the Old Testament they are fairly up-to-date, modern and sane. We can see how, when presented as individual lectures, the writer could have been entertaining and successful.

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THE LIFE OF JESUS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DISCUSSIONS

The books to be dealt with in this article¹ exemplify a very noteworthy phenomenon in the province of New Testament science—the extraordinary

¹⁹ *Hebrew Life and Thought: Being Interpretative Studies in the Literature of Israel.* By Louise Seymour Houghton. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906. xi + 386 pages. \$1.50.

¹ *Von Reimarus zu Wrede: Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung.* Von A. Schweitzer. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1906. xii + 418 pages. M. 8.

Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung. Von O. Schmiedel. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1906. viii + 124 pages. M. 1.20.

The Prophet of Nazareth. By Nathaniel Schmidt. New York: Macmillan, 1905. xii + 422 pages. \$2.50.

Jesus und das Sacrament. Von H. Vollmer. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1905. 32 pages. M. .60.

The Authority of Christ. By D. W. Forrest. Edinburgh: Clark, 1906; New York: Scribner. xvii + 437 pages. \$2 net.

activity which is being devoted to investigation of the life of Jesus. Within the past two or three years the scholars of Germany have been specially prominent in this department of research. Their efforts have not been confined to elaborate, scientific treatises. Far more common has been the short, graphic outline, intended to present to the laity the most recent results of historical criticism in a terse and attractive form. The larger works of Oscar Holtzmann and P. W. Schmidt; the more popular sketches by Bousset, von Soden, Weinel, Hess, and others; the cognate studies of Baldensperger, J. Weiss, Lietzmann, Wernle, Brandt, Wellhausen, Wrede, Pfeiderer, and Arnold Meyer, have followed one another with bewildering rapidity. Examination of the sources is indissolubly linked together with scrutiny of the self-consciousness of Jesus.

What is the meaning of this eager expenditure of energy? Schweitzer somewhat cruelly suggests that the adherents of the method of "literary criticism" as applied to the interpretation of Jesus have reached a point ("konsequenter Skeptizismus") beyond which they cannot advance a step. Hence their tendency to "inordinate popularizing" (p. 328). Whether there is any truth in this hypothesis or not, at least the writers in question show a true scientific instinct in concentrating their attention on the central problem of the New Testament. A problem we say, advisedly, for, as Dr. Forrest aptly expresses it, inasmuch as the disclosure of God's redemptive purpose and action, "while valid for all time, has been made in a Historic Life correlated to the environment of a particular age, the eternal truth embodied in Christ is perpetually undergoing reinterpretation under the changing conditions of humanity" (p. 430). If we can reach any solid certainty in this sphere of inquiry, other crucial New Testament questions will inevitably fall into line.

Where, then, is investigation to begin? Was there ever such a person as the Jesus of the gospels? This may appear at the first glance a preposterous question to ask, but it is seriously discussed and answered in the negative by A. Kalthoff, a pastor in Bremen, whose works on Christ and Christianity (published in 1902 and 1904) have roused keen discussion in Germany. Kalthoff argues that the early Christian communities owed their origin to the contact of socialistic movements among the masses in the Roman Empire with Jewish messianic expectations. "The history of Jesus in the gospels is only the history of the origin of the Christ-idea, i. e., the history of the developing community" (see Schweitzer, pp. 312 f.; Schmiedel, p. 107). We may smile at this crude hypothesis, but no wide interval separates it from positions which are treated quite seriously by representative scholars—positions such as that of W. Brandt, who holds

that the only absolutely certain information as to the life of Jesus is that which states that he died and was supposed to have risen from the grave (Schweitzer, p. 255). Schweitzer himself, at the close of his masterly survey of more than a century's research on the life of Jesus, affirms with calm deliberation that "the historical Jesus will be for our age a stranger or a puzzle" (p. 397). An inexplicable puzzle, truly, if we were compelled to give our adherence to some modern "interpretations" of his person and career. When, e. g., Professor N. Schmidt describes him as "a philosophical anarchist" (p. 303), when he warns the reader, who may not be "accustomed to compare texts, eliminate interpolations, sift evidence, or test the value of translations," against the impression he may gain "from late additions to the Synoptic Gospels, or early misinterpretations by the authors of these works, that Jesus on some occasions (!) placed himself far above his fellow-men" (p. 294), the most unbiased mind must be conscious that this Jesus is so different from the Jesus of the New Testament that it seems scarcely worth while to waste time on his life at all. Indeed, this was the conclusion—in our judgment a perfectly logical one—at which some of Professor Schmidt's literary predecessors finally arrived. Bruno Bauer, for example, whom Schweitzer regards, with justice, as the founder of that school of gospel-criticism represented in our time by Brandt, Wrede, and Schmidt, etc., became so absorbed in the task of emancipating the world from "that Roman-Jewish idol, Jesus Christ," that ultimately the existence of a historic Jesus came to be for him a matter of complete indifference (p. 157). In his latest work, Strauss, the most epoch-making name in the negative criticism of the gospels, in reply to the question, "Are we still Christians?" answers, "No." The process and its result are significant.

But we must attempt, very briefly, to examine some of the most characteristic elements in that process of theoretical construction of the life of Jesus which has made possible such extreme positions as have been referred to above. The material for such an examination is set before us with generous fulness in Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* and O. Schmiedel's *Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*. Both works, it may be said at once, are admirably planned and admirably written. That of Schmiedel is the expansion of a popular lecture. But there is nothing superficial in his treatment. After rapidly sketching the history of the subject, the author turns directly to the sources. In his treatment of them he occupies a position more or less akin to that of his brother, P. W. Schmiedel, H. J. Holtzmann, and others. Early in the book he has the usual contemptuous fling of the radical school at "mediating"

standpoints (p. 4). Surely this is fundamentally a most unscientific type of criticism. In most departments of investigation the truth is actually found to lie between the extreme hypotheses on either side. Typical of Schmiedel's estimate of the gospels is his criticism of the grouping of narratives in Mark. This grouping, he argues, has no regard to chronology, "which is decisive in pure narrative." One might ask in passing what "pure" narrative means. None of the world's most impressive narratives has ever been a mere chronicle of sequences. It must be interpretative. But Mark's arrangement of incidents is disparaged because it is intended to "*teach* something" (p. 33). As if the life of Jesus could ever be delineated without "teaching something." Similarly, readers are warned that in the gospels they have before them the life of a Redeemer, the life of the Messiah. "The early church in whose circles the narratives of the life of Jesus originated. . . . was at one in its acknowledgment of Christ, its exalted Lord. . . . Thus the halo of glorification was cast back . . . from their faith in his resurrection and exaltation . . . upon his earlier Galilean activity" (p. 35). But whence did this unanimous acknowledgment of Jesus as Messiah and exalted Lord proceed? It was already in full activity a few years after the crucifixion. There must have been some adequate cause for it. Some altogether marvelous impression must have lain behind it. The story of Jesus could never have been written *in vacuo*. The reason it was written at all was that his most intimate companions actually found in him their Redeemer, the Christ of God. The gospels must be scrutinized by historical criticism. But let it *be* historical, and not the arbitrary assumption of an individual or a school. It is high time to protest, in the name of science, against the practice, almost universal with some scholars who deny the designation "scientific" to any save themselves and their allies, of first constructing the life of Jesus ("*pure* narrative," perhaps), and then forcing this construction upon the text of the gospels. It is almost surprising, after much detailed criticism of the type of which we have given examples, to find the following important admission as to the oldest sources (*Urm Markus* and *Logia*): "It is the unanimous view of most scholars that we may really trust them, that especially the course of Jesus' life exhibited by the Gospel of Mark corresponds with his historical career" (p. 40). In the same spirit as this admission are the closing words of a very suggestive outline of the history of Jesus, in which Schmiedel accounts for the varying conceptions of him by saying: "The person of Jesus is so great and surpasses the ordinary human standard to such an extent that no age and no conception is comprehensive enough to exhaust his complete

significance for the history of the world" (p. 104). However subjective may be the canons of criticism, an investigator of moral sensibility cannot evade the overpowering impression of the story which he has scrutinized.

Schweitzer has conceived the very happy idea of writing a history of the investigation of the life of Jesus, from Reimarus, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, to Wrede, at the beginning of the twentieth. The result is a work of unusual interest and importance. A complete master of the huge mass of material to be handled, he has traced the development of research in his chosen province with true insight and laborious thoroughness. Peculiarly luminous and instructive is his treatment of D. F. Strauss and his *Leben Jesu* (pp. 67-119). One could scarcely imagine a more penetrating estimate of his significance for subsequent gospel-criticism. Unfortunately for the balance and proportion of the book, Schweitzer is an uncompromising advocate of the theory, chiefly associated with the name of Johannes Weiss, according to which Jesus, throughout his career, regarded the kingdom of God and the functions of the Messiah *exclusively* from the standpoint of eschatology. This "tremendous one-sidedness" (to quote Holtzmann's phrase) is Schweitzer's unfailing criterion of the value of those many phases which research into the life of Jesus has assumed. Hence he concludes, as the result of an elaborate discussion, which he would probably regard as the most important section of the volume (pp. 327-95), that two alternatives finally emerge from the long history of investigation which he has described. These represent the only schools of criticism which seem to him worthy of consideration. The one is the literary-critical school, whose culminating product is Wrede's *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*. The other is the eschatological-historical, represented by Schweitzer's own *Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis*. The outcome of the former is skepticism; of the latter, pure eschatology. Between these alternatives we have to decide (chap. xix, *passim*).

How has this extraordinary dilemma been reached? Schweitzer clearly shows that modern "liberal" constructions of the life of Jesus rest fundamentally on the position taken by Bruno Bauer as far back as 1841. For the "mythical" theory of Strauss he substituted that of the church-consciousness. The gospels are not history, but the deposit of Christian reflection having as its source faith in the sacrificial death and resurrection of Jesus. Bauer endeavored to prove that events like the temptation, the sending-forth of the Twelve, the Last Supper, etc., were simply experiences of the Christian community read back into the life of Jesus. Obviously, there need be no limits to so subjective a theory as

this. Its logical issue will be complete negation, as it was in B. Bauer's own case. This issue was averted, pre-eminently by the labors of Holtzmann, who, following to a large extent the lines suggested by Weiss (twenty-five years earlier), sought to deduce an organic development of the career of Jesus from the Gospel of Mark as the earliest source. The attempt was, of course, made in close association with an exhaustive investigation of the synoptic problem. But there has been a reaction toward B. Bauer. According to Brandt, Mark is almost entirely a poetical creation (Schweitzer, p. 255). Pfleiderer asserts that Mark and the other synoptists stand on the same footing as the Gospel of John. The difference is merely one of degree. They simply embody different strata of theological reflection (*op. cit.*, p. 311). Wrede carries the radical criticism of Mark to its extreme issue. This gospel arose, he urges, from the impulse to give the earthly life of Jesus a messianic guise (*op. cit.*, pp. 335-45).

How are such theories to be tested? As a matter of fact, all but the most arbitrary scholars are willing to admit a number of remarkable sayings as well as many self-evidently authentic deeds and situations in the narrated life of Jesus. There are many even of the most radical school who would hesitate to accept some of the criteria laid down by Professor Schmidt; e. g.: "The best evidence that he actually wrought some cures is the early tradition, still preserved in our gospels, that he sometimes did not succeed at all" (p. 265); or again: "these sayings [viz., some words of Jesus of which Schmidt has given the most perverse interpretation] possess evidential value just in proportion as they contradict the notions current in the circles through which they were transmitted" (p. 235). As if the influences which dominated these circles were not precisely the influence of Jesus. What light have the earliest Christian documents to shed on the data of the gospels? Here comes in the invaluable evidence of the Pauline epistles. Schmidt's preposterous criticism of these letters might well be passed over in silence, were it not for one audacious statement which we scarcely know how to characterize. He says: "The most burning question in New Testament isagogics at the present time concerns the genuineness of the four epistles, Galatians, I and II Corinthians, and Romans" (p. 196). Probably there is no New Testament scholar of repute at the present time who would not assent to Lipsius' verdict on the arguments used to discredit these epistles: "sheer assertions," he calls them, "which, on the one hand, have no foundation in fact, and, on the other, lack all demonstrative force." Even if we had no other literature belonging to the apostolic age, the testimony of these four epistles would be sufficient to show that the impression which Paul has of

Jesus is identical with that made upon the disciples, as reported in the gospel narratives. There is no more assured result of recent investigation of the apostolic age than that Paul was in agreement with the Jerusalem apostles on the fundamental facts of the faith. Now, pre-eminent among these facts is the unique and solitary position of Jesus in the divine purpose for humanity. For Paul and the whole early church Jesus is the Christ, risen from the dead and exalted as Lord. How has this attitude been reached? Obviously, in the case of his immediate disciples, contact with the personality of Jesus must in large measure have accounted for it. But the outline in the Synoptic Gospels leads us farther. There we are brought face to face with Jesus' consciousness of his own functions, his messianic self-consciousness. In this connection, much, although by no means everything, turns on the interpretation of his own self-designation, "Son of Man." Schmidt's *Prophet of Nazareth* is an attempt, he tells us, at a reinterpretation of the life and teaching of Jesus in the light of the conviction that "Jesus never used this term concerning himself, either to claim messiahship in any sense, or to hint that he was 'a mere man,' or 'the true man,' but in some pregnant utterances used it in reference to 'man' in general, his duties, rights, and privileges" (p. vii). It is difficult to take Schmidt's arguments seriously. We cannot pause here to point out the precariousness of basing the decision upon the supposed Aramaic original. It is sufficient to refer to the excellent discussion in Dalman's *Worte Jesu*. Here is Schmidt's exegesis of Matt. 8:20, which may serve as a sample of his results: "The foxes have holes and the birds of the heavens nests, but *bar nasha*—i. e., man—has nowhere to lay his head. Man's life is full of danger and uncertainty. . . . The beast is not deprived of home and hearth by his convictions" (p. 111). The title is too firmly woven into the texture of the gospel narrative to admit of this easy elimination. It occurs in connections which suggest pre-eminently Jesus' official functions. Very soon it must have come to be associated with the founding and guiding of the kingdom of God. And such an association had been foreshadowed by the famous passage in Daniel (7:13-14), and later by the *Similitudes of Enoch*. Plainly it held up a messianic ideal largely divergent from current views. With reference to these erroneous ideas "it served," as Bruce has put it, "the purpose of an incognito, making it possible for Jesus to declare himself to be the Christ to those who were in the secret, and yet remain an outside stranger to the outside world" (*Kingdom of God*, p. 177). It is Schweitzer's merit fully to recognize that "his messianic self-consciousness flashes out everywhere from his words and deeds" (p. 369). His fatal error is

the theory that this self-consciousness "can only be explained by means of eschatology" (p. 364). All attempts at an organic construction of the life of Jesus from the standpoint of a spiritual interpretation of his messianic self-consciousness are denounced as "psychologizing" (e. g., pp. 219, 244, 247). As a matter of fact, the materials for this interpretation confront us in the gospels. Eschatological elements, of course, exist. They were the scaffolding, so to speak, of the messianic hope which Jesus discovered to be realized in himself. But in virtue of his unique relationship to God, that filial relationship realized in the most intimate spiritual communion, Jesus must inevitably transform the religious conceptions of his time.

We have no space to devote to the central question of the sinlessness of Jesus as estimated by the writers with whom we have dealt. Characteristic of the most recent of them is their apparent reluctance to make negative pronouncements on the subject. Dr. Forrest, whose book on *The Authority of Christ* offers an exceedingly able treatment of an all-important theme, puts the case convincingly when he says:

Any man of ordinary intelligence and of honest moral perceptions has, if he will, the power of recognizing that such a one as Jesus could not refrain from confessing sin, if he felt he had any to confess; that such confession, if it occurred at all, affecting as it must his whole tone and attitude toward God and man, must have been known to the disciples; that if they knew of it, it was morally impossible for them to speak of him afterwards as the sinless one and the Lord of glory; and that therefore no rational account can be given of the gospels as we have them, unless on the hypothesis that the personality they depict was actually free from sin. (P. 28.)

A perusal of recent studies of the life of Jesus is an instructive discipline in the estimating of critical theories. Few of them, indeed, can be accused of the baseless extravagances which appear on the pages of Professor Schmidt. And yet to many the criticism of Kalthoff is strictly relevant: "Jesus," he says, "has become for Protestant theology the vessel into which each theologian pours the contents of his own thought" (Schweitzer, p. 313).

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ABBOTT'S JOHANNINE GRAMMAR

This bulky volume¹ is the sixth part of Dr. Abbott's *Diatessarica*, a work which up to the present demands an outlay of some twenty dollars,

¹ *Johannine Grammar*. By Edwin A. Abbott. London: Black; New York: Macmillan, 1906. xxvii + 687 pages. 16s. 6d. net.

and in mere printing and binding gives full value for the money. The output of this veteran scholar is sufficiently remarkable, whatever judgment may be passed by posterity upon his results. From the dedication we learn that "the Johannine materials . . . were gathered and arranged, and the results corrected and revised," by the writer's daughter, whose powers as exhibited here prompt the hope that so excellent a scholar will give us work on her own account when she has completed her part in the "future treatise" hinted at in the present volume. A seventh instalment of these laborious researches will form a most fitting celebration of Dr. Abbott's threescore years and ten, now not far away.

Those who know Dr. Abbott's work will at least expect with confidence a rigid and careful scholarship, which they will get in full measure. They will perhaps be surprised to find so complete an absence of his well-known critical theories. There is hardly a line in this prodigious book to suggest that the author is not on all fours with Westcott as to the personality of the fourth evangelist and the strict historicity of the narrative, miracles and all. The book is wholly given up to grammatical exposition, to such an extent that with the use of the text-index the reader is provided with a commentary on the greater part of the gospel. The arrangement of the material is fairly convenient, when the fulness of the indices is brought in; though the rediscussion of a large number of points by way of supplement in the latter part of the book creates some confusion. The reviewer, however, must here confess himself a fellow-sinner on a smaller scale: the attempt to write grammar in the form of continuous exposition and discussion almost inevitably carries with it the sacrifice of the systematic orderliness which is a primary virtue in a reference grammar. Having thus alluded to my own *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, I may as well express the regrets which its coincidence in publication with Dr. Abbott's book have occasioned me. The early and hurried call for a second edition made it impossible for me to complete my study of *Johannine Grammar*, and the references I have made to it in the new pages do not represent half of what I should wish to make now. In particular I may note a correction Dr. Abbott supplies (p. 519) of my treatment of a Berlin papyrus in the *Classical Review*, repeated in my *Grammar*, p. 75. The words *δραχμὰς . . . ἃς καὶ ἀποδώσω σοι τῷ ἔργῳ σου δοθησομένῃ δυνάμει* I translated "with your next wages." Dr. Abbott, however, points out that the document is an I. O. U., given by a common soldier to a comrade, and suggests instead "at next pay (day)." The suggested sense is, I think, fairly certain. The case remains instrumental, "with my next pay," meaning "at the time of;" and the phrase will still serve to illustrate *ταῖς προσευχαῖς* in Rev. 8:4,

if we slightly change the nuance of the latter. Dr. Abbott's correction of my use of the Leyden magic papyrus (numbered *w* in Leeman's edition) I have briefly discussed already (*Gram.*, 2d. ed. p. 245). His evidence that this document is quoting John 1:15 is clear, and the papyrus must disappear from my evidence that in this case the superlative ousted the comparative. But that in the vernacular of moderately cultivated people *πρῶτος* did supplant *πρότερος* seems to me the more certain for Dr. Abbott's own quotations. It is quite possible that the Teubner editor of Plutarch was justified in accepting the conjecture *πρότερος* where the MS have *πρῶτος*, for Plutarch was writing literary Greek; but the MS tradition in his case and Aelian's, with the passages Dr. Abbott quotes from scholiasts, may be taken as sufficient evidence that in ordinary speech even educated people did not care for the nearly obsolete word *πρότερος*. (How many of us take the trouble to say "on the former occasion" instead of "the first time"?) Dr. Abbott's translation "my chief" claims in its support the unquestioned use of *πρῶτος* as a title; I may present him with a new and early (but not very good) example from the just published Hibeh Papyri, No. 110 (see the editor's note, p. 293). In 15:18 he apparently wishes the phrase to suggest "Elder Brother" as well. That the Latin *priorem vobis* means "something like this" I should hardly think proved; and the alleged Johannine use seems to me rather a long way from the technical term *πρῶτος* as used in the papyri and in Acts 28:7. Moreover, the parallels for the genitive are not exact. I may say "premier of Great Britain," but not "my premier;" and the possibility of "my chief" does not avail till it is shown that *πρῶτος* is capable of this kind of genitive.

In a book of this size there are naturally a great many decisions which the reviewer would like to confirm or challenge at length; but space forbids. There are two main characteristics of Dr. Abbott's grammatical exegesis which may be singled out for remark. The first is the pervading subtlety of his interpretation. Westcott was subtle enough, but the "spiritual interpretations" which in this book either underlie the history or are to be substituted for it go beyond anything we have seen in modern times; we seem to be studying the allegorical expositions of Origen's school. Two specimens may be quoted, the first as perhaps the solitary example in this book of Dr. Abbott's characteristic short way with miracles. It refers to the walking on the sea:

Under "Prepositions" . . . reasons will be given for thinking that John regards the Lord as "*on the seashore*," and not as advancing over the sea to the boat. If so, he may use *γινώσκον ἐγγύς* as we speak of the coast "*coming into view*" when we ourselves "*come*" within sight of it. The words and their

context are susceptible of a spiritual interpretation. At first the disciples, in terror and unbelief, beheld Jesus "*becoming near*." Then (6:21) "they willed to receive him;" and "straightway the boat was on the land." That is to say, like the Ephesians, "they that had been far off were made to be near." (P. 19.)

I confess the miracle, understood in the old-fashioned way, seems to me quite an everyday occurrence after reading this. Is it dulness of spiritual perception which forces us to ask *what really happened*, in John's conception of the event, between vss. 20 and 21? Our other example is from the exposition of John's concluding narrative (p. 544). Dr. Abbott regards προσφάγιον as "later, and more vernacular than [its equivalent] δψάριον." (Here I agree; see my note, *Gram.*, p. 170.) "In classical Greek," he proceeds, "it might naturally be taken as a form of πρόσφαγμα 'a preliminary victim.'" Then, quoting Origen, he says that Christ, "standing on the shore" of Tiberias at the moment of sunrise, might be a type of the sacrifice that is "sent up at the moment of the enlightening of the soul." Regarded in this light, προσφάγιον might have an inner meaning intelligible to none but the initiated—including an allusion to the ΙΧΘΥC, or ONE FISH, which in this very narrative appears as a eucharistic type of Christ: "Ye have not yet received THE FISH. Ye have not yet partaken of that sacrificial victim which was slain before the foundation of the world (Rev. 13:8), without which the eyes of your souls cannot be enlightened nor can ye see how to cast the net of the Church 'on the right side' of the ship." Comment seems hardly necessary; but I must venture to assert that if the Fourth Gospel was really intended to suggest to "the initiated" "spiritual interpretations" so desperately far-fetched as these, we have exceedingly little use for such a book at the present day. "Now we see in a mirror, riddle-wise" gets a new and sinister meaning when symbolism goes wild in this fashion. Augustine's interpretation of the "25 or 30 furlongs" need make us gasp no more.

I need not say that, however incapable I am of understanding or accepting interpretation on these lines, I am perfectly aware that Dr. Abbott not only has every right to his own view, as a scholar of great learning and experience and remarkable originality, but errs, if he does err, in the very best company. In the other line of criticism on which I might venture, I am questioning not only Dr. Abbott's results, but those to which most of us were brought up. There are a great many grammatical points upon which I no longer feel it possible to insist, on the survival of classical distinctions in the vernacular Common Greek of the first century; for my reasons I must refer to my *Grammar*. Dr. Abbott quotes frequently from the non-literary papyri, but I hardly think he has adequately realized the

change in our perspective which the systematic study of the vernacular documents has brought us since Deissmann showed us the way.

To mention two important examples, Dr. Abbott refuses to be convinced by the evidence which has forced most of us to disbelieve in the sharp distinction of *eis* and *ἐν*, and in the presumption that *ἵνα* must have some degree of purposive force in it, express or latent; and he refines as boldly as if he were dealing with classical texts. Here he is going back, not upon the revolutionary theories of a modern authority like Blass, but even upon views admitted with due caution by the English editor of Winer a generation ago. In 1:18 we find Dr. Abbott translating "He that IS *into* the bosom of the Father;" "from man the Logos is ever going up *to* God and is also abiding *in* Him." Now, when we know that this "provincialism" (as Blass calls the confusion of *eis* and *ἐν*) was current at the time when the gospel was written, can we acquiesce in the supposition that John used language so eminently ambiguous to express a most recondite meaning? Dr. Abbott tries to meet Blass's argument as to *εἶναι eis* with words denoting places, of which he declares no safe example is forthcoming. Whatever may be the facts as to *εἶναι*, I cannot feel satisfied with the devices by which any verb of rest with *eis* is declared to have some latent motion about it. The papyrus BU 385 *eis* Ἀλεξανδρείαν ἐσσί (sic) may not count much, though I do not believe the obsolete *εἶμι* really does occur either there or in O P 529. But we may quote an unmistakable example in Acts 11:25 *Δ' αὖ eis Τάρσον ἐστί*, which must be at least a second-century reading; nor can I see the difference when in a Ptolemaic inscription (Letronne, 26) we find *οἱ παρεπιδημοῦντες eis φίλας*. No doubt the use of *eis* for *ἐν* started in phrases where the motion idea was latent; but the weakening of the distinction between "whither?" and "where?" which admittedly ended in the vanishing of *ἐν*, is by far the most obvious *vera causa* for passages in which the motion can only be forced by violence upon the Greek. And can we really say that the recondite meanings which Westcott or Abbott get out of the *eis* are appropriate to the relation between the Logos and God? Surely here if anywhere we desiderate a preposition which denotes unchanging rest. We had better return to the view which Buttmann preferred long ago (see Winer-Moulton, p. 518, n.), that we must admit "a more negligent use of *eis*, recognizing in these examples the first steps toward the ultimate confusion of the two prepositions."

Space forbids my discussing at equal length the Johannine use of *ἵνα*. Here I must frankly confess that I would not merely acknowledge the existence of *ἵνα ἑβατακόν*, as Winer's English editor was ready to do.

Epictetus himself—the use of whose Greek to illustrate John is one of the most useful features of Dr. Abbott's book—can even substitute *ἵνα* for consecutive *ὥστε*. Examples from Hellenistic literature and the New Testament show that *ἵνα* can take the place of any kind of infinitive; I need not repeat the account I have given elsewhere (*Gram.*, pp. 40 f., 205, 211) of the geographical distribution of infinitive and *ἵνα*-locution, according to the theory of Professor Thumb. I have admitted that “the strong volitive flavor which clung to *ἵνα* would perhaps commend it as a mannerism to a writer of John's temperament.” But to seek all manner of mysteries in a construction which other first-century writers adopted for the whole gamut of infinitive uses, seems to me straining probabilities. *Quem nosse vivere*—except for the important difference between *γινώσκειν* (pres.) and *nosse*—translates 17:3 as exactly as we could wish, if I am not grievously wrong. We put purposive force into *ἵνα* just when we put it into our own infinitive—that is, when the context decisively requires it—not elsewhere.

A few miscellaneous points may be noticed. On p. 76 Dr. Abbott says he has “not found in classical Greek an instance of *ἀγαπᾶν τινα* with *ἀγάπην*.” Has he found *ἀγάπη* with anything else? The discovery, after Deissmann's disappointment (*Bible Studies*, pp. 198 f.), would have peculiar interest. I should like to have discussed some of the alleged “Hebraic” uses—such as that of *καί*, p. 133—but I must be content with registering a general dissent. On instrumental *ἐν* (p. 256) I may refer to my *Grammar*, where I hope I have sufficiently reinforced Deissmann's arguments against the Semitism. On p. 319 Dr. Abbott delivers *en passant* a judgment with which few philologists will agree, when he suggests the existence of a difference in function between first and second aorist. It would be very interesting if we could have the evidence that “the second aorist has not this solemn or authoritative meaning” which has just been assigned to the imperative first aorist. There is much I should like to have discussed in Dr. Abbott's treatment of the tenses, but I must be content with what I have said independently in print already. I will only note that on p. 344 it is misleading to say that *τεθέαμαι* might mean “I have [just] beheld;” it is the aorist which expresses the *immediate* past. The same remark applies to the comment on *τοὺς πεπιστευκότας αὐτῷ* (p. 366). I am necessarily passing over in these notes the many points of grammar and exegesis in which Dr. Abbott seems to me to have given us sound and excellent doctrine; but I must make an exception in favor of the argument by which he claims the series (1) *μου τὰ ῥήματα*, (2) *τὰ ῥήματά μου*, (3) *τὰ ἐμὰ ῥήματα*, (4) *τὰ ῥήματα τὰ ἐμὰ* as a “climax of pronominal emphasis.” The statement that

(1) is the weakest position for the possessive seems fairly established, and if so is of very wide importance in exegesis. Resuming the points of difference, I cannot feel satisfied with the distinction drawn between *παρέλαβον* and *ἔλαβον* in 1:11, 12 (p. 426); a much simpler explanation comes from classical idiom, as shown in my *Grammar*, p. 115. Dr. Abbott's comment (p. 480) on the "curious spelling of *ποιεῖν* as *πυεῖν*" in some illiterate papyri would suggest that this *υ* for *α* was something of a rarity. It is abundant in documents of this class, and actually gives rise to the late name *ῥ ψιλόν*—i e., the the *ψ* sound written with one letter instead of the diphthong *α*, which at this period had the same value. This fact has caused him to accept a mistaken correction of the editors in O P 269: *ἐὰν σοι δῷ* is not for *δῶ*, but for *δοῖ*, a subjunctive form familiar enough in the New Testament and in papyri. The infinitive *δῶναι* which he cites on the same page (530) is also not uncommon. On p. 501 Dr. Abbott criticizes a statement of "Winer-Moulton" as to *ἀκούσομαι*, but he overlooks Moulton's correction in the footnote. The difficulty noted on p. 539 as to omissions of *δν* is not, I think, justified by the vernacular documents and the LXX; see my *Gram.*, p. 200 (where I have to confess to an unfortunate slip in copying one of the two papyrus passages Dr. Abbott himself quotes. The mistake, and a premature inference from it, are corrected in corrigenda to the second edition). I might add, for New Testament examples of dropped *δν*, Gal. 4:20 and Acts 15:22; also Gal. 3:21 D*FG, which, whether right or wrong, helps to prove the obsolescence of *δν* in the vernacular. On p. 600 Dr. Abbott quotes papyrus passages for *ἐὰν ᾗν* (*ἐνᾗν*), regarding these as imperfects. I think I have proved that these are (generally, at least) subjunctives, with a parasitic *ν* that is not infrequently found after long vowels at the end of words (*Gram.*, pp. 49, 168). Dr. Rouse notes for me how common the phenomenon is in modern Greek. Dr. Abbott's suggestions (p. 609) as to Paul's inability to write Greek characters except in clumsy, uncouth fashion, would take too long to discuss here, but they seem to run counter to all we have been learning as to Paul's perfect command of spoken Greek.

The selection of points of difference—and naturally there are a good many more which could not be referred to—has taken up too much space for me to emphasize as I should have wished the invaluable character of the material with which this monumental volume is packed from beginning to end. I frankly disbelieve in nearly all of Dr. Abbott's secondary meanings, and most heartily trust that he will not prolong the life of an exegesis which is only that of the Fathers risen again. And in many grammatical principles I think he has not specialized in Hellenistic enough to shake himself free

from the predispositions of the classical scholar. But no one will study the Fourth Gospel, or New Testament Grammar in general, without seeking and finding in Dr. Abbott's work the most careful, acute, and suggestive investigations of its problems.

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SHELDON'S SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

This latest work¹ of Professor Sheldon is the ripe result of his years of faithful and patient study of the Christian system. Out of the fulness of large acquaintance with what history has delivered to us, and the new thought of the modern epoch added, he has set forth what he believes to be the truth with great clearness, in a conciliatory temper, and with impartial fairness. And the system which he has produced is, in substance, the historical theology of the church.

The work is divided into five "parts," dealing successively with "Pre-suppositions," "The Doctrine of God," "The Subjects of God's Moral Government," "The Person and Work of the Redeemer," and "The Kingdom of Redemption." The whole is followed by some essays upon Christ's resurrection, ethnic trinities, scholastic realism, the theory of a merely ideal pre-existence of Christ, and some ethico-religious questions—marriage, Sunday, temperance. It is in the first part, and in a lesser degree in these essays, that the more important contributions to the settlement of questions at present vexing the religious mind are to be found.

Beginning with self-consciousness as the source of our knowledge, Sheldon affirms the necessity of a unitary psychical agent, or self, as a condition of knowledge. He does not bring the discussion of this subject farther down than Mill and Spencer, though it is equally demanded by the current methods of what is now specifically called "psychology," which is often vague in affirming, when not positively denying, a real agent. He then passes to the validity of knowledge, in which he refutes the extreme idealism of Kant, and maintains objective knowledge and an objective world. The chapter is brought to an end by a discussion of the principles of a rational interpretation of the universe.

The "existence of the Infinite Person" is next introduced. Sheldon does not intend to attempt to prove the existence of the Christian God without reference to the Christian Scriptures from which, historically, our very idea of God has come; but he thinks it right here to discuss "the

¹ *System of Christian Doctrine*. By Henry C. Sheldon. Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye, 1903. xii+636 pages. \$2.50.

general notion of a divine person." He devotes considerable space to the question of the personality of the Infinite. He meets the objection that, since the Infinite has no rival to its eternal being, no object set over against itself, it has no means of self-consciousness, and so lacks the distinctive feature of personality. He says:

An assumption of the eternal passivity of mind lurks in this objection. . . . No analysis of experience can discover that this is the character even of finite mind. On the contrary, it is the consciousness of subjective energy which is the principal means of interpreting to us the notion of force generally. . . . Not a few hints are given us in the human range that mind is intrinsically the power of initiation, the original spring of energy. Accordingly, it is no speculative rashness to conceive that the infinite mind, notwithstanding the absence of external stimulus, may be alive, energetic, inclusive of all loftiest feelings and purposes, and thus have abundant means of self-consciousness. Indeed, there is good reason for concluding with Lotze that complete self-consciousness, or personality in the highest sense, can be predicated of the Infinite alone.

When the arguments for the existence of God are passed in review, it is to the design argument that the greatest attention is naturally devoted. The *fact* of plan is insisted on, and then the necessity of the supposition of a planning mind behind it. A strong, and somewhat new, argument from human nature is presented. Intelligence, freedom, moral obligation, and religion all point to such qualities in the framer of man.

But the most important of the chapters in this portion of the work is that upon revelation. The argument is familiar to all theologians, and is from the personal freedom of God to the possibility of revelation, and from the "exigency," arising from the entrance of human sin, to its reality. The argument from the intrinsic worth of the Bible as a fact, to revelation as its only suitable explanation is well wrought out. "The signal proof for the Bible which is contained in the unique personality of Christ" is exceedingly well done. But the chief weight of discussion falls, as it should, upon the evidence furnished by miracles; and the preliminary question here is whether we are to accept the biblical accounts of miracles as literally true, and miracles as actual facts in the religious history of man.

Modern thought questions the supernatural interference of God in the course of human history, and makes this question most emphatic in the consideration of the miracles recorded in the gospels. It places the objection which it feels not so much upon the ground of the possibility of miracles, as upon the idea of an order in the world, which order is itself the revelation of priceless attributes of God and could not be violated without impairing or destroying such revelation. Perhaps still more powerful is the general

impression created by the explorations of science among the mysteries of the world, which have one after the other yielded to examination and taken their place under the domain of natural law, that all such mysterious events, among which are miracles so far as they are historical at all, will finally yield to research. The outcome, at any rate, is a profound skepticism in reference to miracles and to the supernatural in general, to the incarnation and the atonement, and to the whole scheme of what has been called evangelical religion.

Now, in answer to this sort of criticism, Sheldon does not pursue the path of a demonstration of the *necessity* of miracles to revelation. He thus certainly avoids a great difficulty, if he can only otherwise prove their actuality. His argument from the personality of God to their possibility may at once be admitted. He sets up three criteria of genuine miracles: "(1) intrinsic and recognizable connection with ends that may be regarded as worthy of divine wisdom and benevolence; (2) demonstrated efficiency to impress men healthfully, or to promote their moral and spiritual development; (3) confirmation by a sufficient amount of honest and intelligent testimony." The argument is at last reduced to a defence of the credibility of the Bible. Take away the miracles, and you have destroyed the entire credibility of the biblical story; and you have "the vapid conclusion that nothing is known of the historical character [Christ] who produced the mightiest effects that ever emanated from a single life." The question thus resolves itself into an explanation of Christian history without Christ.

As to the results of the modern historical criticism of the biblical books, while Professor Sheldon shows acquaintance with them, and does not maintain any view of inspiration which would exclude their more moderate conclusions, he nowhere thoroughly grapples with the situation created by this modern phenomenon, nor meets the questions suggested by those studies which have been compendiously presented in Professor G. B. Foster's recent book.

So much for Part I. Of the remaining portion of the work it is the less necessary to speak at length for the reason that it is simply modern evangelical orthodoxy, starting from an Arminian standpoint, just as the New England theology was such orthodoxy starting from a Calvinistic standpoint. In fact, Sheldon is in remarkable agreement with such theologians as Fairchild, of Oberlin. If the New England School has finished its course, as now appears, and if the cause of this was its failure really to meet the modern issues, or to furnish the materials for the erection of a theology which would, then the question as to the permanent value and service of

Professor Sheldon's work would seem to require a not altogether favorable answer.

Indeed, whether this theology meets the demands of modern thought or not, it does not meet the inner demands of its own making. Take, for example, the study of the christological problem. Sheldon nowhere shows any disposition to take the unity of the person of Christ seriously. Until he does that, and furnishes some approach to a rationale of it, he has not met the insistent question which Unitarianism has been thrusting upon orthodoxy for more than a hundred years in Massachusetts, without having it yet adequately answered. It is significant that he gives a large place to the discussion of theories of kenosis, and in his summary of results (p. 358) specifically rejects what he supposes to be its characteristics; but he has not succeeded in understanding the Kenotics. To be sure, he hits the bull's eye when he says of the theory: "This vast assumption, in spite of all that has been said in its behalf, stands greatly in need of being made to appear rationally credible." But he leaves the objection unanswered which the Unitarian would bluntly put: "That is no theology which leaves the very central point upon which all turns, the conception of the Redeemer, inconceivable."

For largeness, adequacy, fairness, calmness, keenness, balance, and conformity to the evangelical spirit of aggressive churches, we hold this System, in spite of all the adverse criticism above made, unsurpassed in its school. The unanswered question pertains to its *truth*.

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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTION IN RELIGION

A little volume by G. Gross¹ deals with the significance of aesthetics in the evangelical religion. The essence of aesthetics is characterized as spiritual enjoyment or gratification (*Genuss*) which is brought about by an exaltation in fantasy above the crudeness and rawness and discord of the concrete to a sense of the harmony of the whole. Since the sole aim of aesthetics is enjoyment, any attempt on the part of the artist to minister to morality or religion means its corruption. On the other hand, the essence of religion is not enjoyment, but duty. The author depreciates the effort in many quarters today to view religion under the concept of worth, since religion deals, not with the supreme worth, but with the

¹ *Die Bedeutung des Ästhetischen in der evangelischen Religion.* Von G. Gross. Noch ein Wort über den christlichen Dienst. Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. D. A. Schlatter. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. 83 pages. M. 1.50.

supreme Lord. Religion is duty, obedience to God, and not enjoyment; and its exaltation above the actual in life is not a mere fantasy or play of the imagination, but is an ideal that is to be made actual through conduct and character.

In general, then, the mingling of aesthetics with religion means the corruption of the one and the deterioration of the other. It is only with great care and under strict limitations that aesthetics is to be employed in worship. Churches should be built with more regard for the preaching and teaching of the Word and with less straining after aesthetic effects, and the preacher who is more anxious for artistic form and finish than he is to present in earnestness and clearness the gospel message of repentance and service has failed to understand his mission. Music is the one art that can be employed with most efficiency and with least danger in religious worship, but even here great care should be exercised in the character of the hymns and manner of rendition.

There is a practical message in this interesting and suggestive essay, and yet it is not difficult to see that the author has taken a narrow and one-sided view both of religion and of aesthetics, and one that would be rejected by students of both disciplines. And when a broader and more comprehensive view is taken of these magnitudes, it will be found that the relation is more intimate and sympathetic.

There is another essay in this volume on religious service, which is a partial polemic, a reply to certain criticisms upon a former work of the author, and contains a clear and sane presentation of the work of the Spirit and of the relation of faith to service.

An essay by Marcel Djuvara^a seeks to settle the controversy between science and religion by the application of the philosophical principles of Fries, a disciple of Kant. It maintains the Kantian dualism throughout and is subject to the criticism against the Kantian philosophy. The sphere of science is the realm of phenomena, and its method is by observation and application of the laws of thought. It brings the data of sense under the concepts of the understanding. It is concrete and rich, an intelligible system in itself, but confined to the realm of the phenomenal, and lands in contradictions whenever it tries to apply its methods to the reality beyond its sphere. On the other hand, religion has to do with the *Ding-an-sich*. Its object is affirmed as a fact by the speculative reason. And this affirmation springs from the immediate knowledge of the unity of consciousness, and cannot be regarded after the manner of Kant as

^a *Wissenschaftliche und religiöse Weltansicht*. Von Marcel T. Djuvara. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906. 40 pages. M. 1.

a kind of transcendental illusion. Then, too, through the immediate consciousness of the moral law, the object of religion gets content in the practical moral life.

But it is primarily in the realm of the feelings that the content is given to the object of religion. Aesthetic ideas, which are synthetic in character, and not at all subject to the limitations of the concepts of science, become the vehicle of religious feeling. Religious truths are poetic, symbolic, mythical, and express an objective reality, but are not to be regarded as scientific statements. The essay exaggerates the dualism between the form and the content of experience in a manner more open to psychological criticism than any statement of Kant; and its division of knowledge into the immediate and certain, and the mediated and so liable to error, though it contains an element of truth, is crude, naïve, and unphilosophical. The absolute dualism between the two spheres of knowledge arises out of the failure to see that the test of truth in any case is just its value for life, its ability to unify experience and further the purposes of the will.

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THE CHARACTER OF MODERN PREACHING IN GERMANY

The desire to read printed sermons is developing rapidly in Germany. Publishers are anxious to print sermons of well-known preachers, and many editors collect for publication sermons of many different pastors on a single theme. Taking a number of pamphlets printed during 1905 and the early months of 1906,¹ we shall attempt to gain a knowledge of the

¹ *Ein evangelisches Osterbuch.* Von E. Quandt. Dresden: Angelenk, 1905. 258 pages. M. 2.50.

Apologetische Predigten. Von F. J. Winter. Dresden: Angelenk. 158 pages. M. 1.50.

Die alttestamentlichen Perikopen. Von J. M. Reu. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1905. 292 pages. M. 4.

Fastenpredigten. Von B. Hoffmann. Dresden: Angelenk. 48 pages. M. 0.60.

Predigten über Zeitfragen. Von C. Lülmann. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 90 pages. M. 1.60.

Zwanzig Predigten. Von Thv. Klaveness. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 143 pages. M. 2.20.

Konfirmationsreden. Von E. Siedel. Leipzig: Jansa, 1905. 96 pages. M. 1.

Zwölf Weihnachtspredigten für einfache Christenleute. Von M. Schenkel. Leipzig: Jansa, 1905. 100 pages. M. 1.

Beichtreden. Von J. Rütling. Leipzig: Jansa, 1905. 91 pages. M. 1.

Zwölf Sylvester und Neujahrs-Predigten. Von K. Storch. Leipzig: Jansa, 1905. 92 pages. M. 1.

character of modern preaching in Germany, and especially the trend of that preaching. No attempt has been made to gather all such printed collections. The variety, however, of the sermons thus accessible is deemed sufficient, embracing as it does, in the various symposiums the messages of very many of the leading preachers in the German state church of today.

Two styles of preaching instantly force their peculiarities upon the reader; indeed, the authors by their very titles and introductions link themselves with the conservative theology and the past, or with the new theology and the modern world. The sermons of Lülmann and Klaveness by the very printer's and bookbinder's art, the introductions,² the titles of the sermons, the short paragraphs of the text, and the subject-matter itself, all herald through Germany a new kind of preaching.

Of a second division the themes, which rigidly and often adhere to the church calendar, the form with prescribed benedictions, and advance announcement of divisions, the sermon material with its ever-conscious relation to Luther and the succeeding period of orthodoxy, and the almost exclusive use of biblical illustration, tie these sermons to the church of the former century.³ Of course, several rare exceptions might be mentioned in which the treatment was not so rigid and trite.

The typical German sermon is well known to all who have heard or read examples. Usually a benediction precedes the introduction and follows the conclusion; a short prayer for special guidance follows the introduction and the announcement of divisions. This three- or fourfold division invariably precedes the main body of the homily and takes away all spontaneity of logical development. The church calendar and peri-

Festpredigten über alttestamentliche Texte. Von B. Kühn. Leipzig: Jansa, 1906. 102 pages. M. 1.

Christus für uns! Von J. Rüling. Leipzig: Jansa, 1906. 88 pages. M. 1.

Die stille Woche. Von Fr. Langheinrich. Leipzig: Jansa, 1906. 81 pages. M. 1.

Grabreden. Von O. Hardebrand. Leipzig: Jansa, 1906. 95 pages. M. 1.

² "The author has made in the pulpit a fresh attempt to illuminate weighty and difficult problems, which deeply concern Christendom today, in the spirit of modern theology, which in the last analysis is animated by the spirit of Holy Scripture. (Lülmann.)

"The sermon in particular drives away the modern man from church. In what way? The form and the manner of development both work in this direction, especially the inherited method of preaching both in expression and delivery. . . . Also the subject-matter itself. . . . The error of the usual sermon is that it passes over the heads of the auditors." (Klaveness.)

³ "They [the sermons] wish, after the manner of former centuries, to bring to light, without fear of man, the wrongs of the day." (Hoffmann, Introduction.)

cope force the preacher's mind into a definite mold without much freedom.⁴ One can well imagine there is no fine choice of text, theme, and illustration, and none of the artistic aesthetic articulation in development which in America and England is so popular and well exemplified in a Hillis, a Van Dyke, a Dawson, and a Watkinson. The monotony of such preaching comes with its full force when one reads twenty-four Easter sermons, including those of Dryander and Achelis, and especially in Professor Reu's 292 pages of Old Testament exegesis, homiletic values, and sermon outlines old and new. The same thought is iterated and reiterated by the same or other preachers. If one misses the finely wrought intellectual preaching, one also feels the absence of strong, virile, and homely discourses of an evangelist on fire—such personalities as Finney, and Moody, as Spurgeon and Booth.⁵

An intermediate stage between ultra-conservative and the progressive preaching is seen in the two pamphlets of Rilling and those of Storch, of Siedel and of Schenkel. The topics are more inviting and not exclusively conventional; the treatment appeals much more to the rising generation, and present-day evils are exhibited and rebuked.

Probably the best ready standard by which to judge these three outlined divisions is that laid down in the recent inaugural address of President James G. K. McClure, of McCormick Theological Seminary.⁶ Out of a rich experience of thirty years as a pastor, "among the simple and the learned, the poor and the rich, the tillers of the soil and the workers of the city," he certainly is authorized to speak forth the demands of modern preaching the world over, and will enable us especially to consider these German productions in the light of America's homiletic needs. To be effective, he writes, the modern preacher must emphasize: (1) God; (2) the worth of the individual in contradistinction to both the masses and classes; (3) the essentials of religion; (4) the encouragement of scholarship; (5) the social needs and the consecration of wealth; (6) fellowship between all true followers of Christ.⁷

⁴ Professor Baumgarten, in his introduction to the Klaveness collection, characterizes the traditional sermon with a large measure of sarcasm. Cf. p. viii.

⁵ Germany possesses such a popular preacher in the Evangelist Keller, pastor in Düsseldorf.

⁶ This address, entitled "The Mission and Opportunity of Presbyterianism in This Present Generation," has been issued in pamphlet form.

⁷ These six requirements answer exactly the six spiritual wants found among men: (1) "a moving sense of sin;" (2) "a right valuation of the individual;" (3) "a clear emphasis of essentials;" (4) "religious encouragement to scholarship;" (5) "unflinching loyalty to today's convictions;" (6) "effective concentration of forces."

Conservative preaching has always urged God and his supremacy upon its hearers. The worth of the individual and his individualistic relation to the heavenly Father, the divine Savior, and Holy Spirit has always been rightly prized and strongly uttered. In the land where justification by faith alone was rediscovered and so courageously proclaimed, this is to be expected. When the essentials are weighed, they are not those of the apostolic church simply, but those of Lutheranism. Baptismal regeneration finds a large place in all discourses at confirmation time.⁸

It is a curious fact that modern scholarship is seldom touched upon in German pulpits. The pastors and divinity professors make a clear distinction between their academic and popular utterances. But at times a preacher of the old school will reflect on the "good old days" when the Scriptures were sacredly received without the slightest critical examination, and will hold up modern criticism to ridicule by extreme and unwarranted statements.⁹ Certainly no careful critical insight is displayed when Job 19:25 is used as the basis for an Easter sermon.¹⁰

The crying need of the modern German conservative pulpit is a frank recognition of social conditions and struggles. The state churches as a whole are well-nigh empty¹¹ during the regular divine service, with only the rarest exceptions. Special favorites, appearing in the pulpit about once a month, draw the crowd. There is no point of contact between preacher and day laborer or mechanic. The Social Democrats, with their special economic and social programme, have captured the ear and the heart of the workingman.¹² The leaders¹³ in many universities see no hope for the state church until the large parishes of twenty-five, fifty, and a hundred thousand and more are broken up into smaller units in which the pastor will have the stimulus of personal acquaintance and individual sympathy with his flock.

The Lutheran state church, as is well known, rejects all fellowship with Christians of other name, and refuses to make or receive advances.

⁸ Cf. Siedel, *passim*. Hardeland, p. 84.

⁹ Schenkel, pp. 51, 52.

¹⁰ Schrader in the *Evangelisches Osterbuch*. On the text see Davidson's Job.

¹¹ Cf. *Independent*, June 7, 1906, p. 1310, "Massenaustritt;" and the *Outlook*, August 18, 1906, p. 875.

¹² A pensioned teacher of the classics in Leipzig, a man therefore of culture, told the writer that he was once on a committee caring for the poor in winter time. One day he suggested to the committee, including several clergymen, that the pastors ought to make it their business to find out what was "in the pot on the stove." The latter indignantly asserted such investigations beyond their duty. The eager worker in the interests of social reform was silenced and frowned out of the circle.

¹³ Professors Hauck and Sohm, of Leipzig.

All the English and American denominations are on the same plane and dubbed "sects." Against such every official preacher feels it his bounden duty to take up the cudgel of the apologete and to denounce all later movements in the church. "If they [the sects] preach against our state church, and indeed, as I hear often in very sharp terms, it will be permitted us in turn to preach against them."¹⁴ The day when all Christians shall dwell together in unity is still far distant in Germany.

The authors with mediating tendency cling rather to tradition and are not willing to launch out far. As respects the six requisites of modern preaching, they do not in statement strike notes beyond their brethren above discussed. Indeed, in this division we find instances of baptismal regeneration taught in explicit terms¹⁵ and the sharpest attack on modern scholarship.¹⁶ Even a verse from the apocrypha can serve as a text.¹⁷ But nevertheless a new spirit is distinctly perceptible in these sermons. A live, penetrating, spiritual atmosphere pervades them; and, as well, a strong vital assurance of the reality of divine things. These preachers are anxious to reach the mass of the people and so speak simply. The advanced announcement of divisions and set benedictions are avoided. Rüling is certainly a master in preparing the mind and heart for a worthy reception of the elements of the Lord's memorial feast.¹⁸ Siedel in confirmation discourses adapts his tone and material wonderfully well to youthful minds; yet from year to year his thoughts reappear in new dress, and even former illustrations come with the old force on a new generation. Storch pens short, terse, epigrammatic sentences of the nature of those to be found in modern German literature in general. He describes some of the social evils so prevalent in modern society, and certainly pictures the conditions plainly, yet hesitates to give the correction, asserting a solution well-nigh unattainable.¹⁹ For him modern society is highly destructive of the best ideals. The present moral condition of Germany he paints black indeed.²⁰

The two ostensibly modern preachers are divided in their allegiance to modern theology. Professor Baumgarten does not accept Klaveness as a fellow-adherent of radical views. On the other hand, Lülmann openly acknowledges his acceptance of modern theological teaching, which, he declares, rightly interprets the spirit of Holy Writ.²¹

¹⁴ Dr. M. Schenkel, "Eine Predigt gegen die Baptisten," *Apologetische Predigten*, p. 89.

¹⁵ Siedel, *passim*.

¹⁶ See above.

¹⁷ Tobiah, 5:23; Siedel, p. 62.

¹⁸ *Beichtreden*. Rüling has his reward and in Leipzig invariably preaches to large congregations.

¹⁹ Pp. 57, 79.

²⁰ Pp. 6, 21.

²¹ See the short translation above.

These self-styled modern homilies of both preachers are fervent in their adoration of God the Father, Christ the Son, and the Holy Spirit.²² The persons of the Godhead are brought into the busy and practical life of the hearers in simple language and illustration.²³

The individual assuredly holds his former place—indeed, he takes a new one, in addition—as the writers try to understand his earthly burdens and sorrows as well as point him to the future joys of heaven. This point will be clearer when we take up the attitude toward social questions. Religion no longer is comprehended in a catechism four hundred years old, nor are the only essentials the cardinal truths taught therein. According to Professor Baumgarten, the three great essentials of Klaveness are God, sin,²⁴ and morality.

Klaveness does not himself define his relation to modern methods and results in theological research, but his whole attitude toward truth would undoubtedly cause him to adopt heartily the position of Lülmann.

²² Of the twenty sermons by Klaveness one deals directly with God, two with Christ, and two with the Holy Spirit.

²³ The definitions which Klaveness gives of God, Jesus, the Holy Spirit, and the gospel sound very orthodox indeed.

God "is a holy Father, who desires his children to become perfect; therefore he rears them sternly and punishes their sins, as the law of causality shows. But he is still Father, who forgives the penitent child, entirely and fully forgives, who comforts the suffering child, blesses the obedient child and trains it up for his kingdom." (Introduction, p. vi.)

Jesus: "A figure such as his never before and never since dwelt among us. From his cradle, from his life, from his message, from his wounds, from his cross, and from his open grave there streams a radiance as from no other great man, who has lived and died in this world. . . . This radiance is heavenly, divine. . . . One may say what he will—the crucified Jew from Nazareth has constructed the world anew. The best thought the world has in culture, she has from him. And no one counts the number of those who through him have come to peace, and from him have received the strength to live a noble life and to die a blissful death. We, too, in all weakness, thanks be to God, have experienced something of it. Therefore we also believe in him; we also have faith in his assurance that he will come again, and complete what he has begun. . . . His life, his death, his resurrection, and his ascension are to us a secure pledge of the sincerity and truth of his words." (Pp. 5, 6.)

The Holy Spirit: "The deeper knowledge of God and the Son is given us neither in the creation nor in history. This is bestowed by the Spirit. Father and Son are strangers to thee, as long as the Spirit has not touched the strings of thy heart and permitted thee to experience the love and grace of Father and Son." (P. 123.)

The gospel "is the message: thy sins are forgiven thee. God is thy Father, and thou art his child. . . . God in heaven, my Creator and Judge. . . . Jesus gives this certainty. His words, his life, his cross, his open grave, cry to every poor human soul that will listen." (P. 11.)

²⁴ To sin he adds a message of love to those who have suffered shipwreck of life's cherished plans and to those mourning unrequited love or for wounds inflicted by those who should have loved instead. (Introduction, p. vi.)

Even in the church we are forced to permit the battle for truth. Truth cannot and should not petrify in the letter of any creed that has become historic. The vigorous struggle of various convictions and beliefs can be only beneficial to our church. So much more certain will she help to bring truth to light.²⁵

We may imagine that these two preachers are men of firm convictions which are held against the continued pressure of traditional views and the inertia which opposes all things new. Klaveness, we learn, has endured severe censure and opposition from within his own church.²⁶ Not only the form, but the matter, of these sermons is new. Custom dictates that only themes directly treated in systematic theology may be discussed from the pulpit. Yet these men discourse on the burning questions of the day and without reserve deliver their own conclusions.

The consecration of wealth is not yet emphasized in Europe as much as in America. But the social needs are nevertheless pressing and cry the louder for aid. These modern preachers are not afraid to speak on social topics and give good advice to the rising generation. The German traditional love for malted liquors is truly hard hit by Lülmann in several passages. It is novel to read such words in a German sermon:

Music in the home is the worry of Satan. We can only rejoice when old and young, instead of sitting behind a glass of beer, will rather sit behind some musical instrument at home.²⁷

How many people, who must plod for their daily bread, throw many a dollar out of the window, as it were, for trifles and drink every single Sunday afternoon. . . . What will help? . . . Again, only Christianity.²⁸

The duel is similarly characterized as un-Christian as well as unmanly, and as strenuously opposed by this modern social reformer. All lovers of temperance who have studied conditions in Germany are immensely cheered by such forceful and pertinent language from one in such high authority.

The social needs in Scandinavia are as clearly discerned and publicly expressed. So plainly does Klaveness speak that he must answer the charge of lack of refinement and propriety in the choice of material for pulpit discourse. "Many claim that the love between man and woman does not belong to utterances in the pulpit. It is too worldly and impure. I am not ashamed to discuss it."²⁹ On the topic of divorce he is extremely severe in his strictures:

²⁵ *Predigten über Zeitfragen*, p. 65.

²⁶ Cf. Introduction to Klaveness, p. ix; attack by Bishop Heuch.

²⁷ *Predigten über Zeitfragen*, p. 17.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁹ Cf. *Predigten*, p. 46.

If our modern ladies and gentlemen were converted to Jesus, certainly they would not so soon sigh for the freedom of divorce. Much less would they run away, to throw themselves into the arms of a new paramour or a new sweetheart to the shame and dishonor of themselves and to the disgrace of others. . . . Such is brutality with culture as an outward veneer.³⁰

Conventional eating and drinking in modern society,³¹ the prevailing morality,³² and the moral code among university students,³³ are all treated with scathing and even bald directness. One is often astounded by the openness of the burning philippics. That religion is the only power that can cope with immorality and win the victory is enunciated in plain and perspicuous terms:

On the whole, no art is able to curb the animal [passions] in man. The animal is too strong and art too weak for that. To accomplish this end there is a stronger power in human life—religion. . . . From Jesus' person, his life and death, streams forth a spirit of discipline and purity which reins in the impure lusts. . . . Jesus does still more. He raises the fallen one up.³⁴

Nothing whatever is said of fraternity and interdenominationalism in Germany. Both preachers hold their appointment from the state and are governmental officials. In this matter of a common brotherhood, among all Protestant bodies at least, they are either children of their environment or deem it unwise at present to bring forth and press this new issue.³⁵

Judged by the sermons under consideration in this article, neither the conservative nor the progressive party in Germany is preaching the gospel in the full enlightenment of the present age. The conservatives are answering about half the needs of mankind; they are bound so effectually by the past that new developments are all alike ruinous; or else they are laid lame by the fear of chaos, if a social and world-wide fraternal note were added to their message. The methods and results of scholarship are rarely mentioned; yet we know that the conservative side is not a unity in its attitude toward modern criticism.

The representatives of the more progressive wing are helping their generation to the extent of about two-thirds to five-sixths of their privilege. They hold to the doctrines of the church, modified perhaps in conception,

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 42, 43.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³⁵ Curiously enough, Lülmann willingly recognizes "children with the inheritance of the saints," but beyond the borders of his own fatherland. (*Predigten über Zeitfragen*, p. 27.)

but essentially the best teaching of the centuries. They throw to the winds stereotyped homiletic traditions and have gained tremendously in directness of appeal to the modern man and woman. These preachers rightly diagnose the diseases of the present social body and do not mince words in describing modern sins. They apply the only remedy—the dynamic in Christianity. Yet, even with all their keen insight into social ailments and humanity in general, they have no message of a love, wide as the world, for all those who worship the same God “in spirit and truth” and “who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality.”

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CHRISTOLOGY IN CONTEMPORANEOUS GERMAN THOUGHT

In Arnal's treatise¹ we are brought face to face with German rationalism in its treatment of the person of Christ. The theologians considered under this classification are Biedermann, Lipsius, and Pfeiderer. They are grouped together because of their kindred Hegelianism; philosophic unity leads to dogmatic unity. Arnal employs three criteria in his criticism: logic, psychology, and history. Warmly does he champion scientific method. Religion can lay no claim to a special logic; modern science has become a part of the human spirit; there is no other way to knowledge acceptable in this day. He considers Christ as man, as superman, and as God. He is in essential agreement with the rationalists in their insistence upon the humanity of Jesus. Jesus was thoroughly a man, even in his sentiments, desires, and ideals. And to be man is to be only man. The rationalists “are in accord with the gospels and with reason; with them we must reject the dogma of the two natures.” It is impossible to emend the God-man idea so as to make it acceptable. The formulae of rationalism on this point are at fault only in not being complete. Omitting all texts of the Scripture except those that deal with the historic Jesus, rather than with his pre-existence or post-existence, there is no evidence that necessitates his divinity. Even in John's Gospel the power, glory, and knowledge of Jesus keep within human limits. They attest a personal relationship to God, but do not necessitate an essential relationship. Jesus was holy, yet not inerrant, because he was man. His holiness is the explanation of his uniqueness, and is the very core of the revelation

¹ *La personne du Christ et le rationalisme allemand contemporain.* Par André Arnal. Vol. I. Paris: Fischbacher, 1904. 424 pages. Fr. 7.50.

of Christ. Jesus was conceived as God because of the resurrection. Exegesis, psychology, or logic will not justify the theory of visions in explaining the fact of the resurrection. It is this fact upon which rests the foundation of the church and of Christian faith. It is illogical to assume at the very start that the supernatural does not exist. Because God is a free being, miracle must be admitted. Christianity itself is a miracle. Rationalism recognizes only the miracle of the world and its harmonious course. Lipsius' distinction between dogmatic miracle and supernatural religion is to be rejected. Nor dare one accept the distinction between a historic and an ideal Christ. Christ is more than an ideal; he is the historic means by which God grafted a new humanity into humanity. Accept the Hegelian philosophy of the rationalists, and their conclusions follow; but the philosophy of German rationalism must be revised, if it is to escape false elements and contradictions. Our author rejects traditional trinitarian symbols. God is the only God; Christ is not God *qua* God; the Holy Spirit is a divine influence, a divine presence in our lives. Yet the requirements of faith oblige us to accept a hypothesis of a miraculous birth, even though one other than that of Matthew or of Luke. This is necessary in order to conserve Jesus' holiness. Jesus pre-existed; nor was this pre-existence ideal. How can an abstraction pre-exist? In summation, rationalism affirms only the humanity of Jesus. It accepts his post-existence in a religious sense, but denies utterly his pre-existence. Three orders of facts may be distinguished: (1) the holiness of Christ; the resurrection of Christ; (2) the post-existence—facts that unfold in contemporary religious history; (3) the supernatural birth and pre-existence—really explicative hypotheses. Rationalism accepts only the first fact in the first order. It denies supernaturalism, but thereby denies liberty to God. In fact, God becomes a mere symbol. In the last analysis rationalism is agnosticism.

Such a work as this displays brilliancy and keenness. Rationalism is not condemned *in toto*. In fact, though Lipsius' symbolism is criticized, there is evident a sympathy with his general attitude of thought. Yet the author is not a rationalist as he understands the term. He is saved from this by his belief in miracle. Miracles he grounds in God's freedom. Against a God who is abstract he places a God who is analogous to a human personality. To do this he goes outside of rationalism and rests upon faith. He would not deny that, as against the metaphysics that rationalism destroys, he establishes a newer metaphysics. Yet his whole system falls with his concept of God. The validity of the argument of analogy as applied to God is not sure. Since he himself denies sub-

stantialism, it is difficult to see what God may be for him, if not the very ideal or abstraction he would criticize in others. Even his faith is subordinate to reason; it is evident that the gospels are. Logically he would not be able to escape from rationalism. The motive that has stimulated him is the desire to account for the holiness of Christ. He assumes that such uniqueness necessitates a unique office. He accounts for the latter by the miraculous birth and the theory of pre-existence. These point to the divinity of Christ, yet Christ is not God *qua* God. In what other sense he may be God is not clear. The problems that are left to be pondered are many. The philosophy of the rationalists is condemned without giving a substitute. The resurrection is assumed as a cardinal fact in Christianity at one moment and the holiness of Christ at another. Does this not involve the assumption of the whole solution? Is the resurrection a historic fact? And does Christ's character necessitate the conclusion that he was God? Nor is it satisfactory to ground miracle in God's character. Miracle is not to be discussed on an *a priori*, but on a historic basis, if at all. The question as to whether there is or is not a supernatural realm is in the end a matter of definition.

Schaefer,² in an article on the Christology of the confessions, follows Kaftan in distinguishing between the theology of a new faith and a modern theology of the old faith. The former involves a new religion not worthy to be termed Christian. Ritschlian theology is left out of consideration as no longer modern. Modern theology is either religio-historical in method, and therefore a new faith, or else some form of an old faith. For the former Christ ceases to be an object of faith; he is only a subject of faith. To be an object of faith Christ must be divine in his human personality. Precisely in this sense the theology of the new faith rejects the divinity of Christ. For it Christ is only a religious genius or a religious hero. Such a Christology lacks vitality. The divinity of Christ is more than a postulation; if it were not, the work of Christ would lack reality. The question is a historical one to be settled by the Scriptures. Christ's sonship to God is essential, in contrast to that of believers. The Christ of the confessionals needs reconstruction, however, for the doctrine of the two natures is untenable. Yet one must retain the virgin birth and pre-existence, or else do harm to the Christian faith. It is nonsense to believe that the world brought forth its Lord. The choice is between eternal existence and creation to explain Jesus. His own self-conscious-

² *Die Christologie der Bekenntnisse und die moderne Theologie*. Von Erich Schaefer. [In "Beiträge zur christlicher Theologie."] Heft 5. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1905. 154-226 pages. M. 1.60.

ness is alone competent to decide. The Logos doctrine affords a solution to modern Christology. The Logos is the expression of God, yet becomes man by its own willing. At the same time, Jesus did not cease to be Son of God. The death of Christ means that God's life ceased in him, the resurrection that God's life returned. It may be remarked that Jesus' self-consciousness dare not be given the value attached to it by the author. The infallibility of that consciousness would have to be established, or else it could only be accepted as an opinion and not a criterion. The naivness of a modern theology that gives up the two-nature theory, but plunges one into other and even greater dogmatic and psychological difficulties is noticeable. Must one remain true to the Logos idea and the theory of kenosis at the expense of psychology?

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BRIEF MENTION

ANGUS, S. *The Sources of the First Ten Books of Augustine's De Civitate Dei*. Princeton, 1906. 279 pages. \$1.

The *De Civitate Dei* of Augustine may be considered the final expression of the attitude of the western church toward the culture of Greece and Rome. It is of the greatest importance to determine the sources from which Augustine derived his knowledge of the pagan history and literature. The direct quotations had already been indicated in the editions of Dombart and Hoffmann; but even to bring these together gives an interesting hint as to the extent of the reading of the greatest scholar of the early western church. Dr. Angus has carried on this difficult investigation with great thoroughness, and his conclusions are, in general, convincing. A few errors, however, occur; e. g., on p. 16 Apuleius seems to be credited with the authorship of the *Asclepius*, or *Hermes Trismegistus*, and on p. 201 there is an amusing misinterpretation of Augustine's statement in regard to the trial of Apuleius on the charge of magic.

In addition to the study of the sources, many other questions of interest have been considered by Dr. Angus in the commentary. Thus there is a full discussion of the impression made upon Augustine by the news of the sacking of Rome by Alaric in 410, the catastrophe that really suggested the writing of the *De Civitate*. His conclusion is: "So far as the testimony of Augustine's writings is concerned, his attitude to the fall of Rome and the state of the Roman Empire of his day was one neither of intense and deeply patriotic feeling nor of heartless indifference, though nearer the latter than the former. To say the least, he appears surprisingly calm in the face of so terrible a calamity. Augustine's pride in Rome was centered in her achievements of the *past*, not in her *present*. He was more of a Christian than a Roman." The last part of the dissertation is a discussion of Augustine's knowledge of Greek—a point of considerable importance in view of the many allusions in the *De Civitate* to Plato and the Neoplatonists. In this chapter we have an exhaustive collection of passages from several of Augustine's works, which afford direct evidence of his ability to

use Greek, even so far as to distinguish synonyms and to venture upon simple textual emendations. In view of this, it would seem that certain statements in the study of the sources are entirely too dogmatic, as when (on p. 18), after referring to the banishment of the poets from Plato's ideal state, Angus adds: "Of course, Augustine did not get this from Plato's *Republic* in the original." It is true that his later reading of Greek was probably confined to the Septuagint and the New Testament; but it is not at all impossible that such a passage as this is a reminiscence of the earlier days, when he might well have read Plato and other Greek philosophers in the original. The dissertation is a work that will prove of great value to students of Augustine, and there is thus the more reason for regretting the large number of typographical errors.

Theologischer Jahresbericht. XXIV. Band, 1905. Herausgegeben von G. KRÜGER und W. KOEHLER. Berlin: Schwetschke & Sohn, 1905. 1410 pages.

The twenty-fourth volume of the *Theologischer Jahresbericht* forms another indispensable compendium of new literature for the student of the broad field of theology. It outstrips its predecessor by 56 pages, and for practical value condenses its remarks to the smallest possible compass. The work is brought up to its present efficiency through the unremitting co-operation of twenty-six specialists and workers. The first part, dealing with the literature of hither Asia, and extra-biblical religious history, is treated by Beer and Lehmann with a fulness ample for an introduction to a theological work. Holtzmann, Knopf, and Weiss pass upon the New Testament literature that fills the pages of Part II. Volz alone has gathered up with surprising completeness the mass of literature that the year yielded on the Old Testament. As a rule, the fullest treatment is accorded German works, though there is a gratifying spirit of fairness throughout. The largest and fullest part is that devoted to church history, with its seven editors—among them Krüger, Clemen, and Vogt—and over 500 pages. It is a *vademecum* on the history of the church, and a superb showing for one year's productions by the workers in this field of investigation.

Systematic theology classified by Neumann, Christlieb, and others, covering the same stretch of time as the preceding part, though only about one half as thick, is still full and comprehensive enough to satisfy the requirements of students of this wing of theology. The part (VI) on practical theology is almost a solid bibliography, bespeaking the masses of practical theological literature that poured from the presses of Christendom in 1903-4. And this great volume is made immediately available by the comprehensive *Register*, or General Index. The theological world is to be congratulated on the issuance of such an invaluable bibliography as this work has already proved itself to be.

The Jewish Encyclopedia. Vols. XI and XII. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1905. 690 pages. \$6 each.

The Jewish Encyclopedia has at last reached completion. The publishers and editors are to be congratulated on the splendid success with which they have carried through this great undertaking. The work started out on a high plane of excellence and interest, and has steadily maintained it to the end. Indeed, promises have been much more than fulfilled. For example, there were to be 8,000 pages by 400

contributors, and 2,000 illustrations; but the twelve volumes actually contain 8,572 pages by 605 contributors, and 2,464 illustrations, with numerous photogravures and 23 reproduced in facsimile by lithographic process in colors. The work as it stands is a very full and complete account of the Jews from their earliest appearance to the present time, considering them in all the phases of their very diversified activity. It is accordingly a work of interest, not only to Jews, but to all students of history and sociology. It should have a place in all libraries that make any pretension to completeness, whether private or public.

HADLEY, A. T., *Freedom and Responsibility*. New York: Scribner, 1903. 175 pages. \$1.

President Hadley has brought to the discussion of grave themes the special knowledge of the economist and the insight of the religious man. He insists upon the doctrine that a nation cannot continue to enjoy freedom, power, and wealth without recognizing their responsibilities. He touches with firm hand the theory of democracy, the basis of civil liberty, the religious conception of freedom, the legal aspects of freedom, the ethical implications, the limits of individual freedom, and the outlook for the future.

LIGHTWOOD, JAMES T., *Hymn-Tunes and Their Story*. London: Kelly, 1905. xiii + 402 pages.

Hymn-Tunes and Their Story in an unusual degree combines critical knowledge and popular form. No other work tells us so much that is interesting about the hymn-tunes. After a chapter on the German chorale the author treats with ample learning of the rise of modern psalmody, of the psalmody of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and of the Methodist revival. There are special chapters on "Some Well-known Eighteenth-Century Tunes" and "Some Well-known Composers," followed by "A Chat about 'Old Methodist Tunes.'" The wealth of psalmody in the nineteenth century could not, of course, receive full treatment, but what is given is fairly satisfactory, at least so far as Great Britain is concerned. American psalmody remains unnoticed, except for brief passing allusions to Lowell, Mason, and Zeuner. The so-called Moody and Sankey gospel songs are unmentioned. We must admit that America has not made a very important contribution to our treasures of hymn-tunes, and we must remember that our author was writing from the standpoint of British usage. Yet American hymn-tunes surely deserve some consideration, not only on account of a fair degree of intrinsic merit and their historical importance, but also because a number of them are in very common use in Great Britain. Certain other American tunes, which are in full accord with the style of the present English school of church composers, deserve ample recognition across the water. The last chapters of the book treat interestingly of "The Names of Tunes" and of "Adaptations and Arrangements." There are three good indexes. The typography is good in form, but it is not very accurate.

WALKER, DAWSON. *The Gift of Tongues, and Other Essays*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1906. 248 pages. \$1.75 net.

The title essay advances some new, but on the whole inconclusive, arguments to prove that the glossolalia of the Day of Pentecost was a veritable speaking of foreign

languages. The essay on the "Legal Terminology in the Epistle to the Galatians" satisfactorily refutes Ramsay's contention that the *διαθήκη* of Gal. 3:15 was a Greek will, criticizes, favorably in the main, the view of Halmel that Paul was speaking of a Roman will, but contends that it was neither a Greek nor a Roman will as such that was in mind; it deals inadequately with the view that *διαθήκη* means "covenant." The third essay defends the common identification of Paul's visit to Jerusalem of Acts, chap. 15, with that of Gal. 2:1-10, chiefly against the arguments of Ramsay. The fourth argues for a very early date of Luke and Acts, putting the former between 58 and 60, and the latter not later than 63. Though none of the essays makes any notable contribution to the subject, and the conclusions of the first and last are distinctly improbable, all are worthy of attention.

STRACK, HERMANN L., *Die Genesis, übersetzt und ausgelegt*. München: Beck, 1905. xi+178 pages. M. 3.50.

This new edition differs from the first (1896) in several features. Among these differences is the presentation of the new material offered by Assyriology for the interpretation of the book, including a review of the *Bibel und Babel* discussion, a comparison of the first ten kings of Babylon with the first ten patriarchs, the Babylonian story of the flood, the Nimrod epos, and a review of the evidence for the identification of the four kings of Gen., chap. 14, in which case the effort seems to the author only partially successful. In an excursus to chaps. 12-25, he emphasizes with new evidence his belief in the general trustworthiness of the patriarchal narratives (pp. 95-97). The sources of the book are freshly examined, and while the usual analysis is followed in the main, and the process carried out into much fuller details than in the former edition, the author dissents strongly from the extreme tendency of some of the critics to find differences betokening multiple authorship. The different documents are distinguished in the text by different type.

SLATER, JOHN ROTHWELL. *The Sources of Tyndale's Version of the Pentateuch*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906. 56 pages.

One of the disputed questions in connection with the first translation of the Pentateuch from the Hebrew into English is here presented as a dissertation for a doctorate. The real comparison is made, on twenty-seven pages of seven columns each, between the Hebrew, Septuagint, Vulgate, Hereford's, Purvey's, Luther's, and Tyndale's translations. After all his comparisons the author concludes "that Tyndale did use the Hebrew in his Pentateuch," as is shown in passages where against all the versions he rendered it literally.

MACLAREN, ALEXANDER. *The Book of Genesis*. ["Expositions of Holy Scripture."] New York: Armstrong, 1906. 339 pages.

This volume of expositions is characterized by the keen insight and the well-known felicity of expression that belong to all of Dr. MacLaren's utterances. It is a volume for the preacher and the layman, not for the scholar. It is wholly practical in its aims, and totally lacking in any attempt at critical or historical evaluation of the narratives. The stories are accepted at their full face value and made vehicles for the communication of the loftiest Christian teachings.

SCHLOESSINGER, MAX. *Rashi, His Life and Work*. Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press. 1905. 23 pages.

A paper read before the Central Conference of American Rabbis at Cleveland, O., July 5, 1905, in commemoration of the eight-hundredth anniversary of Rashi's death (1105).

FIEBIG, PAUL. *Pirqe 'aboth—Der Mischnatractat "Sprüche der Väter."* Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 43 pages. M 1.20.

This famous important Jewish document, based on the text of Strack, is here translated into German and compared with the New Testament. It is abundantly supplied with important and valuable footnotes. Such tracts as these will greatly facilitate the scholar's use of the invaluable material that too often lies buried in works that are not available except in rare editions.

GUNKEL, H. *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*. Herausgegeben von FR. MICHAEL SCHIELE. II. Reihe, 8. Heft: Elias, Jahve und Baal. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 76 pages. M. 0.50.


One of the most vigorous treatments of Gunkel. Elijah the prophet is painted in the strongest colors, and remains in the mind of the reader as the hero-prophet of early days.

PELOUBET, F. N., *Studies in the Book of Job: A Biblical Drama Illuminating the Problem of the Ages*. For Advanced Classes in the Sunday School, for Biblical Literature Courses in High Schools and Colleges, for Evening Services, and for Individual Use. New York: Scribner, 1906. xxxii + 115 pages \$1.

A helpful, illuminating guide to Job by one who has had long experience as a teacher and as author of helps for teachers. With this book any intelligent Sunday-school teacher should make the Book of Job and the problem of suffering of absorbing interest to students. The critical standpoint of the author is uncertain, and his estimate of the literature on Job is in many points at fault, but the interpretation of Job is affected by errors of this kind perhaps less than that of any other Old Testament writing.

STRACHAN, J. *Hebrew Ideals from the Story of the Patriarchs*. Part II: Gen. 25-50. ["Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students," edited by MARCUS DODS and ALEXANDER WHYTE.] Edinburgh: Clark, 1905; New York: Scribner. 170 pages. \$0.60.

Recognizing and indorsing the view that the stories of Genesis did not assume literary form till the eighth or ninth century B. C. Mr. Strachan seeks to set forth the ideals they express. What is done can hardly be accepted as a faithful presentation of the Hebrew ideals of the ninth century B. C.; it is rather a series of modern ideals reinforced by illustrative materials drawn from the patriarchal narratives. As such it is interesting reading and useful for edification.



THE EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
THEOLOGY ANNOUNCE WITH SINCERE SORROW
THE DEATH, FEBRUARY 17, 1907, OF THEIR COL-
LEAGUE, **Eri Baker Hulbert**, DEAN OF THE
DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CHURCH HISTORY, AND FROM ITS FOUNDATION
ONE OF THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL.


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SHOULD THE DENOMINATIONAL DISTINCTIONS OF CHRISTIAN LANDS BE PERPETUATED ON MISSION FIELDS?



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Of course not. Even the most rabid sectarian would answer this question negatively, could his sect be the favored one. The ideal of all Christian workers is, beyond question, that of an undivided church in each land. The question, however, is the practical one confronting modern missions. Can they be so adjusted and carried on under present-day conditions as to avoid the disadvantages of sectarianism? Or—to change the wording—should the local churches resulting from the missionary work of separate denominations be united into a single native church in which the denominational distinctions of the co-operating missions are obliterated? And, if so, in what way may such union be effected? My answer to this question must be stated in a series of propositions, the elaboration and defense of which the limits of this paper will not allow.

1. It is a mistake to denounce denominational distinctions. These

have arisen under God's providence, and, with possibly rare exceptions, were religiously imperative. The rise of divisions in the church has been a necessary step in Christian progress. We may well deplore the evils they have occasioned, but we should not overlook the benefits they have secured.

2. Denominational distinctions are twofold, doctrinal and organizational. History shows that each of these has had powerful influence on religious life and development. But history also shows that many distinctions once thought vital are not so. One of the problems with which modern Protestantism is unconsciously wrestling is the question: Which of the doctrinal and organizational distinctions of denominations are vital and which are not? The solution of this problem is being attained through experience—through the application of the principles of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fit. Quite unexpectedly to each group of Christians, hated theological doctrines and despised ecclesiastical polities are proving themselves fitted to survive because of their ability to produce and maintain genuine Christian life. God has blessed their labors far beyond the expectations of their opponents.

3. Under the present conditions of Christendom denominational extension in mission fields has been, and still is, unavoidable. Missionaries whose education and experience are limited to the denominations to which they belong cannot do otherwise than plant Christianity in the doctrinal and ecclesiastical forms with which they are acquainted. These are, indeed, the only forms they can make effective. How, for instance, could I, a Congregationalist by birth, education, and mature conviction, effectively teach Christianity in the form required by the Episcopal doctrine of ordination, the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper, or any other belief or practice contrary to my convictions?

4. In the long run, however, this extension of denominational distinctions will be not without its advantages. When unified native churches shall arise, native Christians will be able to make a synthesis of the varied doctrines and practices introduced by missionaries, and to establish their churches with a wealth of forms and variety of beliefs and experiences impossible, had all missionary work been carried on under a single type of polity or theology.

5. It was highly desirable for the development of Christianity even in Christian lands that each distinct type of theology and polity should put its theories and convictions to the test in fresh soil. The modern collapse of sectarian antagonisms and the development of even interdenominational cordiality are in no small part due to the discovery that the Christian work of denominations, having supposedly defective forms of polity and theology, is nevertheless blessed of God. The once dominant assumption that "my church" possesses all truth is being overthrown by evangelistic experiments in non-Christian lands. Interdenominational charity is one of the by-products of foreign evangelism. The work of the Holy Spirit is seen to be confined to no one church, to depend on no particular system of theology, to be tied to no particular ritual or polity. This has been a lesson of immense importance which the churches have been long in learning; and even yet the Christian church as a whole cannot be said to have learned it.

6. Complete obliteration of denominational distinctions in foreign missionary work is as yet impossible. The diversities of theological beliefs and of ecclesiastical organizations are too great to admit of real union. Few Protestants probably would be willing to surrender the proclamation of Christianity in any land exclusively to Roman or Greek Catholics on the one hand, or to Plymouth Brethren on the other. Few non-Episcopal Protestants would wish to see High Church Sacramentarian Anglicanism the only form of Christianity given to a non-Christian people. There are still many Trinitarians and Unitarians, Calvinists and Arminians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Congregationalists, and Baptists who would similarly be unwilling to surrender a field exclusively to alien denominations.

7. But the practical question today is as to the amount of concession in creed and polity possible and desirable between those groups of Protestants who are finding themselves in closer agreement on fundamentals than they had supposed. This question cannot be answered dogmatically by anyone. A few principles, however, are clear. (a) The surrender of conscientious convictions by any missionary or denomination is undesirable as well as un-Christian. Everyone must be faithful to the truth God has revealed to him. (b) But equally important is charity of word and thought toward those who differ.

Missionaries should take pains to teach converts that in fundamentals all Protestant denominations are agreed. The chief differences are today organizational. These have to do with questions of practical efficiency, not with salvation. (c) Co-operation in many kinds of work is possible; and wherever possible, it is highly imperative, as showing in practical forms a unity deeper than the differences. Bible translation and publication, hymn-books, Christian literature, mass-meetings, have been fields of successful union work. Co-operation, however, should be pushed in medical and educational work. So far as feasible, all Protestant missions in each land should be federated, and should develop their federal activity to the greatest possible extent. A single annual report covering the entire Protestant work would be of great value. The transfer of native membership from one denomination to another, according to the convenience of members who have changed their residences, should be made easy and even be urged. And I would go even a step farther. I am convinced that, in some lands at least, for the sake of the independent native church that is finally to arise, there should be co-operation in theological education.

The success of all co-operative enterprises, however, depends on the spirit of the men in charge, and on the details of the methods of co-operation. This brief article is naturally not the place in which to discuss these details. Successful co-operation along the lines here mentioned would prevent the wasteful reduplication of necessarily expensive institutions, as well as make possible their adequate support, both of which are important considerations in effective Christian propagation.

8. The aim of foreign missions should be, and doubtless, in the case of Protestant missions, is, the establishment of self-propagating, self-supporting, and self-governing churches. In my mind, this includes final organic separation of the native from the mother-church. The normal development of the native church, and the complete adaptation of the forms of Christian truth, as well as of ecclesiastical organization, to the people of any land, is impossible so long as the native church is ecclesiastically and theologically dependent on the votes and beliefs of Christians of an alien race and different civilization thousands of miles away.

9. The truly native church, in highly civilized non-Christian lands, cannot be founded by foreigners. Missionaries can proclaim the Christian evangel, plant the Christian life, teach the Christian conceptions of God and man in the forms known to them, and can organize local groups of Christians, helping them in their earlier ecclesiastical experiments. They can lay foundations, prepare the soil, encourage, suggest, and stimulate. But not until a country possesses a large group of self-supporting, self-governing, and self-propagating churches, ministered to by many well-educated, consecrated, and gifted pastors who, in order more effectively to evangelize their own people, have secured complete ecclesiastical independence, can a truly native church be said to have arisen.

Such an ecclesiastical church should, in my opinion, be brought into existence, be given organic form, and be officered and supported wholly by natives. Its creed should express the genuine belief of native Christians resulting from their own study of the Bible as guided by the Holy Spirit and in the light of their own religious experience. That creed should not be a translation of some foreign creed, not even of any of the ecumenical creeds of Christendom, although of course these may well be held in high esteem. The creed of the native church should be indigenous, adapted to the truths, and also to errors, of the particular non-Christian environment in the midst of which it lives and with which it must cope. Only when a native church has arisen from which all authoritative and even nominal control by missionaries or foreign ecclesiastical organizations has been eliminated can the Christian work in any land be freed from the popular objection of being a "foreign" religion. In proportion to the civilization of a people, however, is overcoming of such an objection essential to the extensive evangelization of that people.

10. A significant fact reveals the unwisdom of expecting foreign missionaries to take the lead in organizing strictly native churches. Its brief statement will probably occasion misunderstanding. Yet even at this risk its importance demands recognition.

Christian triumphs in all lands, in both ancient and modern times, have been due to the exceptional efficiency of Christians in humanitarian enterprise, personal integrity, and social reforms, rather than to their metaphysical doctrines, systematic theologies, and specific

types of church organization. Nevertheless, for centuries teachers of Christianity have in their formal instruction reversed the emphasis. They have regarded these latter as the essentials of Christianity. They have insisted that acceptance of certain theological creeds and membership in their own churches are primary conditions of salvation. In the teaching and requirements of Jesus, however, systematic doctrine, and especially metaphysics, rituals, and church organizations, are never more than implicit, while practical godliness, moral integrity, and universal brotherly kindness are the essentials. Since the time of Jesus, in proportion as his disciples have taught and practiced these, has the gospel triumphed. It is this ethical aspect of Christianity that is today winning its way in the Orient, rather than occidental formulations of Christian metaphysics. These, on the contrary, are proving an obstacle to the spread of Christianity. It is certain that in the organization of independent native churches in the Orient it would be a mistake to make obligatory western metaphysics, rituals, or polity. Metaphysics at least, if present at all in the creeds, should be implicit, as in the teaching of Jesus.

Now, from the very nature of the situation, it is altogether likely that experienced native pastors are less liable than occidental missionaries to introduce occidentalisms into the native church, especially if free, financially and ecclesiastically.

11. These paragraphs are not to be taken as a condemnation of metaphysics, systematic Christian doctrine, or ecclesiastical organization. These unquestionably have their place. But they do not constitute the gospel; nor should they occupy the primary place in Christian instruction. Nor are these paragraphs to be taken as impugning missionaries. They are a noble band—the salt of the earth. They are, nevertheless, the product of their denominations. In their formal Christian teaching, doctrine and polity are given a leading place. As a rule, however, they live the gospel better than they teach it. And living is the most effective method of teaching.

12. The time for the rise of a wholly native church depends on a number of circumstances, among which are: (a) The existence of many local congregations whose membership is large enough to insure a steady, well-educated, representative constituency. (b) Their complete self-support and self-government, coupled with zeal

and ability for self-propagation. Experience in local self-government is an essential requisite to a more comprehensive organization. Financial self-support is a sure sign that belief has taken firm hold; that Christianity has become well rooted and can continue regardless of foreign favors and financial backing; that it is no longer an exotic, but has become indigenous. (c) A feeling on the part of native leaders of restiveness under foreign control, and a desire for perfect freedom in thought and organization, in order to secure a native church wholly free from imposed occidentalisms, and from the charge of being a "foreign" religion.

13. The danger of perpetuating unnecessary and even disadvantageous denominational differences in non-Christian lands arises more from missionaries, boards, and supporting constituencies in Christian lands than from native Christians. To these latter the differences between Protestant denominations are insignificant—many of them even meaningless. It is far easier for Japanese than for American Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, and Congregationalists to unite. This they should be allowed to do when the above-named conditions have been fulfilled. The Christian duty, therefore, of those in home lands who pray for the unity of the church of Christ is to stand aside and allow the native churches that have grown up under their care to unite in such wise as the Holy Spirit may lead them. American and English Christians should not oppose union movements of native Christians.

14. But what, it will be asked, should be the relation of missionaries and mission boards to such native churches? They should, of course, work together in harmonious co-operation and mutual consultation. But for how long? Until the native church is able effectively to carry on its home missionary work alone. In case the native church departs so widely from the gospel, as understood by any denomination, as to cause its serious perversion, that denomination is free, of course, to establish its own independent work. By so doing it appeals to the practical test of competition—to the struggle for existence and survival of the fit. For this is the method ordained of God whereby he reveals his approval of truth and his condemnation of error.

15. There would seem to be no good reason why all Presbyterian

boards working in any land should not unite their efforts to the up-building of one native Presbyterian church, as in Japan and India, nor why all Methodist work should not unite in one native Methodist church. Such union movements may well be inaugurated and even carried through by missionaries. Further union movements, however, should generally wait on the demands of native leaders and be carried out by them. They should be left to choose and to harmonize, so far as they can, the various elements of the various denominations. Their tentative programmes they must experiment with and test. By a gradual process of adopting, adapting, or dropping, a form of church organization and of statement of Christian belief may finally be attained, fitted to the peculiar needs of their own land.

16. And yet, although I approve unreservedly and heartily of union efforts, I am not sanguine that the ideal of a single national church wholly free from schism will be attained, or, if once attained, long maintained. Should the native church adopt any form of organization or creed in which authority and conformity play a part, schism will surely arise sooner or later. The numerous sects of Buddhism and Shintoism argue ill for the long survival in Japan of an undivided Christian church. Only on condition that the native organization allow utmost freedom in belief, ritual, and practice could such a church arise. Yet, to theological conservatives and to advocates of a "strong" church government, such freedom would be unacceptable.

17. In closing this paper, I would emphasize the following practical points: (a) Missions and boards should make every effort to co-operate in their institutional work—schools, publications, hospitals and dispensaries, and even in their theological seminaries, seeking the highest efficiency of the whole rather than denominational advantage. They will thus manifest their real unity, which is deeper and stronger than their differences. (b) Missionaries should take pains to make known to their own Christians their high regard for other denominations.

By carrying out these two general policies the evils of denominationalism will be largely avoided, and native Christians will be prepared for their own union movement in God's own time.

SIDNEY L. GULICK

The above question scarcely admits of an unqualified answer. It seems clear that, until our fellow-Christians in China have sufficient experience and knowledge to frame a church system, or systems, of their own, the missionaries of necessity will have to instruct them in these matters, and to a large extent to take the initiative in introducing some kind of church order. In doing this they will, of course, be guided mainly by their own convictions on the subject, as formed in the home lands; that is to say, the tendency will be to reproduce the church government of their own denomination. At the same time, it may be affirmed, without reservation, that the introduction by a missionary of his own church order, in a mere "rule-of-thumb" manner, would argue serious unfitness for his calling. A slight knowledge of church history and a common-sense observation of things as they are in the ecclesiastical world are enough to convince anyone that each and all of the various systems prevailing in modern Christendom have largely been shaped and colored by influences connected with the political and social life of the countries in which they have grown up. It may, indeed, be stated without exaggeration that nearly all of these systems give expression either to compromises between conflicting views, or to the triumph, and therefore undue predominance, of one set of ideas over an opposing school of thought. Men being what they are, it is inevitable that, in the heat of conflict and controversy, the judicial temper should often be impaired. In a revolt from the exaggerations and abuses of one type of church order, the pendulum has swung to the other extreme, and a new system has resulted with its own inherent limitations and mistakes. And these, as time goes on, have given rise, in their turn, to a new campaign of protest and secession.

Hence, while it would be a serious confession of weakness, and even a culpable drawing-back from duty, for a missionary to decline to introduce some ecclesiastical order in the churches under his care, he should remember that what may, on the whole, be the most suitable for us, with centuries of church life behind us, will be cumbersome and positively hurtful, if introduced as a finished product from Christian lands. He will, if wise, therefore endeavor, as far as possible, to cultivate detachment of mind in respect to his own and other denominational forms familiar to him in his own country.

He must discriminate between what is cardinal and fundamental in them, and those features which are the result of local influence. He will bear in mind that the New Testament is not explicit on this subject. It contains no crystallized, formulated statement. It gives us an outline of the growth and development of the Christian church during one generation, leaving us to infer from the account certain general principles, and to trace their practical application to actual circumstances and requirements as they arose. Doctrinaire discussions as to the relative rights and responsibilities of church officers and the rest of the congregation are conspicuous by their absence; nor is it difficult for a dispassionate reader to perceive that, in the actual arrangements of that era, there are adumbrations of the various principal ecclesiastical ideas, which since then have found expression in more or less rival or antagonistic systems. However much we may deplore the resultant situation, as we have it in our own lands, and may seek to mitigate it by plans of federation, it is obviously impossible to revert to New Testament conditions in the case of our home churches. In that of the young Christian communities in the mission field it is far otherwise. It may, indeed, be safely said that the true and permanent solution of the ecclesiastical problem there will be found only in this way. While in practice each missionary will naturally give prominence to that particular aspect of church government to which, by previous training, he is personally attached, he will, if guided by the foregoing line of thought, do so only to a very modified extent; and will be careful to make his arrangements sufficiently elastic to admit of their healthy growth and modification in harmony with the particular characteristics of the race among whom he is privileged to labor. He will seek to avoid the mistake aptly described by the French as "governing too much," but will rather remember that, if the young church is a living and healthy organism, it will grow after its own order, and will be free from that ecclesiastical self-consciousness that finds its expression in elaborate and redundant paper constitutions. His part is to introduce certain simple germ principles, which, as they grow, will largely receive their external form and color from their environment. When the process, for instance, by which the present conventional place of worship was evolved from the assembly-hall commonly used in

cities during primitive times is considered, the introduction by missionaries of that particular type of building, among peoples whose architecture is of a totally different character, seems, to say the least, superfluous and uncalled for. In some countries the effect of such a practice is apt to be positively detrimental to the cause of Christianity, as it tends to excite the dislike and mistrust of foreign religions which are felt in varying degrees by most races. The same, of course, applies to the fittings, vestments, and other accessories of public worship. The principles contained in the old refrain, "Be it ever so humble, there is no place like home," can with advantage be applied to this part of our subject. If it is becoming more and more widely recognized that certain large sections of our modern city populations do not like to enter the ordinary place of worship, and that, if they are to be reached, halls more resembling their usual haunts have to be secured, how much more should the same principle be followed among the peoples of other climes and continents! The missionary, therefore, needs above all things to be delivered from that stupid parochialism, which tends to obliterate the individuality and initiative of his converts, by the introduction of practices and arrangements merely because they are what, through training and habit, suit his ideas and habits best.

The writer having for over twenty years been a missionary in China, it may not be out of place to add a few remarks referring more particularly to that country.

It may be taken as certain that before long the churches in countries such as Japan and China will insist upon making their own arrangements, and correspondingly resent any attempt on the part of missionaries to curtail their liberty in this respect. From this point of view the wisdom of our not now drawing the bow too tight is obvious. The time is rapidly approaching when the provincialism that imagines that we ourselves have all the knowledge and wisdom, and ignores the fact that other races have powers and qualities from which we can obtain profit and instruction, will meet with its well-merited rebuke and discomfiture. The history of China, for instance, furnishes a record of achievements in the domain of government probably unsurpassed in the history of mankind. China has produced a literature and worked out a social and political system which, whatever its

defects and errors, has, through the shocks and vicissitudes of many centuries, held together a civilized society numbering hundreds of millions and covering a vast and diversified area of country. It is much to be desired that the past political and social history of China should be more widely and intelligently studied in western lands than has hitherto been the case. Until this is done, reproaches of the Chinese on the score of their ignorance and self-conceit seem out of place. We cannot afford to despise a race which, without the facilities of modern means of communication and mechanical skill, has during so long a period of time developed and maintained a political, commercial, and social system of vast magnitude and importance. It may be taken as certain that, as time goes on, China will give to the Christian church men fitted for leadership and endowed with organizing power on a large scale. Nor can the fact be ignored by anyone attempting to forecast the future ecclesiastical development of Christianity in that country, that from time immemorial the governmental ideal, set forth by her literature and cherished by her scholars, is that of a benevolent despotism, combined with a real and healthy influence of popular opinion. In dealing with a people of so strong and independent a spirit as the Chinese, it can at all events be predicted with confidence that any attempt to force upon them the diversified denominationalism of our home lands will end in disaster. Here, if nowhere else, the missionary needs to exercise the utmost self-restraint and discrimination between essentials and incidentals in the forms existing in his own land, and to bear in mind the words of his Divine Master: "Neither do men put new wine into old bottles; else the bottles break and the wine runneth out . . . ; but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved."

D. E. HOSTE

There could not be a better field than China for observations on such an important question as the one before us: "Should denominational distinctions be perpetuated in mission work?" A hundred years have rolled away since Morrison endured the vituperation of foes and the misunderstanding of friends in his attempt to introduce the Christian religion into China. In this period, and in *all* this period, missions of every persuasion have faced a common enemy, a common

"hatred of the foreigner," and now join in celebrating a common victory already within sight. This state of things has conduced to a drawing together of the forces of Christianity at work in China. It was said to the writer by a veteran missionary: "The different missions at work out here are like the various companies in one regiment of soldiers." It is also the psychological moment for consideration of the question. A movement, emanating from northern China, is on foot for the federation of *all missions at work in China* and for the unification of the Christian Chinese church. This is referred to by the various contributors to this article. Suffice it to say that opinion is against a mere mechanical union brought about by a majority vote, while the trend of thought is strongly in favor of doing away with the causes of friction that mar the ethical unity of the church of Christ; and the probability is that any action taken at the great conference to be held in Shanghai in the spring of 1907 will be along this line.

Invitations to contribute to this symposium were sent out to leaders of missions in central China whose experience in the field demands that their opinions receive consideration. Through pressure of work, or other reasons, some have felt unable to send replies; others again have given verbal answers. The various contributions in this article should therefore be regarded as representative rather than as exhaustive: an indication of the attitude of missionaries as a whole to this great problem that in the near future is to confront the church in China, and not as a final pronouncement on the matter on the part of any individual missionary or mission.

Rev. T. E. North, district chairman, Wesleyan missionary, with a quarter of a century of experience in China mission work, writes:

It is somewhat startling to have to reply to the question: "Should denominational distinctions be perpetuated in mission work?" by what practically amounts to "Yes;" but though one shrinks from the bald monosyllabic reply, I suspect that the trend of a more detailed reply from myself could be only that. In the first place, then, I do not think that these denominational distinctions in themselves are a serious matter, except possibly in one or two extreme cases, and that whether as regards matters of church administration or of doctrine. To endeavor to efface these distinctions is, in my opinion, simply to emphasize and magnify them in the eyes of our native converts. As regards plant, church discipline, responsibility for members and their conduct, relationship to Chinese authorities, both the claims of our home churches and the moral claim of the

Chinese government, as well as the comfort and convenience of the various missions, demand the continued recognition of the various societies. In case of a breach of Chinese law on the part of a mission preacher or schoolmaster, for instance, to whom would the Chinese official turn if all distinctions were obliterated? Fortunately there is no great difference in the moral standards which we seek to establish among even our ordinary church members, but one would hardly like to become responsible in the eyes of the Chinese for the conduct of men over whom one has no jurisdiction or control whatever; and it would not be difficult to imagine such a position under the circumstances supposed. There is too much talk these days about a *union* which practically means *uniformity*, and that alike of creed and terminology and worship. To my mind this not merely belies the name "nonconformists," of which many of us are so justly proud, but strikes a serious blow at the principles of Protestantism itself. I would almost as soon hand over our converts to the thralldom of Rome and the rule of the Pope as enslave them to any system of theology or church practice, however excellent, if regarded as absolutely binding on their conscience. True union is to be cultivated and sought after by every means in our power, but I regard true union as a union, not of sameness, but of diversities; and the more diverse and numerous our unimportant differences, the grander and deeper the unity which in Christ Jesus binds us together in the bonds of brotherly affection and united purpose and aim. Fortunately such strivings after *uniformity* must defeat their own aim, but it is lamentable to think of the energies and time frittered away in quest of this wrong ideal. A frank recognition of differences of conviction and creed, and, at the same time, a sense of the true deeper union which exists already, would, I feel sure, pave the way for a federation of our mission churches—a federation which will enable us in a temperate way to face the questions affecting mission comity as they arise—e. g., division of territory for mission operations, withdrawal from or exchange of stations in some cases, owing to geographical considerations—and lead us from time to time to unite in special social, literary, or educational work. Is not a craving for uniformity too often the result of narrowness of view, and lack of consideration for the convictions of others? Is it not devoid of the very elements of true union? Does it give much hope for securing wisely directed federation?

Rev. A. S. Adams, the veteran superintendent of the work of the American Baptist Missionary Union in Hanyang, writes:

Denominationalism has its roots in the churches at home, and these churches would soon use the ax if the branches in the mission field did not bear fruit according to the root. The whole question seems to me to imply that these distinctions are not worth the reproduction; but surely what has so aided in the purity and growth of the church at home (by the natural process of argument and conviction among men in earnest about the truth) cannot but be of equal service on the mission field. Yet, for the sake of the churches we represent, the converts

whom we shepherd, and the truth committed to us, we should endeavor to reproduce the best in these distinctions, without the strife and bitterness which was but the working yeast and scum of the vintage, and not the pure wine of truth. Moreover, the practical work of a mission in China is involved, and I should deprecate any outside attempt to prevent the natural growth of the vine of truth on these various denominational fences. These subdivisions certainly have the merit for greater efficiency, if only for the reason that I pay more attention to *my* garden than to the cultivation of *ours*. They act, too, on the native church as to the watchcare of the flock. One of the strongest arguments against the federation scheme, in my opinion, is that all are reduced to the same dull level; and when our converts go astray, as alas they will, if we are all known by the same name it will be difficult to detect and discipline a defaulter. The natural laws of selection and survival of the fittest must be allowed to act in the denominational as in other realms. It would be impossible for an equal distribution of the world's wealth to remain an equality of possession for twenty-four hours. Men's capacities and inclinations differ. So with truth: an equality of power to receive and appreciate truth is almost inconceivable. Men's minds naturally appreciate different shades of thought. I am a *Baptist by conviction*; my brother is a *Churchman by conviction*. His spiritual food comes in one way and mine in another, but we are both children of God by *conversion*. We must ever remember that there is cohesion—the cohesion of love—among us in spite of our so-called “distinctions.” In the strength of this cohesion the army of the Lord in China will be led on to victory.

Rev. Arnold Foster, B. A. (Cambridge), the chairman of the Central China District Committee of the London Missionary Society, with an experience that takes in nearly four decades of mission work in China, gives a valued contribution. It is a matter of profound regret that it is necessary considerably to curtail it. He says:

I have been asked to reply to the question: “Should denominational distinctions be perpetuated in mission work?” The question assumes, not unreasonably, that “denominational distinctions,” as such, have no permanent place in Christ's ideal for his church, but are rather an imperfection which clings to Christianity as it has been handed down to us, and as it exists today in the lands from which missionaries go forth. Looked at in this light, one can have no hesitation in saying of *this* weakness: it should certainly *not* be perpetuated either in mission work or among ourselves. But when we come to consider practically *how* this imperfection is to be got rid of, and *when*, and *by whom*, we find ourselves dealing with a highly complex problem, and one that cannot be disposed of by a mere act of will, or by ignoring all the most important elements in the complication, and all the wonderful train of causes that led up to it. Although we admit that “denominational distinctions are not ideal,” it does not follow that they are at all times and under all circumstances inherently injurious. Nor

does it follow that a Christianity from which all such distinctions had been eliminated would necessarily be any nearer Christ's ideal for his church than is the divided Christianity which exists amongst us today.

The expression "denominational distinctions" is capable of two interpretations, both of which should be clearly before our minds. The expression may stand (a) for different parties or camps in the church into which Christians arrange themselves according to their views of particular theological questions, ecclesiastical practices, and other matters. Or it may stand (b) for differences of view or practice among Christians, who do not therefore separate themselves into different bodies. In the New Testament we have illustrations of both these kinds of denominational distinctions. (a) At a very early stage in the history of the church we find at Corinth separate camps in the Christian community of that city, calling themselves respectively after the names of Paul, Apollos, or Cephas, somewhat as Christians of later date have come, though perhaps less culpably, to call themselves after the name of "Luther," "Calvin," or "Wesley." (b) The Acts, the Epistle to the Ephesians, and the Epistle of James, not now to speak of other books of the New Testament, reveal differences of teaching and of practice among the apostles themselves, which even *they* found it not altogether easy to harmonize. In the hands of less spiritually minded teachers such differences tend to crystallize into contending systems. These and other distinctions in the days of the apostles represented intensely living and real differences then existing, which, if they had become actively antagonistic, might easily have developed denominations in the church. I cannot doubt that a common devotion to Christ among the leaders in the Christian community, and an intense and constantly deepening realization of the greatness of the kingdom of God and of the vastness of the divine counsels, alone saved the situation. The ability of believers in the first days to preserve an outwardly united church life before the world was not due either to the fact that the majority could rule the minority, or to the fact that the minority was convinced by the reasonings of the majority; nor was it due to a growing indifference on both sides to the great importance of varying aspects of the truth. There were dissentients no doubt, but they, in place of separating from their brethren because of the differences between them, seem to have accepted what we should call a "policy of comprehension." The whole history of that time deserves close study and will repay it.¹ The Bible supplies us with principles that suggest the solution of all our difficulties. It would seem that denominational distinctions found a twofold expression in the first days. The one was due to the essential weakness of human nature only imperfectly influenced by the spirit of the Christian revelation, the other to the essential greatness and manifoldness of the gospel. *Life* involves variety and involves change. It involves also a certain conflict and competition between dissimilar ideals. The inherent superiority of one ideal over the other will be manifest only when both have been fully tested. To bring the two prematurely into "unity" by

¹ For such study two books by Dr. Hort are of the greatest value, *The Christian Ecclesia* and *Judaistic Christianity*.

stopping the development of both can lead to no unity worth having, and is a course subversive of the real interests of the truth. Rather we should look forward to a time when what *we* regard as conflicting theories, or as competing ideals, shall be recognized by men of larger vision than we as really complementary truths, both deserving of sympathetic treatment, even though we, in our ignorance, see not how to harmonize them.

I come now to speak particularly of the question of "denominational distinctions" as, during a long life in China, I have observed them and their working in mission churches. At the outset I must avow my belief that, whatever may be the disadvantages connected with denominational distinctions, the outcry against denominationalism tends greatly to divert attention from the *real* cause of lack of unity among Christians, whether at home or abroad, which is nothing else than a want of love and of the mind that was in Christ, and to fix our thoughts and hopes instead on improved plans for bringing about, through formal federation, united organizations, and schemes for mutual compromise on points of doctrine or of ecclesiastical order, a state of general uniformity in mission churches. Such devices and expedients move on an altogether lower plane of Christian conception and thinking than that which the New Testament emphasizes. "By this," says Christ, "shall all men know that ye are my disciples if ye have love one to another." It is, I imagine, within the experience of most missionaries of long standing that some of the closest and most intimate friendships existing in the mission field are between persons belonging to different missions. The keen eyes of the Chinese do not fail to observe where the missionary finds his affinities; and where the Chinaman, Christian or non-Christian, sees all the indications of brotherly love and sympathy between one man and another, he pays but little heed to those denominational distinctions which are supposed to mar the unity of the church.

The truth is that the real danger of discrediting the unity of the church may quite as easily arise within the limits of the same society and in the midst of the same forms of worship, as amid separate societies and in connection with varying church customs. What matters it that two missionaries are united in the same outward system, if the Chinese around them know that they bear no love one to the other? What profit is to be expected from federation of churches and societies, unless the people whose work is involved have learned by spiritual discipline to bear and forbear with new fellow-workers, trained in different surroundings, and possessed by utterly different views on questions of the greatest importance? Let no one hastily assume that *of course* Christian workers on the mission field can always easily work with anybody possessed of the ambition to bring to the heathen the knowledge of Christ. Not only is it not the case in fact; it requires but very little knowledge of human nature to enable one to realize that to live peaceably with all men, even with all Christian workers, requires much patience, forbearance, lowliness of mind; and that such blessed fruits of a high Christian character will not always follow upon votes of majorities on mission boards deciding to abolish denominational distinctions.

For myself, I must say that it is through the exercise of *right feeling* and *thoughtful love*, treating generously and frankly each difficulty caused by denominational distinctions *as it arises*, that my chief hope for a universally prevailing visible unity among Christians lies. Spiritual forces, it is true, move much more slowly than improvised human plans of "moral compulsion."

But it is also true that the "kingdom of God cometh not by observation": not while men are elaborating schemes for differentiating between necessary and unnecessary articles of belief, that will include all the Christians whom the framers of these schemes think ought to be included, and shut out only those whom these same persons think are too "broad" or too "narrow" to be comprehended in their plan; not thus cometh the kingdom, but, like the King himself, it "cometh" in an hour and in ways that are least expected, for in truth both the kingdom and the King are *ever present* in the conscious experience of those who love one another, and who, without regard to name or party, are ever trying to be helpful to all who in any way are seeking only the glory of the Lord and the welfare of men.

Alike to the masterful mind and to the mind that is unable to see the importance of any theological or ecclesiastical distinctions, it is easy to evolve a system for harmonizing denominational differences in the line of formal compromises of opinion and practice, while overlooking the *sine qua non* of love. The former will treat as essential points on which he himself holds a strong and definite opinion; on all other points, about which he is indifferent, he will allow every variation of doctrine and practice that anybody desires. The latter, while feeling very strongly the importance of his own theological beliefs, does not see exactly how at any point these beliefs are inconsistent with, or exclude, their opposites. It is needless to say that, while the breaking-down of denominational barriers on either of these grounds may be possible for many, it is absolutely impossible for others. The very attempt to obliterate what theologians know to be important practical distinctions is only likely to sow seeds of active dissension, even in the same mission, between those who on the one side have had no theological training and hold lightly by all theological distinctions, and those on the other side who have carefully studied theology. These know that some of the differences that have kept Christians apart in their church organizations in bygone days are as real as the differences that in the world of medicine make it necessary for the homeopathist and the allopathist to work in different hospitals. Such distinctions cannot be lightly ignored.

One other point should be always borne in mind, viz., that even though such names as "Lutheran," "Calvinistic," and "Wesleyan," which have meant much to the church in the West, should die a natural death in China, it cannot but be that, as the church takes root in China, and as great teachers, thinkers, orators, or organizers from among the Chinese spring up and influence deeply the conscience and religious thought of the nation, China will have its own problems of denominational distinctions to face. It is my deep conviction that the welfare of the church in China demands that we who know something of the

slow growth of the Christian ideal and of the full apprehension of the truth, as it is in Jesus, in western lands, should refrain altogether from seeking to suppress differences among Christians that plainly are not due to the perversity or self-assertion of human nature, but rather correspond with various aspects of the truth in all its manifoldness.

The Church of Rome sought in the past for a unity essentially unspiritual. No better symbol of that unity can be suggested than that which is afforded today by the worship of God in all lands carried on by the Romish church in a dead language! Well said the reformers of the English church in one of their Thirty-nine Articles: "It is a thing plainly repugnant to the Word of God and the custom of the primitive church to have publick prayer in the church or to minister the sacraments in a tongue not understood by the people." But as Rome could recognize only one language in which public prayer could be offered to God, so it could tolerate only one statement of truth, one theory of the ministry, and one view of many other things. It had come first to frown on, and then to persecute, all others. There was no room in the Romish system for spiritual liberty, elasticity of church organization, or recognition of the rights of the individual conscience, and of the claims of reason, or for different interpretations of Scripture. This unspiritual unity had to be shattered in pieces. "Above all the ideal of an infallible church holding plenary powers from an absent King had to be rooted out before men could begin to see the *gradual development* which is God's word to successive generations. . . . The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the afterswell of the storm; and only the nineteenth was free to take up the work which the Reformation made possible even in countries where it was rejected. That work is hardly more than begun, but we can already see its character. Our losses are no doubt immense. The old social order is gone, the old conception of miracle and inspiration is overthrown, and a growing tangle of practical questions represents the growing complexity of life and thought. But is there no gain in our wider knowledge of truth? In a more strenuous and earnest life? In a quickened hatred of social wrong? In a higher tone of that national conscience which under any form of government speaks the final word? Is it nothing to know Christ as He was never known before? To see the realms of grace and nature joined in their incarnate Lord"?*

It is for missionaries to understand that it has *not* been given us more than to a previous age to settle what extent of divergency is allowable in the church of God—in regard either to orders of church government, to the interpretation of Scripture, or to the method of administering baptism. The church has not yet attained to a full-orbed view of the exceeding breadth of the law of God, of the law of truth, and of the law of the church's development. Let us not think by feeble compromises to hand on to the church in China a doctrine of the Christian ministry patched up to suit all comers, or a teaching that all Christians

* Professor Gwatkin, *The Eye for Spiritual Truth*, pp. 54, 55.

must be content with for the sake of unity. We sometimes hear it said: "It is impossible that all Christian sects can be right." It would be more to the point to say: "It is highly improbable that *any one of them* has the whole range of truth in sight, or that any one of them has nothing that is not better represented elsewhere." Let us not believe that it is the duty of the missionary to settle in consultation with his fellows what residuum of truth we shall extract from the beliefs and practices that are today common to all the reformed churches of the West, and decide that on that basis a native church in China must spring up, to develop itself subsequently on its own lines. Let us rather remember that "other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid which is Jesus Christ"—Christ crucified, Christ risen, Christ ascended. It is ours to hand on a gospel of *life*, and we shall do so most satisfactorily if we simply move each one on those lines of "life" which we have proved for ourselves, and which are natural to us—at the same time showing all love to those in whom the one life manifests itself through somewhat different symbols and different forms of teaching.

From the foregoing contributions it will be seen that the trend of opinion amongst missionaries in central China on the question of the perpetuation of denominational distinctions in this field is this: As signs of weakness and of non-attainment of the Christian ideal they are to be deplored; as productions—secondary productions—of the great crises in the evolution of the Christian ideal in western lands it is probable that, being exotics in an uncongenial climate, they will not flourish; and it is to be hoped that following on their natural decadence in China other denominational distinctions of purely Chinese origin and conception will not spring up. The apprehension of truth seems to move in cycles more or less well defined; at present in this mission field the Christian church appears to have reached the first stage only—in the reception of a new idea, in the dawn of Christian truth on the human consciousness. The second stage, that of scrutiny and selection, seems barely to have been entered on. It is in the next generation that one must expect to find the Chinese church concerned about the question before us. It is instructive to note that missionaries in general, true to their ideals of mission work, are more careful to set forth the ethical than the denominational side of Christianity. The new arrival may come out imbued with the idea of founding Episcopalian, or Baptist, or Methodist, or Congregational, or Presbyterian churches; but the very immensity of the field in which he labors, the noble example of Christian comradeship set by his seniors of divers missions, the community of interests, the common

enemy, all combine to change the bent of his inclinations, and he begins to work for the *whole* rather than for the *part*, for the coming of the King into his kingdom rather than for the prosperity of his own mission.

In conclusion, let me state that the conception of a church in sections, as represented by various denominations, is not a novel one to the Chinese mind. Strangely coupled with intolerance of the foreigner is toleration of his religious systems. The *san kiao* (three religions), Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, not only exist side by side, but intermingle on every hand. In fact, a religious Chinaman belongs to all three religions at one and the same time and does not find them incongruous. One often hears *san kiao* placed side by side, for comparison, with the *liang kiao* (two religions) of the West, viz., the Church of Rome and the Reformed church. And it is in this direction that the Chinese sees "distinctions"—distinctions both appealing to his eye and to his mind—rather than in the various companies into which the regiment of the soldiers of Christ have for divers reasons separated themselves. I am inclined to think that the intelligent Chinese, be he Christian or non-Christian, will see the "propriety"—to use his favorite word—of maintaining in things essential, unity, in things doubtful, liberty, in all things, charity.

BERNARD UPWARD

Inasmuch as so many of the mission fields are located in the Orient, and the writer's experience has been limited to one of the oriental fields, he begs leave to amend slightly the topic, so that it will read: "Should the denominational distinctions of Christian lands be perpetuated on oriental mission fields?" The answer to this question is a most emphatic "No;" and this answer is based upon five reasons: Because such distinctions are (1) occidental, (2) accidental, (3) disproportionate, (4) unnecessary, (5) un-Christian.

1. The *occidental* denominational distinctions of Christian lands should not be perpetuated on oriental mission fields. Those distinctions grew up out of the peculiar political, social, intellectual, moral, and religious conditions of occidental nations. They are natural outgrowths of occidental civilization, and may have been even neces-

sary phases of the religious life of the Occident. But this fact does not prove that they are necessary in the religious life of the Orient; and it is evident that they are not natural growths but excrescences in oriental civilization. As Hall says,³ they "commemorate only the local history of the West;" "many of them sprang from episodes in European history involving no necessary world-relation;" and their theology "may be meaningless for eastern minds." And they hinder, by extra-territoriality in religion, the development of Christian self-consciousness and self-expression in the East.

2. The *accidental* denominational distinctions of Christian lands should not be perpetuated in oriental mission fields. Those distinctions may be called "accidental" in two senses of that word: some of them came about somewhat by chance; others emphasize, not the essential, but the accidental, or incidental, phases of Christianity. "It is curiously interesting to note upon what small, incidental action of individuals may depend the form of a dogma; upon the presence or absence of some person; upon the numerical chances of a vote; upon the current phraseology of the day" (Hall). It is not much less than disgraceful that the lasciviousness of Henry VIII should have affected the relations between the Church of England and the Church of Rome. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance for Christians, especially for those in oriental lands, "to discriminate between the differentia of the Christian sects and the common essence of the Christian religion."

3. The *disproportionate* denominational distinctions of Christian lands should not be perpetuated in oriental mission fields. Some of the denominational distinctions tend to distribute the emphasis unfairly between the major and the minor, the important and the insignificant, the essential and the incidental, elements of Christianity. The main purpose of a separate denomination is often to put the emphasis upon some point which is thought to be neglected by the other denominations. "Every religion and every denomination in the Christian religion has its weakness in overemphasizing some phase of truth and underemphasizing others."⁴ Therefore there is a constant tendency to divide and split up on comparatively unimportant differences of opinion. And such disproportion looms larger

³ *Universal Elements of the Christian Religion.*

in the East than in the West, is more dangerous, and should therefore be avoided. The common essence of Christianity is a good platform for oriental believers.

4. The *unnecessary* denominational distinctions of Christian lands should not be perpetuated on oriental mission fields. It may be that those distinctions were once necessary; but it seems quite evident that they are no longer all necessary, even in occidental lands, where they are gradually breaking down under the growing demand for comity, unity, and union. And still greater reason is there why distinctions which are no longer necessary should not divide the Christian forces in oriental mission fields, and should not hamper and hinder the work of evangelization, where, indeed, "union is strength," nay, is absolutely necessary. More than "one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all," is unnecessary in the Orient.

5. The *un-Christian* denominational distinctions of Christian lands should not be perpetuated on oriental mission fields. This term "un-Christian" is not employed with the idea of casting slurs on conscientious Christians. It is used merely in the sense that such distinctions were not recognized by Christ himself and are contrary to his spirit. They had no place in the time or the thought of Christ. And even if it is urged that Christ showed by his prayer for unity that he feared dissension, it still remains true that he desired and prayed for unity. Paul, too, the "wise master-builder," realized that "sectarian movements were incompatible with the ideal of a church as he conceived it" (Hall).⁵ And if oriental Christians are able, as they seem likely to be, to sink differences and distinctions imposed upon them from the outside, they should certainly not be hindered from accomplishing a unity in harmony with the spirit of our Lord.

The writer now begs leave to make another slight amendment in the topic under consideration, and to propose the question: "Will the denominational distinctions of Christian lands be perpetuated in oriental mission fields?" And realizing the difficulties and dangers of posing as a prophet, he is willing, nevertheless, as far as he can read the signs of the times in Japan, to reply again

⁴ Hume, *Missions from the Modern View*.

⁵ I Cor. 1:10-13.

with a most emphatic "No." It is natural, reasonable, inevitable, that the Orient, under the leadership of Japan, should develop its own type, or types, of Christianity. Japanese Christians realize this very profoundly. At the meeting of the Japan Evangelical Alliance in May, 1906, plans were adopted, not only for reforming that loose organization into a more definite church federation, but also for the union of as many churches as possible into a Japanese church of Christ. The Japanese naturally lack the intense spirit of love and loyalty for a particular denomination. They are inclined to minimize their differences and magnify their correspondences in such a way as to organize a national church. The trend in Japan is to nationalize institutions, from railroads up to religions. While the Anglo-Saxons want to fight for a principle and will often die before they will yield one iota of individual liberty, the Japanese will sacrifice personal opinions and convenience on the altar of public welfare, and will yield a little to each other in order to effect a compromise on some common basis. Just as they have evolved a form of constitutional government which theoretically recognizes the "divine right" of the emperor to be absolute in his realm, but in practice gives the people a large measure of administration with such representative institutions as an imperial diet and local self-government; so they seem likely to develop a form of Christianity such as Hume calls "Episcopresbyterial." The Japanese are syncretic, synthetic, in politics, education, and religion. Just as they nationalized Buddhism and Confucianism, and brought them into more or less harmony with Shinto, so they will nationalize Christianity and harmonize it with a modernized *Yamato-damashii*. The resultant religion, which will inspire New Japan in her leadership of the Far East, may be a kind of christianized Bushido.

Such a form of Christianity would disarm prejudice and hostility. There is opposition, whether right or wrong, to the gospel, or at least prejudice against it, because it is an imported article. A naturalized and unified form of Christianity would therefore win adherents, and extend the bounds of the influence of the gospel. Dr. De Forest well expressed it before the Evangelical Alliance in Tokyo when he said: "You have the right and privilege and duty of evolving, under the leading and inspiration of the Holy Spirit of God, your own Chris-

tian church or churches, in such ways as shall best take hold of the social and national life of your beloved Japan."

In view, therefore, of the foregoing considerations, it is a natural conclusion that the occidental, accidental, disproportionate, unnecessary, and un-Christian denominational distinctions of Christian lands should not, and will not, be perpetuated in oriental mission fields. Christianity is, indeed, "a growing religion." "Cromwellian equipment and Cromwellian tactics were ample at Marston Moor, but would be [would have been] inadequate at Mukden." It seems much more natural and reasonable that, just as there were, or are, Jewish, Greek, Roman, German, French, Swiss, Scotch, Anglo-Saxon, and other occidental types of Christianity, there will also be Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and perhaps other oriental types of Christianity. Therein "the common essence shall localize itself in terms of thought and modes of practice adapted to the eastern conception of life." And, as Hall shows further, because "our Lord himself was an oriental," "nothing is more certain than that the common essence of Christianity lends itself to expression in the terms of the East." These new types of Christianity may possibly be less logical and sentimental, but they will likely be more simple and practical, than occidental Christianity. And it is not at all improbable that, as Bishop Gore suggests, oriental ways of thinking may influence, as they should, the ideas of occidental Christianity. Each needs the other to complete and unify Christianity.⁶ In that way only can Christians "measure up to the cosmopolitanism of Christ for whom there were no sects, no ecclesiastical polities, no dogmatic systems—only a world to be brought to him, and he, the Living Truth, to be brought to that world." This may be an ideal difficult of attainment, but it is Christ's ideal—"that they may all be one."

ERNEST W. CLEMENT

The only way to decide this question is by considering whether denominational distinctions should exist in Christian lands. Do the varieties of disposition and of culture justify the different views which men have of Christian truth? Does the present time call for

⁶ See *Missions from the Modern View*, pp. 208 f.

emphasis upon the truths which justified the rise of those bodies which are now carrying the gospel message abroad?

Missionary operations are merely the labors of the out-stretched arms of the religious organizations of Christian lands. Missionaries have their views and church relations. Interdenominational societies plan for denominational results and associate the workers so as to aggregate rather than counteract them. If denominations are inevitable in Christian lands, they are inevitable on mission fields.

Movements toward uniting the efforts of different sections of the same denominations have been set on foot, and in some cases at least have been successful, as for example that by the Presbyterians in Amoy.⁷

Baptists, including English, Canadian, and American, north and south, have counted themselves one in laying their plans for evangelization. Methodists and Wesleyans do the same, as also Congregationalists, American and British. But while even such unions have not been accomplished without effort, this is beside the point, for denominational distinctions are not eliminated by the formal alliances of sections of the same bodies.

An Englishman, long a judge in one of the provinces of British India, recently said: "The time will come when our work [that of the official and the missionary] will be overthrown. Orientalism will restore its supremacy." And, however confidently we assail his proposition, we must admit that in it is involved the crucial question: Will Christianity become indigenous in the Orient? The effect of denominations upon this is most interesting. Would the simple story of our Lord's life and teaching, free from the dogmas of modern or even of ancient times, be more apt to take root in this soil? It is worthy of remark that the nations in which it is now indigenous all received it when it was more or less systematized, and most of them did so after rival systems had been developed. Christianity is vital, and becomes indigenous in every soil. If it were a formal scholasticism, its habitat might be limited. Christianity presented as a life has already wrought itself deeply into the lives of many orientals, and is the motive force of many of the most active social organizations that they have.

Some hold that an outwardly divided Christianity is repugnant

⁷ *Ecumenical Miss. Con.*, Vol. I, p. 266.

to the unevangelized. Let it be noted that for the most part the unevangelized are not close observers. They mingle in their thought licentious traders and government officials with missionaries. The whites are called "Europeans" indiscriminately, and in many localities only the evangelized and educated discern the true distinctions.

Then disagreement in the views of those who are related in fraternal fellowship cannot be very offensive to the native mind. Buddhism has no coherent force. In thought there are great lines of cleavage. In practice it is even worse. It is difficult, if not impossible, to get enough Buddhists associated to carry on any respectable undertaking. Each devotee with property builds his little pagoda or kyoung, and others do not usually enter into the effort far enough even to repair an old structure, lest they fail to have the merit ascribed to them. Hindus associate in supporting priests and building temples, but are divided into two great sections denoted by the marks put on their foreheads. And these are greatly subdivided in thought. Even the solid front presented by Mohammedans is real only to the outsider. Within their own ranks they are Shiahhs and Sumahs, who unite only to resist a common enemy. Denominations are quite in accord with the genius of the Orient and do not offend the native mind.

The furtherance of "comity in missions" is most commendable. Our leading evangelical missionary bodies teach a fairly complete and symmetrical gospel when left to themselves. Each should be permitted to carry on its work without the feeling that a rivalry is pressed upon it by the establishment of a new mission. The expression recently made in this connection, that the world is getting small, does not do credit to consecrated common-sense. There must be a limit to opening new fields, and it is better to develop old ones than to place several in the same neighborhood. There are sufficient destitute communities in fields which are now called "occupied" to arouse in the missionary the highest degree of enthusiasm. Let us hope that the missionary who exists merely for denominational extension shall not arise in our evangelical bodies. Interdenominational societies are as apt to err in this matter as any. Their championship of all makes them forgetful of the individual. Where a denomination is left alone in its ministry to a tribe

or people the evils of denominationalism are reduced to a minimum.

WALLACE ST. JOHN

I believe that the denominational distinctions of Christian lands should not be perpetuated on the mission fields, for the simple reason that they ought not to be perpetuated at home. I believe there is no adequate excuse for the continued existence of the scores of ecclesiastical bodies now existing in America. The Presbyterian and Reformed churches should be united in one body, all the churches of Congregational polity in another, the Methodist churches in another. Further than this, there is no sufficient reason for the separation of Presbyterian and Congregational churches, nor of Calvinistic and Arminian Christians, nor of Christians who baptize by one mode and Christians who baptize by another. There are, perhaps, certain general temperamental types now divided among the various churches, and it may be well, until we reach a riper stage of Christian character, to retain provision for the separation of the types; but such diversities will tend to disappear, and they furnish no adequate basis for a permanent division of Protestant Christendom. The doctrinal differences of truly evangelical Christians and their differences of polity, are not, to my mind, sufficient reason for an indefinite perpetuation of denominationalism. Not believing in it at home, except as a temporary necessity, I do not believe in its extension abroad.

There is less reason for our denominations abroad than here. Our denominational differences rest on historical grounds. This history has significance to us. It has none on the mission field. So far as our different churches spring from different historical incidents in our western life, they may justify themselves to us, but they cannot on these grounds justify themselves to the Chinese and Hindus. Our differences as to Christian doctrine, moreover, which seem to warrant our separation, are artificial in Asia. It is not necessary there to try to prevent men from being both Calvinists and Arminians at the same time, as most of them are, as a matter of fact, here at home now. Indeed, the Methodists have been working all these years with great success with a Calvinistic type of theology in China. One of them complained recently in a paper published by their press in Shanghai:

What distinctively Methodist literature does Methodism in China need at present? In answer I would say one thing needed is a work on systematic theology. So far as I know, there is no treatise from the Methodist standpoint. What we have is tinctured with a diluted Calvinism, not rank, to be sure, but still retaining a mild flavor of that dead system.

Many of us would think that theology that combined Calvinism and Arminianism was a very desirable theology, and that a native church could not be better supplied than with a theological teaching that recognized the truth in both of these systems. Some, however, are for separating the two and reproducing in Asia the theological differences of the West. In a later number of the little publication just referred to another missionary writes:

Many times have I been pained to hear our preachers present Calvinism to their congregations, and, what is worse, to know that the books taught in our theological seminaries are tinctured with that dead system. Let the Methodists of China look about and at once select a man filled with the spirit of God and Methodism, and set him aside for the work of preparing clean Methodist theological works.

It is to be hoped, however, that most missionaries will prefer the combination to the separation.

As to church government missionaries are great eclectics. The necessity of supervision makes consistent independency an impracticable polity, and hundreds of missionaries believe in the desirability of real episcopal oversight and suggestion who have no faith in any polity of episcopacy as an ecclesiastical theory. Large homogeneity of organization and method in the mission field indicates the superfluity of perpetuating there our denominational dissimilarities.

It is often urged in behalf of our divisions at home that they are mainly for administrative purposes, that organic church union would result in an unwieldy organization in which men would give less and work less than now. Whatever truth there may be in this contention as applied to home conditions, there is less as applied to conditions abroad. What is wanted there is the closest unity. The magnitude of the work to be done, the elementary needs of the people who are to be reached, the definiteness of the common missionary aim, the substantial agreement of all evangelical denominations in these fundamental convictions, the nature of our disagree-

ments which are so alien to the oriental mind—all invite us to unity in our foreign missionary enterprise.

The perpetuation of our denominational divisions is out of harmony with the central aim and purpose of a rational missionary policy. This aim is the establishment of strong national churches which shall be self-supporting, self-propagating, and self-governing. Some missionary agencies, I know, do not proceed upon this view. They are endeavoring to establish this or that particular western denomination. Some are founding churches which even bear a western national name, and others relate the churches they are establishing and subordinate them to an American or European ecclesiastical court or authority. Such a policy is inconsistent with the missionary principles of Paul; it is debilitating to the native church; it will break down under the proper spirit of nationalism which education and contact with modern political ideas will inevitably produce.

Philosophical students of missions inevitably recognize this. "The aim of all missions in India," says Professor Christlieb, of Bonn, "should be to create an independent church in the future, neither Episcopalian, nor Presbyterian, nor Congregational, but the outcome of the national spirit. For, now that people are coming over to Christianity in masses, the question as to the formation of a Protestant National Indian Church must become ever more and more a burning one." "It behooved England," said Archbishop Benson, "to insist on the principle on which she lived—that in the whole united body of the Catholic church there must be national churches, and that each must hold the gospel with such forms as might interpret it in the best light to itself." Dr. Norman Macleod put the whole matter more vigorously still:

Is the grand army to remain broken up into separate divisions, each to recruit to its own standard, and to invite the Hindus to wear our respective uniforms, adopt our respective shibboleths, learn and repeat our respective war-cries, and even make caste marks of our wounds and scars, which to us are but the sad mementos of old battles? Or, to drop all metaphors, shall Christian converts in India be grouped and stereotyped into Episcopal churches, Presbyterian churches, Lutheran churches, Methodist churches, Baptist churches, or Independent churches, and adopt as their respective creeds the Confession of Faith, the Thirty-nine Articles, or some other formulas approved of by our forefathers, and the separating signs of some British or American sect? Whether

any church seriously entertains this design I know not, though I suspect it of some, and I feel assured that it will be realized in part as conversions increase by means of foreign missions, and be at last perpetuated, unless it is now carefully guarded against by every opportunity being watched and taken advantage of to propagate a different idea, and to rear up an independent and all-inclusive native Indian church. By such a church I mean one which shall be organized and governed by the natives themselves, as far as possible independently of us.

It is sometimes said that the native Christians in some foreign lands are stronger denominationalists than their missionary preceptors. There have been instances of this, but they have been exceptional. In many fields the great mass of native Christians do not know of these different denominations. They are Christians or believers in Jesus, and while they may know the difference between Protestants and Catholics, they are entirely capable of amalgamation in one common evangelical Christian church. Native Christian leaders are sometimes opposed to such a movement because they prefer to be supported by foreign funds, and they realize that these are more certain of continuance in subsidized denominational native churches. When all the native Christians unite, it means self-support and the wholesome exercise of control by the body of native lay Christians. Some native agents do not relish this, but the best men do. They have seen the right ideal, and they are working for it. Missionaries would help them. The best do. The bishop of Lucknow spoke plain words on this point at the Bengal Church Missionary Conference in 1882:

Yes, brethren, let us not deceive ourselves in this matter; the sin and shame of the disunion which exists among native Christians rest almost entirely with us European missionaries. It is *we* who are guilty; we conciliate our brethren, and have often carried ourselves stiffly and as though we had a monopoly of the grace of God; and the nonconformist missionaries have needlessly perpetuated their sectarianism and imposed it upon their converts in this heathen country where often the original cause of difference has no existence. God forgive us all, for we are verily guilty concerning our brethren. How should *they* know, how should *they* be able to stand out for union against those whom they regard as their spiritual fathers! No, it is *we* who are to blame, we with our pharisaism and our bigotry and our want of brotherly love. Let us not attempt to excuse or hide our fault, but, frankly acknowledging it to God and one another and our native brethren, try to make amends, and before it becomes quite too late, begin to strive sincerely and honestly to put away these unhappy divisions and build up the church of Christ in godly union and concord.

In this matter, however, missionaries only represent the churches which send them out. In some cases their home churches would not approve of their abandoning their denominational shibboleths. The home authorities have sometimes rebuked missionaries for being more Christian than denominational. But I believe that the great majority of the Christians at home do not give their money to extend and perpetuate a particular denomination, but to spread the simple knowledge of Christ; and those missionaries who constitute, I believe, the majority, who are tired of division, and who are pressing for unity on the foreign field, really represent the great majority of home Christians, and will have their support in abandoning western denominationalism in the interest of national church organizations.

Having said all this, however, I should like to add that there is a great deal of foolish talk on the subject of the extension of our denominations on the mission field. It is said that it confuses the native people, that it opens Christianity to reproach as compared with the non-Christian religions which are supposed to be free of denominationalism, and that missionaries spend their time trying to convert one another's converts or crowding in upon one another's fields. But the non-Christian religions are as full of sects and denominations and schools as Christianity is. The heathen people are not really perplexed at all by the competing arguments of warring denominations; and there are sensible and well-observed principles of missionary comity and co-operation, so commonly accepted that the cases of the rejection of these principles in the interest of denominational ambition and invasion are usually regarded as shameful by the common Christian sentiment at home and abroad. But the foolishness of some arguments against the perpetuation of our denominationalism must not invalidate the arguments grounded in facts and right reason.

Very possibly the national churches on the mission field will break up into denominations of their own. That will be their reproach, not ours; and such denominations, if they do come, will have their roots in reality, and not in the ecclesiastical history of alien races.

ROBERT E. SPEER

AN ACTUAL EXPERIMENT IN NON-SECTARIAN MISSIONARY ACTIVITY

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The missions of the American Board to the oriental churches, more specifically the missions to the Armenian church inaugurated by William Goodell at Constantinople in 1831, were originally committed to a policy of strict non-proselytism—a policy which had for its sole aim the instilling into those churches of evangelical ideas and ideals without alienating any of their members from them. The “instructions” of the Prudential Committee of the board to Cyrus Hamlin, delivered on the eve of his departure for the Levant in 1838, dealing with the subject of the oriental churches, declared emphatically: “Our object is not to subvert them; not to pull down, and build up anew. It is to reform them; to revive among them the knowledge and spirit of the gospel.”¹

The considerations which conspired to commend such a policy were various. In the first place, the American Board was originally to a certain degree a non-sectarian organization; it represented not only New England Congregationalism, but also the Presbyterian and the Dutch and Associate Reformed churches. Further, any appearance of proselytism was sure to awaken the authorities of the oriental churches to challenge the missionaries’ right of residence in Turkey, and thus to endanger the missions of the board in the empire; for, while only in the year previous to the arrival of Goodell at Constantinople a treaty of friendship had been concluded between the United States and the Porte, it was generally understood to be strictly commercial

¹ Goodell virtually acknowledged his action in receiving two Armenian ecclesiastics into the mission church at Beirut in 1827 as a mistake of his early years of inexperience, when in 1835 he wrote: “When I first came into these countries, I laid hold of individuals, and endeavored to pull them out of the fire; but my aim is now to take hold of whole communities, and, as far as possible, to raise them all up to ‘sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus.’”

in its nature and provisions.^a Finally, it was held that a campaign of evangelism without proselytism promised success in the case of the oriental churches as it did not in the case of the Church of Rome. To the formation of this conviction the English missionary societies which preceded the American Board in the lands of the East largely contributed. On the testimony of these societies, while the Church of Rome, intrenched behind a doctrine of the supreme authority of the Pope in matters of faith and practice, afforded as a church no avenue of approach to Protestant evangelism, the oriental churches, holding, tacitly at least, to the final authority of the Bible, were essentially evangelical in character and easily accessible to the Protestant missionary, and possessed in themselves a sufficient basis of internal reform. And the pioneer missionaries of the American Board in the Levant readily fell in with this view. Eli Smith, writing from Malta early in 1830, spoke of the opposition experienced by the mission in the Levant at the hands of the Church of Rome, and then added:

The spirit of the other churches is essentially different, and we are determined not to call them forth into opposition by a proselyting and controversial course. Our object is not to pull down or build up a sect, but to make known and inculcate the great fundamental truths of the gospel.

In the pursuit of this policy, Goodell and his associates in their early efforts steered clear of all controversy, and directed their every activity with a view to convey the impression to the native Christians that they were not in Turkey with any sectarian objects at heart. Goodell came to Constantinople with a supply of Testaments and tracts of a non-controversial character. On his arrival he bent his energies to the introduction of improved methods of primary instruc-

^a As late as May 16, 1841, Commodore David Porter, American chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, wrote in reply to a note from the Porte requesting the removal of the American missionaries from the Lebanon: "The Constitution of the United States allows to all its citizens the right of the free exercise of their religious opinions, but no article of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Turkey gives them authority to interfere in any way with the rites and religion of any person living under the authority of Turkey. Therefore, after this correspondence has been made known to the American citizens residing in the vicinity of Mount Lebanon, any attempt to excite the minds of the inhabitants to change their rites and religion must be done at their own risk and on their responsibility."—*Unpublished Diplomatic Correspondence*.

tion in the common schools of the city, advocating, and introducing into many of the schools, the then modern and improved system which went by the name of Lancasterian. In the fall of 1834 a mission high school was opened at Pera—the first institution of higher learning among the Armenians of Constantinople—and presently the first impulses were given by the American missionaries to female education among the Armenians of the Turkish capital. These early efforts were all based on the theory that what the oriental churches needed above all things else was not more controversy, but more enlightenment of the kind calculated to arouse a widespread interest in the Word of God.

It is well known, however, that within fifteen years from the founding of the Armenian mission the missionaries of the American Board in Turkey were compelled, contrary to their original plan, to establish an independent evangelical church.

The immediate cause for this action is not to be sought, as is sometimes done, in the *persecution* of 1846. For a number of years previous to that date the evangelicals suffered various persecutions. In 1839 the first systematic persecution of Armenian evangelicals was inaugurated: everyone guilty or suspected of heresy was imprisoned and exiled, and missionary publications were placed under the anathema. The evangelicals suffered much petty persecution also from 1841 onward. The year 1846, therefore, was the year of the greatest persecution of the evangelicals, but not the only year of their persecution. It should be noted further that all official persecution in 1846 had ceased before the first of the evangelical churches was organized.

The immediate cause for the organization of the evangelical church in Turkey lay in the excision of the evangelicals by the authorities of the mother-church. On January 25, 1846, Matthew, then Armenian patriarch of Constantinople, began to excommunicate the "new sectaries" in the Armenian community. Within six months from the promulgation of the first anathema about one hundred were excommunicated at Constantinople and in the provinces, excommunication bringing with it various temporal penalties, such as ejection from one's own house, separation from one's kindred, loss of one's business, imprisonment, and social ostracism. In some places was added to these mob violence of a fierce sort. In June, 1846,

the patriarch issued a bull of perpetual excision and anathema against the evangelicals, intended to be publicly read in the churches annually. The evangelicals were thus excluded from the communion and ordinances of the mother-church. There was no course then left open to them but to organize themselves into a separate body. On the first day of July, 1846, therefore, the First Armenian Evangelical Church of Constantinople was organized with forty charter members. In July and August small evangelical churches were also organized at Nicomedia, Adabazar, and Trebizond. At the end of a year the evangelicals who had seceded from the Armenian church numbered about one thousand. By charters secured by the British embassy at Constantinople in 1847 and 1850, the sect thus established was accorded government recognition.

But it is not to be supposed that the founding of Protestantism in Turkey as a separate sect was the result of a sudden emergency. It is a partial view of the matter which lays the entire responsibility for the organization of the Armenian Evangelical Church at the door of the patriarch Matthew and his advisers. While the excision of the Protestants served as the immediate cause and public justification of the founding of the Armenian Evangelical Church, it was not the ultimate cause of it. Back of the immediate cause for schism lay ultimate causes—causes which led the missionaries to look forward to the establishment of a Protestant church in Turkey for some years previous to 1846, and to regard a strict adherence to their original policy of non-proselytism as impracticable.

What were the causes which conspired to discourage the missionaries' adherence to their original policy of non-proselytism, and to effect its final abandonment? Four causes may be given.

1. *The pressure of a popular demand in the home churches for tangible results.* What we may know on this phase of our subject is to be learned only by "reading between the lines" of the published correspondence of the mission in the Levant. But—provided we do not make too much of this fact—we shall not fall short of the truth if we say that the pressure of popular impatience at home (and the home churches were more impatient in the early days of missionary endeavor than at the present time) to a certain extent influenced the missionaries to abandon the more obscure and intangible work of

quietly enlightening the oriental churches, and to adopt a method and policy which promised results more easily to be tabulated.

2. *The intolerance of the oriental churches.* In May, 1838, Dwight, after a visit to Nicomedia, expressed it as his sincere desire that the "brethren" in that city might not secede, but might continue in the national church. In November, 1839, he spoke of individuals forsaking their church on account of a change in religious opinion, and of the consequent desirability of the recognition of an evangelical civil community in Turkey, and gave utterance to these significant words: "A separation ought not to be forced, although it will, without doubt, ultimately take place; for light and darkness cannot always exist together." What caused this change of view in such a short space of time? The answer is easily discovered. Dwight had witnessed the persecution of 1839, and had been convinced that the church would not tolerate evangelicalism within her pale. And, this being the case, schism was only a matter of time. That the excision of the evangelicals by the oriental churches, and the consequent necessity of organizing them into a separate church were generally anticipated by the year 1842, is apparent from the following extract of a committee report submitted to and adopted by the American Board at its thirty-third annual meeting at Norwich, Conn., in the summer of that year:

Whenever those oriental churches, having had the gospel fairly proposed to them, shall reject it, excinding and casting out from their communion those who receive it—as the Jewish church excinded and expelled the primitive believers, and as the Romish church excinded and expelled the Reformers—then it will be necessary for our missionary brethren to turn from them as apostate, to shake off the dust of their feet as a testimony against them, and to call on all God's children to come out from among them and not to be partakers of their plagues.

And as soon as it was perceived that the evangelicals must sooner or later be expelled from the mother-church, we may be sure that the missionaries ceased to insist upon their continuing strictly in her communion.

3. Closely allied to the intolerance of the church, and underlying it, was *the essential antagonism between oriental orthodoxy and the missionaries' doctrines and methods*, which we may mention as

another cause of the abandonment of the original policy of non-proselytism.

To begin with, the Armenian church, as it came in contact with the evangelism of the American missionaries, more and more evinced a spirit which was far from the essentially evangelical character originally attributed to the oriental churches. Protestant evangelism was not so congenial to the Armenian church as had been supposed. The Armenian church, with the other oriental churches, indeed theoretically held to the supreme authority of the Scriptures. But, with the other churches also, it had given place to a great mass of patristic interpretations and ceremonial regulations prescribed by church councils, which had come to be regarded with a veneration next only to that accorded the Sacred Scriptures, with the result that the Word of God had been all but lost in the traditions of men. The following points, to which all evangelicals and suspects were required to subscribe during the persecution of 1846, will serve to summarize the salient features of the Armenian orthodoxy of that time, and to show how utterly antagonistic it was to evangelical principles: (a) "Faith³ without works" cannot save a man; and the proof of the correctness of a Christian's faith is not his good works, but the conformity of his confession to the creed of the universal church. (b) The visible church, under the headship of Christ and the guidance of the Holy Spirit, "never has erred and never can err." (c) The sacraments of the church are seven in number—namely, baptism, confirmation, penance, communion, ordination, matrimony, and extreme unction. (d) Ceremonial baptism is essential to salvation, and the unbaptized person "is out of the church, and has no salvation, even though he had never sinned at all;" confession to a priest with true repentance, and submission to the penance imposed by him, are indispensable to forgiveness and "eternal glory;" and the souls of such as die before having performed full penance for sins committed must be purified by the prayers of the church, the sacrifice of the mass, and the giving of special alms, to become worthy of "eternal glory." (e) "The mystery of the holy communion is the true body and blood of Christ," and "whoever does not partake of the communion in this belief is under eternal condemnation." (f) The Virgin is "mother of God,"

³ It will be observed that the term "faith" is here used in the sense of "creed."

perpetually a virgin, and "worthy of honor above all the saints;" "the intercession of the saints is acceptable to God, and their relics and anointed pictures are worthy of veneration;" and "the holy cross and the relics of saints" are unfailing instruments of God's wonder-working power. (g) "To believe in the church means to believe those things which the Universal Holy Church of Christ unitedly believes, and to believe them in the same way in which she believes." The true follower of the church must observe "her external ceremonies of piety and Christian rites, and all her requirements, as having been received by tradition from the holy apostles, and the holy fathers who succeeded them." (h) There are different grades of office in the church; and the patriarchs of every nation "are Christ's vice-gerents, appointed to shepherd the holy church, and to superintend her discipline." (i) Those who declare that "error has entered into the faith unitedly received by the universal church," affirming the "mother of God" to be only "mother of Christ," and denying her perpetual virginity; condemning the veneration of the "holy cross," the relics of saints, and the anointed pictures, as idolatry, and denying the intercession of saints, are anathema, "as impious blasphemers of the Holy Spirit, and enemies of God and all his saints."

Again, the missionaries' ideas and methods of evangelism were far too radical for the oriental churches, and certain on that account sooner or later to invite opposition. Of the missionaries' ideas we may say that they were of the ultra-evangelical type. Rufus Anderson, the famous secretary of the American Board, was voicing the sentiments of the missionaries in the Levant when in 1842 he expressed it as his opinion that the modern missionary should be more radical in his teaching than Luther; that he should insist on discarding all that was not expressly required by the Bible, instead of, like Luther, retaining all that was not expressly forbidden by the Bible. Perhaps it was teaching based on this principle which in the early years of the evangelical movement (1837) prompted an "enlightened" merchant, who went to the patriarchate to take out his marriage license, to refuse to pay the customary fees because their payment was not required in Scripture. The missionaries' methods of evangelism

also were radically "evangelistic." At a conference of the mission of the Levant, held in 1837, it was resolved:

That we regard the public and formal preaching of the gospel as an exceedingly important means for the conversion of men in these countries, as well as in our own, to be employed wherever and whenever Providence opens the way; and that we believe it to be practicable at most of our stations.

—an opinion which was readily adopted and urged upon the missionaries of the various stations of the mission by the Prudential Committee of the board. Now, the native Christians, who regarded public preaching as the peculiar function of the church, when they saw the missionaries resort to preaching, especially to preaching in order to conversion, were convinced that these men had come, not to spread education, but to establish some sect of their own, and proceeded to treat them like any other intruders. Dwight little understood at the time the "thoughtful and peculiar expression of countenance" with which in the course of an interview in 1835 the Armenian patriarch's vicar turned to him and said: "You will, by and by, become a preacher to the Armenians." In his account of the incident the missionary adds naïvely: "I hope the prophecy will prove true." But we may venture to think that he did understand the vicar's "thoughtful and peculiar expression of countenance" at last when, the latter's prophecy proving true in the following year,⁴ some of the warmest friends of the reform movement forsook the cause, because they saw in the public services of the mission the nucleus of a new sect, and the authorities of the church began to resist the missionaries' efforts at every turn.

By virtue of the mutual reaction of the prelatical traditionalism of the church on the one hand, and the Puritanic evangelism of the missionaries on the other, the evangelical Armenians found themselves seceding long before they were excommunicated by patriarchal anathema. So early as the beginning of 1835 some of them were urging the missionaries to secure the organization of an independent evangelical church, and soon after, the recognition of a Protestant

⁴ Dwight's first Armenian sermon was preached September 9, 1836. Dwight was the first American missionary to learn the Armenian language, and he is known as "the father of the Armenian mission." Goodell's time was mainly absorbed in the translation of the Scriptures into "Armeno-Turkish," and he had little to do with direct evangelistic work. He spoke Turkish, but not Armenian.

civil community which should insure to them liberty of conscience and make it possible for their numbers greatly to increase. The fact of it was that as soon as they had embraced the missionaries' views of religion they found the old church uncongenial. Attendance on the sacrifice of the mass became the great point of conscience in the ecclesiastical life of the evangelicals. While it is clear that different missionaries differed in their counsels to them on this point, the common conscience of the great body of them condemned it as a species of idolatry, and many of them preferred to partake of the communion at the "mission church" with the missionaries and their families, rather than in the national churches. And so years before the excision of the evangelicals Dwight perceived that evangelical principles and practice, and orthodox principles and practice, were like light and darkness mutually exclusive.

4. *The official recognition of the treaty rights of American missionaries in Turkey by the United States government.* In response to a memorial of the American missionaries in the Turkish Empire submitted to the United States government through ex-Governor Armstrong of Massachusetts, Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent to the United States minister at Constantinople, David Porter, under date of February 2, 1842, the following dispatch:

It has been represented to this department that the American missionaries, and other citizens of the United States not engaged in commercial pursuits, residing and traveling in the Ottoman dominions, do not receive from your legation that aid and protection to which, as citizens of the United States, they feel themselves entitled; and I have been directed by the President, who is profoundly interested in the matter, to call your immediate attention to the subject, and to instruct you to omit no occasion, where your interference in behalf of such persons may become necessary or useful, to extend to them all proper succor and attentions of which they may stand in need, in the same manner that you would to other citizens of the United States who, as merchants, visit or dwell in Turkey.⁵

The strange position which Commodore Porter had assumed with reference to the American missionaries in Turkey—namely, that they were entitled by treaty to the protection of the government of the United States only so long as they refrained from proselyting⁶—

⁵ *Unpublished Diplomatic Correspondence.*

⁶ See above, note 2.

was virtually pronounced untenable by this dispatch. No such distinction could be drawn in practice as between proselyting missionaries and non-proselyting missionaries, and it was now to be understood that, if a missionary had any right to reside in the Turkish dominions at all, he was as much entitled, as a citizen of the United States, to the protection of his government *in the pursuit of his calling* as an American merchant was in the pursuit of his. This dispatch had a very direct bearing on the missionary activities of the American missionaries in Turkey. From 1842 on they were characterized by greater boldness and aggressiveness than ever before; and, so far as a policy of non-proselytism had been considered a matter of expediency, it was then flung to the winds.

By these various causes the American missionaries in the Turkish Empire were led to relinquish their original policy of non-proselytism a number of years before the final disruption of 1846. Then in place of it was adopted the modified policy of only refraining from taking the initiative in any open rupture with the mother-church. On this revised policy converts were to be made to Protestantism, but an independent Protestant church was not to be organized until the evangelical party was forced to it by hierarchical excision and anathema. That the missionaries for several years before the Protestant excision earnestly desired the hastening of the day when such a church should be established, is clear from the fact that they made it the object of special prayer.

It should here be recorded, in conclusion, that the original aim of enlightening and internally reforming the oriental churches has never, even since the Protestant excision, been completely abandoned by the American Board, and that the policy of the board's Turkish missions has of late years especially reverted to that original aim. The gaining of converts from those churches is not indeed in our day deprecated, but it is not made the sole, or even chief, end of missionary activity among the Christian races of the Turkish Empire. And it may be affirmed that the promotion of the counter-reformation still in progress in the Armenian church is regarded as fully as important an end in itself as the maintenance of a large Protestant community of 16,000 communicants and 53,000 adherents.⁷

⁷ "The strength of our work in Turkey is not measured by the number and size

of native evangelical churches, or by the large company who have separated themselves from the old churches and now bear the name Protestant. It is well known that it was never the purpose of the board or its missionaries to separate a Protestant body from the oriental churches. The separation that did take place in 1846 was due to the action of the ecclesiastics of the old church and not to the missionaries. In all parts of the empire today the process of separation is decreasing, while the old church, both Gregorian and Greek, is shot through and through with thoroughly evangelical ideas and beliefs. Protestant and Gregorian children, side by side in the same schools, study the life of Jesus Christ and listen to the same Christian instruction. The name 'Protestant' is no longer regarded as opprobrious, and the old churches are teaching in many forms the same Christian truths that our missionaries teach. This fact is dwelt upon that no one may think the work has diminished because no reports are made of large accessions to the churches. There have been sweeping revivals, like those at Marash and Harpoot, but even the import of these is not measured by the number who become Protestants, but by the opportunities that are thus created for planting evangelical truth within the precincts of the old church."—"Annual Survey of the Work of the American Board," *Missionary Herald*, November, 1906, p. 545.

THE ORIGINS OF ETHICAL INWARDNESS IN JEWISH THOUGHT

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When the student of the general history of ethical thought attempts to determine the characteristic and essential notes of the ethical teaching of the Founder of Christianity, two traits stand out as the most distinctive and best authenticated among the otherwise equivocal and conflicting moral attitudes ascribed to Jesus by the synoptic tradition. The historian whose task is not conveniently simplified by some theological *parti pris* does not find it easy, upon the evidence, to be sure whether Jesus taught with emphasis a species of otherworldly asceticism, in which withdrawal from the civic and family life and the rigorous cultivation of individual purity were enjoined for those who were "able to receive" such commandments; or whether, on the contrary, the emphasis was laid upon the natural and social virtues of the common life of man, upon the wholesome enjoyment of the good gifts which the Father in heaven knows how to give even in this world, upon that broad and unstrained human sympathy by which man can best imitate the perfection of a God who makes his sun to rise upon the evil and the good, and sends rain upon the just and the unjust. These are questions which can be answered only after the New Testament critics have solved the prior problems concerning which they alone can speak with expert authority; and these specialists have unfortunately not yet reached such a degree of unanimity as can give much encouragement to the general historian of ethical ideas who waits upon their labors. But meanwhile two points seem sufficiently well established. The first is that Jesus' teaching centered about a certain "gospel of the kingdom" which was to come. What Jesus meant—in distinction from what the evangelists understood—by "the kingdom of God" is obscure enough; that it was something extra-mundane, and cataclysmic in the manner of its coming, is possible, though hardly so certain as some

recent critics would represent it to be. It is possible, also, that the kingdom was conceived as something that—even if gradual in its coming—should be brought about solely by divine agency—as something which did not depend upon the moral endeavors of men. But, in any case, it resulted from this element in his preaching that Jesus' ethics was not merely static, not a system of fixed imperatives that took no account of time or events, but was infused with a sense of the relation between human life and action and a larger process at work in history, and fortified by a constant reference to future ends which the present righteousness of men might serve to help realize, or at all events to foreshadow; that, in the words of a recent writer,¹ "the virtues and tasks emphasized by the ethics of Jesus were essentially such as were conditioned by expectancy and enthusiasm," and inspired by the hope of some "divine event to which the whole creation moves." The other element in the primitive Christian ethic which—at least if we may regard the Matthew version of the Sermon on the Mount as reflecting in even a slight degree the spirit of Jesus himself—seems equally well established, is its insistence upon the "inwardness" of virtue. That discourse appears in the First Gospel as a somewhat systematic statement of the relation between the morals of the old law and the new demands of membership in "the kingdom of heaven." In successive sections (5:17 ff.) the cardinal points of right conduct are set forth in the light of a contrast between that which "was said by them of old time" and "that which I say unto you;" and the contrast in each case consists, not in the abrogation of any of the old requirements, but in the translation of them into terms of permanent inward attitudes of feeling and desire. Where the law forbade certain acts, the new commandment forbids corresponding states of "the heart;" where the one forbade crimes of violence, the other forbids anger and hatred, and requires the love even of enemies; where the one forbade adultery, the other prohibits lustful thoughts and desires; where the one forbade the breaking of oaths, the other forbids all taking of oaths, both as implying irreverence toward the sacred name invoked, and still more as implying a disposition to falsity and deceit in affirmations not so attested. It is needless to point in detail to the evidence for

¹ Foster, *Finality of the Christian Religion*, pp. 420, 421.

the familiar and very generally recognized truth that the supremely distinctive note of the ethical teaching of Jesus (as portrayed by the Synoptists) is its inwardness.

Now, it has often enough been pointed out that, in the first of these characteristics, Jesus simply developed, and gave a new meaning to, a feature that had already long been characteristic of the most distinctive ethics of Judaism. The preacher of the "gospel of the kingdom" was merely the consummator of the reflection and the work of the Jewish prophets; both the phrase and the kernel of the thought go back to them, and can be rightly understood only in the light of this connection. It has, however, rarely been recognized that the other unmistakable element in Jesus' ethics—the inwardness of it—is also historically the product of an evolution; that it, too, has very definite Old Testament antecedents. If, in his preaching of a coming kingdom of righteousness, Jesus gave the last and greatest expression to the most characteristic trait of the ethical spirit of prophetism, in his demand for integrity of heart as well as of conduct, Jesus was similarly carrying out the most striking and characteristic conception resulting from the movement of Jewish thought manifested in the Wisdom writings. Not only has the relation of this feature of the Christian ethic to the Wisdom movement been too little noticed, but also the singularly indirect and gradual character of the course of thought by which the idea of inward goodness was apparently evolved, has been too generally overlooked. The present study attempts to bring out the stages of the evolution of that conception so far as is possible in view of the uncertain date and origin of much of the literary material upon which our study must be based.

A few preliminary words are requisite in order to indicate the results of historical criticism with respect to the Wisdom literature that are taken for granted in what follows. That all the Wisdom writings—including a large group of psalms having obvious affinities with the thought of this school of religious moralists—are of relatively late post-exilic date is here assumed. It is, however, possible to suppose that a considerable period of time elapsed between the earliest of these writings and that one of them which is both fullest in matter and best determined as to date—the book of Ben Sira

(about 200 B. C.). The question of absolute date is, however, of no great importance for the purposes of this paper. As for the relative dates, I accept, in deference to the authority of Professor Toy, the sequence: Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ben Sira, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom of Solomon; the last, however, with its doctrine of immortality, belongs in a class by itself, and does not come into consideration here. There seems, indeed, to be serious reason for doubting whether all of Job, or even the Colloquies of the Friends, constitute the earliest writing of the group; and the several psalms which belong to this body of literature manifestly represent quite different stages in the development of reflection upon the characteristic problems of the school. This, however, implies little even as to their comparative dates; for an early phase of the doctrine may naturally enough survive and find literary expression at the same moment when some acute mind is finding very different implications in the same fundamental ideas—just as savages belonging properly to the Stone Age are contemporary with Edison and Marconi, and just as our libraries contain theological or philosophical works all bearing the current year as their date of issue, but belonging severally to the thirteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, in their character and contents. In the consideration of the Wisdom books, in other words, it is rather the logical than the chronological sequence that is of importance for our present inquiry; and the former appears to be fairly certainly ascertainable from the differing doctrinal characteristics of the books themselves.

I

It is a historical common-place that the morality of early peoples is usually based upon an unquestioning acquiescence in established custom rather than upon any sort of reasoned reflection; that it concerns itself with concrete and objective acts, and not with introspective searchings of the conscience; and that it makes the community rather than the individual its unit of reference, regarding the individual as of importance only as a member of a continuing visible society, and enjoining upon him duties and abstinences which often have no professed relation to his own ends, claims, or desires, but relate rather (when they are not purely arbitrary) to the well-being,

increase, and glory of the family, tribe, or nation. It is an equally evident historical fact that, in virtually all races whose development is not arrested, there sooner or later supervenes a sharp and well-defined moral crisis, in which at least two of these traits of the old morality of custom and communal solidarity are criticized and tend to disappear: when grounds more rational, and less local and accidental, than established conventions are demanded for the prohibitions and injunctions of morality; and when the individual, coming to a sharper self-consciousness, learning to think of himself as an entity having an existence and claims distinguishable from those of the community, begins to ask for individually valid reasons for his social virtues and conformities—begins to inquire what morality, as commonly understood, “has in it for him.” This crisis, marked by such an outburst of rationalism and individualism, appears with especial distinctness in the history of the two peoples that have most influenced European thought; and in treating of it in the case of either it is instructive to note both the similarity and the contrast to the corresponding movement in the other race. Among the Greeks (or, more accurately, among the colonial and Athenian Ionians) such a turning-point in the history of morals is found in the period of the Sophistic Enlightenment, and in the resultant early attempts at a moral philosophy undertaken by Socrates and his immediate disciples; among the Jews the like tendencies exhibit themselves in certain of the later prophets, and above all in the Wisdom books. So much, then, is familiar. Upon a closer examination of the movement of reflection which took place at this juncture in Hebrew history, we shall see that precisely the trait which constitutes the peculiarity and the logical weakness of the Jewish Wisdom, as contrasted with the early Greek moral philosophy, was also the indirect cause of that development in Jewish thought by which it eventually reached one sort of profundity—an appreciation of the inner springs of conduct, and a sense of subjective “sin”—that the Greek mind scarcely ever attained. The sages of both the Greek and the Hebrew *Aufklärung*—the former doubtless remotely influencing some of the latter—taught, for the most part, an ethics characterized by individualism and rationalism. But the ethical rationalism of the Jewish moralists was, as we shall have occasion to note, far less bold, consistent, and

thoroughgoing than that of the Sophists and the Socratic schools. Yet just this failure in consistency it was that led the Wisdom thinkers into certain difficulties, in the attempt to extricate themselves from which they made the discovery of the inner life.

Primarily, both the Wisdom writers, and the Sophists and Socratic moralists, undertook to intellectualize morality. They all alike felt the necessity of reducing virtue to terms of knowledge, and of proving that the bad man was also in some sense a fool. But this undertaking was simply the response of earnest and, for the most part, morally serious minds to a growing individualism which they observed in the community around them.² Morality must be intellectualized just because, as it seemed, it must be individualized; because, that is, the individual man was beginning to demand that reasons which both satisfied his individual judgment and had reference to his individual ends and interests, should be shown him, for the rules of life which his ethical teachers prescribed. It is very evident also that, in this phase of both Greek and Hebrew history, there was a general intellectual ferment, a new awakening to almost an intoxication over the charms and wonders of the "kingdom of man's mind;" so that morality in such a period could best and most persuasively be taught by being represented as a sort of cleverness, as an art of life based upon insight and skilled judgment. The method of ethical reasoning which the Greek thinkers—especially Socrates and the Socratic schools³—developed, to meet the demands of such a juncture, consisted in showing that morality is merely a means to an end, which end the individual does, as a matter of fact, desire and seek; so that wrong action becomes a sort of self-contradiction or self-stultification—a choice of means inconsistent with

² The earlier history of individualism in Hebrew thought is instructively set forth in a paper by Dr. John Merlin Powis Smith, in the issue of this *Journal* for April, 1906. To Dr. Smith's paper readers of the present study may be referred, for a fuller treatment of the transitional period, some of the later ethical consequences of which are here examined.

³ The arguments of several of the more constructive Sophists appear to have consisted rather in the attempt to show that bad conduct was irrational because "contrary to nature." The doctrine of Protagoras took still another turn. But the limits of the present paper do not permit the consideration of these distinctions. The main outcome of the Greek reflection of the period is fairly represented by the generalization above.

the end at which, in the last analysis, one really, and by virtue of one's essential nature, aims. This necessary end, or τέλος, of all rational human volition—this state of being which would satisfy man's will and give him what, at bottom, he always wants—was, of course, variously defined: for the Cyrenaics, and apparently for Socrates, in one phase of his teaching, it was pleasure; for the Cynics, and for Socrates in his most characteristic mood, it was αὐτάρκεια self-sufficiency, freedom from all desire for, and dependence upon, any goods not completely within the power of one's own unaided will; for Plato it was (among other things) the complete and balanced functioning of the entire nature of man as a rational being. In each case, however, the essence, the compulsive force, of the moralist's argument lay in his appeal to a supposed universal "end of every man's desire." To attain virtue then meant to realize with clearer self-consciousness the nature of this end, and to have an insight into the means to its realization; while vice implied, for the same reason, ignorance, inconsistency, self-negation. Virtue was knowledge; and vice was folly—in both cases with reference to the realization of the implicit ends of the individual's existence.

The method of the Wisdom moralists, though less explicitly defined, was unmistakably the same. They very plainly and constantly take for granted that all men really want one thing—and that thing, in essence, happiness, well-being, prosperity, within the natural term of a man's life. They assume⁴ that the best way to commend virtue to men is, not to appeal to the moral feelings or sentiments latent in human nature, but to show the bearing of different kinds of conduct upon the well-being of the individual. The egoistic hedonism implicit in Proverbs, Ben-Sirā, and Ecclesiastes is, indeed, obvious and well recognized. "Wisdom is the principal thing," contends the writer of the little ethical treatise which constitutes chaps. 1-9 in our Book of Proverbs; and the meaning and value of wisdom (as a quality in human nature) consists in the fact that (3:13 f.):

⁴ Except when they momentarily forget their rôle as sages, intellectualizers of morality, and are (as rarely happens) carried away by a burst of simple and natural moral or patriotic feeling.

Happy is the man that findeth wisdom,
 And the man that getteth understanding
 Length of days is in her right hand,
 And in her left hand riches and honor.
 Her ways are pleasant ways
 And all her paths are peace.

The individualistic reference could hardly be more plainly put than in 9:12:

If thou art wise, thou art wise for thyself,
 And if thou scornest,^s thou alone shalt bear it;

or in 8:36, where Wisdom speaks in poetical personification:

He that misseth me wrongeth himself;
 And they that hate me love death.

The evil-doer is denounced, less in a tone of moral indignation against his actions than in a tone of contempt for his folly—for the futility of his aims and the short-sightedness of his devices for procuring happiness. The Wisdom moralist can hardly be said to have caught a vision of the beauty of holiness; but he has realized with great force the profitableness of decency and order in the conduct of life. Most of these writers—especially the author of Prov. 1:9—lay great emphasis upon the virtue of chastity; the subject, doubtless owing to social conditions in their time, seems to be something of a preoccupation with them. But their reasons for the observance of this virtue are in all cases strictly egoistic and hedonistic. The sexual vices are inveighed against, not from any aesthetico-moral sentiment of purity, nor yet from any consideration of the social importance of maintaining the integrity of the family, but because the "latter end" of such conduct is "bitter as wormwood," because "the house of the strange woman inclineth unto death," and through association with evil women "a man is brought to a piece of bread." Adultery is condemned, hardly at all as a breach of honor and social faith, but as foolish; for the angry husband "will not spare in the day of vengeance, he will not regard any ransom, neither will he rest content

^s The use of the term "scorners" (לִצְרִים), as a name for those lacking in wisdom, is characteristic of the writers of Proverbs (cf. also Ps. 1). The word occurs in parallelism with פְּתוּיִים, "simple ones" (also a favorite Wisdom term in Proverbs and Psalms), with אֲנָלִית, "folly," and the like. Outside of Wisdom writings, a like use of לִצְרִים is, I believe, found only in Isa. 28:22; 29:20; and Hos. 7:5.

though thou givest many gifts;" so that the adulterer shall get only "wounds and dishonor." Side by side with this—in Proverbs, Ben Sira, and Ecclesiastes—there is much commendation of early marriage and of the enjoyment of married life—usually in a somewhat frankly sensual tone (Prov. 5:15-19; Eccles. 26:13-20; 9:9; 11:9-12:1).⁶ In general, the purely didactic writers of the Wisdom school, while counseling moderation, temperance, and a cultivation of the ability to get along without particular pleasures, counsel also the prompt grasping of all unharmful pleasures as they fly, the losing of no opportunity for cheerful enjoyment—though they are ever mindful that not much of this sort of thing is to be expected, in view of the meagerness of man's powers, the uncertainty of his fortunes, the brevity of his life. So Ben Sira (14:14 f.):

Defraud not thyself of the good day,
And let not the part of a good desire escape thee
Give and take and beguile thy soul,
For there is no seeking of dainties in Hades.

Thus far, then, the Greek moral philosophers and the teachers of the Hebrew Wisdom undertake to meet the apparent needs of similar junctures in the moral development of their respective nations in the same general way—by stating morality in terms of insight, and teaching the principles of the art of living well from the egoistic standpoint. But there remains, from the beginning to the end, a fundamental difference between the two groups of thinkers. The Greek philosophers, having defined virtue as consisting in a right knowledge of the means to some determined end—pleasure, or self-sufficiency, or self-realization in accordance with the generic nature of man as a rational animal—thereupon proceeded to reconstruct the content of morality by the use of the principle which they had discovered. They undertook the enterprise—both logically and socially a hazardous enterprise—of boldly revising the established moral codes, rejecting all requirements not deducible from their doctrine of the end, and adding all imperatives which their general

⁶ In Eccles. 12:1 the reading בְּרִיךְ ("fountain," i. e., wife) for the intrinsically improbable בְּרִיךְ is so imperatively indicated by the context that it is difficult to see how any critic can hesitate to adopt it—as does, e. g., Davidson, s. v. Ecclesiastes in *Encyclopaedia Biblica*. For the usage, cf. Prov. 5:16, 18; Song of Solomon 4:12.

moral criterion seemed to demand. As everyone knows, this revision of the particular contents of the code of right conduct went at first to extraordinary lengths in the case of the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, and even of Plato. But in all this the Greek philosophers showed at least consistency and intellectual intrepidity. The Hebrew sages were far less bold. They did not say: "Virtue is what leads to happiness, prosperity, and long life; therefore we will discover what courses of conduct lead to these ends, and commend them; while we will set down as evil only those things which can be clearly seen to be unfavorable to the individual's happiness." On the contrary, they unquestioningly took for granted the validity of the customary Hebrew code and of the written law; so that their task became, not that of deducing rules of conduct from the principle of egoistic hedonism, but merely that of showing that the traditional and generally accepted rules of conduct were justifiable from the standpoint of egoistic hedonism. Where, indeed, the law had not spoken, the moralist permitted himself to deduce his particular counsels from his general conception of the end and aim of existence; and the result was not always such as one can nowadays admire. An example of this is the injunction against going surety for a neighbor, in Prov. 6:1-5 (Ben Sira seems to adopt a somewhat more generous attitude, 29:14); the advice is doubtless that of prudence and commercial shrewdness, but the spirit of it is mean and ungenerous. But, in the main, the Wisdom teacher is content simply to enforce the recognized system of duties by the hedonic sanction—dwelling, doubtless, by preference upon those virtues (such as industry, peaceableness, chastity, and temperance) in which this egoistic justification is most easily made out. Above all, these sages are (with one possible exception) untouched by religious skepticism; their belief in God's reality and power over human affairs is intense. For them God not only exists, but is an extremely practical reality, to be reckoned with in any practical scheme of life. If the art of living well consists in shrewdly adapting oneself to those facts in the world upon which one's welfare depends, then it must first of all consist in accommodating oneself to the good pleasure of the Almighty, from whom all prosperity comes. Thus the Wisdom writers never weary of reiterating that "the fear of Yahweh is the beginning of wisdom."

There is no discrepancy between the attitude of the Wisdom moralists and the legalistic pietism of those psalmists whose "delight" was "to meditate on the law of Yahweh day and night." All this class of psalms clearly represent simply one side of the Wisdom movement. The authors of them share with the gnostic writers their recognition that the revealed Torah is the primary source of that practical knowledge by means of which a man may secure for himself the best and happiest of possible lives, in a rather mysterious and dark world; they share with them also their silence and relative indifference in regard to sacerdotalism and the ceremonial aspects of the Jewish religion. The glowing praises of the law which these religious poets sing are motivated usually by considerations entirely characteristic of the Wisdom type of thought; the commandments of the law are precious because they "enlighten the eyes" and "make wise the simple"—and because, finally, "in keeping of them there is great reward."

The result of this combination of a thoroughgoing egoistic hedonism with a thoroughgoing acceptance of the traditional and written moral law, was that the Wisdom theorists were from the outset committed to a large and precarious affirmation; namely, that the good man who observes the customary morality and devoutly obeys the divine law, in every case enjoys greater well-being, gets a greater measure of the concrete goods of life, than does the evil-doer—and that within the limits of an earthly lifetime (since no belief in a future life of compensations and expiations had yet arisen). Earlier Hebrew thought, with its sense of the solidarity of the individual with the family or race, was committed to no such contention; the sufferings of the righteous might be explicable as a punishment for the sins of the fathers, or (in the lofty conception of the Second Isaiah) as a purification of the errant race as a whole through the vicarious suffering of its innocent with its guilty members. Later Jewish thought, after the growth of Pharisaism, likewise involved no such assertion—for it could maintain *its* theological utilitarianism in morals by pointing to the compensatory rewards of righteousness in another world. But at just this juncture in Hebrew reflection the moral teachers of the nation had involved themselves in the doctrine that a man's possession of the external good things of existence—long life (by which, with their obsessing fear of the grave, they set especial store),

health, prosperity, and public esteem—corresponds always to the degree of his moral excellence.

Those writers of the school who, whatever their date, seem to represent the earliest and simplest phase of its doctrines, advance this unpalatable affirmation without much appreciation of its difficulties, of its incongruities with common facts of experience. Proverbs 1:9 is full of it; the Friends in the Book of Job frequently reiterate it; certain of the psalmists insist upon it. Even in these cases it is, of course, admitted that temporary and superficial appearances may be against the doctrine; but in reality it is contended, the prosperity of the wicked is always brief, and serves only to make his fall more bitter; the sufferings of the righteous are likewise brief, and but enhance his final triumph. So the writer of Ps. 37:

Fret not thyself because of evil-doers
 For they shall be cut down like the grass
 Trust in Yahweh and do good,
 And he shall give thee the desire of thy heart
 For evil-doers shall be cut off,
 But those that wait upon Yahweh shall inherit the land
 I have been young, and now am old,
 Yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken,
 Or his seed begging bread
 I have seen the wicked in great power,
 And spreading himself like a green tree on its native soil,
 But one passed by, and lo! he was not.

But it must have very soon become apparent through the experience of life that this strict proportionality between virtue and earthly well-being could not at all universally be verified. Yet the moralist did not abandon his theory. And so, out of this difficulty, this conflict between the theory and the realities of experience, there arose the characteristic problem of the Wisdom—which is the problem of the Book of Job. The nature of that problem should not be misapprehended. It is not the problem of evil in general. In all the Wisdom writings, with the possible exception of Prov. 1:9, the reality and necessity of evil is recognized and emphasized. The writers regard it as an obvious fact—and a fact which, while it throws an intermittent gloom and melancholy upon their view of life, causes no difficulty for their theology—that man, being far inferior to his Creator in power and

dignity, can expect at best only a brief, broken, and imperfect felicity. That "man that is born of woman is of few days and full of troubles," creates no special wonder in them. The fact which does seem to them a difficulty is not evil in general, but the relative distribution of evil—the fact that often the wicked are seen to flourish proudly while the man of conscious rectitude of conduct is poor and sick and afflicted and despised of men. There are few things in literature more pathetic than the group of psalms which give utterance to the good man's protestations of the integrity and uprightness of his own life, and his bewildered distress at the delaying—even to the verge of the grave—of that merited felicity and that vindication of the wisdom of righteousness which his faith and his philosophy of life have taught him to expect. "O spare me!" cries the Psalmist (39:13; Job 10:20 f.), with a painful note of urgency,

Spare me, that I may take comfort a little,
Before I go hence and be no more.

The difficulty in which Hebrew reflection thus found itself was, in a sense, a gratuitous and illogical one. If the Wisdom thinkers had had the intellectual courage and thoroughness of their Greek counterparts, they might have avoided the difficulty, and retained the consistency of their doctrine, either by descending to what we should regard as a lower plane of moral ideas, with the Cyrenaics or the Epicureans; or by rising to a higher plane, with Plato. If they had rigorously adhered to their conviction that the good is simply that which is profitable for a man's enjoyment during his lifetime, they ought in consistency to have concluded that a course of life which does not appear to yield worldly happiness—even though it be prescribed by what professes to be a divine revelation—is one which a rational man has no obligation to follow. Or if they adhered to their conviction of the imperishable worth and validity of the ethical teaching of the law and the prophets of their race, they should have abandoned their meager hedonism; so doing, they might have reached Plato's profound paradox,⁷ that the just man realizes his own good better than the unjust, even though to the unjust life there be added all possible riches and health and power and worldly glory, and freedom from all fear of retribution after death. Yet, as a matter of

⁷ *Republic*, Book II.

fact, the inconsistency—or shall one say, the tenacious determination to hold both sides of an as yet imperfectly stated truth—was a felicitous one, and singularly fruitful for subsequent ethical and religious thought. For out of the stress of the resultant difficulty there came—by a natural and necessary working of the human mind—both the tendency toward the belief in a significant immortality, and that new recognition of the inner side of virtue, the more immediate causes of which we have now to consider.

II

The answer which the Wisdom thinkers found for the problem of the sufferings of the righteous and the prosperity of sinners is expressed in their conception of the divine instruction or chastening (תּוֹכַח, *paideia*). This conception alone is an important contribution of the Wisdom school to the religious interpretation of life. It is an application to the experience of the individual of an idea which the author of Deuteronomy had already applied (8:2-5) in the explanation of God's dealings with Israel as a race. The good man suffers because the divine Instructor designs, through the uses of suffering, to increase his goodness.

Whom Yahweh loveth he chasteneth,
Even as a father the son in whom he delighteth.

Such is the favorite and the reiterated argument of most of the typical passages dealing with the problem—of the three friends and of Elihu in Job, of several sections of Proverbs, of a number of psalms, of Ben Sira. Chastening is not an evil, but one of the rewards of goodness; for by means of it the righteous man becomes more completely righteous, and thereby has the greater assurance of eventually gaining in the fullest degree the outward rewards of righteousness. "He that refuseth correction despiseth himself."⁸

It is this last point which is significant, and is oftenest misapprehended, in the Wisdom doctrine of the divine chastening. No Wisdom writer has any idea that chastening is valuable because of the intrinsic excellence or beauty of the qualities of character that are gained in the school of sorrow. His ultimate concern is always about the ulterior and external consequences; such qualities are

⁸ Prov. 15:31.

valuable only—or, at all events, chiefly—because they are a part of the practical wisdom which leads to well-being and happiness. The chastening, therefore—this is very clear upon a comparison of all the passages bearing upon the subject—is conceived, not as a training, but as a testing. The good man may have some hidden weaknesses, some “lack of understanding” at a special point, of which he might remain unconscious until too late—until the weakness betrays him into fatal error, and so into misery and disgrace. Both for the testing of the genuineness of the virtue of the professed follower of wisdom,⁹ and for the prompt and advantageous bringing to light of the latent imperfections of the man of essentially right character, rigorous discipline is necessary. For both purposes the virtuous man prays for such discipline—to demonstrate the completeness of his virtue, or (in humbler mood) to enable him to see in what particulars it is incomplete. So Job calls for vindication (23:10):

God knoweth my conduct (יָדָעָה),
When he hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold

And so the psalm-writers:

Judge me, O Yahweh, for I have walked in mine integrity,
I have trusted in Yahweh without wavering,
Examine me, O Yahweh, and prove me,
Try my reins and my heart;¹⁰

Or again:

Search me, O God, and know my heart,
Try me, and know my thoughts,
And see if there be any wicked way in me,
And lead me in the way of perpetuity.

Thus the Wisdom conception of the corrective chastening of the righteous (which is developed in the search for a solution of the

⁹ Cf. *Ecclus.* 4:17:

At the first Wisdom will walk with him in crooked ways,
And bring fear and dread upon him,
And torment him with her discipline,
Until she may trust his soul and try him by her laws,
Then will she return the straight way unto him,
And comfort him, and show him her secrets.

Also 2:12; 6:18 f.

¹⁰ *Pss.* 26:12 and 139; cf. also 17:3.

central difficulty of the system of the school) involves the recognition of the possibility of "secret" or unconscious sins (סִתְיוּת) or "ignorances" (*áγνοια*, as the Greek version of Ben Sira renders it)—that is, deficiencies of which the man himself is unaware. It must, once more, be observed that the discovery of these deficiencies is regarded as beneficial, not so much because the deficiencies are in themselves inherently evil, as because they are dangerous, the potential causes of greater disaster in the future. Such is the spirit of Ben Sira's prayer for correction (23:2):

Who will set scourges over my thoughts,
And the discipline of wisdom over mine heart?
That they spare me not for mine ignorances,
And it pass not by my sins:
Lest mine ignorances increase,
And my sins abound to my destruction,
And I fall before mine adversaries,
And mine enemy rejoice over me.

But what is most significant is that these "unconscious sins," to the idea of which the doctrine of discipline so directly leads, are necessarily regarded as inner sins. A man is not ignorant of his outward acts; he knows whether or not he has violated any of the prescriptions of the law. The man who is conscious of his rectitude, as Job or some of the psalmists, may express perfect confidence that his record is clear of any outward wrong-doing. It can only be concerning his inner state of "heart"—out of which wrongful acts may in due season spring—that he can feel the need of any self-revealing discipline.

At this point another feature of the Wisdom writings must be mentioned which serves to reinforce the influence of the idea just noted as making for a recognition of the inward side of character. In their thought about God these thinkers delight above all to dwell upon what may be called the intellectual aspect of the cosmic attributes of deity. Not so much the divine goodness as the divine wisdom is the supreme object of the reverence of the sages—and this means God's power to conceive and design a world so vast, so complex, and so orderly, and, after creating it, to understand it completely—to know it through and through in all its parts, from the incomprehensibly great to the inconceivably little. In a word, the omniscience of God was the attribute that most impressed these enthusiasts

of "understanding" in all its manifestations; and this led them to a vivid sense of the openness of even the most secret and subjective movements of human consciousness to the divine vision.

Sheol and Abaddon are before Yahweh,
How much more, then, the hearts of the children of men.¹¹

So the most nobly eloquent of all the psalms:¹²

Thou hast set our iniquities before thee,
Our hidden sins in the light of thy countenance.

Consequently these moralists feel strongly that the obedience which can win men the favor of such a God cannot consist simply in external acts of ceremonial or of moral correctness, but in inner states and qualities; for Yahweh "tries the reins and the heart" and "requires truth in the inward parts."

One more distinctive (and often overlooked) feature of this connected group of Wisdom ideas needs to be noted, to complete the picture. The "secret sins" which are discerned by the divine omniscience, and brought to the consciousness of the individual himself by the divine "correction," do not generally seem to be conceived, as they are in the gospels, as consisting of wrong states of feeling or desire with respect to one's "neighbor;" they are, though inward, yet purely religious sins, and are, indeed, reducible to a single fault—pride, lack of humility before God. The "last infirmity of noble mind," for the Wisdom doctrine, is unmistakably the pride of the virtuous man. And by pride is meant, not the introverted vanity of self-righteousness, but simply a failure in self-abasement before the incomprehensible wisdom of omnipotence. There is, to the end, in the Wisdom thought a considerable residuum of the notion, common among early peoples, of the enviousness of the deity, his jealousy for his own dignity and greatness; the final virtue is humility; the ultimate and unpardonable sin, even in the upright man, is overweening presumptuousness. "Every one that is proud in heart is an abomination to Yahweh" (Prov. 16:5).¹³ All this is clearly shown in the three classic expressions of the full meaning of the Wisdom doctrine of disciplinary chastening. The first of these

¹¹ Prov. 15:11.

¹² Ps. 90:8.

¹³ Cf. Pss. 34:18 and 19:51.

is the speech of Elihu in the Book of Job, which, whether or not it be (as is probable) an interpolation, is at all events a typical bit of orthodox Wisdom philosophizing. Elihu confidently undertakes an explanation of Job's sufferings; and he does so without impeaching Job's claim to exceptional goodness of life in all outward conduct and in all his human relationships. Job lacks only one virtue—humility; and his bitter experiences have been merely a beneficent chastening for the purpose of making him conscious of this fault.

Then God openeth the ears of men,
And completeth the chastening of them,
That he may withdraw man from his conduct,
And remove pride from man. . . .
To bring back his soul from the pit,
-That he may be enlightened with the light of the living.

So again:

If they be bound in fetters,
And taken in the cords of affliction,
Then he showeth them their conduct,
And their transgressions, that they have behaved themselves proudly.
He openeth their ear to instruction
If they hearken and serve him
They shall spend their days in prosperity.

Secondly, the conception is summed up in Ps. 19, a typical Wisdom psalm, in a single familiar sentence, which should be rendered thus:

Who can discern his errors?
Cleanse thou me from unwitting faults!
Yea, restrain thy servant from proud thoughts,¹⁴
That they may not have dominion over me.
Then shall I be perfect,
And I shall be clear from great transgression.

Finally, the same thoughts find expression in that psalm (51) which has been said to manifest the deepest conception of sin of any writing

¹⁴ In vs. 13 *וְיִתְּנִי* may, of course, be rendered "the proud," i. e., proud men, its more usual signification; and it is so translated by Wellhausen. But such a rendering wholly breaks the connection between this verse and what immediately precedes and follows—a connection otherwise natural and significant. How can "protection from the proud" be equivalent to "cleansing from unconscious faults," and the last step toward the attainment of "perfection"? We are entitled, then, to understand the word to mean "proudnesses," or "proud thoughts"—or "presumptuous sins" in the language of the R. V.

in the Old Testament. The psalm is a cry of penitence, and a prayer (unequaled, doubtless, elsewhere in ancient literature) for the searching and purifying discipline of God; but the penitent confesses to no wrong-doing against men, and acknowledges no outward departure from the duties of the law. It is only when he looks within—and when, looking within, he considers his attitude toward God, not toward his fellows—that he seems to find that transgression in himself by which he can justify, as a salutary correction, the suffering which he has undergone:

Against thee alone have I sinned;
It is in thy sight that I have done the evil;
That thou mayest be justified in thy sentence,
And blameless in thy judgment
Lo, thou desirest truth in the inward parts,
And in the hidden part thou wilt make me to know wisdom.
Purge me with hyssop that I may be clean,
Wash me that I may be whiter than snow.
Thou wilt make me to hear joy and gladness,
The bones that thou hast broken shall rejoice.
A clean heart create in me, O God,
And a steadfast spirit renew in me.
Cast me not away from thy presence,
And take not thy holy spirit from me.¹⁵

¹⁵ Wellhausen's translation and explanation of this important psalm, in Haupt's *Polychrome Bible*, seems to me wide of the mark. With the aid of a gratuitous alteration to the text, vs. 8 is rendered:

"Yea, faith and truth—it is these that thou lovest;
Grant me then insight into the mystery."

On this and the following verses Wellhausen remarks: "It troubles him [the psalmist] to be obliged to acknowledge God's righteousness without understanding the reason therefor. If he could but get an insight into the mystery, his faith would be strengthened." "By the clean heart is meant a joyous spirit assured of the divine favor. The opposite to this is the troubled, not the impure, heart." The whole psalm, Wellhausen thinks, is based on Isa., chaps. 40 ff. "The servant [of Yahweh] prays for the restoration of his good conscience toward God, that he may execute his prophetic mission, the conversion of the heathen." But there is no indication whatever in the psalm of any national reference; its individualistic character is conspicuous. Its affinities, in language and thought, with the pietistic side of the Wisdom school are obvious; in particular, its emphasis upon the divine demand for a "clean" (not a "joyous") heart, and its prayer for an inner purgation of spirit, are (as is shown above) completely characteristic of the Wisdom thought, and have their counterparts in most of the other Wisdom writings. It is a further consequence of Wellhausen's

Yet deep as is the note of spiritual experience and of religious feeling sounded in this great Hebrew lyric of the inner life, it falls completely into place among the expressions of the characteristic conceptions to which the affirmations and problems of the Wisdom moralists eventually led. It contains no ideas—though it assuredly contains qualities of emotion and of literary utterance—which have not their counterparts in other Wisdom writings; it is, indeed, only a more intense and profound version of Ben Sira's prayer for the disciplining of his thoughts and the correction of his "ignorances."¹⁶ The psalmist accounts for his own sufferings, and reconciles them with the justice of God, by the same explanation which is proposed to the recalcitrant Job by the less inspired utterances of Elihu in that dialogue. The whole group of Wisdom writers (external and superficial as much of their didacticism seems) are thus constantly led, as it were by the unescapable dialectic of their own doctrinal position, to this recognition of the possibility of an inner sinfulness which may remain even after all the social duties and outward moralities of the law have been fulfilled. It is a significant fact that the characteristic phrase of a subjective and introspective, but still untechnical, ethics, "a pure heart," is peculiar, in the Old Testament, to the Psalm Book and the Book of Proverbs. And it is in one of the earliest, simplest, and most unquestionably representative of the Wisdom writings (Prov., chaps. 1-9) that there occurs the warning which perhaps, out of all the Old Testament, sounds most like a sentence from the Sermon on the Mount: "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life."

We have seen, then, that the sages of the Hebrew Wisdom were led by their emphasis upon the intellectual attributes of deity, and therefore upon the divine omniscience, to an especially vivid and constant thought of God's knowledge of the "hidden things of the heart" of man. And they were at the same time led by the exigencies

determination to connect this psalm with Isaianic prophetism, instead of with the Wisdom, that he refuses to regard vs. 20 and 21 (in spite of their direct negation of vs. 18 and 19) as an orthodox "tag" added by a ritualistic editor.

¹⁶ For a similar expression, in the Book of Proverbs, of this idea of the inward-reaching and heart-searching nature and office of the divine chastening, cf. the reference in Prov. 20:30 to stripes "that cleanse away evil and reach the innermost parts of the belly" (תִּדְרֹשׁ בֶּטֶן).

of their doctrine of the divine chastening (which was their only solution of the problem of the sufferings of the righteous) to conclude that that chastening must be chiefly directed, not to the correction of external transgressions, but to bringing to the consciousness of the man of essentially right purposes the deep-seated and unrecognized inner weaknesses, the wrong subjective attitudes, which constituted the final limitation upon the completeness of his virtue, and thereby prevented him from attaining the prosperity, earthly pre-eminence, and happiness which are (according to the primary contention of the school) the necessary consequences of virtue. The inner sins which they had in mind do not seem to have included wrong attitudes of feeling and desire toward other men, but only unacceptable states of heart toward God—and chiefly, the sin of pride. In this the Wisdom ethics conspicuously falls short of the Christian teaching, in which the acceptability of a man in the sight of God is measured by his possession of certain qualities of emotion and will with respect to his social fellows—above all, by the degree of his “love of his neighbor.” But, though the Christian ethical doctrine gave to the conceptions of inward goodness and inward sin a wider application, it is clear that it is to the Wisdom moralists that we must look for the first introduction of the note of inwardness in ethical thought; of the emphasis upon motive as contrasted with act; and of the conception of the morally supreme thing in the experiences of life as consisting, not in the deeds done before men, but in the progressive purification of the inner life before the searching judgment of a Father “which seeth in secret.” It is, indeed, a strange source for such a historical result; for the Wisdom writers are, as a school, not distinguished for philosophical subtlety; and they are not, by first intention, inclined greatly to introspection. It was, therefore, by somewhat indirect courses, and almost in spite of themselves, that their reflection was led to so important an outcome. For just this reason, the continuity of development from the first attempt of the earliest Jewish moral philosophers to justify good conduct and obedience to the law in terms of individualistic hedonism, to the Christian demand for thorough rightness of spiritual attitude toward God and man, constitutes one of the most remarkable phenomena in the whole history of the development of ideas. The ethics

of Christianity seems to have fused into a single conception two elements which had been separately elaborated by two dissimilar groups of Hebrew thinkers: the prophetic gospel of the coming kingdom, with the insistence upon social righteousness which had always been associated with it in the prophets' teachings; and the Wisdom's recognition of the primacy of "the heart" in morality and of the reality of a sinfulness lying deeper than evil-doing and a possible goodness transcending any outward expression in deeds. The real characteristic of the Christian teaching lies chiefly in the perfection of its fusing of these two. But if we consider them separately, it is perhaps rather the latter element—the factor which was developed out of the Wisdom ethics—that constitutes the uniquely distinctive trait in the influence of Christianity upon the history of morals. The "inwardness" of Christianity is, indeed, a fount from which bitter as well as sweet waters have been drawn;¹⁷ it has been sometimes the source of much unhealthy introspection and of much harmful neglect of man's social relations and duties—faults to which the more objective-minded pagan world was less prone. But it is, none the less, in its emphasis upon the cultivation of the inner life that Christianity has made its peculiar contribution to the world's stock of fundamental moral ideas; it is in this, perhaps, that it has done most to enlarge the range of human experience and to make fuller and deeper men's sense of the worth and significance of their lives.

¹⁷ This, however, through a neglect of the other element. It does not seem unwarranted to say that the discourses of Jesus bid men look within only for the sake of making sure of the soundness of their attitudes and the genuine self-forgetfulness and sincerity of their purposes with respect to the outward and objective realities of the world of persons in which they live.

THE SPIRIT AND VALUE OF PRUSSIAN RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION

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Every Prussian child must receive instruction in religion. The subject is prescribed by the regulations of the ministry of instruction, to which all schools, public and private, are obliged to conform. On the other hand, the regulations do not intend to compel any child to receive a religious instruction contrary to the religious faith of his parents. The matter is administered thus: The state schools, and in general the private schools, provide separate instruction for Protestants and for Catholics, and in some cases for Jews; the parent may send his child to whichever of these forms he adheres to. Or, if he dissents from all the forms provided, he may withdraw his child from religious instruction in the school, on the one condition that he shall provide for the child a religious instruction which in quantity and thoroughness satisfies the public educational authorities.

In actual fact the vast majority of the people profess one of the above-mentioned faiths, and allow their children to receive the corresponding instruction. In 1901 there were in Prussian schools 5,670,870 pupils, of whom 3,520,743 were Evangelical, 2,118,815 Catholic, 24,022 Jews, and only 7,290 of "other Christian confessions." It is evident that dissent, in the sense of open withdrawal from the regular confessions, is in Germany a negligible quantity.

The chief point to emphasize here is that the religious instruction in the schools is in all cases "confessional," or, as we should say, sectarian or denominational; it is in all cases distinctly and avowedly Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish.

There are two plans of arranging for the separate religious instruction of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. The first and commonest is the confessional school, in which all persons and all teaching are supposed to be distinctively Protestant or Catholic, or in a few cases Jewish. Since there is seldom a sufficient population of Jews

to permit of a Jewish school, the Jewish children ordinarily go to Protestant or Catholic schools, and have their religious lessons outside of school, from the rabbi of the congregation to which they belong. The second plan is the so-called *Simultanschule*, in which teachers and pupils of different confessions are found; the children are mixed without discrimination of creed in all subjects except religion; for this they are sorted out and instructed separately. Thus even in the *Simultanschule* the religious instruction is just as definitely confessional as in the confessional school.

The debate over the respective merits of the two plans is very animated. The matter need not detain us, since the religious instruction itself is the same whether given in a confessional or a *Simultanschule*; and, moreover, the number of the *Simultanschulen* is small, especially in Prussia. In 1901 there were in Prussia 24,910 (67.77 per cent.) Evangelical schools, 10,799 (29.38 per cent.) Catholic, 244 (0.66 per cent.) Jewish, and 803 (2.18 per cent.) *Simultanschulen*.

Religion is the first-named subject in the school programme; it is studied throughout the course in both higher and lower schools; the amount of time devoted to it varies somewhat, but is always large. We give below the programme laid down by the general regulations for the *Volksschule* with more than one teacher—that is, for the usual town or city school. The numbers indicate hours of instruction per week.

	Lower Grades	Middle Grades	Upper Grades
Religion.....	4	4	4
Mother-tongue.....	11	8	8
Arithmetic.....	4	4	4
Geometry.....	2
Drawing.....	2
Natural science.....	..	6	6
Singing.....	1	2	2
Gymnastics.....	2	2	2
Total.....	22	26	30

It is seen that only one subject exceeds religion in its allotment of time; that is, the mother-tongue, including reading, composition, literature, and other forms of language instruction. Arithmetic has exactly the same amount of time as religion. The three "R's"

in this school are evidently reading, 'rithmetic, and religion. Taking the eight years of the *Volksschule*, we find that religion gets a little over 15 per cent. of the whole time. Counting forty weeks to the school year, we have 1,280 hours of religious instruction in the common-school course.

For the small, one-teacher schools the regulations prescribe a little more religion: four hours a week for the lower grades, and five hours for the middle and upper grades, thus putting religion in advance of arithmetic, and giving it 17 per cent. of the whole school time.

A small amount of variation from these hours is sometimes permitted with the special sanction of the ministry. Berlin, for example, has only three hours per week in the lower grades instead of four.

In the higher schools less time is given to religion, but the subject is still prominent. The prescription is the same for all the types of "higher schools"—*Gymnasium*, *Realgymnasium*, and *Oberrealschule*. The time assigned to religion is three hours per week in the lowest class (*Sexta*) and two hours in the remaining classes. To this must be added the three years of preparatory work in the *Volksschule* or in a *Vorschule*. The time for the *Volksschule* has been given, four hours per week. I have found no prescription for the *Vorschule*, but representative programmes give to religion three hours a week for the first two years and two hours for the third year. This gives for the whole twelve years of the higher school education a total of a little over 1,000 hours' instruction in religion, or about 8½ per cent. of the whole time.

It may be noted, in passing, that the time allotted to religion has been cut down little by little for many years. Before the Falk regulations of 1872 the subject had six hours a week in the *Volksschule*.¹

Religion is regularly omitted from the curriculum of the continuation schools of Prussia. In the kingdom of Saxony it may be included, provided no lessening of time for other subjects is caused thereby. In Bavaria, on the other hand, religion is the first subject in the continuation school, historically and in present fact. It seems passing strange to count fourteen-year-old children ripe for

¹ See *Report of the United States Commissioner of Education*, 1893-94, pp. 295, 296.

independence in religion, while still recognizing their need for further instruction in reading and arithmetic.

During the last part of the common-school period, usually in the last school year, the children receive special religious instruction from the pastor as a preparation for confirmation. This is in addition to the regular school instruction in religion, which continues as usual.² The confirmation instruction usually takes two hours a week throughout the last school year or the greater part of the year. Its matter is much the same as that of the school lessons in religion; its methods naturally differ somewhat, being as a rule more emotional and hortatory.

In what esteem is the instruction in religion held among the school studies? What place does religion hold in the minds of the teachers and managers of the schools? Schoolmen, almost without exception, are emphatic in asserting the unique power and incomparable value of religious instruction. Falk himself, the greatest minister of education of recent times, wrote in 1873: "It is just the religious instruction which makes the most essential contribution to the solution of the task of the *Volksschule*; and upon this school rests the duty of guarding and cherishing the highest interests of the life of the German people."³ Professor Rein, the noted pedagogical leader, expresses himself repeatedly to the same effect; for example: "It is an empty illusion to suppose that anyone, whether of the common people or of higher rank, can be educated without the aid of religious motives."⁴

An eminent evangelical clergyman, prominent also as a writer on education says: "Scarcely anyone who knows human nature will doubt that education without religious instruction is impossible. Only the lowest materialism, which degrades man to the rank of beasts, could deny that."⁵ The expressions often rise to a poetical enthusiasm, as in the following, quoted approvingly by Rein: "He

² In some states the school instruction is omitted or abridged during the period of the confirmation instruction. There is a desire on the part of some Prussian teachers for a similar arrangement.

³ Schneider, *Volksschulwesen und Lehrerbildung in Preussen* (Berlin, 1875), pp. 45, 46.

⁴ *Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung der Religion* (Munich, 1905), p. 302.

⁵ Katzer, *Das Judenchristentum* (Leipzig, 1893), p. 7.

takes the sun from the heavens and robs the year of spring who would banish the religious instruction from the school or reduce it to a subordinate place."⁶ Or again, this time from an emeritus seminary director: "To remove the religious instruction entirely out of the school and hand it over to the church would be to destroy the crown of all our school work, to rob it of its consecration and blessing."⁷

Further, the religious instruction is to be made the center and foundation of the whole school; Rein takes this position, and Dörpfeld quotes it approvingly,⁸ and the idea is found explicitly or implicitly in much of the literature.

Moral instruction is declared to be quite inadequate: it lacks the very best educative forces—concreteness, rich color, freshness of interest.⁹ It is significant that Dörpfeld, perhaps the best-known pedagogical writer on the *Volksschule*, out of his three volumes on special method devotes one whole volume to religion. Interesting also are the declarations of the various German states as to the aim of the school; with one exception they emphasize religion, morals, and patriotism, in most cases putting religion first.¹⁰

Over against all this magnifying and admiration must be set several facts. First, the very men who so highly praise religious instruction in the abstract in most cases condemn severely the existing instruction, in not a few cases charging the present widespread irreligion and estrangement from the church as a result of egregious faults of the religious teaching in the schools.

My own observation produced the impression that the majority of teachers were at best comparatively indifferent toward the religious instruction; very few used any such expressions of esteem as are quoted above; some said in private conversation that they would prefer to have no school instruction in religion rather than the present form. But even these men admitted freely that the right kind of

⁶ Rein, *Das erste Schuljahr*.

⁷ Leutz, in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik*, Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 30.

⁸ Dörpfeld, *Schriften* (Gütersloh, 1894), Vol. II, Part 2, p. 63.

⁹ Rein, in *Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung der Religion*, p. 292.

¹⁰ Lexis, *Das Unterrichtswesen im Deutschen Reich* (Berlin, 1904), Vol. III, pp. 64, 65.

religious teaching would be a thing much to be desired. Few seemed satisfied with the present conditions, and these were all men in middle life or older.

There is no doubt that the deep conflict existing between various conceptions of the true nature and function of the religious instruction makes itself felt in the actual school work. In some schools the lesson in religion is regarded, and perhaps even realized, as the crown of the teacher's work; in other cases it is a dull and common task, or even an unwelcome intruder.

As to public opinion in general, it would not be far wrong to sum it up thus: that religious instruction is an indispensable element in any complete school course; but that the present form of religious instruction stands in need of radical and extensive reform.

The aim of the religious instruction is definitely formulated by the official regulations. For the *Volksschule* we read:

The aim of the Evangelical religious instruction is to enable the children to understand the Holy Scriptures and the creed of the church to which they belong, in order that they may be able to read the Scriptures for themselves and share actively in the life and work of the church.¹¹

The regulations for the higher schools prescribe the aim as follows:

The Evangelical religious instruction aims, with the aid of the total activity of the school and through education in God's Word, to train the pupils up to personal Christianity and well-formed principles, so that they may in due time show themselves competent through their faith and life, and especially through active participation in the life of the church, to exercise a beneficent influence, worthy of their social station, upon the life of the people as a whole.¹²

We cannot fail to be struck with the prominence of church and the Scriptures in these official statements of the aim of the religious instruction; not that these are out of place, or could be omitted, but that we should have looked for more emphasis upon life and character, upon spirituality and conduct—which are slightly touched in the latter of the two paragraphs and not even mentioned in the former.

It will be of interest to notice what some representative German

¹¹ Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹² *Lehrpläne und Lehraufgaben für die höheren Schulen in Preussen* (Halle, 1902), p. 8.

writers have to say about the aim of the instruction in religion. We quote first from Dr. Zange, a well-known writer upon this subject:

The function of the Evangelical religious instruction. . . . is to introduce the pupils to the creed of their church, to demonstrate the scriptural and historical justification of this creed, and to set forth both its agreement with and its opposition to the teaching of the Catholic church; and also to give the pupils an elementary knowledge of the diversities of creed within the limits of Protestant Christendom.¹³

Here the paramount interest is confessional and ecclesiastical. We quote next from Dr. Thrändorf, teacher in a normal school and author of numerous much-used works on religious instruction:

As our Lord and Master took his leave from his disciples, he gave them the commission: "Make disciples of all nations!" This commission applies today above all to the teachers of religion. "Make your pupils," says Jesus to them, "my disciples; that is, persons in whom my spirit lives and works continually." Every other task of the religious instruction must be brought into the service of this one supreme end.¹⁴

Here the church is not mentioned, and the emphasis is laid upon inner religion and the religious life. Another type of interpretation is found in the next quotation, from the eminent Jena professor, Rein:

The only right aim is this, to provide the heart with pure emotions and a consecrated, determined, vigorous will. . . . We must implant our ideas of life and its values in our children. The highest of these ideas are embraced in the religious conception of the universe, along with the principles of the moral order.¹⁵

Here church and creed are not even hinted at, and even the religious element is subordinated to the moral.

These three quotations represent three elements which are present in varying proportions in practically all conceptions of the aim of religious instruction: the ecclesiastical or confessional, the religious, and the moral. It is evident from the quotations, which are fairly representative of various types of actual opinion, that there is great

¹³ Zange, *Evangelischer Religionsunterricht*, p. 45; quoted in *Mitteilungen des Vereins der Freunde Herbartischer Pädagogik in Thüringen* (Langensalza, 1904), No. 24, p. 9.

¹⁴ Thrändorf, *Der Religionsunterricht im Lehrerseminar* (Gotha, 1901), p. 5.

¹⁵ *Pädagogische Warte* (Osterwieck-Harz), January, 1904, pp. 670, 671.

difference of opinion as to the relative importance of *church*, *spirituality*, and *morals* in the aim of religious instruction.

There is another form of dissension as to aim which we must consider; that is, the question whether the religious instruction ought to work upon the intellect merely, or upon the emotions. A fair idea of the conflict of opinion may be gained from the following. In a meeting of teachers a paper was read in which the following statement was made:

The religious instruction in the higher schools belongs to the category of scientific studies. It is our duty, therefore, to treat predominantly the scientific, that is usually the historical, side of the subject. As in all scientific culture, we must place the understanding, not the emotional nature, in the foreground.¹⁶

This provoked warm discussion; several speakers vigorously attacked the position of the paper; the following, spoken by a bishop ("Generalsuperintendent") of the state church, may represent the opposition: "The aim of all branches of the religious instruction must remain ever the same—simple, heartfelt piety." It must be remembered that the bishop was by no means an outsider in the controversy, but stood officially for the state church, which has almost absolute control of all regulation and much of the inspection of the school instruction in religion.

The literature of the religious instruction is full of the view that the just ends of the work cannot possibly be attained by any appeal directed exclusively, or even mainly, to the understanding. I have met only two definite expressions to the contrary—the one quoted above, and an article by Gymnasium-Director Henke, of Bremen, in which the whole content of the religious instruction (in the higher schools at least) is reduced to preception (*Belehrung*) and knowledge.

The above citations may be taken as expressing the ideals held for the instruction in religion, by the governing authorities, and by eminent men more or less directly engaged in the work of the schools. But it must be understood that these are ideals, and find realization for the most part very imperfectly. It is easy for a regulation to say, as one clause does, that the lessons in the Bible are "to be made fruitful to the growth and culture of the mental and moral nature;" but very hard to find the man or woman who can obey this exhor-

¹⁶ *Zeitschrift für den evangelischen Religionsunterricht*, Vol. XIV, No. 4, p. 272.

tation. As a matter of fact, the impression made by most lessons in religion is much the same as that made by a lesson in arithmetic or history—that the chief aim is to “get the lesson,” to achieve complete mastery of the story, the hymn, the paragraph of the catechism, or whatever chances to be the task in hand. Out of many classes which the writer visited in Prussia in higher and lower schools, he met with only one teacher who manifested any other purpose than that of mastering the knowledge contained in the lesson for the day; even when moral or religious “application” was made of the history or incidents, the method and spirit were intellectual and involved knowledge and thought, not feeling. So that, whatever may be the aim in the minds of the minister of education and his colleagues, and of educational writers, there is no doubt that the aim of the actual teacher is in general much the same in religion as in geography or algebra.

There is good reason to believe that the teacher with the religious aim and motive, so rare an exception in Prussia, is more common, and perhaps much more common, among some of the warmer and more emotional peoples of other German states, especially Bavaria and the small Thuringian countries.

The subject-matter of the lessons in religion is fixed by official decree for the whole kingdom. Its largest part is study of the Bible, including Bible stories for the youngest pupils, gradually developing into Bible history as they advance; the learning of texts, which are constantly used in illustration and amplification of all parts of the lessons; the study of the non-historical portions of the Bible, especially the Psalms, many of which are committed to memory; and the weekly study of the church lessons, or “pericopes,” as they are called. In addition to this comes what is called Bible knowledge, which is usually, however, not much more than the learning of the names of the books in their order, and never in any case ventures upon anything of a critical nature. Next to the Bible comes the catechism, which is committed to memory, along with Luther’s commentary or explanation, and is diligently recited from almost the first year of school to the end of the common-school period. Some prayers and many hymns are learned. A little church history is learned in the older classes, chiefly relating to Luther and the

Reformation. Finally in the last year of the common school the pupils are introduced to the forms and significance of the church service and the ecclesiastical year. To these elements, common to all schools, the higher schools add a brief study of theology and Christian morals, based chiefly upon the Augsburg Confession.¹⁷

The advantages of such a discipline as the German religious instruction lie upon the surface; no one who looks with unbiased eyes can fail to perceive them. The mere knowledge of the history and literature of the Bible itself, and, though far less important, of the creeds and poetry of the church, is indispensable for any full and rounded culture intellectually. The personalities of the Scriptures—Moses, Abraham, David, Job, Paul, and the rest—are so omnipresent in our civilization and literature that no one unacquainted with them can claim to be intelligent. The same is true of biblical events, such as the plagues of Egypt, the flood, the ark, the incidents of the gospels, and the like. To attempt to comprehend the history of the world, and particularly of any Germanic race, without a knowledge of the facts contained in the Bible and some acquaintance with the history of the Christian church, is to try to solve a problem without the aid of the most vital factor.

No doubt our greatest aesthetic debt is to the Greeks; yet we must believe that the conceptions of religion as set forth in the Old Testament poetry and prophecy, and in the nobler hymns of the Christian church, contribute a peculiar and vital form of the beautiful. A strong confirmation of this is the stimulus which many of the greatest writers have found in the ideas and language of the Bible. What has been a source of inspiration and aesthetic illumination to them may well serve the same end to the youth through school instruction in such works as the Psalms, the Book of Job, and the purest and grandest hymns—of which the German tongue has such rich store.

But, of course, the chief service for which we look to the religious instruction is moral and spiritual uplift. Here the possibilities are unlimited. Who can deny that the Bible surpasses all other literature in the most essential requisites for moral and religious teaching: in concreteness, in richness of incident, in unswerving fidelity to

¹⁷ For a fuller account of the content of the religious instruction, see *Education* (Boston), November, 1906.

truth, in loftiness of conception of righteousness? Concerning the greatest figure in Bible and religious instruction we may say, in spite of scattered voices to the contrary, that the principles of Jesus are the motive and explanation of modern life and history, and that no one who has not in one way or another appropriated these ethical ideas can bear his part in the world today. This is perhaps the supreme justification for a religious instruction, at least if the state is to contribute to its support. The Germans are right when they declare that no other branch of study can contribute so largely and richly to the formation of a *Weltanschauung*, a conception of the universe and of life, as can the religious instruction. But just here we meet the question: Granted that it can, does it actually do so? And to this many of those who ought to know answer in the negative. Not a few go so far as to say that the religious instruction harms rather than helps in just this process of character-formation and establishment of life-principles. So strong is the condemnation of the religious instruction as it exists that we are driven to seek for serious defects to explain the alleged undesirable results.¹⁸ To a discussion of these defects let us now pass.

The religious teaching as a whole is dogmatic, traditional, and uncritical, and thus in contrast with all other branches of school study. Luther's appeal to the Bible—his substitution of infallible book for infallible church—is the charter of the religious teaching. And although the Bible is the only declared source of authority, yet in practice the mantle of inspiration is stretched to cover catechism, and even hymns. No commoner question is heard than: "What does the Scripture say?" "What text can you give?" And hardly less frequent is: "Give a sentence from the catechism for this point." The whole general impression of actual class work is marked by this dogmatic and authoritative tone. The tales of the Old Testament, no matter how strongly discredited by current scholarship, are treated here as literally true records of actual events.

This impression is confirmed by the declarations of the authorities, by the form of the accepted schoolbooks, and in other ways.

¹⁸ For a discussion of the results of the religious instruction, see an article by the present writer in *Religious Education*, August, 1906.

In the work on German schools authorized by the government on the occasion of the St. Louis Exposition we read:

Religion, the most important of human affairs, demands, as does no other branch, constant reference to the sources, in this case the Bible. . . . Thus the seminary works, with the single exception of church history, entirely from the sources, the Scriptures. . . . Faith and morals must be built exclusively upon the Holy Scriptures.¹⁹

I have examined dozens of schoolbooks in actual use in Prussian schools, and have failed to find in any one of them a phrase which could be considered as casting any doubt on the most rigid theory of inspiration.

Thus for its subject-matter the religious instruction draws exclusively from the past, if we except a modicum of church knowledge and a few modern hymns. But this backward look is not merely with respect to the matter; it affects the question of methods also. Luther is quoted as the best authority on a point of modern school practice, by Falk, writing in 1873:

On the question, what parts of the catechism are essential for the instruction of the youth, no one can be better qualified to answer than Luther himself. . . . [Luther says] "the ordinary Christian, *who cannot read the Scriptures*, must be taught"²⁰

Thus Luther's judgment, though for such manifestly mediaeval conditions, is asserted to be the best authority for the present day. In another place appeal is made to the recommendations of school ordinances of 1528 and 1542, to determine the best practice for the religious instruction of the present.

The appeal, then, in the religious teaching is not to facts and the external truth of things, as in other studies, but to the record, chiefly and avowedly the Bible, and also, at least implicitly, to the catechism. This procedure is aided, or rather made possible, by the fact that in the vast majority of Prussian schools the pupils *ask no questions*; otherwise, we can hardly doubt that, in the older classes at least, wonder and doubt, and even out-and-out disbelief, would come to utterance. The question naturally arises: What about the teachers? Do they accept the traditions and teach them in full

¹⁹ Lexis, *Das Unterrichtswesen im Deutschen Reich* (Berlin, 1904), Vol. III, pp. 277 ff.

²⁰ The italics are ours.

faith? Far from it: the teachers of the higher schools are *Gebildete*, and as such in the large majority extremely liberal; many of them hold the Old Testament stories, or even the whole miraculous content of the Bible, as mythical. The teachers in the *Volksschulen* are rapidly moving in the same direction. Doubtless there are exceptions to this, even among the higher teachers, and more among the teachers in the common schools; but the rule and the tendency are generally admitted to be as above stated. The uniform orthodoxy of the teaching is simply the result of strict regulation and supervision; the authorities of church and state require such teaching, and the teacher is compelled to perform it.

We may add the testimony of a distinguished professor of theology, who has taken a prominent part in the discussion of the question—Baumgarten, of Kiel. He says:

The most extreme stress of conscience is endured by our best and most progressive teachers . . . it often happens that teachers who for themselves have renounced belief, not merely in a personal devil, but even in a personal God, must with all energy expound such phrases as "the power of the devil." Thus arises that cold-blooded, purely objective, desolating religious instruction which must be a bitter load even to the teacher himself. Similar is the case of the teaching of the miracles by teachers who are completely imbued with belief in the inviolability of natural law.²¹

In another place Baumgarten declares that the present situation violates the truth of scientific results, of the conscience of the person, whether teacher or pupil, and of the sense of reality.

In the home often, and, failing that, in the world at large, the ideas and sanctions of the school instruction in religion will be ruthlessly criticized and attacked. The household of the average social democrat or of the typical *Gebildeter* is likely to give but a chill reception at best to miracle and Bible myth when they are set forth as facts, or to the Apostle's Creed on any terms. No doubt in many cases the considerate parent may forbear, at least for the time, to controvert what he at heart disbelieves, in order to avoid confusion in the mind of his child. But even this is a questionable and only temporary procedure; it would be hard to prove any obligation on the father's part thus to abdicate his own duty of moral and religious

²¹*Neue Bahnen* (Tübingen), p. 19.

preception and allow his child to be trained in conceptions which he himself rejects.

And, supposing that the conflict between tradition and new thought is averted in the home, either as just suggested or because the home does still agree with the church and school, yet the time must soon come for testing; the world is no longer orthodox nor pious in the evangelical sense. No written word is its test of truth, and the Apostle's Creed is for the mass of men no longer in any sense an expression of actual personal belief.

Not only is the standard of truth held by the religious instruction opposed to the best thought of the times, but the type of spiritual experience which it embodies is impossible to the great majority of both teachers and pupils. We have seen that teacher and pupil are compelled to say they know and think things which they really doubt or reject; we shall see that they are also compelled to declare that they *feel* what they do not feel, and often have never felt.

The Bible, and to a somewhat less degree the catechism, come to us from a time in which the supernatural and the mystical formed an essential and fully accepted part of all religious experience; when a personal God and a personal devil, and angels and demons of all ranks, were as real as any visible thing. Moreover, both the biblical writings and the catechism, hymns, and prayers which are found in the religious lessons, embody the thoughts and experiences not of the average man but of the unusual or even extraordinary religious souls. It is clear that much will be found in this body of religious literature which the normal modern man cannot expect to find exemplified in his own experience. In part it has passed away with the age which produced it, and in part it is simply beyond his spiritual range. How foreign it must be to the inner life of the average child in school!

So varied and numerous are the forms of this evil that it is hard to select illustration or make any classification. The catechism is undoubtedly the chief source of offense; in it the imposition of a foreign experience is in its most extreme form—the confessions and declarations are all in the first person: the child constantly says, "I believe," "we ought," "I am in duty bound," "Christ hath redeemed me," and the like. How many teachers of religion in the schools have

experiences to correspond with the creed, and especially with Luther's "interpretation" of the second and third articles? As to the children, it is perhaps fortunate that they repeat words without thought, in such phrases as "me, a lost and damned creature," or, "on the last day, He will raise me up, with all the dead," and other like passages in the catechism. Men who lived in the midst of such tragedies as the Peasants' War, and such travesties of religion as the papacy of Luther's time, might well pray to be "taken out of this vale of tears to Christ in heaven;" nor does modern life, alas, always escape agony and despair; but to force even the verbal expression of such sad experience upon happy and normal children is unjustifiable and perilous.

Many of the hymns learned by heart, and recited and explained without end, are strongly pietistic, and bring the personal religious experience to the strongest expression. Here again there is no lack of material entirely suitable for school use; this needs no proof to anyone who has even a slight acquaintance with the German hymnology. But nearly all, even of the best hymns, need to be edited by omission at least, and many that are actually used are unfit. How many children, or even teachers, can feel in harmony with Gerhardt's outburst: "Where art thou, O sun? The night hath banished thee! It matters not; another sun, my Jesus, my joy, shines full brightly in my heart"? And in the eighth verse of the same hymn ("Nun ruhen alle Wälder") the intensity and unrestraint of the emotion rise to such a pitch that translation would become caricature:

Breit' aus die Flügel beide,
O Jesu, meine Freude,
Und nimm dein Küchlein ein.
Will Satan mich verschlingen,
So lass die Engel singen:
Dies Kind soll unverletzt sein.

And this verse must be explained by *teacher and pupil*, memorized, and many times recited; and all as a part of an ideal religious experience. Paul Gerhardt's hymns are generally permeated with this intense personal tone, and they are the favorites for school use.

The chief elements of this foreign experience may be summed

up under four heads: *conscious personal love of God and Jesus and communion with them; faith in divine aid and guidance in one's own life; consciousness of sin; and longing for heaven.* The religious instruction in all its branches abounds with these ideas, expressed, not as general possibilities of human experience, which would be comparatively innocent, but embodied in declarations of personal testimony—not as objectively conceived, but as felt and known in the soul of the speaker. And these intimate personal expressions are forced upon the lips of those to whom the corresponding inner events are unknown, and in many cases actually impossible. The last two of these types of experience are the most foreign to the child, and deserve special attention.

Jesus made childhood the type of the kingdom of heaven; the Lutheran catechism in the Evangelical school makes the child call himself “a lost and damned creature,” needing to be redeemed by blood and suffering, from sin, death, and that favorite concept of the catechism, the power of the devil. The gentle and beloved Gerhardt drives home the sense of guilt and debt in his grand version of Bernard’s hymn, “O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden;” the agony and shame of the cross “is all my burden, the desert of my guilt, borne by the innocent Jesus.”

We need not fall into the absurdity of declaring that the child is sin-free, “pure as an angel in heaven”—a doctrine which has not entirely lacked advocates. Every normal child, at least, commits faults not a few, and should upon occasion be made aware of them, and that with all needful force; and this can be effected without doing violence to his nature, and on the basis of ideas and feelings really his own. But to say, and to make him say, that he is essentially and exclusively a sinner, blackening the name still more by joining with it words which to the child are profane echoes of the street—this is a totally different and quite unjustifiable procedure. As Baumgarten indignantly writes:

The pupils are defenseless, the prey of the instructor. . . . The lessons put answers into the mouths of the children which do not come from their own sense and understanding. . . . By skillful interrogation consciousness of sin, despair on account of sin, are catechized into the child-mind and out again.

“Love not the world nor the things of the world. If anyone

love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." What can this mean to a twelve-year-old boy, full of life and spirits, rejoicing in every breath he draws, just as God meant him to, as we must believe? And why should the clear and valid cry of the prayer, "Deliver us from evil," require a declaration that this world is a vale of tears? The child who could really feel in his heart what he repeats with his lips, "If I have Thee, I will not desire heaven or earth," would have little hope of fulfilling his true destiny either here or hereafter.

Here again Paul Gerhardt, with all his charm and sweetness, is one of the chief offenders—or at least is made so by the use of his hymns indiscriminately for all ages. One of his best-known hymns, often heard in the school, "Wie soll ich dich empfangen?" contains all the forms of unchildlike religious sentiment; sin, contrition, world-weariness, longing for heaven; and ends with a passionate cry: "Come, ah come, O Sun of Righteousness, and take us, one and all, to the eternal light and rapture of thy mansion of joy!"

It would be easy to multiply illustrations of this element in the religious instruction; but hardly necessary, since it is simply the reflection of a powerful current familiar to all who study either present or past Christianity—a current coming more from Paul, asceticism, and pietism than from the Founder of Christianity. That no child and comparatively few adults in this age can sympathize with this expression, in any such extreme form, hardly needs to be stated.

What is the ground of the defects which we have pointed out in the religious instruction? The one central cause is the fact that the form and substance of the instruction have been determined by the church, with only the slightest influence of the school as such. This fact is writ large in the history of the German school, higher as well as lower, though more prominent in the *Volksschule*. It is constantly referred to in current educational discussion.

The Evangelical church in Germany, perhaps neither more nor less than churches in general, is bending its chief energies upon the defense and nurture of the faith which it holds to have been delivered to the Fathers; and its most effective and available organ for this task is the school. Hence the stress upon catechism, hymns, the Bible, as the norm of morals and religion, and upon church history;

hence the bitter opposition to the non-confessional school advocated by so many educational leaders; hence the tenacious hold upon the clerical inspection of schools, which the trend of affairs is slowly but inevitably abolishing; hence, too, the jealous insistence upon orthodoxy in the religious views of teachers who impart the religious lessons. The main elements of this clerical control are these: First the whole educational system, from primary school to university, including the normal schools in which all teachers must be trained (for the *Volksschulen*), is under the control of a ministry which also administers ecclesiastical affairs. We may be sure, then, that there is no lack of clerical representation in the supreme educational authority. Secondly, a very large portion of the inspection is still in the hands of the clergy. For example, out of 1,243 circuit inspectors, 873 are pastors in office; and no doubt many of the others have had more or less theological training, and some have taken orders, but are not in actual incumbency. Then the religious instruction is in all cases open to the inspection of the local clergyman at his pleasure; he may report to the higher boards any criticism he sees fit to make on the teaching. Thirdly, all textbooks for religious instruction must be approved by an ecclesiastical board even before being submitted to the ministry. It is easy to see how this affects not merely the introduction of textbooks, but also their very production: the writers of religious textbooks cannot be oblivious to the churchly censorship to which the future book must be submitted before it can even enter on its mission in the actual work of the school. Fourthly, the seminaries in which the *Volksschule* teachers are trained are strongly churchly in their whole tone and tendency. Reukauf says: "Most of the seminary directors are essentially theologians." The future teacher lives in the seminary as a home for three years, and is subject to far deeper impression than any mere instruction could produce.

These elements are merely some of the more important external and official holds of the church; the vital fact is that the church is so great a power with the government as a whole through political circumstances. The phrase "throne and altar" is frequently heard as indicating the spirit and aim of the present government. How much influence in the school and the religious instruction is to be

assigned to political considerations would be hard to estimate, and lies beyond the limits of our discussion; but there is good reason to suspect that not a little zeal ostensibly for Christ and the church might, if thoroughly analyzed, turn out to be devotion to the existing political order. Many would be inclined to echo the proverb of the mediaeval peasants: "The pastor bridles us for the nobleman to ride."

The teachers and lay authorities in the schools in general view this condition with strong disapproval, and, at least outside of Prussia, outspoken complaint. Thrändorf says: "The clergy are bent upon developing fanatical devotion to confessional dogmas, rather than genuine moral character." Lietz complains of "antiquated and unscientific dogma, through which wider and wider circles of the people are being estranged from religion." Reukauf declares that "the school must be emancipated from the oppression of the church and the bureaucracy." Dörpfeld complains that the church compels the school to do the menial work, as it were, the mere memorizing, for the later confirmation instruction. These are manifestations of a deep and far-reaching feeling among the teachers.

The foregoing description and estimates are the fruit of thorough personal observation of the religious instruction and of extensive study of the literature relating to it. If we should add one word to express the chief impression resulting from the whole study and the reflection upon it, it would be this: The ground of most of the failures and defects of the German religious instruction is the effort to make it bolster up a formal creed and an ecclesiastical establishment which are no longer in accord with the best thought and work of the time. And we believe, with Professor Rein, that any such attempt is foredoomed to failure, and bids fair to carry down with it the whole body of the religious instruction. We believe there are abundant lessons in the German situation for us in America, both those of us who are entirely satisfied with our present condition and those who deplore the absence of religious teaching from the school.

PAUL'S HISTORICAL RELATION TO THE FIRST DISCIPLES

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Did Paul develop his gospel quite independently of the earthly Jesus? At present this is one of the unsolved problems in New Testament study, and it is of special interest alike to the historical critic, the preacher, and the thoughtful layman. If, as is often held,¹ Paul is not influenced by the earthly life and teaching of Jesus, nor by the tradition of the primitive community, then he may be practically a second founder of Christianity; and possibly the title of our faith is a misnomer—perhaps it should be Paulianity, not Christianity. At least it is the heavenly Christ of Paul rather than the earthly Jesus of Palestine that has dominated the religious thought of the past; and although Paul may be a master-interpreter of his Master, the value of his interpretative work is conditioned historically upon his accuracy in transmitting the tradition that passed through the hands of the first disciples. But if it is his own heavenly Christ only that he interprets, then there is no assurance that his opinions are an exposition of the gospel of Jesus.

In this inquiry the first step—and the only one the present discussion will take—is to ascertain whether the historical circumstances permit a contact between Paul and the pre-Pauline Christians by which the former may have been informed and probably influenced by the latter.

We are, however, at once confronted with Paul's emphatic denial of subordination to any authority save that of Jesus Christ. He did not derive his gospel from a human source, nor was it received by him through the medium of human communication.² He did not obtain from men his authority to preach,³ and he is "not a whit behind the very chiefest apostles."⁴ Are these assertions intended

¹ This view has been advocated, with varying degrees of rigidity, by Pfleiderer, McGiffert, Brückner, and several others.

² Gal. 1:11 f.; II Cor. 10:8; 13:10.

³ Gal. 1:1; 2:8; I Cor. 1:1; 9:1; Rom. 1:1.

⁴ II Cor. 11:5.

to be so sweeping as to render futile any attempt to trace elements of his theology to primitive Christianity?

It might be urged that the revelation received at the time of his conversion furnished him with both apostolic authority and a full equipment of doctrines and facts independently of the early Christians. But a careful study of Paul does not prove that he ever made this claim. No doubt he believed in the external reality of his vision experience,⁵ but nowhere does he explicitly state that Christ gave him a definite verbal call. It is not strange that tradition should have put the express words into Christ's mouth commissioning him with the apostleship to the gentiles,⁶ for this was the distinctive work performed by Paul. But, even in this, tradition is not uniform. At one time it is Ananias, to whom the fact is communicated, who fails to pass it on to Paul;⁷ and again it is in a trance in Jerusalem that Paul receives the announcement⁸ supplementing the less definite statement already made by Ananias.⁹ It is true that he never wavers in the confidence of his true apostleship, and he regards his vision as a distinct call to the discharge of that office; yet he does not claim his apostolic authority from any word of commission spoken by Christ at the time of the revelation. It was, indeed, Christ who sent him to preach;¹⁰ not, however, by any formal fiat, but by granting him a special spiritual equipment in the revelation of grace. It is not so much the command to do the work of an apostle as it is the spirit and power of an apostle which Paul brings from the scene of his vision.¹¹ Inspiration rather than installation was the gift of that crucial moment in his life, and thus was he energized¹² for the work of an apostle and made a "steward of the grace of God," having attained to an understanding of the mystery in Christ.¹³ Thus he derived his apostolic authority from the general content of his great revelation, and not from any specific communication therein. For a Jew the

⁵ I Cor. 9:1; 15:8; II Cor. 4:6; cf. Acts 9:3 ff.; 22:6 ff.; 26:12 ff.; also 7:55; Rev. 1:13-16.

⁶ Acts 26:17.

⁸ Acts 22:21.

⁷ Acts 9:15, 17.

⁹ Acts 22:15

¹⁰ I Cor. 1:17.

¹¹ Gal. 1:15; 2:7, 9; I Cor. 4:20; 9:1, 2; II Cor. 10:8; 12:12; Eph. 3:7 f.; I Thes. 1:6b.

¹² *ἐνδυνάμην*, Gal. 2:8.

¹³ Eph. 3:2 f.; Rom. 16:25.

outcome of history and the intention of God agree; so Paul naturally brought his call into line with the divine will,¹⁴ but this did not invalidate its spiritual content. Similarly other Christians are objects of divine selection.¹⁵ Certainly Paul's testimony concerning his call to apostleship does not exclude the possibility that elements of his theology may have been derived from the early Christians.

Nor, in view of the real meaning of his "revelation of Jesus Christ," are his statements of the independence of his gospel so absolute as they at first appear. Of course, we cannot say that, because he acknowledges his gospel to have been substantially the same as that of the original Christians,¹⁶ therefore it is secondary to theirs; nor does it follow as a logical necessity that it must have been revealed to him in its entirety, in the sense of a fully developed system of truth and doctrine, at the time of his conversion. Since he emphatically states that his gospel was received by revelation, what became central in his preaching will disclose the vital content of that revelation. That was the truth of the manifestation of the glorified Jesus, the new spiritual man, by faith in whom all men became new.¹⁷ This was the essence of Paul's gospel, and it must therefore be affirmed that his vision was not primarily concerned with a narrative of historical incidents in the life of Christ, or with matters of indoctrination.

Nevertheless, there are references to the "Lord" as his source of information in regard to certain matters of history and Christian practice.¹⁸ Does he mean that direct revelation is his only source of authority for these things? Apart from the difficulty of conceiving that the "revelation of Jesus Christ" could have been concerned with rules for conduct, details of ritual, or even the disclosure of historical events, is the lack of certainty in Paul's language. On a matter of so much worth to his claims to speak with authority he surely would have expressed himself definitely. But such is not the case, except when he speaks of the initial experience in his career. It is a perfectly legitimate interpretation of his language at other

¹⁴ Gal. 1:15 f.; II Cor. 1:1; Eph. 1:1; Col. 1:1.

¹⁵ Rom. 1:6 f.; 8:28; I Cor. 1:2, 24; 12:28; Eph. 4:11.

¹⁶ Gal. 2:6 f.

¹⁷ Gal. 6:15; Eph. 2:15; 4:24; Col. 3:10; Rom. 6:4; II Cor. 5:17.

¹⁸ I Cor. 7:10, 12, 25; 9:14; 11:23; I Thess. 4:15.

times to infer that through the first disciples he traces his authority to Jesus.¹⁹

But may not these things have been revealed to him at some subsequent time? "Visions and revelations of the Lord" were his frequent privilege,²⁰ but they can have no additional significance for the roots of his doctrine or the content of his teaching. He never refers to more than one "revelation of Jesus Christ," and his interpretation of that left no room for any additional visions of a different nature. By it Paul became one who lived "in Christ"—that is, a "spiritual" man²¹—and lived in the sphere of a continually possible revelation. The spirit of Christ abode with him,²² and the will of Christ was revealed to him constantly.²³ But, while these later visions may have been decisive influences in determining his actions²⁴ or his personal convictions,²⁵ he does not claim for them any miraculous disclosure of historic facts, nor does he make them the basis of any doctrinal distinctions between himself and the others, much less an authority in matters of ritual or a source for rules of conduct. That which was characteristic of his first revelation was characteristic of them all: they gave spiritual insight and power. The heavenly Jesus continued to be the source of inspiration—but not *verbal* inspiration. Tertullian, arguing that Paul's gospel is not essentially different from that preached by Peter and the rest, says:

Although Paul was carried away even to the third heaven and was caught up to paradise, and heard certain revelations there, yet these cannot possibly seem to have qualified him for teaching another doctrine, seeing that their very nature was such as to render them communicable to no human being.²⁶

Tertullian is right at least in concluding that these experiences in Paul's life had no molding effect on his gospel.

Furthermore, the apostle's whole conception of revelation is in line with this more general interpretation of its content. It does not belong to him alone; all who are in Christ may be so directed.²⁷

¹⁹ See citations of note 18; also I Cor. 15:3.

²⁰ II Cor. 12:1-7.

²¹ I Cor. 12:4 ff.; II Cor. 1:22; 3:14-18; Rom. 9:1.

²² Rom. 8:9, 16.

²³ I Cor. 2:10-16; Rom. 11:34.

²⁵ Rom. 14:14; Phil. 2:19.

²⁴ Gal. 2:2.

²⁶ *De praescriptione*, chap. 24.

²⁷ I Cor. 1:7; Eph. 1:17; Phil. 3:15; cf. Rom. 16:25.

The chief apostles are also subject to the revealing spirit,²⁸ and under its influence the Christian prophets speak.²⁹ The same power that convinced him of the truth wrought in others a like understanding based upon the witness of the spirit. And, finally, when he sets his own vision side by side with the first vision which others had of the risen Lord,³⁰ he leaves us no certain ground for making it mean other than the manifestation of Christ as the new spiritual power in the new creation.

Thus there is nothing in Paul's assertions of his independence, or in that which he discloses to us of the content of his revelation, to prevent the supposition that he may have received from the early Christians the foundations of his doctrines. Indeed, he may have taken more from them than he himself realized. During the first seventeen (or fourteen) years of his Christian life he could have had no motive for avoiding their beliefs, or for distinguishing in his own mind between original and received. The touch of the master-hand, Jesus Christ, who wrought the warp and woof of his Christianity into one complete whole, was for him the supreme consciousness; and the elements involved, whether contributed by himself or by others, were all so subordinated to the thought of Christ who wrought in him as to render distinctions between primary and secondary, original and received, of little moment. It should be observed, however, that while his vision was not primarily doctrinal in its content, yet it was essential to all his doctrine. Without it there could have been no apostle Paul and no Paulinism. It gave him the power by which he preached, whether an old truth or a new. But through it all he was not concerned to evolve theology; his aim was to preach "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God."

Even if the independence which Paul claims both for his gospel and for his apostleship does not exclude the possibility of a relationship between him and the first believers, it cannot therefore be immediately assumed that the chief sources of his theology lie in primitive Christianity. It is still a question whether the constituent elements of Paulinism, in its initial stages, permit the supposition of any close contact with the thought of the early community. No one can doubt

²⁸ Eph. 3:5; cf. Gal. 2:9.

³⁰ I Cor. 15:5-8.

²⁹ I Cor. 14:6, 26, 30.

that Paul's Christian theology begins with his experience on the way to Damascus, but there are differences of opinion concerning the elements involved and the development of his thought subsequent to the event. Perhaps his theology is simply the result of deductions made independently of the other Christians in the days immediately following his conversion. Or it may be that the heritage he brought over from Judaism became the chief source of Paulinism; and it also is not impossible that his acquaintance with Hellenistic culture—with Philo or the Stoics—may have been an element largely influential. Or he may have had access to written sources of information that made a direct appeal to the primitive Christians unnecessary. We must ask whether any of these elements is so prominent in Paul's thought from the very first as to make it improbable that there was an important historical relation between him and the first disciples by which the latter may have contributed to Paulinism.

Perhaps

it may be fairly assumed that it was in Arabia that Paul thought out his gospel, and that in his Epistle to the Galatians he mentions his visit thither, just because it was there, in communion with himself and with his God, and not at the feet of the apostles in Jerusalem, that he learned his message and received his equipment as a preacher of the gospel of Christ.³¹

As yet he could have had no motive for conscious avoidance of the Palestinian Christians; so his failure to make an immediate visit to Jerusalem, indicating that he felt no necessity for going to the primitive apostles to learn about Christ, may be taken as further proof of his complete originality.

But, reasoning thus, there is danger of reading too much into Paul's conversion experience and utterly ignoring the significance of his contact with the Damascene Christians. Unfortunately we are not informed of the size or constituency of the Christian community which Paul there found, but what we know of his later tendencies would lead us to expect Paul the persecutor to strike at the most important point. At this time Damascus may have been a Christian center of some consequence. Here and in Arabia Paul spent the next three years. It is useless to speculate upon the question of how long he was in Arabia, or what he did there. So far as facts upon

³¹ McGiffert, *Apostolic Age*, p. 161.

which to rest an opinion are concerned, one might say that he there thought out his whole theology, or that he remained just long enough to rest his nerves—the one supposition is as groundless as the other may be absurd. There are not even probabilities with which to start a hypothesis. Nor is there definite information available in regard to his life at Damascus; but he certainly must have associated with the Christians. Moreover, it is probable they were of the Hellenistic type³²—a circumstance which explains why he was so vigorous in his action against them. He knew he had left the leaders of the community in Jerusalem unmolested,³³ but toward them he had no special animosity. An earlier persecution of the Judeans had been by the Sadducees, not on religious but on political grounds; but the disciples in Jerusalem did not publicly break with Judaism,³⁴ consequently they did not incur any special displeasure of the Pharisees. Though they may have been constant opponents of Jesus, probably it was his attitude toward legalism, and not his messianic claims, that most aroused their antagonism. His death ended their active opposition, which was not again awakened until believers of Stephen's type began to emancipate Christianity from Judaism. This was the cause of the Pharisean persecution into which Paul threw himself so energetically, and this also explains his action in leaving the apostles at peace in Jerusalem while he directed his attack against those in Damascus. Against them his indignation burned the more exceedingly because they were not zealous for the traditions of the fathers. One could not expect to trace Paul's anti-legalistic attitude to ideas received from his associations in Damascus, but it may there have been unconsciously cherished by congenial surroundings. The difference between the Hellenistic Christians and those of Jerusalem was not, however, a matter of dispute at this time; so his action in casting in his lot with the Hellenists cannot have been influenced by any conscious avoidance of Jerusalem, so far as the Christians there were concerned. It is rather because those at Damascus are quite able to instruct him in the new life that he feels no immediate need to visit the primitive community. Perhaps also he did not care to encounter, on their own ground, the hostility of those whose ranks he had so recently

³² Cf. Acts 6:1; 7:51-53; 8:1, 4.

³³ Gal. 1:17a.

³⁴ Acts 3:1.

openly deserted. But that he did acknowledge the Jerusalem Christians to be the custodians of tradition appears from his visit paid Peter for the purpose of obtaining information,³⁵ and his action in submitting the questions of dispute in the great controversy with the legalists to the Jerusalem council. Of course, he does not look to the first apostles as his superiors in point of authority, but he treats them as his peers, and, so far as his own relation to primitive tradition is concerned, he is fully aware of his inferiority.³⁶

Nor is Paul's attitude to the law so radical that we must suppose him to have been particularly conscious from the very first of vital disagreement with the others. Certainly after his conversion he never trusted the law as a factor in salvation; neither did Peter;³⁷ but Paul does not despise the law—it is its perverted use which he so severely denounces; but the law as a factor in Jewish thought was probably a secondary matter with all the Christians. There is nothing to lead us to infer that Paul, previous to his first Galatian visit, felt any element of discord between himself and the other Christians, particularly in Damascus and the regions of Syria and Cilicia.

Moreover, the great controversy itself was not a question of principle, but of practice. As such it must have been the outgrowth of subsequent events, and is not to be considered a formative factor in determining Paul's attitude to the Jerusalem church. From the beginning of his new life he was conscious of his call to be a gentile missionary, but it is arbitrary to attribute this feeling to any estrangement, prompted by his anti-legalistic views, between himself and the Jewish Christians. The break with them was a consequence and not a cause of his missionary activity. The peculiar motive which led him to evangelize the heathen was his unique emphasis upon salvation by grace. In this respect he and the others were one in principle, but he carried out the logical inferences of the truth more consistently than they did, making it universal in its application to individuals. Eventually this would lead, in the order of cause and effect, to collision with the practice of Jewish particularism; but as Paul took up the task of evangelizing the world, he manifests no evident consciousness of being at variance with his fellow-believers in

³⁵ *ἰστορήσαι Κηφᾶν*, "to hear Peter's story," Gal. 1:18.

³⁶ I Cor. 15:3-10.

³⁷ Gal. 2:15 f.

Jerusalem or elsewhere. Not until they attempt to limit his vision to their narrow horizon does discord appear.

There are some who hold the chief source of Paul's theology to be Jewish thought prepossessions recast under the influence of his conversion experience. Wrede³⁸—to cite a single representative of the view—would reckon the primitive Christians of no importance as a source for Paul's theology, and while they may have been a new element in his thought after conversion, this soon disappeared before the preponderance of his Jewish thought. Between them and him there was a great gulf fixed. First, their horizons were entirely different. To them Christ was merely a Jewish Messiah, but to Paul he was a world-redeemer; so faith in him was for Paul more than a form of Jewish religion—it was a new religion. Secondly, not only did the man Jesus mean much more to them than to Paul, but with him the source and nature of Christ became heavenly. Thirdly, there arose from this an essentially new interpretation of Christ's death; it became a peculiar mystery of world-salvation.

There is truth in this representation of Paul's distinctiveness, but possibly there is error in the emphasis put upon it. For example, it may be very true that his horizon differs from that of the early community. It is not, however, a difference in location, but in range of vision—he sees what they see and more. To him Christ was both a Jewish Messiah and a world-redeemer; so he does not exclude the earlier views, but extends them to a wider sphere. The primitive Christians had already exalted the earthly Jesus to a heavenly place, and Paul extended the idea to make Jesus come from heaven, if indeed this may not have been done by some before Paul's day. The step from belief in present heavenly exaltation to belief in pre-existence is not a great one for a Jew to take.

And to emphasize Paul's deficient knowledge of the earthly Jesus is also apt to prove misleading. He testifies that as a Jew he was a traditionalist,³⁹ and when he became a Christian he retained the same attitude, but changed the subject-matter of the tradition.⁴⁰ As already observed, he sometimes refers to words or deeds of Jesus, the

³⁸ *Paulus*, in *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher* (1905).

³⁹ Gal. 1:14.

⁴⁰ I Cor. 11:2, 16; II Thess. 2:15; 3:6; Col. 2:8 f.

implication being that the first disciples were his source of information. And his acquaintance with the earthly life and teaching of Jesus is more extensive than has sometimes been recognized. For example, he knew that Jesus had lived a sinless life in comparative worldly poverty;⁴¹ he was acquainted with his family connection and the naturalness of his earthly life;⁴² of Jesus' lowliness and self-sacrifice he had also heard;⁴³ he seems to have known of Peter's confession;⁴⁴ he was imbued with Jesus' thought of God's fatherhood and man's sonship;⁴⁵ he could speak of the "twelve" in a natural way;⁴⁶ and he was thoroughly aware of Jesus' crucifixion and resurrection.⁴⁷ Of course, this is only general information;⁴⁸ but there was never any occasion for Paul to write a detailed life of Jesus, even had he been able to do so. That he did not appeal to Jesus' free attitude toward legalism in his own controversy with the Judaizers is not positive evidence, as Wrede seems to think (p. 92), that he was ignorant of the fact. The nature of the dispute excludes the possibility of any such appeal. Jesus' antilegalism was essentially an emphasis of inner righteousness against mere ceremonial purity, and he had made no pronouncement upon the issue of Paul's day. Even if Paul could have said, "Jesus set aside the law in many details; he even ate with publicans and sinners," it would not have been worth mentioning in view of the fact that both Paul and his opponents knew Jesus had been subject to the ordinances of Moses in general. The real precedent of Jesus on the question in debate was against Paul; so the latter could not cite Jesus in this connection without suggesting to his opponents a sharp counter-argument; nevertheless, he may have been conscious that he was carrying out a line of conduct in harmony with

⁴¹ II Cor. 5:21; 8:9; Phil. 2:5 ff.; cf. Matt. 8:20.

⁴² Gal. 1:19; 4:4; Rom. 1:3; 9:5.

⁴³ Rom. 15:3; II Cor. 10:1; cf. Matt. 11:29.

⁴⁴ Gal. 2:8; cf. Mark 8:27 ff.

⁴⁵ Cf. Rom. 8:15-17; Gal. 4:4-7.

⁴⁶ I Cor. 15:3.

⁴⁷ I Cor. 15:20; Gal. 2:20; etc.

⁴⁸ The topic will be found, treated more exhaustively, in H. J. Holtzmann, "Zum Thema: Jesus und Paulus," *Protestantische Monatshefte* (1900), pp. 463 ff.; Drescher, *Das Leben Jesu bei Paulus* (1900); Feine, *Jesus Christus und Paulus* (1902); Goguel, *L'Apôtre Paul et Jésus Christ* (1904); Knowling, *The Testimony of St. Paul to Christ* (1905).

the true spirit of Jesus.⁴⁹ At all events, we need not suppose Paul's practical polemic against Judaism to be entirely uninfluenced by Jesus' moral polemic, for if we do not find an ethical criticism of the law in Paul, neither do we find an occasion demanding it. Moreover, the first believers' attitude toward the law is essentially Paul's, only he carries out the natural inferences of their common attitude with more logical severity.

Nor can we be sure that Paul's interpretation of Jesus' death is essentially new. Of I Cor. 15:3 Wrede says: "That Paul received from tradition the 'died for our sins' is warranted only on a very literal interpretation of his words" (p. 112). It is difficult to see why this statement should not be taken as literally as those that follow. Why Jesus died, when he arose, and the account of his post-resurrection appearances are all matters upon which Paul had received information, and from what source more naturally than from the primitive Christians! On this point the circumstances of his conversion give additional evidence. It would be difficult to think his Jewish theology could furnish him with the idea of a Messiah who was to die, crucified by the Romans at the instigation of the Jews; and yet it is the cross in which Paul boasts. His problem had always been how to effect deliverance from sin. He had tried the law without success;⁵⁰ but now he boasted in the cross, for that told the story of Jesus' death for our sins. Once he preached a sermon in which he did not make this the central truth of his message, but he seems afterward to have regretted it.⁵¹ Now, how came Paul to make this connection between Jesus' death and the forgiveness of sins? Doubtless the decisive moment came while he was on his way to Damascus; but was this truth shot into him from the heavens, or was he already in some degree prepared for it by what he had formerly seen and heard, the elements being already present which were fused into one glowing mass by the appearance of Jesus Christ whose light was more brilliant than the noonday sun? We have already seen that it was a vision of the glorified Jesus rather than any truth about him that he claimed for

⁴⁹ With Matt. 22:37-40; Luke 10:28 cf. Gal. 5:14; and with Matt. 7:12; Luke 6:31 cf. Gal. 6:2.

⁵⁰ Rom. 7:14-8:11; Phil. 3:4-11.

⁵¹ Acts, chap. 17; I Cor. 2:1 f.

the content of his revelation, and some hint that Jesus' death had a relation to man's deliverance from sin is one of the natural presuppositions necessary to explain Paul's condition of mind at this time. He was struggling for righteousness under the law, and was dissatisfied with the result; but the heretics were proclaiming a salvation through faith in Jesus who had died for man's sin, and Paul had seen them meet death bold in this confidence.⁵² In the face of his defeat they were boldly triumphant. They surely had just the truth he needed to put his soul at peace—if *indeed it were a truth*. But all his doubts were dissolved by his vision experience, and the difficulty of believing in a dead Messiah was removed by a revelation of the fact that Christ was still alive. Thus the adequacy and fulness of the primitive Christians' faith in Jesus as the deliverer from sin took possession of his soul. This is the link between him and Jesus that renders the mystery of his conversion explicable, and this alone seems to supply the initial step by which Paul could come to connect the idea of deliverance with the crucified Jesus. Nor can we suppose that he may have done so by bringing Jesus into comparison with the suffering servant of Isaiah, just as the others did. To this there are two insuperable objections. In the first place, there is no sufficient motive to lead Paul to wish to explain Jesus' death, while the first disciples had the strongest reasons for seeking some satisfactory defense of the disastrous event, even if Jesus himself had not already suggested the solution which they finally effected. But for Paul the persecutor Christianity was not a cause worthy of justification, but an impious heresy deserving severest opposition. And, secondly, the Isaian idea of the suffering servant never appealed to Paul as an adequate proof of the great truth that "Jesus gave himself for our sins." He adopted from the others this central truth, but not the characteristic argument by which they defended it, if we are to credit at all the testimony of Acts and I Peter. Though Paul did not use the Isaian prophecy as a proof-text, he did accept the thesis: "Jesus died for our sins according to the Scriptures."

It is unfortunate to lose sight of this fundamental dependence of Paul upon the first believers' faith. With this starting-point it is easy to see how he would expand the idea to meet the peculiarities

⁵² Cf. Acts 6:15; 7:55 f., 60.

of his thought; but the original kernel of truth is never lost, nor is it materially obscured by excrescences. Even the Pauline conception of Christ's work as the culmination of a peculiar mystery of world-salvation, whether its ultimate source be Jewish or heathen, is but an extension of the central truth which he had made his own at the beginning of his Christian career. And if faith in a pre-existent Messiah, heavenly in nature, becoming man, dying and rising again, is for Paul "the sum-total of religion, the connecting beam in the erection of his piety without which it would collapse" (Wrede, p. 94), still the foundation-stone upon which the whole superstructure rests is the original truth, "Christ gave himself for our sins."⁵³

Paul's indebtedness to Hellenism has often been emphasized. His theology is so comprehensive that there have been found in it traces of Alexandrian culture, acquaintance with Stoic philosophy similar even to that of his Roman contemporary, Seneca,⁵⁴ and no small element taken from Greek mystery religion. But how small hold these things had upon Paul before his conversion! It may have been a Stoic interpretation which he put upon the tenth commandment as he read it in the Greek Bible,⁵⁵ but he certainly did not look for the solution of his problem in the current philosophies. Though a Hellenist by birth, or at least by early training, he was a true Pharisee at heart for whom the *summum bonum* in the religious sphere was the observance of the law, just as any Jew of like seriousness, unacquainted with a single tenet of Hellenism, would have believed. The truth that brought relief to his situation was the supremacy of grace over works, and in this he occupied common ground with the older Christians. But this truth was comprehensive, and capable of being cast into different molds according to the needs of those to whom it was preached. Paul's previous circumstances and training had made him thoroughly aware of the conditions of his time; so the resemblances between Stoic philosophy and some phases of his teaching may mean no more than that he sought to present his truth in a garb attractive to those "before whose eyes Jesus Christ was openly set forth crucified." The foreign elements are not the kernel,

⁵³ Rom. 4:25; 5:6, 8; 8:32; Gal. 1:4.

⁵⁴ Cf. Pfleiderer, *Urchristentum* (2. Aufl., 1902), Vol. I, pp. 29 ff.

⁵⁵ *ὁκτὸν ἐνδεκάλογον*. Cf. Bacon, *St. Paul*, pp. 60 ff.

but the husk, of his theology, and belong to the period of later elaboration. They certainly are not so pre-eminently present in the early period of his Christian career as to isolate him from the common Jewish Christianity of his own day.

According to Resch,⁵⁶ there is a rather close relation between Paul and Jesus brought about by the Hebrew Logia, a copy of which Paul received soon after his conversion and studied during his retirement in Arabia. This made so profound an impression upon him that it alone is to be reckoned the chief source of Paulinism, and even the original community is but a *Nebenquelle* beside it. Under these circumstances the relation of Paul to the first believers would at best be remote, and for purposes of historical certainty scarcely worth mentioning. But the conclusions of Resch, because of the uncertain character of his data, do not seem to be winning approval.⁵⁷ An argument based upon the verbal likenesses between Paul's letters and the so-called Logia is liable to a double weakness. In the first place, many think it quite impossible to ascertain the exact contents of the lost logia, nor are they so certain as Resch that its language was Hebrew and not Aramaic; and, secondly, it must be remembered that the gospel-writers and Paul used the same tongue and moved in the same sphere of thought, and so only the strongest kind of verbal resemblance could warrant the theory of a common literary source. After all, Paul's contact with the Christian community may be the real *Hauptquelle* that best explains the significant data which this author has so carefully collected.

Finally, what can be said positively of Paul's relation to the early Christians? It has been maintained that he came into personal contact with the earthly Jesus. He says: "Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?"⁵⁸ and, "though we have known Christ after the flesh;"⁵⁹ but for purposes of accuracy these passages are not valuable. In the first it is more than probable that Paul refers to his conversion experience, and in the second he may be speaking of the general knowl-

⁵⁶ *Der Paulinismus und die Logia Jesu* (1904).

⁵⁷ For samples of thorough yet unfavorable notices of Resch's work, see Vischer in *Theologische Rundschau*, April and May, 1905, and Lake in *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1906.

⁵⁸ I Cor. 9:1.

⁵⁹ II Cor. 5:16.

edge of Jesus' earthly life commonly possessed by all Christians. This is the natural inference if the plural number includes the Corinthians, and it is also implied by the context, "he died for *all*," "if *any man* is in Christ he is a new creature."

But Paul's relation to the early Christians finds a positive basis in the indisputable historical touching-points between him and them. These facts are attested by Paul himself, and therefore ought to have great weight, especially when it is remembered that at the time he recorded these things his dependence upon the primitive church was the constant challenge of his enemies—a dependence which his opponents identified with inferiority.

1. The first point of contact occurred in his pre-Christian career. He informs us that at one time he had vigorously persecuted the Christians, and we must believe he was sufficiently acquainted with the tenets of their faith to have had a basis for his action.⁶⁰ But still more may he have been influenced by what he saw. Doubtless the first disciples heeded the warning of their Master, "by their fruits ye shall know them," and thus their conduct as well as their confession bore witness to their faith. Speaking of Jesus' influence in this formative period, Wellhausen says:

He continued to live, not only in the dogma, but also in the ethics of his community, and their pious life in imitation of him had perhaps even more attracting power than the preaching about the crucified and risen one. Before this one appeared to him at Damascus Paul had, no doubt from the impression which the persecuted Christians made upon him, already in his heart the goad against which he was vainly trying to kick.⁶¹

And ever after as a Christian he emulates their example in the conduct of both personal and social life. There is good reason to believe that this first period of contact with the early Christians imprinted itself vividly on Paul's mind.

2. Next came his stay at Damascus. Apart from attesting the fact of his presence there for a period of unknown duration⁶²—and possibly on two occasions⁶³—Paul has told nothing, but that he came into friendly association with those Christians whom it had been his

⁶⁰ I Cor. 15:9; Gal. 1:13 f. Cf. Acts 7:58; 8:1, 3; 9:1; 22:4 f., 20; 26:9-12.

⁶¹ *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien* (1905), p. 114.

⁶² Gal. 1:17.

⁶³ II Cor. 11:32 f.

intention to persecute can scarcely be doubted. This, as has already been noted, may have been an important source from which he would feel the influence of early Christian life and thought.

3. Then came his first visit to Jerusalem.⁶⁴ Seemingly not satisfied with what he had already learned, he visited Palestine to hear Peter's story and tarried there two weeks. It chanced that the majority of the original apostles were absent at the time, but their leading representative, Peter, was present and received the visitor. For them these few days of close and undisturbed association could have had but one all-absorbing theme: the Messiah who had called Peter from his fisher's boat and had miraculously appeared to Paul on the Damascus road. Around him their life-work had now come to revolve, and in what related to him must their common interest now have centered. This period, spent by one who would be most eager to learn with one who was most competent to teach, cannot be regarded with indifference in estimating Paul's dependence upon primitive Christianity.

4. Of Paul's life in "the regions of Syria and Cilicia" nothing in detail is known, but quite probably he came into contact from time to time with those who were acquainted with the Palestinian community. He explicitly says the Judean churches joyfully approved his work, even though he and they had no intimate personal association,⁶⁵ and this could not have been the case had there not been some means of communication between him and them. News traveled because Christians traveled. Even during this period it is not to be supposed that he was preaching his gospel in absolute isolation from all Palestinian influences.

5. Afterward came his association with Barnabas. Paul gives no full account of their relationship, but he amply testifies to the fact,⁶⁶ and the narrative of Acts concerning their united labors at Antioch⁶⁷ and their later missionary activities consistently supplement Paul's more meager information. Barnabas seems to have been an important personage in the early days⁶⁸—an impression of him which Paul's few references also support.⁶⁹ Both his equipment and his

⁶⁴ Gal. 1:18-20.

⁶⁵ Gal. 1:22-24.

⁶⁶ Gal. 2:1, 9.

⁶⁷ Acts. 11:22-26.

⁶⁸ Acts 4:36 f.; 9:27; 11:22.

⁶⁹ I Cor. 9:6; Gal. 2:13; Col. 4:10.

opportunity make him an important agency in transmitting primitive tradition to Paul.⁷⁰

6. The memorable visit to Jerusalem recorded by Paul in the second chapter of Galatians furnished him an excellent opportunity to obtain new points of doctrine, but he significantly informs his readers that by this time he had come into full possession of their common truth—from their store they had nothing to add unto his (vs. 6).

7. Peter's visit to Antioch provided still another chance for Paul to acquire any further information which Peter might be able to impart. Peter was in Antioch some time before the emissaries from James arrived, and he had identified himself closely with the Christians. Not only in private, but doubtless in public, the prominence due to one who had companied with the Lord himself would be recognized. It is, indeed, quite supposable that he would preach at Antioch; for Paul himself tells us that Peter went about doing missionary work.⁷¹ And if it be assumed that he could not speak Greek,⁷² still Syrian Antioch doubtless could furnish an audience able to understand Aramaic. If the assembly there on the day of Peter's retraction was unable to use a common language, then the publicity which Paul emphasizes in his account of the event has no force: "I said to Peter *before them all*." And if Peter did preach, there is little doubt what his theme would have been. At least we are accustomed to think the Gospel of Mark gives us a reliable suggestion of his usual discourse—the story of the earthly Jesus who has now become the heavenly Messiah.⁷³

8. To these may be added several indirect, though scarcely less valuable, evidences of Paul's contact with Jewish Christianity. From this source must have come the Aramaic words which he transliterated and taught to his gentile readers.⁷⁴ Once he sends saluta-

⁷⁰ According to Acts 11:30, Paul made a visit to Jerusalem in company with Barnabas, but the historicity of the account is not beyond dispute.

⁷¹ I Cor. 9:5.

⁷² Papias calls Mark Peter's *ἐρμηνευτής*, "interpreter," but the exact force is uncertain. Cf. II Tim. 4:11.

⁷³ Cf. Acts 10:35-43.

⁷⁴ ἀββα, Rom. 8:15; Gal. 4:6; μακαρθς, I Cor. 16:22. Cf. κατὰ μίαν σαββάτου, I Cor. 16:2, which follows the Aramaic custom of using cardinals for ordinals in enumerating the days of the week.

tions to two of his kinsmen who were of note among the apostles, and who had become followers of Christ previous to his own conversion.⁷⁵ What he may have learned from them, and from other unknown persons who are to be counted in the same class, we can only imagine. Moreover, John Mark, who was so prominently connected with the leaders in Palestine, was the fellow-worker of Paul in his later career, despite the misfortune that befell their friendship when they were both younger and more impulsive.⁷⁶

On the whole, there was abundant opportunity for Paul to learn from the early community the story of Jesus' earthly life, as well as the interpretation they put upon his person and work. Whether he availed himself of this privilege may still be an open question, but there seems to be no good reason why he should have failed to do so, and it is difficult to suppose he could have closed his ears to what must have been spoken in his presence. Furthermore, had he heard and consciously rejected, how could his manifest sense of oneness with them in the first period of his career have been maintained? Paul certainly was never given to the practice of hypocrisy. At any rate, it is unquestionably evident that Paul had a close historical relation, both directly and indirectly, to the first disciples, with whom he was in essential harmony until the unhappy break with Peter and Barnabas at Antioch.

⁷⁵ Rom. 16:7.

⁷⁶ Col. 4:10; Philem. vs. 24; II Tim. 4:11.

CRITICAL NOTES

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE DIVINITY OF MAN?

In the interest of clear thought let a few words be allowed with reference to a topic which is often mooted in these days. I refer to the phrase "divinity of man," or kindred expressions frequently used in homiletical or theological discourses respecting the nature of men in general and that of Christ in particular. In attempting to restate christological doctrine so as to give more prominence to the humanity of Christ, it is sometimes thought that the difficulties besetting the older doctrine of the double nature of the Redeemer are avoided, and the essential truth guarded, by saying that Christ was a man who had more divinity in him than other men, or that he had as much divinity as it is possible for a man to have. In such statements the implication is that Jesus was a mere man, born into the world in a natural and ordinary way, but uniquely endowed, the uniqueness consisting in an unusual proportion of that divinity which is common to all men.

Let us examine this conception. By the term "divinity," as here used, must be meant the quality or characteristics of a divine being; it is practically the same as "deity." For those whom I have in mind are not Arians, who regard Christ as neither God nor man, but as a being forming a class by himself—superhuman, but created—and who speak of his "divinity," while denying his "deity." Moreover, the persons under consideration are not polytheists, in whose mind "divinity" might denote almost anything more or less superhuman. No; "divinity" and "humanity," as used in the christological discussion, are as antithetic as "God" and "man."

What, then, we need next to ask, is the difference between God and man? There is not a little nowadays written, whose object seems to be to minimize the difference. We are told not only about the divinity of man, but about the humanity of God; stress is laid on the essential likeness of the human and the divine nature. A modern writer has said: "To be God is to have more love than all besides, to be able to make greater sacrifices for the good of all, to have an infinite capacity to humble himself for others." Another prominent theologian (Ritschl) goes so far as to assert that love is the very essence of deity in such a sense that in our conception of God love logically precedes personality. Now, not to dwell on the absurdity

of imagining that love can be conceived as an entity existing apart from a person that loves, the point emphasized in these representations is that moral character—holiness—is the most essential and important thing both in God and in man. In man, it is confessed, this moral character is imperfect, whereas in God it is perfect; but as man advances in the possession of it, he becomes more and more divine; and some do not hesitate to take in the literal sense Athanasius's dictum that in the incarnation the Word was made human in order that man might be made divine, and speak of the just made perfect in the heavenly world as being real deities. This is simple polytheism, though less coarse than that of the ordinary heathen.

Now, that God and man are alike in having a rational and moral nature, and that this moral and rational nature is the noblest thing in both God and man—this is a very great, but a very trite, truth. The question, however, recurs, whether there is any specific difference between God and man; or is there a difference only of degree? It seems strange that there should be any occasion to ask such a question. If we were polytheists, it might be held that men and gods are not specifically different; but that in Protestant Christendom, where the strictest and purest monotheism is supposed to have its home, such a notion can have any countenance is amazing. It is an essential feature of Christian theism that God is conceived to be uncreated, and the Creator of all things; that his power sustains and energizes all things; that he is omnipotent and omniscient; and that, as a moral being, he is not only morally perfect, but is the Moral Ruler of the universe, to whom other moral beings are responsible, and to whom belongs the prerogative of pardon and of punishment. These attributes, not to attempt a more exhaustive statement, are distinctively divine attributes; they distinguish God absolutely from man. No amount of progress and growth on man's part can ever bring him to the possession of any of these attributes. In our mental and moral constitution we are akin to God, though even in this there is such a difference as might well be called specific; but in those other characteristics above mentioned no man has ever shared or ever can share. And it is those especially which constitute deity.

If we bear this simple and obvious truth in mind, it is easy to see what absurdity and nonsense is uttered in the talk about the divinity of man and the humanity of God. True, it may be said that God and man are in some respects akin. Yes; and so are the elephant and the snake. But if any one should seriously talk about the elephantineness of the snake and the serpentineness of the elephant, simply because they have some characteristics in common, we should have some doubt of his sanity. It is the

elephantineness of the elephant that distinguishes him from other animals, the snake included; and it is the serpentineness of the snake that distinguishes him from other animals, the elephant included. When we wish to assert or imply the *likeness* of the two, we do so by calling them both animals. To take a case in which the difference is less marked than the likeness, man and woman are different, though very much alike. But who would ever think of asserting or emphasizing the likeness by insisting on the femaleness of men and the maleness of women? Men and women are alike in that they are human beings; but men are not women, and women are not men. God and man are alike in that they are moral beings; but God is not man, and man is not God.

The application of these remarks to the christological problem is obvious. Whoever regards Christ as a mere man conceived and born just like other men, is a Unitarian of the 'Humanitarian type, and ought frankly to say so. No amount of vague and loose talk about the divinity of men in general and the superior divinity of Christ in particular, can change this fact. It is nothing but a juggling with words, which may serve to conceal the real fact from others, and may even deceive those who indulge in the talk. If by "divinity" is meant moral perfection, then, by saying that Christ had more divinity than any other man, one only says that he was the best man that ever lived; if by "divinity" is meant intellectual acumen, then the assertion is that he was the unique genius of the world. If that is meant, why not say so in plain terms, instead of bringing in this misleading word, which serves no useful purpose, and tends only to confuse the reader or hearer? One has a perfect right to hold that Jesus was nothing but a mere man, if he thinks the evidence warrants that judgment; but that is simply saying that he was human, and not divine. If, however, one is persuaded that the evidence shows Jesus to have been an altogether unique being, not simply one of the human race; and if, at the same time, one cannot be satisfied by considering him to be a being of some intermediate sort, neither God nor man; then the logical and natural conclusion should be that he was really divine, in the proper sense of the word. To say that he was nothing but a man, a man, however, endowed with an unparalleled amount of divinity, is to talk confusedly, and almost nonsensically. "Divinity" is an abstract term; it is our human conception of the qualities characteristic of the Divine Being. It is not a substance, that can be doled out to human beings in measurable proportions. There is no such thing as divinity apart from a divine being. If men can properly be said to have a greater or less amount of divinity in them, the language has no clear sense, unless it is meant that they have a certain amount of God in them—that the

Divine substance is parceled out among human beings in varying quantities. But this of course is not meant, unless the one using the language is an outright pantheist. What, then, is meant? The only answer is that the language is rhetorical, poetical, hyperbolic, but entirely unscientific. If one, in his desire to express emphatically his sense of the dignity of human nature, chooses to call men "divine," he may be permitted to do so, it being understood that his terminology is not to be understood literally and strictly. But when, in an attempt to solve a theological difficulty, such language is used ostensibly in its proper and exact sense, those who thus use it need to be reminded that the use is a plain abuse, clarifying nothing, and serving only to make confusion worse confounded.

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CAN THE HUMAN CHARACTER OF JESUS BE CALLED DIVINE?

Can one who does not believe in the supernatural origin of Jesus legitimately apply the term "divine" to his character? I believe that he can, with good and sufficient reason. But his reasons must be better than those given by many liberal theologians who in their own way ascribe divinity to the Prophet of Nazareth. It is not enough to say, as some of these thinkers do, that the character of Jesus is divine because it is an expression of the divine principle which pervades the universe and is manifest in a lesser degree in all other men. While there may be truth in such a statement, its effect is on the whole misleading, and the conservative may be excused for regarding it as a mere quibble. For what meaning is left to divinity, if we thus apply it to the whole sphere of humanity? Surely, if the word signifies anything, it is that which is differentiated from, and raised above, the merely human. In this sense Christians have used the word when they applied it to the Founder of their religion, and in this sense the modern thinker must use it if his ascription of divinity to Jesus is to have any real meaning.

The adjective "divine" may, however, be applied to Jesus upon grounds which, while not involving the miraculous, are sufficient to differentiate him from all other men and to give him a unique place among the figures of history. *For we may base the divinity we ascribe to Jesus, not upon a relation to God which he shares in common with all human beings, but upon a special experience which, as far as we know, has been given to no other man.*

Let us suppose that a man exists possessed of a profound religious insight, a consuming zeal for righteousness, and an entire devotion to the welfare of his fellows. Suppose further that such a man, as the result of

a life of communion with God and sacrifice for fellow-men, achieves so complete a harmony with God that he actually identifies himself in spirit with the Infinite. His reason would become the transparent medium of Eternal Truth, and his will the perfect instrument of Divine Purpose. He would attain that union with the Infinite which choice spirits of all ages have sought to attain. He would be really *one with God*.

If such a person ever lived, we should be justified in calling him divine. For we would recognize in his teachings, not human knowledge, but divine wisdom, and in his life, not man's goodness, but God's excellence. Now, an experience of this sort is not impossible from the standpoint of modern thought. We must admit that objects and events are controlled by natural law, but we may at the same time regard the whole material universe as the realization of One Spiritual Principle. If such an Infinite Spirit animates and controls the world, it is not surprising that man, possessing intelligence and personality himself, should be aware of the pervading presence of this Spirit, and should be able to enter into personal relations with him. Nor is it inconsistent with an idealistic view of the world to go a step farther and hold that in a rare case a man might enter into so close a personal union with God as to identify himself completely with the divine nature, and express in his life and words God's mind and will. We know that in cases of pure love among human beings a man may so identify himself in spirit with the object of his affection as to think the thoughts and feel the emotions of his friend. How is it impossible, then, that one man in human history, impelled by a perfect love, should so completely merge himself in the Infinite as to think the thoughts and live the life of God? What evidence is there that to Jesus alone such an experience has been given? His life and teachings supply, I think, the evidence which is required.

The life and character of Jesus correspond closely to the life and character which we have imagined a person would have who should thus *experience* divinity. His mind was dominated by a sense of God's presence in the world and the nearness of the Divine Spirit to the human soul. His communion with God through prayer and meditation was continuous, and seems to have become steadily more perfect. His zeal for the welfare of fellow-men grew in proportion until social service became an overmastering passion with him. Finally, at the culmination of his career, conscious of the suffering demanded of him in a supreme act of self-sacrifice and of the divine approval upon his determination to complete his work at any hazard, he appears to have risen to actual union with God, so that his words rang with divine authority and his actions were clothed with divine dignity.

But more convincing evidence that Jesus had this unique experience is furnished by the content of his teaching. For here in the fundamental ideas of his doctrine it is least likely that fiction or falsehood should have entered.

The center and core of Jesus' teaching is a revelation which he claims to make of the nature of God and his relation to the world. God is revealed as a being whose essential characteristic is benevolence, who is related to men as a father, and whose love for his human children extends even to suffering and sacrificing himself for them. Now, this is a knowledge which could be gained by no ordinary process of human thought. Its subject, the character and life of God, transcends the limits of normal human experience. Hence, if it is a genuine discovery, it must have been attained by a special experience—an experience of God himself. It must be the result of a direct intuitive insight into the divine consciousness.

But the question now arises: If Jesus' teaching goes beyond what the human understanding can prove or disprove, why is it to be accredited more than the utterances of prophetic frenzy or the deliverances of mystic ecstasy which we at present refuse to accept as communications of truth? The reply is: Because of the supreme value which the revelation of Jesus has for our moral and religious life. That bizarre and fantastic element which prevails in the deliverances of mystic and fanatic is not thus prominent in the teaching of Jesus. Nor does it conflict with the development of moral and religious ideas in human history as the utterances of religious enthusiasm often do. Instead, Jesus' teaching of God and man is directly in line with the progress of the best human thought. It stands related to the ethical and religious speculation of man as an ideal goal toward which human thought was slowly moving but would never have reached by its usual methods. In short the Christian revelation proves its genuineness by being the only adequate solution for the problems, theoretical and practical, of man's moral and religious life.

The great problems of morality and religion had been recognized and defined by the thinkers of the ancient world before the time of Jesus. Man had awakened to self-consciousness, and had reflected upon his relations to his fellows and to the world. The primitive solidarity of the tribe had been broken, and the individual emerged, conscious of interests and ambitions distinct from, and often opposed to, the good of others. Consequently, human thought was confronted with the chief problem of morality—to find a rational basis for social obligation. Why ought the individual to sacrifice his own interest to the welfare of society? The greatest philosophers of ancient times sought to find in the intellectual faculty possessed

by all men a sufficient bond of social union. But this answer proved inadequate; for these thinkers were compelled by the logic of their own view to exalt a life of seclusion and contemplation above a life of service to society and sacrifice for fellow-men. Jesus successfully solved the problem by his revelation of the fatherhood of God. For if all men are children of the one Divine Father, they are bound by a tie of brotherhood in a spiritual kingdom and have common interests and common obligations.

Before the advent of Jesus men had become aware of the fundamental difficulty of religion, that of reconciling the existence of evil in the world with its control by a beneficent deity. The countless ills which man suffers from the blind inexorable forces of nature will always constitute the greatest obstacle to a religious interpretation of the world. Jesus met this difficulty by his revelation that suffering and self-sacrifice enter even the life of God as expressions of his infinite benevolence. This revelation of the nature of God, the Supremely Real, gives us a new conception of reality, and of the significance of pain and sorrow in our lives. For if the Infinite Spirit finds fullest self-expression in sacrifice and suffering for cherished creatures, we may believe that our reality as finite spirits is measured, not by the length of our physical existence or by the amount of our physical energy, but by our moral capacity for sympathy and service. Therefore, pain and even death undergone in the discharge of duty or for the sake of others appear to the laborer in God's kingdom, not as the negation of his life, but as his elevation into comradeship with God, his initiation into a higher mode of existence, an "eternal" life.

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INFLUENCE OF MAX MÜLLER'S HIBBERT LECTURES IN INDIA

Of all the orientalists who have shed a luster on the nineteenth century, Max Müller is the only one whose influence has asserted itself both in our European scientific circles and at the same time among the natives whose language and religion formed his life-work.

Among the latter that influence was felt as early as the publication of the *Rig-Veda* (1849). If the race of the scribes of the great Egyptian and Assyrian monarchs is extinct and has left no descendants to verify and correct the attempts at decipherment of our savants, there still remains in India *pandits* and *shastris* able to control the work of a European bold enough to grapple with their revered Scriptures. Yet, after a time of

justifiable mistrust, *pandits* and *shastris*, in the holy city of Benares as well as in Poona, the stronghold of brahmanical orthodoxy, were disarmed. They had tried at first to boycott the book by spreading the rumor that it had been printed with the blood of the cow by a *mlekkha* ("unclean"); but this did not prevent its being read at Poona before an assembly of Brahmins who corrected the manuscripts which they possessed by comparing them with the text revised at Oxford by the aforesaid *mlekkha*. Later on—a most unique example—the maharajah of Vizianagaram offered four thousand pounds for a reprint of the six volumes of the Rig-Veda and the salary of an assistant during four years.

Now, if from the books we pass on to Max Müller's religious syntheses, we find them no less appreciated and their influence no less telling. And, indeed, why not confess that, while there have been other oriental scholars of ability and distinction who have tried to interpret, discuss, and speculate upon the Indian literature, philosophy, and religion, none of them, except Max Müller, has succeeded in grasping the inner genius of the Hindus?

In December, 1879, writing to Renan, he declares: "As to my own 'Hibbert Lectures,' they begin to tell in India; in England people do not understand them. My whole heart is in them, and I do believe them." This passage of a famous correspondence shows how, at that same date, the lectures delivered by Max Müller at Westminster Hall "On the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religions of India" had met with the rare and unexpected privilege of finding their way into the very intellect and soul of those among the Hindus left untouched by European culture. How numerous they were and still are is not easily understood by people who simply rely on statistical accounts or premature syntheses. Even university degrees and training do not necessarily imply a thorough western education and a profound assimilation of our scientific or philosophic methods. The majority of the students covet them 'in order to secure government appointments; very few realize the fusion between the two spirits. A slight varnish is often considered sufficient in too many cases.

It was highly desirable that the views of such a scholar as Max Müller, an authority acknowledged even in the most orthodox Hindu circles, should be popularized among those who were within and without the pale of university life. Through the medium of vernacular translations, the most obdurate opponents could be thus reached. The way in which that scheme was planned and carried out is worth attention. It is not the scheme of a publisher, a commercial *bonne affaire*. We have two sources of information: one, the numerous quotations in *The Life and Letters of*

*Max Müller*¹ by his devoted wife; the other, the "Recollections" published by Mr. B. Malabari,² the same who took in hand the arduous task of translation, and who has given an original and complete account of it.

It is necessary to recall the origin of those lectures. In January, 1876, Dr. James Martineau wrote to Max Müller in favor of the establishment of a lectureship for scientific theology by the Hibbert trustees, stating that they were anxious to know "whether there was any hope that the one to whom was due the name and conception of a science of religion would inaugurate the experiment." At that time Max Müller was on the eve of his departure for Germany and was contemplating a complete change in his life. Nevertheless, Dr. Martineau preferred to wait for eighteen months rather than to ask anyone else to be the first lecturer. As regards the importance of the lectures in England, we are not here concerned in determining how far Max Müller was right in saying that he was not understood; we have at present to deal merely with India. As Max Müller declares "that they were beginning to tell there," it may be interesting to know from Mr. Malabari himself the almost romantic circumstances which attended the austere labor of the translator. His personal style makes his "Recollections" particularly attractive. He carries us along with him into a new world, and we become acquainted with his efforts and the results of his undertaking, and also with the touching and ever-to-be-remembered souvenirs of his close friendship with the great Indianist. If our readers want to know Max Müller's opinion about Mr. Malabari's personality and character, we can refer them to some beautiful pages in the gallery of the "Indian Friends,"³ without prejudice to the biographical sketch due to his co-worker, Mr. Dayaram Gidumal,⁴ and his own invaluable notes.⁵

Here we will simply consider our hero from his birth to the very day when he began to struggle against the "mental seclusion of India." That idea is the more striking because Mr. Malabari is not a Hindu, but belongs to the Parsi community, and is in fact, like Max Müller himself, a *mlekkhal* Behramji Malabari is a self-made man; some of his biographers wrongly

¹ *The Life and Letters of the R. H. Friedrich Max Müller*, edited by his wife; in 2 vols. Longmans, Green & Co., 1902.

² "Recollections of Max Müller and His Hibbert Lectures," published in *East and West*, March-April, 1903, pp. 327-38, 475-82.

³ *Cosmopolis*, September, 1898, pp. 626 ff.

⁴ Dayaram Gidumal, *Behramji Malabari*. English ed., Fisher Unwin, 1892; French trans., Flammarion, 1898.

⁵ B. Malabari, "Forty Years Ago," *East and West*, June-July, 1903.

consider him a product of western education. In our opinion, he is the most independent of writers and thinkers, the most refractory to university regulations and examinations. Perhaps India wanted the great lesson that a man, through the mere force of mental gifts of the first order and a high moral ideal, can rise to exceptional prominence, as an example also of the superiority of the education of the heart over the education of the head. He belongs to a respectable Parsi family, ruined by the fires and floods of Surat. His admirable mother was reduced gradually to actual poverty. But he had not to repine at his reduced circumstances; his daily contact with the poorer classes was to prove a good school for a future philanthropist. He was enabled to know their needs and aspirations, and through his lazy afternoon strolls on the banks of the Tapti river, and his acquaintances with the street singers (*khialis*), he acquired a precious knowledge of guzarati poetry, the sweet poetry of Dayaram and Premanand, while his meditative qualities are certainly due to the songs of the religious reformers, such as Kabir and Tukaram. As he was quick, spirited, and kind-hearted, he made friends even outside his own community, among the Hindus and Mohammedans. Under the direction of the missionaries, who valued the lad's astonishing powers, he made surprising progress in English, history, and literature; and, in order to earn his daily bread, he gave lessons to boys, often his seniors in age. His teachers, finding him "a special case," resolved to send him to Bombay to pass his university examinations.⁶

Behram disappointed his patrons. He matriculated, but he did not follow the university lectures. His truly poetic soul rebelled against the routine of the classes. Guzarati and English meters already haunted him, and even seemed welcome harbingers of fame. When he began his campaign for the translation of the *Hibbert Lectures*, he had published the *Niti-Vinod* ("Pleasures of Morality"), which was hailed by all the native press; and the *Indian Muse in English Garb* had made his name known as far as England. He was twenty-five, and fully prepared to understand European genius and culture.

Max Müller's first letter reached him during the summer months of 1878, in the small village of Songhad, in the vicinity of the beautiful Jain temples of Satrunjaya (Kathiawar). He was at the outset of his political career (a part of his life which we have not to consider here), and had settled there after a quarrel with the political agent at Rajkot, who had been displeased with the vindication he had made in honor of his friend, the Scotch missionary John Wilson, against an attack in a native paper. That

⁶ B. Malabari, "Forty Years Ago," *East and West*, July, 1903, pp. 816, 817.

vindication might have endangered the politics of strict neutrality of the old official; hence his anger. The arrival of the mail from Europe found the young man rather sulky, but the contents soon restored his serenity. The letters were acknowledgments of the *Indian Muse in English Garb*. The first, almost illegible, was signed Tennyson; the second, in a clear hand, was from Max Müller. Others were from Lord Northbrook, John Bright, the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Gladstone, Princess Alice, Miss Nightingale—quite enough to turn the head of a humble native aspirant. But if some of these messages deeply gratified the vanity of the young poet, Max Müller's was the one which proved the most useful.

After complimenting me on my command of English verse and modestly confessing that he had never himself attempted versification in English, which was a foreign language to him, as it was to me, that master of nineteenth-century prose went on to advise: "Whether we write English verse or English prose, let us never forget that the best service we can render is to express our truest Indian and German thoughts in English, and thus to act as honest interpreters between nations that ought to understand each other much better than they do at present."

The last sentence was for Mr. Malabari most memorable: "It is in the verses where you feel and speak like a true Indian that you speak most like a true poet."⁷

On his return to Bombay, he found the parcel of works sent to him from Oxford. The *Lectures on Religion as Illustrated by the Religions of India* caught his fancy at once.

What a glorious subject, and how gloriously handled! I am a poor book-reader, seldom engrossed even by my favorite works. But there was a genuine Indian ring about the contents of this volume which sounded exceeding sweet to my ear and felt equally satisfying to the soul. The dedication to the memory of his beloved daughter also touched me deeply. In short, the *Hibbert Lectures* impressed me as being the flowers, not the ripened fruit, of Max Müller's labors in the field of oriental researches; and it seemed strange that none of our students had yet thought of presenting them to his countrymen in the simple vernaculars of the land.⁸

Nothing could please the great scholar more than vernacular translations, he answered, above all, a Sanskrit version of his *Lectures*, which would enable the indigenous thinkers of India to see what a foreigner has to say about the religion and literature of the *Rishis*. But who would ever think of spending his time and resources on an undertaking as colossal as it would be unremunerative?

⁷ "Recollections," etc., March, 1903, p. 332.

⁸ *Ibid.*

For Mr. Malabari this was a sort of challenge:

Should I accept it? I was in no sense a scholar, I reasoned, and yet it would be possible for me to find the scholars to take up the work, setting the example myself with a guzarati translation. I informed him of this plan, stating clearly at the same time my lack of qualification for such a task, and suggesting several likely names. His answer was like him, prompt and to the purpose. He should prefer me to take up the rôle of interpreter between the East and the West. I was so particularly fitted for it. He would gladly give money for the start. I would not listen to the last suggestion. India was rich enough to finance an enterprise in which she was much more interested than England.⁹

India is rich, of course, but those who can afford to support enterprises of that kind are not, generally speaking, much inclined to do so. Howbeit, without knowing exactly who could bear the expense, Mr. Malabari began the guzarati translation with the help of Mr. N. M. Mobedjina. He confessed that it was "a tough piece of work" to convey modern European expressions (more or less scientific) of ancient thoughts and ideas to the native reader in a half-developed dialect. They had very often to go to the fountain-head, Sanskrit, for their words, and sometimes to coin them. Max Müller had also to be troubled. In one year, however, the translation was finished. Mr. Malabari added to it a sort of synopsis of Max Müller's theory on the origin and growth of language, and a biographical sketch. This last the scholar enjoyed immensely, and many years after he said to his friend: "If this is your prose, I can well imagine what your verse is like."

But the money question had still to be settled. Two most excellent members of the civil service, Mr. James Gibbs and Mr. Peile, director of public instruction, whom Mr. Malabari had "infected with his literary mania," succeeded in securing for the publication of the guzarati translation a grant from the Bombay government and a number of introductions to likely patrons of literature.

After having intrusted the Guzarati translation to the printer, Mr. Malabari started on a long tour. Nothing more picturesque, more humorous can be imagined than the description of the wanderings and earnest entreaties of the young translator. Even for those who have lived in India it gives a new insight into the manners and way of thinking of her population, so well does India know how to keep the secret of her inner life.

Consumed by a real missionary zeal, Mr Malabari covered enormous distances at a stretch, regardless of health, comfort, even of personal safety. He arranged for the translation of the *Hibbert Lectures* into

⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 333.

Marathi, Bengali, Hindi, Tamil, and Sanskrit, and engaged eight or nine translators for the series, paying them with the money received from the government of Madras and from several native princes.

Often cast down, but never despairing, sick in body and in mind, and poor in purse, I sometimes traveled third, even intermediate, starving at the smaller roadside stations, staying at shops in the bazaar, camping out under trees in the *maidan*, taking my chance of everything as it came.¹⁰

Max Müller was informed of these wanderings and took alarm. He became very anxious during the rainy season, warning his friend, mail after mail, to return home, to take rest and send agents in his place.

And here begins the narrative of Mr. Malabari's tours—a wearisome crusade, undertaken through Guzarat, Kathiawar, Central India, Rajputana, and the South Maratha country; but Mr. Malabari knew that it was the only way of rousing the country, and he spared neither himself nor the hapless victims of his linguistic mania. Those hapless victims were the native princes, the only people in India who could at that time be efficient patrons and give support to a work of that kind. We owe to Mr. Malabari's pen curious silhouettes of them; but we cannot accompany Max Müller's friend in his visits. Nowadays it is almost *banal* to be a state guest of eastern highnesses; at that time it was not so. The colleges and cadet corps had not yet formed the new generations. The Scindhias and Holkars of yore cannot be compared to the princes whose portraits and modern palaces appear in the magazines all over the world.

It was in a meeting at Jeypur, which the maharajah was to attend (he begged to be excused at the eleventh hour, as it was his prayer-day), that Mr. Malabari explained the reasons for considering the translation of the *Lectures* as a necessity (May 9, 1882). The audience was exclusively native, and Major Jacob in the chair. First he impressed on his hearers that Max Müller by his work on the *Veda Sanhita* and other *shastras* had given new life, so to say, to Sanskrit and helped to regenerate the language and literature of their land. As for the *Hibbert Lectures*, in these splendid dissertations the author gave back to the Indians their own modernized and spiritualized.

We badly want character in our modern vernaculars. Here we have as much character and originality as you may wish for. You will readily grant that by reason of his special study, Max Müller is best fitted of all his contemporaries for a work and better qualified than the rest of the Indian scholars, because he is unbiased and disinterested.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

The most generous patron of the *Hibbert Lectures* was a woman, the Maharani Shurnomoye (Cassimbazar). But for the 1,000 rupees that she gave, the Bengali translation would never have appeared. As regards the Tamil translation, destined for the lettered public of southern India, it proved unlucky. Mr. Malabari had offered the dedication to Max Müller's friend, the same maharajah of Vizianagaram, who had given 4,000 pounds for the printing of the second edition of the Rig-Veda, and he had received from him a flattering answer when the maharajah died suddenly. A very interesting personality, that maharajah! a Maecenas more of a sportsman than a scholar. However, like many Indians belonging to the higher classes, he had a great respect for religious science, and considered it a pious duty to propagate it. The help of the late maharajah's family was vainly asked for; no answer ever came.

The fate of these editions was totally different, according to the regions. If I am not mistaken, no south Indian *pandit*, *shastri*, or patron of literature has taken the Tamil edition off the editor's hands. The Bengali edition, done admirably by Mr. Gupta, was the one that Max Müller preferred, because he could read it. It was given away free; not a single copy was purchased. The marathi edition, due to Mr. G. W. Kanitkar, and the Hindi one, to Munshi Jawalaprasad, went off well. It was the same thing in the case of the guzarati edition.

Max Müller was highly gratified to see the popularization of his lectures accomplished in India by such a devoted interpreter. The expression of his feelings is to be found in many letters to Mr. Malabari. As early as March, 1879, he wrote:

These lectures were chiefly written for India. What I wished to do was to show you how much and how little you possess in your own ancient religion. There is a large accumulation of mere rubbish in your religious system! That you know as well as I do, and to an enlightened mind such as yours there can be no offense in my saying this; but beneath that rubbish there are germs. Do not throw those germs away with the rubbish. . . . If you could tell your countrymen something of what I have written in these lectures, it might bear some good fruit.

And again in September, 1881:

I am deeply interested in the effect which my *Hibbert Lectures* will produce in India. When writing them I was often thinking of my friends in your country more than of my audience at Westminster. . . . I wanted to tell (February, 1882) those few at least whom I might hope to reach in English, what the true *historical* value of their ancient religion is, as looked upon, not from exclusively European or Christian, but from a *historical* point of view. I wished to warn

against two dangers: that of undervaluing or despising the ancient national religion, as is done too often by your half-Europeanized youths; and that of overvaluing it, and interpreting it as it was never meant to be interpreted, of which you may see a painful instance in Dayananda Sarasvati's labors on the *Veda*. Accept the *Veda* as an ancient *historical* account, containing thoughts in accordance with the character of an ancient and simple-minded race of men, and you will be able to admire it, and to retain some of it—particularly the teachings of the *Upanishads*, even in these modern days. But discover in it steam engines and electricity, and European philosophy and morality, and you deprive it of its true character, you destroy its real value, and you break the historical continuity that ought to bind the present to the past. Accept the past as a reality, study it and try to understand it, and you will then have less difficulty in finding the right way toward the future.

Were the results in proportion to the tremendous effort it required? "This project of vernacular translations has, on the whole, ended poorly, like most projects in India. In a word, it was premature," says Mr. Malabari.¹¹ I am inclined to think that there is a great deal of exaggeration in this statement; but we westerners are not able to form an opinion. We had better appeal to a most competent authority, the late lamented Protap Chunder Mozoomdar. No one could judge as well of the real benefit caused by the entering of such a man as Max Müller on the scene of Indian civilization. At the very moment of the publication of the *Hibbert Lectures* he had written about them in the *Theistic Quarterly Review* of Calcutta, an English paper intended for a limited circle, the little religious sect of the Brahmos. Now, after twenty years, he remembers the time when English-educated Indians, in Bengal at least, felt a most unpatriotic contempt for the classics of their own country; then he registers the reaction that ensued and the widespread Hindu revivals of the two last years.

Whose words, whose works, whose influence are chiefly accountable for this national awakening, extravagant as, like oriental movements, it shows itself sometimes? It is surely the genius that planned the publication of the *Sacred Books of the East*, that primarily gave the impulse, and brought back the blurred religious consciousness of the Hindu to himself. Max Müller's celebrated *Hibbert Lectures*, translated into the vernaculars of this country, did a service in this respect that can never be forgotten. Ancient India's search for the infinite, the prevailing feature of all her mystic inspiration, whether in the domain of nature or of the soul, the progress and success of that search as embodied in what is best in our Scriptures, revealed the Hindu spirit to the Hindu and struck a light where all was dark before.¹²

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 338.

¹² "Professor Max Müller's Relations to India," *East and West*, November, 1901, p. 93.

That short quotation teaches us two things: first, that "the *Hibbert Lectures* had brought back the blurred consciousness of the Hindu to itself"—a result which has to be ascribed to the admirable pages on the perception of the infinite in which is contained the best refutation of the agnostic tendencies of the young anglicized Indians; then, that "they have revealed the Hindu spirit to the Hindu." Here the circle is widened, and from the small group of students able to understand our western philosophy, the lectures appeal to the *pandits*, the householders, the *sannyasin* who, on the banks of a sacred river, in either a large town or a small village, even in the mountain jungle, find in them the apotheosis of their old religious faith, their own dissertations "modernized and spiritualized," as was said at the meeting of Jeypur. "Could the most apathetic son of India long remain indifferent to the glorification by such a genius of his country's past?" exclaims Mr. Malabari, inflamed by the sublime pages in honor of the visions of the *Rishis*, the Indian philosophy, and the heights scaled by the poet-seers of the Vedic period.

Our scholars, whose criterion is of course different from that of the Indian *shastris*, have often failed in the explanation of obscure passages of the Scriptures—passages probably reserved to the skill of the indigenous talent and the hereditary inquirer after truth. Why so?

To us Indo-Aryas [Mr. Malabari continues], it is the truth that is supreme law, the universal existence, the face behind the veil, the reality beyond the illusion. The Aryan mind does not despise this illusion (not delusion, as western interpreters call it), this phenomenon, this enveloping, overshadowing adjunct of the true and the real.

Max Müller has beautifully understood that phenomenon, and through his constant association with the ideals of the East, and the musings, and reveries that this association must suggest, he has succeeded in obtaining "that genuine ring" which had sounded "exceeding sweet" to the delighted ear of his enthusiastic translator.

Mr. Malabari is far from regretting the time and strength given to the scheme. It helped him materially, he says, for one thing—to study the condition of the country as a whole, its wants and requirements, its merits as well as its defects. It also brought him in contact with some master-minds of the day, securing

the subtle soul-union which recognizes no difference of race, sex, or rank, and which neither distance nor death itself can dissolve. Such was the friendship with Max Müller, which the vernacular translations brought to me. . . . Years afterwards, sitting by the fireside in my friend's library at Oxford, I recounted to him, at his request, some of my vicissitudes of the early eighties,

my trials and triumphs—throwing such side-light as I could on the character and capacity of the race whom he loved and labored for all his days; and then, after the recital had ended, he got behind my chair, rubbed my forehead, as if to relieve its tension, and, stroking my hand fondly, asked: "So you became rabid about my poor *Lectures*?" "Yes," I replied, laughing, "quite mad, as is my wont; even your sobering influence could not restrain me." At this he leaned against my shoulder, whispering: "I wish I had more of your madness." Who would not be mad, to be envied by so eminently sane a monomaniac as Max Müller?¹³

Twelve years were to elapse between the reception of Max Müller's first letter in the small Kathiawari village and the meeting of the two friends at Oxford—twelve years of unremitting labor on both sides. Mr. Malabari, true to his self-imposed mission, and as the proprietor and editor of a powerful paper, the *Indian Spectator*, had stood up as an advocate of the better understanding between the rulers and the ruled, and as a defender of the rights of the poorer classes. Meanwhile he had devoted himself to a most ungrateful task. Though belonging to a non-Hindu community, he had lent the support of his experience, authority, and talent to the advancement and progress of the social reform among the Hindus. During that time the correspondence between the two friends was active, and the *Hibbert Lectures* were not its only object. The question of social reform, which had gradually engrossed Mr. Malabari's attention, had found in Max Müller a convinced supporter. It was with a view to the solution of one of the most serious among our social problems that Mr. Malabari came to London in April, 1890, hoping to arouse an active interest in the question of infant marriage and the status of Hindu widows. It was a great pleasure for Max Müller to make the personal acquaintance of the energetic reformer, and between the two men sprang up a close friendship, which lasted till Max Müller's death. Mr. Malabari paid his friend a visit, which visit is mentioned in the *Life and Letters*,¹⁴ and narrated in the "Recollections" as follows:

As a guest at Norham Gardens I was treated like a prince. My friend gave me the best room in the house, usually reserved for royalty, as he told me; and, what was a greater privilege, he left me as much as I liked to myself. He invited none but intimate friends, and avoided talking shop, except when prompted or provoked . . .¹⁵

all that no doubt on account of that extraordinary disease of shyness with

¹³ "Recollections," etc., March, 1903, p. 338.

¹⁴ *Life and Letters*, Vol. II, p. 257.

¹⁵ "Recollections," etc., April, 1903, p. 476.

which Mr. Malabari is infected, comparing his kind hosts to "parent birds tending a wounded fledgling that had strayed into their nest from beyond the seas." For a whole week, the morning in the library, the afternoon in the gardens, the two friends entered upon the most absorbing subjects of conversation about Indian and European topics and men: Burnouf, Renan, William Jones, Darmesteter, Ram Mohan Roy, Keshub Chunder Sen, etc.

He [Max Müller] spoke in a reminiscent vein, but always with the freshness and buoyancy of youth. His conversation was strikingly rich in the personal element, and his manners had a polish and freedom from preoccupation peculiar to himself. Very remarkable was the contrast between host and guest—the one with a smooth, unclouded brow; at seventy, as spruce and sprightly in his get-up as if ready to attend a wedding at a moment's notice; the other, turned grey and wrinkled at forty, weary and woe-begone in appearance.¹⁶

One day our reformer asked Max Müller to reconsider the advisability of his paying a cold-weather visit to India—that visit which the scholar confessed to have longed for in his youth, and which had been a subject alluded to and even discussed in some letters.

Your suggestion of a voyage to India [he wrote in 1890] has gratified me very much, but I have come to the conclusion that, at my time of life, and with so much important work still to finish, I must not think of it. It is a great self-denial, doubly difficult, after what you told me, that some of my Indian friends would have been willing to defray the expense.

At Oxford Mr. Malabari insisted, so that his dear old friend might see modern India and study "the everyday life of his favorites." "No, no," he urged, "I have lived in an ideal India; don't drag me out of it. I am too old for disillusionizing." Was he right? We shall see, from Mr. Malabari's exact definition of the sort of love that Max Müller had for India.

It is said that he loved India not wisely, but too well. There is some force in the allegation as it stands. But, closely examined, it will prove a superficial view, an incomplete presentment of the fact. Those who charge my friend with undue partiality toward India seem to forget that Max Müller was an idealist, that he had his own India; or, to be accurate, he had reconstructed from the ashes and charred bones of the past an India of the *Rishis*, of the early Vedas, in which he lived, moved, and had his being. . . . Max Müller was a poet, a dream-builder, as distinguished from the Oxford don, even as distinct from the ingenious architect of theories of religion and language.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 477.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

Mr. Malabari remembers a discussion of his merits with the Catholic bishop Meurin, at Bombay. The bishop maintained that Max Müller was only a philologist, not a philosopher. To this Mr. Malabari replied "that philology was the least interesting part of his life-work, the husk, so to say, of the wheat within." To his mind, "Max Müller was a *reviver*, one who made dead things live over again, clothing them in the warm flesh-and-blood hues of life."¹⁸ In a certain way Max Müller was right not to visit India, right also to continue to live in his own ideal *Arya-warta*. He would have seen "how many of the *ideals* of life had been perverted," and he would have been disillusioned. It requires less sympathy for the population, a more selfish absorption in a scientific task, to overcome the results of a personal contact with modern India.

In order to mitigate Mr. Malabari's disappointment, Max Müller suggested, as a token of India's affection, the idea of a testimonial for the forthcoming jubilee of his doctorate, that would make him feel as if he had seen India and the numerous friends he had there.

I sent him this token later, in the shape of an address of congratulations most appropriately worded by Dr. Bhandarkar, and signed by many of the leading scholars and not a few prominent patrons of scholarship in the country. We had the address beautifully engraved and illuminated and placed in a silver casket of peculiar Indian design and workmanship.¹⁹

Max Müller was deeply moved, and accepted it as a token that he had not worked in vain.²⁰

During our reformer's stay in London it was his learned friend who introduced him into the higher circles of English society, wherein he enlisted firm supporters in favor of the great cause of the women of India of whom he had constituted himself the champion. We find in the *Life and Letters* many passages which refer to that common work of charity. Let us open the "Recollections:"

What drew me most to Max Müller was his chivalrous regard for the weak and the oppressed. This was perhaps best exemplified in the course of our crusade against infant marriage and enforced widowhood. He gave me much of his time to solving the problem of state intervention, consulting eminent lawyers and jurists, drawing freely upon his unrivaled knowledge of ancient and modern Indian literature. He wrote again and again at considerable length, explaining the scriptural, the legal, and the political bearings of the question. He discovered the ingenious theory of *tort*, holding the parents responsible in cases when the parties to an infant marriage came to suffer. He visited and wrote to a number

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

²⁰ *Life and Letters*, Vol. II, p. 316.

of influential people, commending our cause to some, encouraging others already interested in it, and he was largely instrumental in getting up the drawing-room meeting at Lady Jeune's which led to the passing of the Age of Consent Bill. Max Müller stood up at the meeting as our staunchest ally, gallantly supported by the Countess of Jersey and Sir Charles Aitchinson.²¹

We must quote one, and the last, passage from the "Recollections." Max Müller had valiantly defended Mr. Malabari during his great contest with the opposition of the brahmanical orthodox party—a hard and painful contest, the contest of the individual against the caste. Besides, was he not an outsider, a Parsi? And it is well known that the Hindus do not like being lectured by outsiders. "If their dirty linen had to be washed at all, they wished to have it washed by their own washerwomen!"²² And it is a fact also that, through his personal influence and assisted by friends, Mr. Malabari at last carried the bill ("Age of Consent Act") which fixes the age of freedom to marry at eighteen for the men, at twelve for the girls (1891). Max Müller simply adds: "It is highly creditable to him that he declined all rewards and honors offered to him at the end of his successful campaign."²³

Mr. Malabari enlightens us on the sense of that phrase, and his explanation does equal honor to the two friends. It throws a vivid light on the personality of both. Max Müller was among the generous patrons who wished to present him with a purse, about four thousand pounds, in order to pay the expenses of his social reform campaign.

When sounded, I said I would gratefully accept the gift if allowed to spend it on the cause itself, say the founding of a central widow's home in India and a working committee to bring about the improvement in some of our social customs. But my friends wished me to accept the purse for personal use, as, for obvious political reasons, they could not identify themselves too closely with an active propaganda. For very much the same reasons I declined the offer with thanks.²⁴

And why did the generous Parsi decline the honor?

My political friends appreciated this, though some of them thought I was carrying my squeamishness too far. Max Müller, it seems, felt aggrieved. Little did the dear old idealist see that in India, the land of ideal charity, people generally start with uncharity in judging what they do not know or cannot understand.

²¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 480, 481.

²² *Cosmopolis*, September, 1898, p. 627.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 628.

²⁴ "Recollections," etc., April, 1903, p. 481.

The movement for a purse was dropped—happily, says the noble reformer; but his kind friend voted him an address of welcome and congratulations. He drew it up himself, with the help of an ex-viceroy and two ex-governors, and had it signed by many of the notable leaders of society. The address was sent to Mr. Malabari when he was on the continent. It is treasured among the most precious possessions of the reformer, “not so much for its intrinsic value—though it is very high—but as the gift of a loyal and loving friend, a wise and faithful guide, and a valiant supporter.”²⁵

From the high religious synthesis of the *Hibbert Lectures* we have come to the particulars of the intercourse of two men who, it seems, have realized that fusion between the East and the West for which some among the higher classes are fervently longing. In like manner Max Müller’s influence has asserted itself in India by infusing a new life into Hindu society and religion, and captivating the friendship and admiration of the best minds of the country.

Mr. Malabari was thus a faithful interpreter of the general feeling when, on Max Müller’s demise (the writer was then his guest at Mahableswar in the Ghâts), he sent a wire to Mrs. Max Müller telling her that “all India mourned with her!”²⁶

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MARTIN LUTHER’S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE

The principle of liberty of conscience was given the foremost place in Luther’s programme of reforms after the Leipzig Disputation (July, 1519). But when a few years later the reformer decided that the new church should be united with the state, he did not hesitate to call upon the secular arm to come to the aid of the church in the attempt to suppress heresy. In later years he reaccepted the view which he had held before he assumed the rôle of a reformer—that capital punishment is to be inflicted on heretics.²⁷

If the testimony of Leo X, as stated in the bull *Exsurge Domine* (June 15, 1520), may be relied upon, Luther held at that time the damnable heresy that “to burn heretics is against the will of the Spirit.” The famous book, *To the Christian Nobles*, which he wrote in June, 1520, is an eloquent

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 482.

²⁶ *Life and Letters*, Vol. II, p. 421.

²⁷ Cf. *Theologischer Jahresbericht*, Vol. XXIII, p. 515.

plea for religious liberty. The reformer shows that every Christian is a member of a spiritual priesthood, and that there can be no earthly authority, either ecclesiastical or secular, to rule over the Christian conscience. In the book *Of the New Bull and Falsehood of Eck* Luther refutes the insinuation of his opponent that his disapproval of the burning of heretics was due to his own love of life, since he realized his tenets to be heretical. "The Papists in Rome," he observes, "when they find themselves unable to resist the truth, slaughter the people and by killing solve all arguments."^a

It was after the Diet of Worms, during Luther's sojourn at the Wartburg (April, 1521–March, 1522), that he decided on a union of the new church with the state. At that time Andrew Carlstadt, his colleague, introduced the first actual reforms in Wittenberg, abolishing mass and administering the Lord's Supper in both kinds to the congregation. Luther realized that Carlstadt's course was sure to lead to divisions within the Saxon church. After some hesitation he resolved that a new church should be organized only when the civil government was ready to make the acceptance of the new creed compulsory for the whole land. In other words, to maintain the (nominal) unity of the church, the task of ecclesiastical reformation was to be taken out of the people's hands and turned over to the princes and secular rulers, to whom, it must be said, the acceptance of the Reformation brought great material advantages.

Luther's deviation from the principle of liberty of conscience is distinctly traceable. In January, 1522, he wrote a book on the relation of the state to the Christian church, and chose for it the title, *A True Admonition to All Christians to Abstain from Uproar and Sedition*. There is indication, he says, in the introduction, that there are those who would slay or drive away the priests, "unless they promise thorough reformation." But presently he corrects himself, admitting that he knows there is no danger of such an outbreak. He then proceeds to show that a reformation of the church should take place only with the sanction of the civil rulers. The secular authorities, he says, should take this matter into their hands, "every prince in his own land." "But," he complains, "they fail to do anything." Yet he urges that the people "shall without the command of the government or the initiative of the authorities do nothing in regard to this matter." He further says:

Therefore, look upon the government. As long as they do not undertake anything and do not give a command, you should keep quiet with hand, mouth and heart, and should be unconcerned about it. If you can persuade the government to proceed and give a command, you may do so. If the government be

^a Erlangen edition of Luther's works (German), Vol. XXIV, p. 19.

not willing, neither should you be. But if you proceed, you are in the wrong and are far worse than the other party [the Romanists].³

This book, it is worthy of notice, Luther addressed to his followers in the states where the cause was expected ultimately to triumph, although a new church had not yet been organized. He did by no means propose that the subjects of a Roman Catholic ruler should forever abide within the fold of that church. For Lutherans in Roman Catholic states he demanded toleration. One year after the publication of the *True Admonition*, when his translation of the New Testament was put under the ban in several states and the people were ordered to deliver the book to the authorities, he wrote a tract on *How Far Is a Christian under Obligation to Obey the Magistrates?* He warns his friends against surrendering the book. Conscience should be free, he contends, and "no one may have authority over the soul but God."⁴ In the same year (1523) he wrote a tract, *That a Christian Assembly or Congregation Has the Right and Authority to Decide in All Questions of Doctrine and to Call and Depose Ministers*. From these books it is obvious that the reformer found it difficult to discard the great principle of liberty of conscience. He attempted to maintain it in theory at a time when with his approval heretics were persecuted in Saxony.

After he had decided that Lutheranism was to be introduced by the Saxon government, and the organization of the proposed new church should consequently be deferred, Luther returned from the Wartburg to Wittenberg and discarded the reforms which had been introduced by Carlstadt. Mass in the Latin language was restored, and the communion *sub utraque* was abolished at the public altar. The weak, it was urged, had been offended by Carlstadt's reforms. The fact, on the other hand, that the restoration of Romanism caused great offense was ignored. When Frederick the Wise died, in May, 1525, and his brother John, a staunch Lutheran, succeeded him, the new church was organized and the Lutheran creed made compulsory for the whole land, the protests of the weak being considered out of place at this time.

Dr. Carlstadt, the former dean of Wittenberg University, was banished from Saxony, September 16, 1524, by Duke (afterward Elector) John. This severe measure has sometimes been justified on the supposition that the persecuted reformer was a revolutionary disturber of the peace. His crime, however, consisted in this, that (at Orlamünde) he proceeded with the introduction of reforms independently of Martin Luther. His recent

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXII, p. 49.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

biographer, Dr. Hermann Barge, in a standard work which is indispensable for the study of the beginnings of the Reformation,⁵ portrays him as the first representative of evangelical Puritanism, and shows that he has been persistently misrepresented by the historians of the established church. Two other ministers, Dr. Gerhard Westerburg and Martin Reinhard, of Jena, both friends of Carlstadt, were banished with him. In his book, *Against the Heavenly Prophets*, Luther informs us that Carlstadt's banishment had his full approval. "Now tell me, my pious reader," he says further, "have the princes of Saxony not had enough patience with the mad spirit? Yes, alas, too much."⁶ Later he advised the elector that in his opinion the proper penalty to be inflicted on Carlstadt was imprisonment.

The first instance, however, of Luther's invoking the aid of the magistracy in the interest of "pure doctrine" seems to be that of the minister of Oelsnitz (his name is unknown). This brave man, in all probability a friend of Carlstadt, rejected mass at a time when Luther had restored it in Wittenberg. About one year before Carlstadt's banishment the Wittenberg reformer wrote to Michael von der Strassen, *Geleitsmann* at Borna: "My petition therefore is that you advise the Schösser of Oelsnitz that he should command the preacher to go slowly and first of all preach Christ properly, putting off his fanaticism, or leave the place."⁷ Again, on December 5, 1523, he wrote to the same officer, admonishing him earnestly "to use force and either drive the preacher of Oelsnitz away or compel him to talk this awkward notion out of the people and to recant." He advises the authorities to "take one or six by the neck and cast them into prison."⁸ A few weeks later the pastorate of Oelsnitz was vacant.⁹ Whether the minister had fled or been removed by force is uncertain.

In a tract which Luther wrote in 1528 on the Anabaptists and their principles, and in which he speaks of them as "the devil's sure messengers," he disapproves of capital punishment for those who may err in doctrine alone, but is of the opinion that they are not to be tolerated in the land. A few years later, in 1532, he wrote another little book against the dissenters, giving it the title, *Concerning the Sneaks and Hedge-Preachers*. He urges the magistrates to make it everybody's duty, by severe penalties, to report promptly concerning the wandering preachers who are not of the established church. The civil authorities, he says, should permit strangers to preach only after the state church pastor of the parish has examined them

⁵ Barge, *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1905).

⁶ Erlangen, Vol. XXIX, p. 174.

⁷ DeWette, *Luthers Briefe*, Vol. II, p. 423.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 458, 460.

and pronounced them orthodox. These preachers ought to labor in public announcing their appointments beforehand. If they will not do this, they are surely the devil's messengers. "Whoever tolerates and hears them should know that he hears the devil himself, as he is speaking out of a possessed person."¹⁰ It is worthy of notice that the time when the Lutheran propaganda was carried on by what the reformer now chose to designate as sneaks and hedge-preachers was past. The further extension of the Lutheran Reformation had become dependent upon the good-will of the ruling princes.

In the writings of Melchior Hofmann, the Anabaptist, there is found a remarkable passage indicating the mood in which this book of Luther's was received by the dissenters. Since they were severely persecuted in Saxony and were arrested as soon as they could be found by the authorities, Luther's insistence that they must call upon the parish pastor before beginning to labor in a given place sounded in their ears like cruel mockery. Says Hofmann in the same year in which this book was published: "Many cry out against the hedge-preachers and desire to have them come to the light, not with good intention, but to drink their blood."¹¹

A number of Anabaptists were executed in Saxony. Melanchthon, in an elaborate treatise, contends that they were worthy of death for heresy. If they did not advocate any other error, he says, than what they teach on baptism, original sin, and separation from the (established) church, it would be right to put them to the sword.¹² He refers to a decree of the emperors Honorius and Theodosius, that rebaptizers were to be executed. In a few instances Melanchthon assumed the rôle of an inquisitor toward imprisoned Anabaptists. Henry Crouth, an Anabaptist minister, was beheaded at Jena, January 27, 1536, in Melanchthon's presence and on his advice, although he had expressly declared his willingness to obey the government except in matters pertaining to religion. On the question "why he and others of his sect preached in secret places and not publicly in the pulpit," he gave the following striking reply: "The divine word is most severely persecuted and we are not permitted to preach; yet we must come together. This we do openly and not secretly. And while we are forbidden and hindered to preach the word, we are not even suffered to be doers of the word."¹³ Henry Crouth and his friends who shared his lot had the courage to reprove Melanchthon for sanctioning persecution.

¹⁰ Erlangen, Vol. XXXI, p. 226.

¹¹ Cornelius, *Münst. Aufruhr*, Vol. II, p. 225.

¹² *Corpus Reformatorum*, ed. Bretschneider, Vol. III, p. 200.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1001.

They were in turn reminded that it was the authorities who were to deal with them; whereupon they said: "Yes, yes, you would wash your hands, like Pilate."¹⁴

Conspicuous among the Lutheran princes of the Reformation time for his advanced views on toleration was Landgrave Philip of Hesse, a ruler who disapproved of the death sentence for heresy. "We cannot find it in our conscience," he wrote to the elector of Saxony, "to have any person executed on account of his faith." Anabaptists were not condemned to death in Hesse. The landgrave also doubted the expediency of banishing them; hence Luther wrote to him in 1538: "It is not only my opinion, but my humble petition, that your Grace would earnestly forbid them the land, for they are nevertheless the devil's seed."¹⁵ Justus Menius, the friend of Luther, in 1530 wrote a book, *The Anabaptists' Doctrine and Mystery*, and dedicated it to the landgrave for the avowed purpose to persuade him to take more stringent measures for the suppression of heretical teachings. To this book Luther wrote the preface.

Landgrave Philip prevented, under peculiar circumstances, the execution of an Anabaptist in Saxony. In 1531 Frederick Erbe was apprehended as an Anabaptist by the Saxon authorities in the county of Hausbreitenbach. This county being under the joint jurisdiction of Saxony and Hesse, capital punishment could take place only with the consent of the rulers of both states. The elector desired to have Frederick Erbe condemned to death, but it was found impossible to obtain the landgrave's consent to such a proposition. Not even after Melanchthon and Luther had expressed themselves in favor of execution did the landgrave yield. Frederick Erbe, after he had been put to the rack, was consequently imprisoned for life in Wartburg castle. While about ten years before Luther had gone to the Wartburg for protection, Frederick Erbe was cast into the tower for the reason that he refused to approve of the teachings which Luther and the Saxon state church had meanwhile accepted. From 1531 to 1548, when death released him from his sufferings, Erbe was a prisoner at the Wartburg. The guardian of the castle gave him the testimony that he led a good life and was always obedient.¹⁶

Induced by the landgrave's scruples concerning the execution of heretics, the elector of Saxony asked the opinion of the Wittenberg theologians on the point in question. Melanchthon, as in a number of other instances, insisted on the necessity of the most stringent measures. The former

¹⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 998.

¹⁵ Erlangen, Vol. LVI, p. 43.

¹⁶ Schmidt, *Justus Menius, der Reformator Thüringens*, Vol. I, pp. 167 f.

mandates against heretical sects, he urges, should be "renewed and aggravated according to occasion." "That execution fails to bring the desired results, since the Anabaptists die so courageously, is not to be so highly regarded that on this account strict measures should not be taken. . . . For the devil is to be despised and not to be feared more than God." Under this document Luther wrote with his own hand: *Placet mihi Martino Luthero*.¹⁷

The fact that in Luther's opinion the Zwinglians, as well as the Anabaptists and other dissenters, were to be refused toleration has oftentimes been ignored. In 1529, at the Diet of Speier, the Catholic majority issued, in the name of the emperor, a decree that the Zwinglians ("the Sacramentarians") should no longer be tolerated in the empire. Luther had nothing to say against this proposition. He advised the elector of Saxony to accept it. "Concerning the other point," he wrote, "that His Electoral Grace should be obedient to His Imperial Majesty's command against the Anabaptists and Sacramentarians, it is right that His Electoral Grace should do this willingly, for of the forbidden creeds none is either found or tolerated in the land of His Electoral Grace, neither are they to be tolerated."¹⁸ In the previous year Luther had petitioned the elector to stop the mouth of a certain Hans Mohr, of Coburg, who had expressed himself as favorable toward Zwinglian views.¹⁹ In vain were the landgrave's efforts to persuade the Lutheran princes to make common cause with the Zwinglians in political matters.

The interesting question naturally arises: What would presumably have been the result, had Luther not discarded the principle of liberty of conscience? Was there reasonable prospect for at least some measure of success, if he insisted on religious toleration? Frederick the Wise, the most enlightened and tolerant of the Saxon rulers of the sixteenth century, would have considered an actual proposition of general toleration as visionary and impossible, both for political and other reasons; and this was also the view of Philip of Hesse. Among the people, on the other hand, there were great numbers who had been led to see the necessity of religious liberty. The peasants' reform movement of 1525, which eventually developed into the Peasants' War, would, if successful, have led to a separation of church and state. The first of the peasants' famous *Twelve Articles* was the demand that every congregation should be given the right to call or dismiss its minister. Luther, to whom the peasants appealed

¹⁷ *Corpus Ref.*, Vol. IV, p. 740.

¹⁸ DeWette, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 441.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

could not deny that he had taught the principle of the supreme authority of the congregation, but he asserted that they had a mistaken conception of it. Their demand for the abolition of serfdom he rejected, partly on the ground that a bondsman's body is the property of his lord, and to declare the serfs free would therefore be robbery. "In the peasants' uproar," Luther informs us in his *Table Talk*, "he [the elector] asked my advice whether he should agree to their Twelve Articles which they had presented to him for consideration at Meiningen. But I advised him strongly against it [saying] he should not consent to one of them."²⁰

It must be borne in mind that the peasants, in the first stage of the movement, expected liberty to be obtainable without an appeal to arms. They hoped that the movement would become national in scope and the authorities would not dare to stand in the way of progress and reform. Had Luther espoused their cause, as they expected, their hope for success would have been by no means unreasonable. But even at the time when the peasants did not propose to take up arms he informed them that he was praying "God that he may enlighten you and oppose your undertaking, and not permit it to be successful."²¹ It was unfortunate that before the beginning of the peasants' movement he had decided upon a union of church and state. He fully realized that their proposed reforms, moderate indeed and sane though their programme was, would, if accepted by the princes, bring to naught all his own plans for a uniform reformation of the church by the civil authorities. Hence Luther proved their most formidable foe. The incomparably heartless words in which he, somewhat later, called upon the rulers to crush the rebellion will ever stand as a blot on the reformer's name. His bitterest enemies rejoiced and helped to spread his writings on the subject. The people saw themselves betrayed by the one who had been so largely instrumental in bringing them to a realization of the perverseness of existing conditions. To the success, however, of the Lutheran reformation the attitude of the people became, after the Peasants' War, a matter of comparative indifference. They were given no voice whatever, either in religious or in secular matters. Luther had identified his cause with that of the princes; the consequence was a strengthening of autocratic government in Lutheran countries.

The principle of liberty of conscience was eliminated from Luther's programme of reforms when he resolved upon a union of church and state. But the seed which he had sown in the first years of his reformatory labors was destined to spring up and yield abundant fruit. There arose a mighty

²⁰ Erlangen, Vol. LXI, p. 2439.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, p. 275.

popular party which took up the primeval war-cry of the Reformation—the Anabaptists. Had the state refused to lend its strong arm to any ecclesiastical body, the Anabaptists would, about the year 1528—i. e., a number of years before the rise of the Münster fanatics—have been the strongest religious party in South Germany. Those within the state churches, both new and old, who were ready to endure persecution for their creed constituted a far smaller number than that of the Anabaptist martyrs. Intolerance proved fraught with the direst consequences for the religious life of the people. All their anticipations of freedom were doomed to disappointment, and their religious interest, which had been aroused through Luther's early labors, turned into apathy and indifference. They accepted the principle expressed in the infamous maxim, *Cujus regio ejus religio*, which was formally subscribed to by the Estates in 1555; they professed the faith of the state and changed their creed on the command of the rulers—no less than five times in the instance of the unfortunate Upper Palatinate. The Anabaptists alone stood for separation of church and state and liberty of conscience; and only after their leaders and thousands of devoted Christian men and women had, within a few years, ended their lives at the stake or scaffold, did the movement lose its immediate peril to the old dogmas of state-churchism and “the burning of the heretics.” Although in northwestern Germany and Holland, in consequence partly of the unprecedented persecution, the movement for a time degenerated into fanaticism, it was never fully crushed. The Independents, Baptists, and Friends of England were the spiritual children of the Anabaptists—the true Protestants of the Reformation period.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

RELIGION AND MYTHOLOGY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

For a bird's-eye view of the development of the religion of the Hebrews as reconstructed by the modern historical school Marti's sketch¹ is unsurpassed. The salient features of the development are clearly conceived and rightly related to the movement as a whole. Lucidity of utterance matches clearness of thought, and the result is delightful reading. Intended as an introduction and background to the recently completed *Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament*, it constitutes an admirable résumé of the chief results of historical criticism as it affects Old Testament theology.

In Marti's hands the history of the religion of Israel resolves itself into four periods, which he designates (1) the religion of the nomads, (2) the religion of the farmers, (3) the religion of the prophets, and (4) the religion of the law; and this, with an introduction, a summary, and an index, constitutes his table of contents. Such a suggestive characterization stimulates to further examination. It may be somewhat ungraciously urged that this analysis of Israel's religious progress is based, at least in part, upon external and adventitious phenomena, rather than upon any real and sharply differentiated phases of the religion itself. Such criticism, however, is captious, and we should rather be thankful that the significance of the conquest and settlement in Canaan for Israel's religious experience and growth has been so rightly emphasized.

With reference to the much-discussed question of the attitude of the prophets toward the ritual, Marti takes the extreme view, declaring that the religion of Moses and his immediate successors was essentially non-ritualistic, and that the prophets adhering to the early customs opposed the ritual *per se* as wholly displeasing to Yahweh. They would have it done away with entirely as an encroachment of Baalism upon Yahwism. That the ritual was greatly enriched when Israel entered Canaan there can be little doubt, but a non-ritualistic religion among the nomads is inconceivable in view of the character of all primitive Semitic religions. Nor can the prophets be credited with so radical a departure from the established usages of their day, for the existence of religion itself would have been imperiled by the destruction of the ritual. Religion is essen-

¹ *Die Religion des Alten Testaments unter den Religionen des vorderen Orients*. Von K. Marti. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. vii+88 pages. M. 2.

tially ritual in its beginnings, and emancipation from ritual is a process requiring time for its successful accomplishment. The opposition of the prophets was directed against the deeply rooted conception that ritual was all that Yahweh demanded; their insistence was upon the worthlessness of ritual apart from a proper state of heart and life; the task they set before Israel was that of translating external symbol and ordinance into inner experience.

Marti's view that the prophets were the greatest of Israel's religious teachers, and that with them the culmination of the religion of Israel is attained, is open to question. Undoubtedly the ethicizing of Israel's religion is to be attributed to the prophets, and this was the most important single step taken in the religious progress of Israel. It is also true that the adoption of the law as the standard of life was an entering wedge that drove Israel and Yahweh ever farther and farther apart, breaking the sense of intimate fellowship and touch with God that characterized the prophets. But it must be remembered that the lawgivers began where the prophets left off, and that the ethical standards of the Jewish community, as reflected in post-exilic literature, are fully as high as those of the prophets themselves. Furthermore, the very fact of the removal of God from immediate contact with man is itself evidence of the highly exalted conception of the divine holiness and majesty as over against human weakness and sin. That a feeling of the divine sympathy and fellowship was by no means lost in the post-exilic community is clearly demonstrated by many psalms. Post-exilic religion was anything but an arid waste of formalism. It surpassed in complexity of interests, in depth of personal religious experience, and in magnificent affirmation of faith in the face of conditions making overwhelmingly for doubt and despair, any preceding stage of Israel's development. "New occasions teach new duties;" so the exilic and post-exilic lawmakers addressed themselves boldly and successfully to the great constructive task of making over their religion from a national inheritance into a vital, experiential possession of the individual and the church. The prophets dreamed their dreams and formulated their ideals in the monastic seclusion of Judah's hills; the priests and the sages of the later age wrought out their conclusions face to face with the great world, in the midst of the swirl of commerce, the clash of empires, and the maelstrom of conflicting philosophies and cults. It was pre-eminently a period of storm and stress, but over and above it all the faith of Israel soared triumphant. Who shall say whether prophet or priest is the greater? Each did his work and did it to the best of his ability, serving his day and generation in the fear of God.

In partial opposition to the general conception of Israel's religious development represented by Marti and the great majority of present-day scholars is Baentsch's monograph on monotheism.² According to the prevalent critical view, Israel achieved her monotheism only after a long struggle in which she successfully passed through the stages of animism, of polytheism and monolatry, arriving at her monotheistic goal finally in the days of Jeremiah and the exile. This advance in religious ideas went hand in hand with a similar rise in the plane of civilization. The Israel that gathered around Moses at Sinai was a horde of nomadic clans, lacking close inner connection, low in the scale of morals, with no literary attainments, ignorant of the arts and crafts, and thoroughly primitive in their social and civil relations. The entrance into Canaan meant for them a tremendous leap forward in their progress toward a high degree of civilization, and opened up to them the way toward world-wide conceptions both of things temporal and of things spiritual. This view has not been allowed to take possession of the field unchallenged. But the attempts to dislodge it have been based more or less upon theological presuppositions and prejudices, and have not been sufficiently concerned with actual facts. Hence they were doomed to failure in an age which will have nothing of theory, but thirsts for reality. Baentsch, however, is a historian and approaches his task solely from the historian's point of view. He belongs to the great body of historical critics and interpreters of the Old Testament, and has done splendid service in their ranks.³ Consequently when he differs from generally accepted conclusions, it must be for good reason. He does not hesitate to inform us that he himself "is certain of his case." Moreover, he claims to have found the answer to that question which has thus far baffled the historical student, viz., why was it that Yahweh, rather than Chemosh, Milcom, or some other national deity, became the sole God of heaven and earth?

In working out his conclusion, Baentsch first shows how monotheism arose in Egypt and Babylonia, and from these two centers made itself a home in the strip of cultivated land that formed the bridge between the two great empires over which marched the forces of commerce, culture, war, and religion (pp. 1-42). He clearly recognizes the limitations of this oriental monotheism, particularly the fact that it was after all a

² *Allorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus: Ein Wort zur Revision der entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Auffassung der israelitischen Religionsgeschichte.* Von B. Baentsch. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. xii + 120 pages. M. 2.40.

³ Witness his commentaries on Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers in the *Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament* (1900-02) and his *Heiligkeitgesetz* (1893).

species of philosophic speculation rather than an inborn, religious conviction; and, furthermore, that in Babylonia, at least, it did not find clear expression until very late in history. In contrast to oriental monotheism, which is astral in origin, presupposes polytheistic manifestations of the deity with which the worshiper satisfies his need for religious communion, is a philosophy for the learned few who seek unity amid multiplicity, and ever worships a nature-god, the monotheism of Israel is characterized as ethical and spiritual, as an experience and possession open to all, as conquering and excluding polytheism, and as worshipping a personal, spiritual God (pp. 42-48). These two types of monotheism having been thus set in bold relief, the balance of the brochure is devoted to tracing the relation between the two. In this effort much stress is laid upon the fact of the residence of Moses, and later of Israel, at Sinai and Kadesh, where it is urged that they must have come in contact with a monotheistic worship of Sin, the moon-god. But no convincing evidence is forthcoming that monotheistic speculations had penetrated into the deserts of Arabia in that age. Nor is the supposition that Yahweh was originally a weather-god subordinate to the moon-god, and that he at last superseded the latter, at all capable of verification. Still further, on the hypothesis that all this were true, it would yet remain a mystery why Yahweh should have superseded Sin, when none of the gods of the various other peoples encircling Sinai succeeded in so doing. Nor is it clear why the absorption of one nature-god by another should have produced a god both personal and ethical.

Nevertheless, we may agree with Baentsch that the ascription to the pre-prophetic Yahweh of a greater range of activity and of a more clearly defined tendency in the direction of monotheism is demanded. It must remain largely a matter of speculation where this movement toward universalism had its origin, whether at Sinai or after Israel came into contact with the life and thought of Canaan. The traditions concerning the theophany at Sinai with Yahweh "coming down" upon the top of the mountain and the narratives of the creation and the flood are indisputable evidence that Israel began to discard the swaddling-clothes of an exclusively national religion and to struggle painfully toward world-wide conceptions of God and life at a relatively early period in the development of its religious consciousness. The presuppositions and express utterances of the early prophets likewise demand some such attainments as their background and source.

This study by Baentsch is thus no reversion to an antiquated type of

thought; it is a piece of thoroughly careful historical work; it applies rigidly and consistently the strictest historical methods; and it secures results that in the main stand the test of the historian's judgment. Every student of the religion of the Hebrews must reckon with this treatise. It does not discredit the prevalent conception of the gradual, historical growth of the Hebrew religion; it simply pushes farther back into history the beginnings of the process, and grants a longer period for the growth and ripening of Israel's choicest fruits.

Closely resembling Baentsch's study in some respects, and like it tending in part toward a rehabilitation of traditional views, is Gressmann's important book on Hebrew eschatology.⁴ The reconstruction of the history of Israel's eschatological ideas on the basis of the literary criticism of Wellhausen, Stade, *et al.*, has been admirably presented by R. H. Charles, in his *Critical History of the Doctrine of the Future Life* (1899), and by Volz, in his *Vorexilische Jahweprophetie und der Messias* (1897) and *Jüdische Eschatologie* (1903). Gressmann is a follower of Gunkel, and consequently, while accepting the results of literary criticism, makes much of comparative mythology. The wide difference in the results attained may be expressed by saying that for Wellhausen eschatology is the goal of prophecy, while for Gressmann eschatology is the starting-point, the background, the source of prophecy.

Gressmann organizes his discussion under two great divisions, viz., the eschatology of bliss and the eschatology of woe. The first has to do almost entirely with the great Day of Yahweh; the second includes the golden age, the Messiah, the Servant of Yahweh, and the Son of Man. All of these conceptions are declared to have had their origin in the realm of myth, and therefore in the prehistoric period. For example, the golden age which is to succeed the present dispensation is but the reflection of the age of Paradise with which the present age began; the Messiah is a mythical, half-divine being, and the עֲלִמָּה of Isa. 7:14 is his goddess-mother; the Servant of Yahweh is likewise a resuscitated mythical being, a parallel form to the Messiah, related to the Tammûz-Adonis cult; and the Son of man is the first man, a divine being, who opened the present age and is to return to inaugurate the golden age. Not only so, but all of these great eschatological conceptions are of non-Israelitish origin; they are importa-

⁴ *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*. ["Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments," herausgegeben von W. Bousset und H. Gunkel, 6. Heft.] Von Hugo Gressmann, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905. viii + 378 pages. M. 10.

tions, most of them in a very early stage of Israel's existence, some of them at later periods. The great bulk of Israel's eschatology is of hoary antiquity; it was incorporated in Israel's consciousness in her infancy. But, we say, how then may we explain the fact that it is not until the post-exilic period that eschatology plays its important part in Israelitish literature? To meet this objection, Gressmann posits a new invasion of foreign eschatology in the later days, which not only brought in new materials, but also revived ideas that had long lain dormant. This invasion is a veritable *deus ex machina*.

We must also feel that Gressmann's view presupposes too great a barrenness of the Hebrew soul. Israel was certainly not totally lacking in the power of creative imagination either in literature or in religion. But Gressmann converts all poetic imagery into myth, and then assigns the myth to foreign sources. He is undoubtedly right in some instances; but his mythological broom sweeps too clean. For example, to call Yahweh a fire-god, and to say that Zephaniah's picture of the destruction of the world must be a survival of an old mythical view, because he speaks of the fire of Yahweh's wrath as causing the catastrophe, is not only to be guilty of an ungracious attempt to throw cold water upon Zephaniah's poetic fire, but also to ignore the fact that the anger of even human beings is often designated in the same way as when it is said of Cain, "it kindled (or was hot) to Cain exceedingly, etc." (Gen. 4:5). Again, it is surely not necessary to seek the basis of Isaiah's picture of the Assyrian invasion as an onrushing flood (Isa. 17:12; 28:17 f.) in a myth concerning an eschatological flood of real water. With the tradition of the deluge at hand the rich imaginative powers of Isaiah were certainly equal to the task of constructing such a figure as this, including its various details, without further extraneous aid. The mythological explanation of the great cedar of Ezek., chap. 31, is open to the same criticism. The reduction of Jeremiah's seventy years of exile to one year is an interesting process: seventy is a round number for seventy-two; the years are cycles of five days each, corresponding to the Babylonian five-day week; but five times seventy-two is three hundred and sixty—i. e., twelve lunar months of thirty days each, or one year. However, this result is hardly reconcilable with Jeremiah's letter to the exiles which urges them to build houses and raise families in view of a somewhat extended residence in Babylonia; and the sum and substance of this letter is quite generally acknowledged to be genuine.

Gressmann has, nevertheless, given us something more than a mass of ingenious speculations. The book evidences his wide reading, keen insight, and interpretative skill. His conclusions cannot be ignored. Some of them

are certainly right, as when, for example, in agreement with Baentsch and others, he insists upon granting a larger conception of God to the pre-prophetic period. The same thing may be said of his attribution to the pre-Amos idea of the Day of Yahweh more of the universal element than is conceded in my own history of this idea as given in a previous number of this *Journal*.⁵ But when Gressmann adds another stage—viz., the mythological—to the beginning of this history, the present writer cannot accept it as proven, though conceding the psychological possibility, or even probability, of such a basis for the later growth. One of the weakest sections of the discussion, it will probably be conceded, is the argument for the early origin of the various oracles concerning the messianic age (e. g., Mic. 4:1 ff.). The attempt to save these oracles by charging upon the prophets an almost total lack of the sense of logic is doomed to failure in the face of the splendid logic of many of the addresses of Amos, Isaiah, and Micah. Nor does the hypothesis of two great mythological world-conceptions, one looking toward total destruction of the world and the other toward the incoming of a glorious golden age, with the bridge between the two furnished by the doctrine of the remnant, add any strength to the argument for the retention of early promises of deliverance and glory.

The book is provocative of thought, and challenges discussion. It is one of the strongest products of the mythological school. The emergence and prominence of this school is the most marked feature in the recent history of Old Testament interpretation. At the beginning of the twentieth century the mythologs occupy a position analogous to that of the literary critics at the opening of the last century. Will the new school abide and play as prominent a part as has the old? Time will tell. Such names as Gunkel, Winckler, Cheyne, Jeremias, Jensen, and Zimmern promise great things. But whatever the outcome for historical criticism—and the school as a whole is far from moribund or being even in the least degree discouraged—it has already by its insistence upon the application of scientific method made its greatest contribution to the science of biblical interpretation. This is a permanent acquisition, and it renders return to the old dogmatic point of view impossible. The mythological school itself will be judged by the principles and methods of the historical school, and will stand or fall according as it does or does not rigidly adhere to these standards.

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⁵ J. M. P. Smith, "The Day of Yahweh," Vol. V (1901), pp. 505-33.

THE EGYPTIAN HEAVEN AND HELL

Deeply grounded in the religious ideas of the ancient Egyptians was the belief in a life beyond the grave, and their conceptions in regard to this life took definite shape at a very remote period. Here, as elsewhere, the characteristic conservatism of the Egyptians led them to retain, alongside of the more refined beliefs of an advanced civilization, the crude ideas of a primitive age, but at all times their conception of a future state was sufficiently material. With due allowance for the many variations in matters of detail to be found at various periods, the state of the blessed dead was a glorified reproduction of the life of the present world, while the gruesome imagination of the scribes depicted with grim realism the horrors in store for the damned. The purer doctrine of the religion of Osiris represented the fate of the dead in the next world as the reward or punishment of the deeds done in the body, and it cannot be doubted that this ethical doctrine was held by a numerous body of the Egyptians down to the latest times. Yet here again an incongruous element was superimposed. The faith in magic, handed down from primitive times, remained in full force, and it was very currently believed that by the use of "words of power" the deceased could, in the world beyond the grave, avoid all perils, overcome all obstacles, force his way into the abode of the blessed, and claim full participation in all the privileges enjoyed by its denizens. A result of this belief was the dull formalism which, in time, sapped all that was vital in the ancient religion, and against which the attempted reformation of Amenophis IV was, in part at least, a protest. Long before 3,000 B. C. magical formulae intended for the benefit of the dead had crystallized into shape, and the development of this important branch of magic may be traced from the Pyramid Texts of the Fifth or Sixth Dynasties, through the inscriptions on the coffin boards of the Middle Empire, to the Book of the Dead of the New Empire. The latter work, called by the Egyptians *Pr m hrw*, "coming forth by day," seems to have attained its final form under the Eighteenth or Nineteenth Dynasties, although it underwent a later recension about 600 B. C. In the main it represents the religion of Osiris, though with some encroachments, especially on the fact of the priesthood of Amon of Thebes, then the prevailing theological school in Egypt. The Pyramid Texts are not accompanied by pictures; these first appear about the time of the Eleventh Dynasty and thenceforward their use becomes increasingly frequent. From these interesting illustrations it is evident that, even at this period, the Egyptian priests and magicians had formulated their conception of the world beyond the grave in such way that they were prepared, not only to describe it in the texts, but even to represent pictorially both its topographical

features and the beings inhabiting it. Such representations had, of course, a practical use. While the texts furnished the deceased, in his journey through the realm of the departed, an effective means of overcoming all dangers and of securing his welfare, the illustrations would familiarize him with the localities through which he must pass and the appearance of the beings to be met with, thus enabling him to avoid straying into the numerous pitfalls that beset his path and to recognize the maleficent spirits and divinities lying in wait for him. In the time of the New Empire the principal book of the underworld was the Book of the Dead already referred to. At the same time, however, two other illustrated guides to Hades seem to have enjoyed considerable vogue, *Am Duat* or "(The Book of) that which is in Hades," and "The Book of Gates." Both these books trace the path of the sun-god as he sails in his boat through the portals of the western horizon and journeys on through the realm of the dead until he reappears in the east in the morning, his course being divided into twelve stadia corresponding to the twelve hours of the night. The accompanying illustrations present in full detail the scenes through which the god passes and the spirits and divinities, beneficent or malevolent, that line his path, while the names of all the infernal personages or localities are carefully noted. On their general plan the two books are very similar, but they differ considerably in their presentation of the subject. In *Am Duat* the twelve stadia are divided by ember doors, while in the Book of Gates the gates are strong fortifications defended by fire-spewing serpents and other monsters which yield only to the words of power by force of which the god gains admission. Both books exhibit a curious syncretism of tenets and myths derived from various localities and periods, but the Book of Gates adheres more closely to the teaching of the Book of the Dead, and in it greater prominence is given to the doctrine of Osiris. The book *Am Duat* also exists in an abridged form without illustrations, doubtless intended for those whose means forbade the purchase of the larger or more costly work.

The first two volumes of Dr. Budge's work¹ present the complete text and all the illustrations of the two books *Am Duat* and the Book of Gates, as well as the abridgment of the former, with a translation of the text and an explanation of the illustrations. The third volume contains a brief general introduction and a detailed analysis of the contents of the two books. The work in fact is not, as the title would suggest, a comprehensive study of the views of the Egyptians concerning heaven and hell, but rather a presentation of the views on this subject set forth in the two illustrated guides to

¹ *The Egyptian Heaven and Hell*. By E. A. Wallis Budge. 3 vols. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.; Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. 816 pages.

Hades, here edited entire, with some indications as to their proper historical setting. In his theory that the book *Am Duat* was composed with the view of asserting the absolute supremacy of Amon-Re in the Other World (Vol. III, p. 85) Dr. Budge is probably right, although the book is distinctly not religious, but magical, and appears to be the production, not of sober theologians, but of a school of religious mystics. His contention, however, that the Book of Gates was composed as a protest against the book *Am Duat*, in which Osiris occupies a subordinate position, in order to reassert the ancient Osirian doctrine, is open to serious doubt. While much greater prominence is given to Osiris, Re is here too the central figure, and the book bears all the earmarks of Theban influence. It is, in fact, a work of precisely the same class as *Am Duat*, although its mysticism takes a somewhat different direction. Bearing in mind the readiness with which apparently conflicting religious views were accepted by the Egyptians, and the strong tendency to interidentify divinities, even when their attributes are wholly dissimilar, it is entirely possible that there was no real conflict between the two books or the mystical schools of which they were the exponents. That they were not considered irreconcilable by the Egyptians themselves is shown by the fact that both books are found inscribed in the tomb of Seti I.

Dr. Budge's presentation of the material is orderly and clear; the illustrations, which form a vital part of the work, are admirably reproduced; and the typography is excellent. The very full index at the close of the third volume is most convenient, and the addition of the chapter on the reunion of the family in the next world (Vol. III, pp. 64-79) is especially welcome. Dr. Budge's handy edition of these interesting, if somewhat bizarre, books forms a useful supplement to his well-known edition of the Book of the Dead issued nine years ago.

CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTON

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HELLENISTIC RELIGION IN EGYPT

The first volume of Otto's work¹ was prepared as a thesis for the doctor's degree at the University of Breslau, and one section (II, 2) was printed a year earlier as the dissertation. In its present form it includes two distinct but closely related topics. Unfortunately, the break between the two volumes does not come at the close of the first topic (priests), but in the

¹ *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten: Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus*. Von Walter Otto. Band I. Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1905. xiv + 418 pages. M. 14.

middle of the second (temples). The first volume includes the chapter on the property and income of the temple, while the discussion of expenditures and administration (p. vi) is postponed to the second volume. For this reason I shall pass over the very interesting discussion of temple property in land, buildings, and slaves, with the account of loans, manufactures, trade, and other sources of income; this chapter should be reviewed, as it will be read, in connection with the second volume.

The subject is an extremely attractive one at the present time, for the large numbers of papyri recently discovered and in process of publication furnish a fund of information in addition to what was available from inscriptions and from literary sources. The papyrus records Dr. Otto has studied with great care, obtaining the critical assistance of Egyptologists for demotic material, with the result that he has been able to shed new light on many vexed questions. He has, in the first place, brought out the sharp distinction between Greek and Egyptian cults in Egypt, and, secondly, he has been at great pains to sift the material chronologically and to make clear changes in the names of officials, in their functions, and in their relations. One general result has been to show how unimportant were Greek and Roman cults in comparison with the ancient forms of worship. Outside of the Greek cities, Alexandria, Ptolemais, and Naucratis, Greek cults were hardly found except as a political institution under the Ptolemies; and even in these cities the worship of Alexander and the deified Ptolemies was the only important type of Greek worship. The cult of Serapis, in spite of some Greek connection, was mainly Egyptian in character. The unity of the whole period (pp. v, vi) lies in the fact that for nearly ten centuries the priesthood and temples were still Egyptian, but under the foreign influence of Greece and Rome; the period begins with foreign control by the Ptolemies, and ends only when Egypt fell into the hands of the Arabians and the Mohammedan caliphate.

The chapter on the gods of Hellenistic Egypt demonstrates that outside the distinctly Greek cities the names of Greek gods ordinarily refer to old Egyptian divinities; Apollo is a name for Haroeris, Aphrodite for Hathor, Asclepius for Imhotep. Similarly the names of Roman gods were attached to Egyptian and to Greek cults. The names of the persons connected with these cults, the organization of the priests, and the forms of worship, so far as known, constitute the necessary test.

The priesthood of the Greek gods in Egypt did not differ materially from the priesthood in Greece. Each center of worship was normally independent of all others; one priest, or a small group of priests, was sufficient to carry on the simple ritual; and the length of service, like the method of appoint-

ment, varied with each cult center. The author pays special attention to the one group of priests in regard to which we have much information—the priests of Alexander and the deified Ptolemies at Alexandria (cf. the lists in Anhang II, pp. 175 f.). From the standpoint of the priesthood he collects valuable data as to the exact time when the worship of Alexander was established in Alexandria, under Ptolemy II, and concludes that the date was in the winter (January or February), 274 B. C., in connection with the penteteric festival for which Theocritus wrote his *ἑγκώμιον εἰς Πτολεμαίων* (*Idyll.* 17, 17 f.) four years later.

In striking contrast with the simplicity of the Greek priesthood is the elaborate and complex organization of the Egyptian priesthood in this epoch. For the most part it was a closed caste, in which the son succeeded his father. At each temple there were two main classes of priests, an upper and a lower, with an *ἀρχιερεὺς* at the head. The priests of a given city or district formed a corporation over which a civil officer, *στρατηγός*, presided; in the Ptolemaic period the king, in the Roman period the *ἀρχιερεὺς Ἀλεξανδρείας καὶ Αἰγύπτου πάσης*, known also as the *ἴδιος λόγος* (a civil official), was at the head of the entire priesthood of Egypt.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that various points in the Roman administration of the province of Egypt are elucidated, and that the light thrown on Hellenistic culture in Egypt is by no means limited to the specific topics under discussion. Twelve pages of addenda give some of the material which has been published while the book was in press, and the author promises more in the second volume.

ARTHUR FAIRBANKS

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WAS JESUS A HISTORICAL CHARACTER?

In the most various departments of science it happens from time to time that assertions are put forth which at once strike the experts in the science as untenable, and yet cannot easily be shown to be so.

An example of this kind is furnished by the theories concerning the origin of Christianity which William Benjamin Smith, professor of mathematics in Tulane University, Louisiana, has published, separately in English in the *American Journal of Theology*, the *Hibbert Journal*, the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, the *Monist*, the *Outlook*, and now in a German translation in book form.¹ Professor Schmiedel, of Zurich, has written an intro-

¹ *Der vorchristliche Jesus. Nebst weiteren Vorstudien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Urchristentums.* Von William Benjamin Smith. Mit einem Vorworte von Paul Wilhelm Schmiedel. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1906. xix+243 pages. M. 4.

duction to the volume, in which he announces that he will later controvert the assertions of Professor Smith, and calls upon others to do so now. This, however, is not easy to do in the limited space of a review. It is, moreover, rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the book gives no complete picture, but consists of five mutually independent essays.

The first bears the title "Der vorchristliche Jesus," and endeavors to prove that Jesus was originally a god who in the two centuries before and after the birth of Christ was widely worshiped among the Jews, especially the Hellenists. The principal proof-passages for this is Acts 18:25, where it is said of Apollos that he had taught with exactness *ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, but knew only the baptism of John. In fact, this is a strange assertion. But it will not in any case bear Professor Smith's interpretation. As he himself says, the author of Acts narrates immediately after (19:5) that Paul told the disciples of John that the Coming One whom the Baptist had announced was Jesus. But it follows from this that in chap. 18, too, the reference was not to a pre-Christian but to the Christian Jesus. To be sure, if Apollos had exact knowledge of him, it could not be that he knew only the baptism of John; it follows that this latter statement must be regarded as unhistorical, but not that *ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ* is to be taken in a sense to which no other evidence points.

The reference, in a remark, to the Epistle to the Hebrews, which "not wholly without reason" is ascribed to Apollos, yields nothing for Professor Smith's case; for this letter speaks expressly in 4:15; 5:7; 12:2; 13:12 of the earthly life of Jesus. Furthermore, as concerns Simon Magus, it is nowhere affirmed of him that he had preached a pre-Christian Jesus; the false prophet of Acts 13:6, moreover, was called not Barjesus, but *בֶּרֶךְ יְשׁוּעָה*—i. e., "Son of Deliverance." Again, the notice of the Jewish exorcists who expel demons in the name of Jesus (19:13 ff.) is to be explained precisely as in the similar passages in the gospels (Mark 9:38 and parallels); it is said of them expressly that they had adjured the evil spirits by the name of that Jesus whom Paul preaches. Finally, the "we" first spoken of in chap. 16 do not travel wholly independently of Paul, but are he and his companions. Along this line also there is, accordingly, no proof of a pre-Christian Jesus-cult.

This disposes also of the alleged attempts of the author of Acts to explain how Christianity spread, as he is said incorrectly to have supposed, from one point. It may, in fact, perfectly well have had such an origin. For what Professor Smith at the end of this first essay anticipates from the second is likewise proved to be untenable; and the closing statement, that only on his hypothesis are the victory of Athanasius and the overthrow

of Arianism in both its older and its modern form explicable, proves only that Professor Smith is wholly ignorant of the forces that determined the development of the history of Christian doctrine.

The second article, "Die Bedeutung des Beinamens Nazaräus," Professor Smith issued for substance in 1905, and at that time laid it before a number of scholars for their judgment. Of these Professors Meyboom and Oort published a criticism of it in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift* for 1905, which contains what is most important. I may therefore deal with this point more briefly. Professor Smith thinks that Ναζαρεῖος is not to be derived from Ναζαρέτ, since the latter name occurs neither in the Old Testament nor the Apocrypha nor in Josephus and the Talmud, and that it is accordingly altogether fictitious. On the other side, if there had been no Nazareth, it would never have occurred to anybody to derive the name "Nazarene" from it. But if there was a Nazareth, then it is entirely possible that Jesus also, in accordance with a widespread custom, was called a Nazarene because he was born there. It is accordingly unnecessary to seek another explanation, and, as in the case of the name "Jesus," to find in it the name of a god. Professor Smith's proofs of this fall far short of proving. It is true that in the great Paris Magic papyrus, among other fictitious names of gods, there is found *νασσαρι*. But this does not prove, from the evidence advanced, anything respecting the later time from which the papyrus comes. And when Epiphanius speaks of the Nazarenes before Christ, this is of no weight in view of the silence of Josephus, Justin, Hegesippus, and Hippolytus. This essay, like the first, fails of its purpose.

In the third essay, which is called "Anastasis," Professor Smith seeks to show that the sentence, "God raised Jesus up," referred originally to his historic appearance. This applies to a couple of passages in the Acts; the rest is again without evidential value.

The fourth essay bears the title "Der Sämann sät den Logos," The parable of the sower and the four kinds of soil is alleged to go back to that which is found in Hippolyt, *Philos.*, v, 8, dealing with the sowing of the Logos. But is this form really so old? Professor Smith claims to have proved this in another study long ago ready for the press. In fact, it follows precisely from the quotation of I Cor. 10:11 in Hippolyt's form that it cannot be proved.

Finally the last, most extended essay, "Saeculi Silentium," affirms that the Epistle to the Romans is nowhere cited before 160 A. D. It is, however, already employed in I Peter. For, although the variation in form from the Septuagint of Isa. 28:16 in Rom. 9:32 and I Pet. 2:6 might, as Professor Smith maintains, go back to a reading of the Jewish synagogue, yet

the simultaneous quotation of Isa. 8:14 proves that the Epistle to the Romans and I Peter are related. And the former is the original, the latter the copy. For in I Peter it is not at all the unbelievers that are being discussed; and there was no need, therefore, to refer to their predestination. In Romans, however, this is the first preliminary solution given for the problem of the unbelief of Israel. This proves that the Epistle to the Romans was already extant in the first century. The Epistle to the Romans, I say, for that it grew up gradually out of separate elements I do not believe Professor Smith will prove even when he brings forward his proofs. If he wonders that the Epistle to the Romans is not expressly cited in I Peter, the reason of this lies precisely in this, that it was at that time not yet in the strict sense canonical; but it would not have been so accepted later, if it had then just recently come into existence. Here also, then, Professor Smith has not achieved what he undertook. If his other assertions are in themselves not impossible, yet, in connection with our other information concerning the origin of Christianity, they must be rejected. Professor Smith has devoted extraordinary diligence and keenness to a lost cause; he must acquire a sense for the natural and the simple before he can enjoy historical knowledge of the beginnings of our religion.

C. CLEMEN

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PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRIST

This volume¹ belongs to the "library" containing such noteworthy publications as those of Stapfer, Bovon, and Sabatier. But the express statement of the author places it in the class of semi-devotional writings, and the execution of his self-appointed task assigns it a place distinctly below first-class work both for interest and for value. Premising that the secret of Paul's unusually strong and joyous life was "his Christ and his Christology," he desires in the present study to discover that secret in order that he and his readers may be able to repeat this virile, buoyant life. His method is a very good illustration of how it ought not to be done. He asserts the genetic development of the apostle's conception of Christ and his work, but he abjures all necessity for conforming his study to it. He seeks to view the apostle's thought in its entirety and generality, and asserts that such a view may be accurate without one's knowing anything of how the apostle reached his thought. Even this is not unqualifiedly true. And

¹ *Essai sur la Christologie de Saint Paul: Première Partie, L'Oeuvre.* Par S. Monteil. Paris: Fischbacher, 1906. 264 pages.

M. Monteil does not consistently maintain his position. It being necessary for him to choose between Pauls' conception of the *person* and the *work* of Christ, he chooses the latter as a starting-point. This he does "because this is the proper approach for an understanding of the apostle." In this statement he is quite correct, but it implies a principle wholly different from the one which controls his study. The method he uses leads him to disregard, not only the psychological aspects of the apostle's development, but the chronological relations of the witnesses to the apostle's thought as well. The mechanical collocation of what Paul thought of Christ may possess inspirational value for some, and M. Monteil is apparently of this number; but there are those who fail to be warmed by the glow of enthusiasm which he really feels in his study. The inspiration and buoyancy of Paul do not appear. The secret is not disclosed.

But what of the material offered us? On certain fundamental questions our author is quite untraditional but on the question of sources is conventional enough. He accepts as authentic all writings assigned to Paul even preferring as most natural so to regard the Pastorals. As to the origins of Paul's thought, Monteil is independent, but not altogether satisfactory. He overstates the difference between Paul and the Old Testament when he asserts that the apostle broke with it absolutely. The fundamental contradiction between Paul and contemporary Judaism certainly existed, but that in some points the apostle simply continued Jewish thought is overlooked. The apostle's relation to Hellenism is more correctly represented. It is given practically no place in Paul's Christology, and the influence of the Wisdom of Solomon is properly depreciated. The apostle's experience of Christ is rightly valued as the chief source of his Christology, but in his discussion of this M. Monteil is a bit hazy.

But what was the work of Christ? It is divided into two general phases—the objective and subjective. The objective work is discussed under three subdivisions: the pre-existent, the historical, and the post-resurrection. From Col. 1:15 he understands that Christ is himself the first of God's creation. He is also the agent of all of God's subsequent creative activity. God is the originator and Christ the mediator. M. Monteil very accurately represents Paul's thought of Christ's pre-existent activity by this one word, "Mediator." The resurrection, he says, is that without which Christ would not be Christ, but its place in Paul is indicated only, not expounded. The intercessory activity of this last stage of Christ's career M. Monteil thinks Paul regarded, as "verbal and oral," or he would not have seen anything peculiar in it. Christ's whole heavenly life is also intercessory

in the sense that it is directed to the welfare of humanity, and especially of the Church. It will be completed in his work as judge. The historical life of Christ naturally has little place in the writings of Paul, but he really knew it intimately and in his preaching made large use of it. His gospel was an interpretation of that life. The death and resurrection of Christ held the largest place in the apostle's thought. So far the discussion provokes little criticism. But what is the significance of that death. The traditional, expiatory-substitutionary theory is not found in Paul. The death of Christ is for the purpose of effecting reconciliation between God and man. This reconciliation does not affect either God or man exclusively, but is essentially a change in the relations between them. How is it efficacious to this end? Monteil apparently thinks its primary address is to men, but thinks Paul gives no explanation of the manner, and to give any is to go behind him. Why is it efficacious? Simply because God chooses to make it so and it is. If to us this is arbitrary, it was not to Paul, and we need feel no difficulty. Here Monteil is weakest. At the point we most desire a definite statement it is frankly declared to be impossible, because it cannot be gained by interpretation. One cannot but believe that failure here is due to the writer of the book and not to the apostle.

The subjective work of Christ is discussed in its relation to the individual and the church. The latter is not particularly valuable, though true to the apostle so far as it goes. But the most important phase of this section of the apostle's thought is not considered. In his discussion of the work of Christ in the individual he more fully covers the ground, and does his best piece of work. In affirming the flesh to be not the cause but the seat of sin, and their relation not logical but empirical, M. Monteil shows his keenest insight into Paul.

He sums up the apostle's thought of Christ's work in the one word "mediator." This is to be taken in the sense of "intermediary." Christ is God's agent in all activity. From God all things, even Christ, come, and to him all will return. For man, Christ's significance is summed up in this: he reconciles him with God and makes him a new creature (II Cor. 5:17, 18). The argument throughout the book is too largely assertion, and will not convince one who does not already believe. It is clever, not keen; confident, not strong; enthusiastic, not persuasive; largely true, but not convincing. At the vital point we are left in the air. The author himself confesses his inability to help us to *terra firma*.

J. W. BAILEY

OSHKOSH, WIS.

EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

Von der Goltz's *Tischgebete*¹ is devoted to showing that in the institution of the Lord's Supper Jesus Christ outwardly follows simply the prevailing customs and forms of the Jewish family meal on all festival days. He examines first the Jewish meal-time customs, then the celebration of the Lord's Supper in apostolic times, then the custom of blessing the food as it appears in the Greek liturgy, and, finally, the traces of the eucharistic celebration in Greek family and monastic table prayers, finding that all forms have their common origin in the simple sacred meal of the Jews. He notes in conclusion that, although as regards form the ceremony of the Supper is borrowed from Jewish custom, as regards meaning it was something more; and he observes "how indelible the new spiritual stamp was" that the Lord put upon the ancient prayers and usages.

Bauer's *Hippolytus*² is a constructive contribution to the literary history of the early church, of the first order. He identifies the second part of the Codex Matritensis Gr. 121, formerly regarded as made up of four anonymous works (of which one is the *Stadiasmus maris magni*), as the hitherto unrecognized Greek original of the first half of the chronicle of Hippolytus. He further identifies three Latin works hitherto regarded, sometimes as independent works, sometimes as excerpts, and sometimes as translations of the chronicle, as, in fact, three independent translations from the original Greek. An edition is here given of the recovered Greek text as far as it extends, together with the texts of the three versions in parallel columns. The literary historical essays of the introduction and appendices bring out much of interest regarding the time of composition, which he fixes at 234 A. D., and concerning the transmission and use of the chronicle by others. Four pages of facsimile, and especially a genealogical table of the redactions of the Diamerismos add to the interest, this latter especially being a most admirable example of genuine higher criticism and genealogical literary history.

Leipoldt's *Didymus der Blinde*³ is an admirable study of this rather

¹ *Tischgebete und Abendmahlsgebete in der altchristlichen und in der griechischen Kirche.* Von Eduard von der Goltz. ["Texte und Untersuchungen," herausgegeben von Gebhardt und Harnack, N. F., XIV, 2 b.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 67 pages. M. 2.

² *Die Chronik des Hippolytos im Matritensis Graecus 121.* Von Adolf Bauer. Nebst einer Abhandlung über den Stadiasmus maris magni von Otto Cuntz. ["Texte und Untersuchungen," N. F., XIV, 1.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 6+288 pages. M. 8.50.

³ *Didymus der Blinde von Alexandria.* Von Johannes Leipoldt. ["Texte und Untersuchungen," N. F., XIV, 3.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 4+148 pages. M. 5.

neglected Alexandrian writer, and perhaps justifies to some degree, or at least accounts for, the relative neglect; for it shows a man whose life was uneventful and whose writings, although extravagantly esteemed by the men of his time, had little power to affect the course of history. Learning from both Athanasius and Origen, he did not have, as Leipoldt shows, the grip of personality to organize this learning into a new living doctrine, and he left a mosaic of thought rather than an organism. This mosaic is, however, valuable in the extreme as material for the understanding of the fourth century, and more than justifies this effort to repair neglect, even if the blind theologian did exert no great influence on the historical development of Christian doctrine. Leipoldt's excellent bibliographical survey of the writings of Didymus is as useful for literary history as his extended analysis of Didymus' personal character and teachings is for doctrinal history—and this is saying much, for the compact but thorough analysis of the learning and teaching of Didymus is the chief substance of the work, and forms a sort of compendium which must be very welcome to any student of the times.

Leipoldt's contribution to the chronological data for the life of Didymus is not in the direction of simplicity, but may be, none the less, a contribution. Palladius says that his acquaintance with Didymus extended over ten years, and that Didymus died at the age of eighty-five; taking Butler's chronology of Palladius, which gives 388 to 400 as the date of his residence in Egypt, Leipoldt infers that Didymus was born in 313 and died in 398; this flatly contradicts the apparently explicit statement of Jerome that Didymus was eighty-three years old in 392, according to which his death at eighty-five would have been in 394. Leipoldt offers two reasons for rejecting the explicit testimony of Jerome: first, Jerome's well-known careless haste in matters of detail, and, second, possible textual corruption. But, on the other hand, this is not a hasty slip; for Jerome, who had studied with Didymus within six years (even if it was only for thirty days), and had been in constant correspondence with him since, states that Didymus is still living (in 392) and has already passed his eighty-third year, which is a peculiarly definite and circumstantial statement, as far as possible removed from those characteristic slips of inattention through careless haste of writing to which Leipoldt refers; and, on the other hand, there is still less ground for supposing textual corruption. It is true that one of the oldest manuscripts (Verona) has eighty instead of eighty-three, but this reading is not supported by any other manuscript of its immediate group, and is by all the rules of textual descent definitely identified as an error originating in this manuscript. It is true also that another ancient manuscript (Paris A) reads

eighty-seven, another thirty-three, and so on; but, so far as known evidence goes, every well-defined group of manuscripts has a demonstrated eighty-three. So far as the evidence goes, therefore, Jerome at least definitely supposed that Didymus was eighty-three years old in 392. If, however, Butler's chronology of Palladius is correct, and Palladius correct in giving age at death as eighty-five, it seems equally clear that Jerome was wrong in his impression. The whole matter hinges on the validity of Butler's chronology, which is accepted by Leipoldt, and probably by most scholars at the present time, as over against that of Preuschen, and anyone would be slow to question so thoroughly reasoned-out a scheme. At the same time, it must be confessed that, on the face of it, and regarded as a matter of evidence, Jerome's statement becomes a positive evidence for the chronology of Preuschen, in that, if his chronology is accepted rather than that of Butler, all the circumstances and statements regarding this particular matter dovetail perfectly; Didymus was eighty-three in 392, as Jerome says; he died after Palladius had known him for ten years, which was, as Preuschen says, in 394; and in 394 he would have been, according to Jerome, eighty-five years old, which was, in fact, according to Palladius, his age at death. If Preuschen is right thus, Jerome and Palladius are both right; but if Butler is right, Jerome is mistaken.

ERNEST CUSHING RICHARDSON

PRINCETON, N. J.

RECENT BOOKS ON CHURCH HISTORY

GENERAL CHURCH HISTORY

Weingarten's *Zeittafeln*¹ is an old favorite with the students of church history, and in the present improved edition will be more welcome than ever. Dr. Arnold, the new editor, has brought the work down to the most recent times. When dates are disputed, he gives more than one, with the names of their respective advocates. He contributes an important appendix on the history of hymns, in which, however, he knows only those of the German language. He supplies a number of genealogical tables, which had been called for by the purchasers of the previous editions. The book is valuable, not only for its chronology, but also for its exact statements of the typical doctrines which have been held by individuals and schools. With all its excellences it is not faultless. It is somewhat lame when it enters England and America. For example, it mentions William Carey but once, and then

¹ *Weingartens Zeittafeln und Überblicke zur Kirchengeschichte*. Sechste Auflage. Vollständig umgearbeitet und bis auf die Gegenwart fortgeführt. Von Carl Franklin Arnold. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. M. 4.80; geb. 5.80.

only to notice that he finished his translation of the Bible into Bengalee in 1809, leaving us entirely ignorant of his great life and his significance as the pioneer of modern Protestant missions. Some things might be omitted without loss, and the space occupied with better materials. For instance, it is doubtful if the publication of Goethe's rather unclean novel, *Selective Affinities*, belongs to church history. There is an index, but it leaves out many things which it should include. Let us be thankful, however, for what the book supplies; and that is a rich treasury of facts and dates in the history of the church, carefully sifted, verified, and arranged.

THE EARLY PERIOD

The little book on Cyprian* which lies before us is one of a series entitled "Men of the Kingdom." It is the purpose of the editors of the series to make the volumes brief and strictly popular. The writer on Cyprian has fulfilled this purpose excellently. He has made good use of the sources, and also of the critical labors of Benson, Otto Ritschl, Goetz, and others. He is thoroughly Protestant in his interpretation of the history. His carelessness of English grammar is his greatest defect. But his book is interesting in spite of this fault.

The book of Dr. Wieland³ is the first of a series entitled "Mensa und Confessio: Studien über den Altar der altchristlichen Liturgie." If its successors shall prove to be as learned and as impartial as this volume, the entire work will be of great value. It is something new for a Roman Catholic scholar to maintain propositions like the following: The Eucharist was not considered an offering by the apostles, or by the earliest Fathers. Nor had they any altar in the sense of a piece of liturgical furniture. When Paul and the apostolic fathers speak of an altar, they do not mean a concrete altar, but Christ, or communion with God. We find neither offering nor altar, in the present sense of the words, before the second century. The author gives us several reproductions of paintings in the Catacombs to sustain his view.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

FRANKLIN JOHNSON

An interesting study of Justin Martyr's⁴ doctrine concerning Christ, by a Jesuit priest, has the approbation of the superintendent of the order in Germany, and bears the imprimatur of the archbishop of Freiburg in

* *Cyprian: The Churchman*. By John Alfred Faulkner. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham, 1906. 226 pages. \$1.

³ *Der Altar der vorkonstantinischen Kirche*. Von Franz Wieland. München: Lentner. viii + 167 pages.

⁴ *Justins des Märtyrers Lehre von Jesus Christus*. By Alfred Leonhard Feder. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1906. 303 pages. \$2.60.

Baden. There are two quite distinct sides to this book—one historical and the other dogmatic, one mainly objective and characterized by much thoroughness and clearness, the other subjective and marked by loyalty to Catholic tradition. On its more theological side the book seems to be especially open to criticism. But before we notice this, we may give a moment's attention to one or two points which, though having plain significance for dogma, are chiefly historical in character. And first, in the assumption that the apostle Paul wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews (p. 147), the almost unanimous conclusion of modern scholars is quietly ignored. How can a scientific writer set this aside without a word in justification of his own view? The importance of this question is greatly increased by the fact that a Pauline and apostolic authorship of Hebrews would lend weight to Justin's Logos-doctrine.

Again, in establishing the statement that Justin drew the materials of his Logos-doctrine from the Old Testament, the author uses this language: "In the writings of the Old Testament a divine power reveals itself, coming forward more and more clearly as time passes, which under the various names 'Angel of God,' 'Messiah,' 'Wisdom,' and 'Word' stands as a self-manifesting personality by the side of Jehovah." This statement is open to objection in two points at least: first, that there is in the Old Testament a gradually increasing revelation of a divine power by the side of Jehovah; and, second, that such a divine power is *ever* revealed in the Old Testament under the name "Messiah."

Again, it is noteworthy that the author, while allowing that John and Paul made use of the terminology of the gentile doctrine of the Logos, denies that they were influenced as to the thought (*sachlich*) by the Alexandrians.

The author says: The Philonian Logos is not God in the proper sense of the term; the Christian Logos is a spiritual hypostasis, true Son of God and God. But the first part of this statement is questionable, and the second clearly goes beyond the New Testament. Again, the Philonian Logos is said to be only the *instrument* of Creation, while the Christian Logos created the world. Here also we must say that the New Testament is misrepresented, for in that God is always the creator, the Logos never. Creation is sometimes said to be *through* the Logos, never *by* him. Finally, it is said that the Alexandrian Logos could have assumed a body only in a docetic sense, while the Christian Logos became true man. But it does not appear from anything that the author says about Philo's doctrine that the Logos as he conceived of it could not have become man. Thus the author's attempt to show the New Testament's real independence of Alexandrian influence in the matter of the Logos is not satisfactory.

Thus much for the more historical side of the book. When we turn to its more theological character, we are less able to go with the author. Let one or two points be cited in illustration of this phase of the book. The heading of the second part of the book carries the thought that Justin had a definite doctrine of the Trinity. This is indeed Feder's view, but he hardly removes the difficulties in the way of holding it. Note *Apology*, I, 6, where Justin mentions angels between the Son and the Spirit as equally with them worthy of worship, and his view that the *whole* Logos appeared in Jesus, while only a part has appeared in other men.

It is admitted that Justin did not teach the essential equality of the three persons of the Trinity. He is regarded as a subordinationist. By what standard is he tried? Ostensibly by that of the New Testament, but really by that of the Nicene Council. "In the New Testament," Feder says, "the dogma of the most holy Trinity came to the clear knowledge of men: it was plainly taught that there are three in God, and that all three are God" (p. 116). But he does not establish this statement. He takes its truth for granted.

The foregoing remarks have perhaps indicated the quality of the book before us. The final criticism to be made upon it is the criticism to which all theological writings are open whose authors accept the authority of the church as supreme. If one believes at the outset and is bound to maintain that the Nicene Council gave a final theological interpretation of the Scripture teaching about Jesus Christ, one is thereby rendered incompetent to investigate that teaching in a historical manner. To one who holds this position theological progress is forever impossible.

GEORGE H. GILBERT

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THE MEDIAEVAL PERIOD

A valuable contribution to what is known of Johannes Scottus is found in the second number of the new series of mediaeval Latin texts,⁵ issued under the general editorial supervision of Professor Traube, Munich, who in a brief introduction emphasizes, as he has done more fully in many valued writings in the past, the varied interest and importance of the Latin philology of the Middle Ages.

Professor Rand edits in a text of fifty pages the commentary of Johannes Scottus to the following of the *Opuscula sacra* of Boethius: *Tractatus I*,

⁵ *Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters*. Herausgegeben von Ludwig Traube. Band I, Heft II. Johannes Scottus, von Edward Kennard Rand. München: Beck, 1906. x+106 pages. M. 6.

De trinitate; Tractatus II, III, *Ad Sanctum Iohannem*; Tractatus V, *Contra Eutichen et Nestorium*. This commentary, recognised as the work of a man versed in grammar and dialectics, acquainted with Greek, and of considerable independence in his theological thought, had been assigned by other scholars, especially Schepss, to the period of Johannes; but Rand in his prolegomena seems to prove clearly, even in the face of some apparent obstacles, that the author is no other than Johannes himself. If it is admitted that it was written about 870, when, near the close of his life, he was seeking to escape the odium of heterodoxy, certain inconsistencies with the bolder speculation of the *De divisione naturae* and other earlier works seem not unnatural. The extensive use made of the commentary is shown by the fact that it is known to us in at least ten manuscripts, dating from the ninth to the eleventh centuries, in five of which it is an independent work, while in the others it appears in the form of marginal or interlinear glosses. To us its great interest lies in the proof it affords of the influence of Boethius upon the development of the theological thought of the Middle Ages, while also making evident the position of Johannes Scottus as the forerunner of scholasticism.

The last twenty pages Rand devotes to a study of Remigius of Auxerre as a commentator upon Boethius, and edits, by way of illustration, the most valuable portion of his glosses, those on Tractatus IV, *De fide catholica*, which evidently was not found in the manuscript annotated by Johannes. To its service in filling this gap was due, undoubtedly, the popularity of Remigius' work. It was clearly not much later than that of Johannes, by whom Remigius was greatly influenced, while at the same time he showed himself more jealous of his reputation for orthodoxy, and perhaps more fond of those puerile discussions so characteristic of later scholasticism.

The typographical appearance of the volume is most attractive, and the clear form of the critical apparatus is to be commended.

EDWARD A. BECHTEL

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

While the Council of Basle was in session, Charles VII, of France, complained that Martin V and Eugenius VI were partial to the English and foreigners generally. As early as 1432 he decreed that all incumbents to benefices must be agreeable to himself and be subjects of his kingdom. But in 1438 he caused a profound and lasting sensation by ordaining the celebrated Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. The main provisions of this Pragmatic Sanction are as follows: first, general councils are superior in authority to the Pope; second, churches and abbeys are to elect their own

heads; third, the payment of annats, etc., is forbidden; fourth, papal bulls in France are subject to the scrutiny and approval of the king. It is easy to see how this ordinance of Charles was startling, and how it became an important factor in the later reformatory movement in France. It is a matter of much interest that the committee on the archives of religious history in France have thought it worth while to take up this very important document and make it the subject of 192 closely printed pages. The work⁶ has been admirably done by M. Noël Valois, a member of the French Institute.

There are four chapters, whose headings will give the reader an idea of the scope of the volume. These headings are as follows: "Le régime antérieur;" "Le régime institué en 1438;" "L'application de la Pragmatique;" "Les nouveaux projets de Concordat." To these chapters is an addition of "Pièces relatives à l'histoire de la Pragmatique sanction de Bourges." These *pièces* cover 288 pages. The entire work thus consists of 480 pages.

There is a good alphabetical index.

J. W. MONCRIEF

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Cäsarius von Heisterbach was a Cistercian monk of the thirteenth century who attained a certain prominence as a writer on theological subjects. From several of his works Koeniger has brought together the substance of his teaching concerning the confessional.⁷ The result is a clear exposition of the theory and practice as they obtained in Germany in the Middle Ages.

Did Pope Honorius III grant full absolution to all Catholics who should enter, reverently and penitently, the church now commonly known as the Portiuncula? Sabatier, in the first edition of his *Life of St. Francis*, answered this question in the negative; but he changed his opinion and answered it in the affirmative in his second edition. Dr. Kirsch, the author of this small treatise,⁸ began his study of the subject with a prepossession in favor of the affirmative, but changed his view to the negative in the course of his researches. The little book which we have from his pen tells us why in a few pages of cogent argument.

⁶ *Histoire de la Pragmatique sanction de Bourges sous Charles VII.* Par Noël Valois. Paris: Picard. cxcii + 288 pages. Fr. 10.

⁷ *Die Beicht nach Cäsarius von Heisterbach.* Von Albert Michael Koeniger. München: Lentner, 1906. x + 107 pages. M. 2.40.

⁸ *Der Portiunkula-Ablass: Eine kritisch-historische Studie.* Von Peter Anton Kirsch. Tübingen: Laupp, 1905. 95 pages. M. 1.20.

THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION

We have before us two books on the Reformation: one, a new edition of an old favorite; the other, an entirely new study of the movement.

The first⁹ is Fisher's history of the Reformation. As is well known, Fisher surveys the entire revolution in all European countries. His book, in this latest edition, no doubt contains much which is not found in the earlier editions. But there is absolutely nothing to guide the reader to these improvements. Indeed, but for the words "New and Revised Edition" on the title-page, he would not think of looking for any changes; and, as it is, when he looks for them he has no means of finding them. He is obliged therefore to estimate the book precisely as he would if it were not said to be "new and revised." His opinion of it will necessarily be favorable, for it has long held a high place, in spite of a certain timidity in dealing with controverted points, an apologetic tone, which might suggest, though erroneously, that the convictions of the author are wavering and weak.

The other volume¹⁰ to which we have referred is the first of two intended to cover the entire ground in all countries. This first volume treats exclusively of the Lutheran Reformation. The second volume, which is soon to appear, will treat of the Reformation in countries other than Germany, of the anti-pedobaptist denominations of the period, and of the Counter-Reformation. But will not the work, thus distributed, be out of balance, with an assignment of space which allows as much to Germany as to all other lands? When we turn to the first volume, now before us, we find much to commend. The chapters which treat of the social condition of Germany in the sixteenth century are especially satisfactory. The discussions of theological doctrines are often clear and strong. When the author works from the sources, he is able, vigorous, and stimulating; but when he trusts his general impressions, he is sometimes liable to error. On the whole, his volume is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the subject.

Turning from the Reformation to the preparation for it, we have a good study¹¹ of the religious thinking of Luther from his childhood to the year 1517. The author is here breaking fresh ground, and with excellent effect.

⁹ *The Reformation*. By George Park Fisher. New and Revised Edition. New York: Scribner, 1906. xxx+525 pages. \$2.50 net.

¹⁰ *A History of the Reformation*. By Thomas Lindsay. I, "The Reformation in Germany." New York: Scribner, 1906. xvi+528 pages. \$2.50.

¹¹ *Le développement de la pensée religieuse de Luther jusqu'en 1517, -d'après des documents inédits*. Par André Jundt. Paris: Fischbacher, 1906. vii+252 pages.

It is astonishing that so much remains to discover about Luther, who concealed nothing in his lifetime, and concerning whom thousands of persons have written. M. Jundt enables us to see how well Luther was equipped for his mission when the time came for him to enter upon it. His opinions had then reached the precise stage which fitted him to guide Germany in the first steps of her great religious revolution. Both by the conceptions which he had formed, and his continued adhesion to conceptions which he was destined soon to overpass, was he qualified for his task of leadership.

From Luther to Melanchthon is but a step, and we are asked to take it in company of Kolde, as he brings before us a slight but interesting addition¹² to our knowledge of the Augsburg Confession. Much has been done in recent years to illustrate the history of this creed, and every nook and corner of Germany has been searched for materials which could cast light on the process of its formation. Among the small but important contributions to the subject is a Latin manuscript discovered in the archives of Nuremberg by Dr. Karl Schornbaum, and now edited and published by Dr. Kolde. It is the earliest sketch by Melanchthon of the Apology as it was slowly taking shape in his mind. The changes which were made before its completion are carefully set forth by the author, who accompanies his study of the document with a study no less minute of the external history which led to the final and greatly improved form which it ultimately received.

The second volume¹³ of Lea's great work contains all the excellent features which were so conspicuous in the first. Four subjects are treated: (1) How wide was the jurisdiction of the Spanish Inquisition? (2) What was its organization? (3) Whence did it derive its financial support? (4) How did it proceed in the trial for heresy? These questions are answered with a carefulness of research and a fulness of detail which leave little to be desired. The entire work, of which two more volumes are to appear, promises to be one of the most satisfactory which this distinguished historian has given to us.

As the world waited till the middle of the nineteenth century for a good life of Luther, though thousands of so-called lives had been written before, so it has waited till the beginning of the twentieth century for a good life

¹² *Die älteste Redaktion der Augsburger Konfession, mit Melanchthons Einleitung.* Zum erstenmal herausgegeben und geschichtlich gewürdigt von Theodor Kolde. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. 115 pages. M. 2.

¹³ *A History of the Inquisition of Spain.* By Henry Charles Lea. Vol. II. New York: Macmillan, 1906. xi+608 pages. \$2.50 net.

of Karlstadt,¹⁴ though hundreds of so-called lives had been written before. In both cases the advance in the character of the work has been secured by the careful study of letters, diaries, and other obscure sources of evidence. In both cases the gain has been so remarkable that the preceding biographies now seem to be legends, rather than narratives of sober truth. In both cases, also, the men who have been the subjects of investigation have been placed far higher in the esteem of impartial readers.

This is notably the case with Karlstadt, about whom an atmosphere of peculiar odium had gathered. Almost every feature of his character comes forth into fair and enviable light, like an old portrait when it is cleansed. It is not true that in the absence of Luther, he forced reforms in Wittenberg to which the citizens or any of the leading university professors were disinclined. It is not true that he was moved by the "heavenly prophets," as Luther called them, to push to extremes the measures which he favored. It is not true that anybody in Wittenberg was greatly influenced by these visitors. It is not true that there was any great violence committed in the reformation of worship at Wittenberg under the leadership of Karlstadt. It is not true that there was anything radical or dangerous in the books of Karlstadt which the censor condemned and destroyed. It is not true that Karlstadt said or did anything worthy of banishment from Saxony, or of any other penalty. It is not true that when he died he left his wife and children in abject poverty. So we might go on indefinitely to deny statements found in the ordinary lives of Luther and Karlstadt, and disproved by Barge in this admirable book.

But the work is in no sense a defense of Karlstadt against his accusers. Barge dissipates ignorance, but he recognizes abuse only casually. He gives us simply a calm and judicial investigation, and the denials to which it leads, and of which we have given a few specimens, follow from a dispassionate survey of the facts.

But, on the other hand, it is not denied that Karlstadt was inclined to go too far and too fast as a reformer, that he paid too little attention to the views of the civil authorities, or that he was too much inclined to mysticism and radicalism.

All future historians of the German Reformation will be greatly indebted to Barge for the unwearied industry with which he has examined every scrap of evidence that could tell him anything about his subject, and for the impartial spirit in which he has written. And readers in general will be no less grateful for his labors. The work lacks the charm of onward-

¹⁴ *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*. Von Hermann Barge. Leipzig: Brandstetter, 1905. Two vols. xii+500 and x+632 pages. M. 10.

flowing narrative; but, on the other hand, it possesses the charm of logical discussion, of evidences weighed in just balances, of a style fairly perspicuous, and of an orderly arrangement of the materials.

FRANKLIN JOHNSON

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The third volume of Doumergue's elaborate work¹⁵ follows the same method adopted in the first two volumes. It seeks to show Calvin in his historical setting, and this means almost the entire contemporary history of Calvin's time. The method, we think, is the true one, for nothing is more sure than that neither things nor persons can be understood apart from their relations. If history falls short of interpretation, it is not history in any worthy and dignified sense. But interpretation involves a very wide and complicated network of relations.

The present volume treats of Calvin at Geneva. The work is so thoroughly done that at the end the reader finds that he has covered the whole social and religious life of the town, not only of Calvin's time, but much of it from early times. It treats of the archaeology, the suburbs, the walks, the streets, the houses, the churches, the hotels, the lower and the upper city. All this is done with a minuteness of detail and a skilfulness of combination that make a vivid portrayal of the urban life.

The chapter on the hotels has a lively interest. There are descriptions of the buildings, of the appointments, of the people native and foreign who assemble there, of the subjects discussed, of the influences that come from these meetings and discussions.

The chapter on Calvin at home brings the reader very close to the real life of the man. The second part of this chapter mentions his diseases. The list is truly appalling—sick headaches, catarrhs, pleurisy, phthisis, hemorrhoids, fevers, nephritic colic, gout, renal calculus. This alone would seem sufficient to account for Calvin's irritability and severity, and we marvel as we contemplate his prodigious achievements in preaching, teaching, writing, and administering.

There was, however, a genial side to his nature, for he says: "Nor is it anywhere forbidden to laugh, or to enjoy food, or to add new possessions to old and ancestral property, or to be delighted with musical harmonies, or to drink wine."

The work is adorned by the reproduction of 99 old prints, autographs, etc., and 124 original designs by H. Armand-Delille.

¹⁵ *Jean Calvin: Les hommes et les choses de son temps.* Par E. Doumergue. Tome troisième. Lausanne: Bridel, 1905. 722 pages. Fr. 30.

THE MODERN PERIOD

Mosheim¹⁶ came upon the stage at a critical period in the history of the church. Three schools with strong organizations of spiritual forces were in the field—Orthodoxy, Pietism, and Deism. Mosheim found much in each of these schools that he valued highly. He firmly held to the truth of the Christian religion as conceived by the Lutherans. He believed that the Lutheran dogmatic system had not been damaged in the least, so far as its leading features were concerned. But he could not go with the Wittenberg theologians when they claimed that the formulations of the sixteenth century were established forever without variableness or shadow of turning. With the Pietists he joined in their opposition to the hair-splitting distinctions that prevailed in dogmatics, but he could not go to the extent of eliminating the intellectual element entirely. With the German illumination, the English latitudinarians, and even the Deists he found much that harmonized very well with his own conceptions; for surely Christianity is a reasonable religion; but reason that entirely eliminates emotion is unreason.

With none of these schools, accordingly, could Mosheim cast in his lot. Yet he founded no school of his own, and the only course left is to classify him as a transitional historian. A comparison with Neander is instructive. Neander went deeper, and let the character and genius of the men of history illuminate and vitalize his narrative. Mosheim did not seem to get back of their opinions.

Yet we are very far from even suggesting that Mosheim was not a very important influence in the development of church history. His criticisms of the philosophical and theological schools that he opposed were telling, and many of them were final.

Mosheim, while much drawn into public life, was constitutionally averse to such a life. He preferred the seclusion of his library and the close companionship of a few intimate friends.

His wide and profound learning very firmly attached his students to him, and through them his influence passed into succeeding generations.

Dr. Heussi has worked over all the material, utilized the knowledge of numerous friends, and given us a very interesting biography of the great transitional church historian of the eighteenth century.

J. W. MONCRIEF

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¹⁶ *Johann Lorenz Mosheim: Ein Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts.* Von Karl Heussi. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 237 pages. M. 6.

Mr. Burrage is a young scholar whose researches have been rewarded by the discovery of three manuscript writings of Robert Browne, the father of modern Congregationalism: "Browne's Letter to His Uncle," "An Answer to Mr. Cartwright's Letter," and "A Reproofe of Certaine Schismatical Persons." These "finds" furnish conclusive proof that the modern claim that Browne made the church independent of the magistrate is not well founded. In the light of these recently recovered writings Dr. Dexter's classical chapter on Browne in *Congregationalism* needs supplementing and correcting at many points. This task Mr. Burrage has successfully performed in *A New Year's Gift*, edited and published in 1904, and in *The True Story of Robert Browne*¹⁷ which appeared in 1906.

ERI B. HULBERT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The well-known "History of the Church in Recent Times,"¹⁸ by Nippold, comes to us in a third edition. The title-page tells us that it has been improved, but it does not seem to have been greatly changed. Even the order of the volumes, faulty as it is, has been retained. Thus Vol. III deals with German church history, Vol. IV with American church history, and Vol. V, which we have before us, with German church history once more. This is especially awkward, as the reader of Vol. V is frequently referred back to Vol. III for the materials necessary to the understanding of a matter. This inconvenient arrangement should have been corrected in a third edition.

Nippold calls his seven great volumes a handbook. They might very well be reduced in size and thus converted into a series of handbooks. The dedication to the fifth volume occupies forty-nine pages, and yet is entitled "A Word of Dedication." It might be entirely omitted without loss. Moreover, the style is diffuse and needs trimming down.

Nippold seems to have in mind as his readers persons already acquainted with the history and needing only to be reminded of the principal facts. Hence he gives us, instead of a narrative, a series of reflections which the narrative has suggested. He seems to be more intent upon the lessons of the history than upon the history itself. This feature has its value. But the ordinary reader should have a narrative as a preparation for these

¹⁷ *The True Story of Robert Browne*. By Champlin Burrage. Oxford: University Press, 1906. vii+75 pages. 2s. 6d.

¹⁸ *Handbuch der neuesten Kirchengeschichte*. Von Friederich Nippold. Dritte umgearbeitet Auflage. Fünfter Band, "Geschichte der Kirche im deutschen Protestantismus des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts." Leipzig: Heinsius, 1906. 676 pages. M. 18.

philosophical disquisitions. We need a work of this kind in connection with the other, and if we point out its lack of interest as a mere history, we do not condemn it, but only characterize it for those who think of using it.

Within its proper sphere, this history is important. It is full of statesmanlike views of the past and the future. It is rich in piety. It is based on a wide and accurate acquaintance with the facts. It is imbued with a tolerant spirit, though also with strong and positive convictions.

It has a predominant political coloring, which the American reader may find difficult to understand. Why should kings and princes exercise a deciding influence over the course of a great church? Why should the fall of Bismarck constitute "a tragedy of church history"? Why should the premature death of Frederic, the father of the present emperor, be regarded by many as a release of the church from peril, and by many others as a mortal blow to its freedom? Why should church history be so mixed with secular history as to have little standing of its own? The separation of church and state, were it effected, would instantly remedy this confusion and give us an independent church history by giving us an independent church. Yet, even for the historian of an established church, Nippold seems to us too greatly concerned with secular events, devoting almost as much space to these as to the progress of the kingdom of God in its proper form.

He pays too much attention also to the Roman Catholic opponents of the German church, and especially to the Jesuits. He has what might be called a morbid fear of the papacy, and attributes to it an astuteness, or rather a cunning, which it is far from possessing. Protestant history is surely not so far determined by Roman Catholic history as one might infer from these pages.

One other perplexity to the American reader is the perpetual theological warfare within the bosom of the church, which must affect disastrously the spiritual life of the nation. Church union is not an unmixed blessing. Were the German church set free from the state and divided into three or four denominations, the kingdom of God might be greatly advanced by the change.

But these are the judgments of foreigners. We are ready to admit that Nippold, being a son of the German church, is better able to judge of such matters than we. Let us be thankful for this immense "handbook." It stimulates thought on every page, even where it forgets that "the kingdom of God cometh not with observation," and is not vitally interested in forms of civil government or in the persons of civil rulers, except in so

far as these may enable its citizens to "lead a quiet and peaceable life" and to preach the gospel unhindered by violence.

The third edition¹⁹ of Dr. Gerberding's life of Passavant succeeds its predecessors almost at once. The call for three editions within the short space of two years shows the high esteem in which both the memory of Passavant and this record of his career are held by the Lutheran church.

William Alfred Passavant was the greatest man ever given to the American Lutherans. Born in 1821, and living in full activity for more than threescore and ten years, his lot was cast in a period characterized by the rapid growth of his church and by heated controversies within its membership. Amid the distractions incident to the coming of millions of communicants from the Old World, his church needed a wise and aggressive leadership, which he was raised up to supply. He possessed that peculiar and rare assemblage of characteristics which always mark the guide and governor in free and popular religious movements. He possessed the gift of oratory in an unusual degree, and could have made himself known as a great preacher, had he not been called to discharge other offices which, at the moment, seemed more important. He possessed also executive abilities of quite as high an order, and the circumstances of his time demanded that he make these the chief means of his usefulness. He possessed will-power of the active and aggressive kind, which kept him incessantly busy and impelled him to do the work of many men. He possessed ardent affections, which gave him a strong hold upon the majority of his helpers. It must be said also that, like all other great organizers and enterprisers, he was impatient with indolence, negligence, and incompetency, so that he had many critics and some enemies. His unbounded faith in the value of the work he was doing, and in the God who had appointed him to do it, enabled him to endure opposition and reproach with an equanimity which gave way only occasionally to outbursts of indignation. He was capable of the most absolute self-sacrifice; he seems never to have cared for a fixed salary, and during a large part of his life had none; yet he did not suffer want. His confidence in God led him to undertake the founding of costly institutions where he had no money; and yet, when the men to whom he applied for aid to support them failed him, others always came forward unexpectedly, so that they were not permitted to languish. He will be known hereafter chiefly as the man who brought the institution of deaconesses to this country and established it so firmly in his own church that no one can ever doubt its value there.

¹⁹ *Life and Letters of W. A. Passavant, D.D.* By G. H. Gerberding. Third Edition. Greenville, Pa.: Young Lutheran Co., 1906. 615 pages.

Dr. Gerberding has done his work in a skilful manner. He has kept himself in the background, and has allowed Passavant to tell his own story in his letters and in editorials which he contributed to the press, for he was the successful manager of several successive church papers. Where Dr. Gerberding speaks, it is briefly, and for the purpose of connecting the statements of Passavant with one another or of giving them their proper historical setting. He is an admirable biographer.

If we should criticize any feature of his work, it would be the occasional expressions of his impatience with the labors of denominations other than his own among the German and Scandinavian immigrants to this country. The Episcopalians meet his severest rebukes. Here are some of his epithets: "Do the Episcopalians know this, or are they wilful deceivers?" "The smooth and bland Episcopalians." "It was the intention to use these renegade Lutherans to entice other Lutherans into the Episcopal fold." But the Methodists and Baptists also receive some attentions of this kind. They "were also busy with their nefarious proselytizing efforts." Sometimes all the non-Lutheran denominations laboring to supply the spiritual destitution of the immigrants are condemned in a lump. Passavant, we are assured, "understood the schemes and deceptions of these sweet-mouthed hypocrites."

Now, no one knows better than Dr. Gerberding that the Lutheran church in Europe saw millions of its communicants flocking to this country, and yet made no adequate provision for their spiritual wants. Often in the course of this biography he notices Lutheran communities without Lutheran ministers. Often he laments the wretched character of the few ministers who could be secured. Is it not true that the Roman Catholics have cared for their immigrants far better than the Lutherans have cared for theirs? What would he have the other denominations do? Would he have them stand idle and see these souls perish? A church filled with life will not often need to defend itself from the encroachments of other churches. It was the deadness of the Lutheran church which led other churches to pity its people and to seek to impart some gift to them also. We are thankful that the Lutheran church is now reviving and caring for her own. That she is doing so is owing largely to the consecrated life of Passavant, so well portrayed in these pages.

But, though we do not share the view of Dr. Gerberding touching this matter, we do not know that we wish him to modify greatly his somewhat heated language. It marks him as a true disciple of Luther, who also hurled epithets at his opponents without doing them much harm. If we must choose between this somewhat excessive denominational zeal and the

undenominational sentimentalism which we sometimes meet, we prefer the former. We appreciate the book of Dr. Gerberding for its genuine Lutheran cast of thought and feeling. Passavant was not a goody-goody Lutheran, and it is well that his biography is not a goody-goody book. We are thankful for it just as it is.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE JEWS

Dr. Samter is a Jew who deprecates the present tendency of many of his race to accept Christian baptism. He has given the subject careful study, and has produced a book²⁰ which merits much commendation for its array of facts and figures, if not for its sweetness of disposition. He discusses first of all the reasons which led the Jewish converts to change, and intimates that these reasons are not worthy of respect. He then takes up the relation of the European governments to the movement. He considers next the activities of the missionary societies especially devoted to the conversion of the Jews, and grows satirical at their expense. Each convert, he estimates, costs the societies two thousand pounds sterling. This brings him to the most interesting and important part of his book, the attempt to estimate the actual number of Jews converted during the nineteenth century. He quotes the estimates of various statisticians, ranging from 100,000 to 250,000. De le Roi, who has made the most careful investigations, has 224,000 as his estimate. No fewer than 69,400 of these were in Russia, where accurate records of Jewish baptisms are preserved. Samter sets before us a great variety of figures from individual cities and states, and for limited periods, leaving us to infer how great the movement has been in the world at large. He then takes up the subject of mixed marriages, and thinks that they might better be called mismarriages. It appears from the marriage returns of several of the European states that there are many marriages between Jews and Christians. There are few nobles in Spain who are not of mixed blood. A large number of the German nobles have married rich Jewish wives, and the names of some of these nobles are given. It appears from the statistics of births that these marriages do not produce as high a birth-rate as that produced by Jewish marriages. Moreover, they produce a larger proportion of still-births. The statistical tables which Samter has constructed are worthy of all praise for the labor which they must have cost him and for the light which they cast on the entire field of discussion. In conclusion Samter asks: "What shall we do?" The Jews must do two things. First, they must learn to understand Judaism, with all its supreme excellences. Secondly, they must learn to understand Christianity, with its theoretical excellences and its

²⁰ *Judentaufen im 19. Jahrhundert*. Von N. Samter. Berlin: Poppelauer, 1906. v+156 pages. M. 2.50.

practical failures. Under this head he constructs an argument to show there is no Christianity now left in the world. And this in a chapter strongly urging the Jews to learn to understand Christianity. The study of Christianity will not greatly benefit those who approach it in this spirit. Samter laments the falling-away from Judaism of thousands who do not become Christians. This movement into blank skepticism seems to have gone much further than the movement into the church.

There lies before us another book on the Jewish question, in which the other side of it is presented. It is a sketch of Gurland,²¹ a rabbi who became a Christian minister and was the means of turning many of his people to our religion. Franz Delitzsch once called him "a noble soul." He labored in Germany, Poland, and southern Russia, preaching, conversing on religious subjects, and distributing the New Testament in Hebrew. After reading this brief biography one cannot doubt that very many Jews are becoming Christians from the best of motives. From Samter's cynical answer to the question, Why do Jews seek baptism? one turns with relief to this book, in which numbers of them are exhibited as coming to Christ, as other persons come, for peace with God; and one renews his confidence in the genuineness of the work among them, so lightly and contemptuously regarded by many of its critics.

THE FUTURE OF THE PAPACY

Labanca, in his study²² of the future of the Roman Catholic church, finds that the papacy has been developed in a three-fold manner: first, as a royal papacy; secondly, as a political papacy, influencing the policies of all nations; and, thirdly, as a religious papacy. He prophesies the future of all these features. He sees but little hope for the perpetuation of the first and the second, and concludes that the continuance of the third depends on the somewhat radical reformation of the church in doctrine and practice, so that its foes may not have just ground to mock it, and the more thoughtful of its adherents may not have just ground for embarrassment in its adherence to positions and customs no longer tenable. The book is entitled to respect not only for its ability, but for its source, coming as it does from a distinguished Roman Catholic professor, who teaches the history of Christianity under the very windows of St. Peter's and the Vatican.

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²¹ *Rudolf Hermann Gurland*. Von Joh. de le Roi. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. 70 pages. M. o. 80.

²² *Die Zukunft des Papsttums: Historisch-kritische Studie*. Von Baldassare Labanca. Autorisierte Uebersetzung von Maria Sell. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. viii + 128 pages. M. 1. 50.

The intention of the Heidelberg professor was a study of Jerome's life and works in two volumes.²³ The first volume appeared in 1901. The concluding volume with index was promised within two years. But accumulation of material necessitated a modification of plan. Fulness of treatment was abridged and the number of volumes increased to three. The second volume was issued in 1906. The third volume, including index, is making. The cuts for the volumes represent two notable crises in the life of Jerome, the departure from Rome (385) and the beginning of the Origenistic controversy (400), thus giving these periods: (1) life up to the withdrawal from Rome; (2) life from the settlement at Bethlehem until the appearance of the commentary on Matthew; (3) life from the beginning of the Origenistic controversy to the death of Jerome in 420.

The sources of this biography are the letters, treatises, commentaries, and translations of Jerome, as well as references to him in the writings of contemporaries. Since the earliest biographies of Jerome date from the eighth century and are mainly legendary, they are worthless as sources. The letters are found to be not personal, but designed for the perusal of the public. As most of Jerome's correspondence and other writings was dictated, allowance is made for haste, ignorance, the unscrupulous character of copyists, premature publication, and later emendations by Jerome. The original text can hardly be restored. His originality and method are determinable from his commentaries.

Jerome cared little for chronology. The first fixed date in his life is his residence at Constantinople (381). The traditional date of his birth is abandoned. Weight of evidence demands the fifth decade of the fourth century. The stay at Rome (382-85) is certain. There are three fixed facts for dating Jerome's works: 385, the departure from Rome; 392, the appearance of *De viris illustribus*; 410, the sack of Rome by Alaric. A valuable summary (I, 99-102) concludes the chapter on chronology, classifying the productions and assigning the most probable date. It is marred by one defect. The first heading is ambiguously entitled *Briefe*; 147 are cited; but only 116 of Jerome's are extant. The list contains letters by Augustine, Theophilus, and others, translations by Jerome, letters not even having reference to Jerome (e. g., 92). An asterisk before those not penned by Jerome should remedy this.

The life of Jerome to 400 is considered in seven chapters; youth, life as anchorite, stay at Constantinople, residence at Rome, travels prior to

²³ *Hieronimus: Eine biographische Studie zur alten Kirchengeschichte*. Von Georg Grützmacher. I, Leipzig, 1901, viii+298 pages, M. 6; II, Berlin, 1906, viii+270 pages, M. 7; III, making.

settlement at Bethlehem, the early years in the convent at Bethlehem, and renewal of friendly relations with Rome. The grouping is natural; before 385 stress centers on the life; thereafter, on the writings. Some of the subdivisions of the chapters invite further analysis to enable ready reference. The copious index which will be added to the forthcoming volume will in part remove this difficulty. The title of § 31 should be revised to correspond with the subsequent discussion.

In analyzing Jerome's productions Grützmacher attempts to trace his sources, estimate his originality, record his contribution to textual criticism and to the literature on the subject treated, and unravel his views. The commentaries rest mainly upon Origen for allegorical statements, and upon Hebrew tradition for historical exegesis. They add little to literature on the Bible. One rule of Jerome in untying knots must not be passed by: if there is a contradiction in the Scriptures, both statements are true, and a third that explains both must be assumed. In translating, Jerome sought to avoid slavery to the letter and also too great freedom. But in case of the Bible he held that the rendering must be literal because here the arrangement of words is also a mystery. The Itala text of the gospels on the basis of the Greek was first revised; then the Itala text of the Psalms was emended; thereupon the Psalter, Chronicles, Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, etc., were revised according to Hexapla LXX; finally the Old Testament was translated from the Hebrew. The goal of Jerome was the authentic text of the Old Testament. His work on the Bible is his greatest achievement. Grützmacher's sanity and balance are much in evidence while weighing the value of *De viris illustribus*, and when calmly demonstrating Jerome's reply to Jovinian to be a marvel of plagiarism, sophistry, vindictiveness, and puerility.

Grützmacher has interpreted Jerome historically. He was the product of a decaying age with nerves of truth paralyzed by the current education; neither trustworthy nor honest; conceited, vaultingly ambitious, cunning, malicious, superficial, untrue to his friends. Excepting Augustine, Jerome was the greatest laborer of his time; incomparable as literary thief; from year to year he grew more sensitive, intolerant, fanatical. He was a conspicuous example of instability, promising much he never attempted; skilful in abuse; a reveler in the obscene; unrivaled in exaggeration; gloriously inconsistent. He abandoned the classics as opposed to Christianity, and yet taught them to others; opposed the allegorical interpretation of Virgil, but performed most daring feats upon the Bible; included Philo, Seneca, and Josephus among the Christian writers, and then dug a wide ditch between orthodoxy and heresy; held that no foreign language might be employed in etymology, and thereupon derived Caesar and Peter from

the Hebrew; denied the messianic interpretation of Gen. 1:1 and affirmed it of Gen. 24:43; advised others to part with their property, but retained his own.

Jerome had no share in the extension of dogma. His theology was strongly influenced by tradition. He held that righteousness is produced by faith and works, that holy days are a condescension to human frailty. He was sure that the will is free. He did not accept the inspiration of the LXX and assumed that the writers of the New Testament quoted from memory, attaching no great importance to the mere words. He opposed chiliasm. It is due to Jerome that the mediaeval church made the expectation of the millennium a heresy. In spite of Matt. 24:36 he held to the omniscience of Jesus. He taught that bishops and presbyters were formerly identical, that the monarchical episcopate arose from schism. Since Noah's ark, the type of the church, contained both clean and unclean, the church must ever be composed of sinners and saints. Baptism cancels every pre-baptismal occurrence, even marriage. Consequently bishops may marry once after baptism. God, not the priest, pardons sin, but the Catholic church is the only authoritative interpreter of the Bible. Jerome's gospel was virginity. Unwedded chastity is the purpose of man. Marriage is endurable because it produces virgins. Difference between virginity and marriage penetrates eternity. Death came through marriage. Life came through virginity. Children were a blessing only under the Old Covenant. Jesus can be reproduced anew by every virgin. The virgin is mother first and then bride.

Jerome possessed an encyclopedic mind, but was not a productive genius. The one genuine thing about him was his enthusiasm for culture. He was a link between the Orient and the Occident, the greatest transmitter of the religious legacy of Greek and Hebrew antiquity to the Latin world. This biography is a storehouse of valuable information regarding the Christianity of the latter half of the fourth century; its superstitions, its amalgamation with heathenism, its adoration of holy places and relics, its fanatical hatred of the Jew, its legacy-hunting priests, its lost millennial hope, its ascetic tendencies, its corruption through the increase of its landed wealth, its central theme—the incarnation, its infinite departure from the Christianity of the apostles.

The two volumes are impartial, sincere, searching, trustworthy, sane, and balanced. It remains to be seen whether the high level can be successfully maintained in the analysis of the Origenistic controversy with which the concluding volume is to begin.

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KÄHLER'S THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS

In 1898 Kähler published in two volumes a series of discussions—some new, some old—of several of the leading questions in dogmatic theology. The new edition¹ is largely transformed and extended. The second volume of the former edition (*Zur Lehre von der Versöhnung*) is to be reissued separately, while in place of the first volume there will now come three. These discussions, though formally quite independent, the author would have us regard as elucidations of his perhaps too compressed *Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre* (third edition, 1905); and as they are full of lively interest, they cannot fail to win friends for the difficult but weighty *Wissenschaft*.

The volume before us, *Zur Bibelfrage*, contains six important discussions of the various aspects of this question. Kähler is the chief representative of a newer biblicism. His standpoint is manifestly related to that of Beck on the one hand and to that of Ritschl on the other. And yet his thinking is not eclectic, but eminently original. On the "Bible question" other theologians have written more extensively or on certain points more in detail, but Kähler has probably given us the most complete and many-sided discussion that we possess.

For Kähler the Bible is first and foremost confession—the witness of faith. This point of view makes it possible to maintain at once the authority of the testimony and faith's independence of critical science. Faith must have a "storm-free domain." Christ, the object of faith, is immediately accessible through the biblical witness. Though insisting so strongly upon the authority of the Bible, Kähler is as far as possible removed from all thought of slavery to the letter. Very interestingly and impressively, and in a great variety of aspects and relations, he develops a thoroughly religious conception of that authority. The author summarizes his main contentions as follows:

The Bible the document of the preaching through which the church was founded. The whole Bible the confessing testimony to the messianic revelation of God. The gospel of the Bible the key to the understanding of the whole Bible. The Bible not at first and chiefly for the individual Christian, but primarily the church's book, and through her the book of mankind.

Three of the essays in the book were first published about ten years ago—one of them as part of the second edition of *Der sogenannte historische Jesus*, the others as pamphlets (*Unser Streit um die Bibel* and

¹ *Dogmatische Zeitfragen: Alle und neue Ausführungen zur Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre*. Von Martin Kähler. Zweite sehr vermehrte Auflage. Erster Band, "Zur Bibelfrage." Leipzig: Deichert, 1907. x+441 pages. M. 8.50.

Jesus und das Alte Testament). The remaining pieces (*Das Offenbarungssehen der Bibel*, *Die Bibel das Buch der Menschheit*, and *Geschichte der Bibel in ihrer Wirkung auf die Kirche*) are either recent or quite new. The whole book is one of rare depth and power.

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J. R. VAN PELT

CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE

IN a series of six lectures before Vanderbilt University¹ Professor Francis Henry Smith proposes a plan for "studying the connection between the Creator and his works" quite the reverse of the argument from design. He urges that we "start from Christ, who claims to be and whom Christians believe to be the center of the created universe," and argues: "If Christ be the maker . . . what kind of a universe have we the right to expect it to be? . . . Is it the world we have?"

It is of course not necessary that one who is set for the "defense and advocacy of the Christian religion" under the terms of the Cole foundation should use a scientific method; but it is remarkable that one whose theme is *Christ and Science* should adopt a method so thoroughly unscientific, one that has proved time and again to be utterly incapable of leading to sound conclusions.

The last three lectures deal with the topic rather remotely; only the first three therefore concern us. Somewhat disguised, these are in reality another effort to show the harmony between science and "revealed religion." "The voice of Christ, . . . uttered before science had an existence," is found to declare (in the creation stories) that "matter, energy, and life are super-physical in their origin;" the voice of science is alleged so to declare; whence "the irresistible inference is that the Bible is right: Christ did make the universe." The New Testament is in like manner justified of its children. "The perfect man of the New Testament" is characterized by humility, simplicity, love of truth, and faith; so is "the perfect man of science;" therefore "the voice of Nature is the voice of Christ."

Wonderful anticipatory "scientific hints" are discovered in both Testaments, though "one class of references . . . of necessity used the science of the times." That hard nut for the harmonizers, the creation of light before the sun, is thus cracked:

When God said, "Let there be light," may it not be that he spoke into being that vast treasure of potential energy in the universe, connected perhaps with

¹ *Christ and Science: Jesus Christ Regarded as the Center of Science*. The Cole Lectures for 1906 before Vanderbilt University. By Francis Henry Smith. Chicago: Revell, 1906. 240 pages. \$1.25.

universal ether, which has been the capital used for its transactions ever since? The subsequent creation of sun and stars would only be the introduction of the mechanism by which this precious capital has been localized and transformed and radiated to serve the purposes of vision.

In the account of creation in Gen., chap. 1, the order of appearance of living beings is held to be "so like the teachings of present-day science" that it "demonstrates the superhuman origin" of the record. And this with Gen. 2:4-25 staring us in the face!

Paul's exhortation to the Romans to make of the body a living sacrifice is said to be illuminated by the fact that in our bodies the coexistence of constructive and destructive chemical changes is a condition of life.

And over Paul's twenty words (Phil. 11, 12) on working out our salvation he exclaims:

How wonderful that in twenty words the most precious truths of recent science [conservation, transfer, and transformation of energy] should be found concealed. . . . If you tell me that St. Paul could not have had such anticipation of present-day science consciously in his mind when he said these words, I am forced to believe that a greater than he was speaking through him.

This suffices to show the author's attitude. We can only deeply regret that his laudable desire to honor the Master should lead to the erection of such a tawdry temple of fallacious analogy and science falsely so called, founded on the sands of verbal inspiration.

The Scientific Creed of a Theologian is an English edition of a work by Dr. Rudolf Schmid, called forth from his leisure after retirement from the court chaplaincy.²

Himself assured that there is really absolute peace between the two supposed antagonists, by whatever name called—science and theology, knowledge and faith, modern culture and Christian conviction, or causality and teleology—convinced that "there cannot be anything at once true from a scientific point of view and false from the religious point of view and vice versa," yet recognizing the difficulties that arise in applying this conviction in practice, Dr. Schmid seeks "to prove that an adjustment is not only possible, but also absolutely essential."

His religious standpoint is that of rather liberal evangelical Christianity, with here and there traces of mediaeval theology. His scientific standpoint is that of a reasonably well-informed reader, without scientific training, who is willing to concede complete liberty of investigation and conclusion,

² *The Scientific Creed of a Theologian*. By Rudolf Schmid. Translated from the second German edition by J. W. Stoughton. New York: Armstrong, 1906. xxiv+251 pages. \$1.50.

and to accept anything probably true at its full value. Philosophically his antagonism to monism, and at the same time his failure to represent it truly, are obvious.

With such an attitude he discusses the usual grounds of conflict: creation, in three chapters; providence, prayer, and miracles in one; and the person of Jesus Christ in one. He faces the problems frankly as he sees them, and shows a position which a Christian who accepts current scientific beliefs may reasonably hold with respect to them. That position will not be shared wholly by the Christian who is at the same time a scientific man, nor by the Christian who is less instructed in scientific matters than the author. But it may be helpful to those who are now troubled by these problems, in leading them to see that, personal allegiance to Jesus Christ being assured, there is no necessary collision with science at any point, and that Christian faith and a rational scientific attitude are not mutually exclusive. That one attain precisely to Dr. Schmid's creed, scientific or theologic, is neither necessary nor desirable; but that all reach a point of view where faith's vision is not disturbed by finite inability to blend all the rainbow of truth into the white light of the infinite, is surely not an unreasonable hope. Many problems, therefore, must be deliberately pigeonholed to await further knowledge; if that waiting must extend beyond this life, is it not still reasonable to wait, and, waiting, to maintain a calm confidence that *this* is eternal life—to know the true God through Jesus Christ whom he sent?

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SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUPERNATURAL

Modern thought recognizes that its legitimate activity is confined to the limits of human experience. As with all other objects, so it is with the supernatural. We can have valid knowledge of it only as it enters or is implied in our experience. Within this, the proper sphere of thought, science has made remarkable progress in the last century, extending the operation of natural law to provinces before believed to be quite beyond its scope. Thus it has become hazardous to find evidences of the supernatural in particular events which seem impossible of natural explanation. For the triumphant scientist surprises us by discovering this explanation, and the vanquished theologian is forced to leave the field and seek elsewhere for traces of the divine. With good reason, therefore, enlightened theists are abandoning the order of events for the order of values. They find in man's moral nature, his ideals and aspirations, a truly super-

natural principle which they use, not as a cause for this or that fact in nature, but as a key to the significance of the universe as a whole.

Thus Henry T. Clark approaches the problem of religion and the object of religious belief from the ethical standpoint. He proposes to treat religion, not as a science of God and his relation to man, but as an art, the "art of character-production." His book¹ is itself evidence that the Christian religion is primarily a mode of life and conduct, rather than a system of science or philosophy. For not only does the author make the claims of Christianity in the practical sphere seem most reasonable and convincing, but he is also led by the logic of his standpoint to suggest a view of God and the world in substantial harmony with the modern conception. Man's supreme end is self-realization. Possessed of intelligence as the outcome of a long evolution, man should be united in sympathy and love to that Infinite Intelligence which is the ultimate source of the whole development. "God wanted the end to be linked back to the beginning again." But man by his self-will has prevented this adjustment. It now requires a moral reconstruction of human nature. This is made possible only through the fatherhood of God, the communication by God of his moral qualities to man. In the incarnation God thus imparts his nature to man. God descends to meet the ascending evolution of man. Christ not merely reveals, he "communicates" God. Hence, when man personally identifies himself with Christ, he attains divine sonship. Such faith in Christ involves the persistent pursuit of goodness and enables man to reach complete self-realization. Mr. Clark writes eloquently and persuasively. His argument would be stronger and more complete if he had pointed out in his chapter on "Christian Self-Culture" how identification with Christ involves for man the realization of a definite ideal of service and self-sacrifice. But, on the whole, the book possesses rare merit, having a freshness of inspiration and a cogency of thought quite unusual among works of its class.

But the tendency to base belief in the supernatural upon man's ethical aspirations may be pushed so far that religion is reduced to a moral sentiment. M. Marcel Hébert virtually identifies belief in God with reverence for the moral ideal. His recent work² is a psychological study of the religious consciousness. This consciousness has, he holds, three main types—the predominantly emotional, intellectual, and practical. He analyzes these types in their order. Religion, he concludes, is an expression

¹ *The Philosophy of Christian Experience*. By Henry T. Clark. Chicago: Revell. 243 pages. \$1.25.

² *Le divin expérience et hypothèse*. Par Marcel Hébert. Paris: Alcan, 1907. 316 pages. Fr. 5.

of man's belief in the objective validity of moral distinctions. Through it we safeguard and consecrate that ideal of perfection whose authority over us nothing in experience suffices to explain. But while we are justified in attributing objective reality to the Perfect, we are not justified in attributing to it *personality*. What corresponds to the ideal in ultimate reality must remain forever unknown. M. Hébert is a keen analyst, and has gathered an abundance of interesting material for dissection and study. In developing his views he takes many different standpoints, and hence his treatment impresses one as well balanced and complete. But further examination does not fully confirm this impression. His discussions are brief and seldom thorough. In fact, the element notably lacking in his work is depth and profundity of thought. His treatment of belief in the personality of God well illustrates this. In discussing the arguments in favor of such a belief he mentions only the traditional "proofs" and never alludes to the stronger arguments furnished by modern idealism. He next makes a short excursus into history and connects belief in a divine personality with anthropomorphic superstitions. Then he asks if the idea of personality is necessary to the thought of the Infinite or Perfect. Because cases are recorded where this thought is not accompanied by the idea of personality, he reaches his final conclusion that personal existence is not essential to the perfect. In this case what may seem to be completeness of treatment is only superficiality, and the discussion is as unconvincing as it is inadequate.

There are those who believe that the present tendency to identify the supernatural with the Perfect is itself only a passing stage in human thought. M. Henri Guyot predicts that when morality shall receive a scientific explanation, no predicate will be left to God but his infinity. As the truly infinite, God will then be equal to the All, the indeterminate, an empty ideal without specific quality. But Mr. Guyot has written a historical and not a philosophical treatise.³ In it he investigates the origin of the idea of infinity as applied to God. He shows how Greek thought after some hesitation decided in the systems of Plato and Aristotle for a perfect but determinate First Principle. It was Philo the Jew who, influenced by the tradition of his race, introduced the idea of a God all-powerful and indeterminate. This conception was opposed by Plutarch and the Neo-Pythagoreans. But Plotinus accepted it, and God became for him the infinite and incomprehensible. M. Guyot's work deals with the same important period in the development of theology that Dr. Caird reviews

³ *L'infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin*. Par Henri Guyot. Paris: Alcan, 1906. xii + 260 pages. Fr. 5.

in his *Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy*. Such works are valuable contributions both to theology and to philosophy.

Despite the success of science in explaining all events, both physical and psychical, by natural causation, Professor J. H. Hyslop believes that he and his co-workers in "psychical research" have brought to light phenomena which must be referred for explanation to a supernatural agency.⁴ Professor Hyslop regards belief in a future life as the foundation of our moral and social system. Hence it is extremely important to obtain evidence of the existence of such a life. This can be done only by establishing communication with discarnate spirits. At present mediumistic communication is the most practicable method. The author then gives an account of the investigations made by Sir Oliver Lodge, Dr. Richard Hodgson, and himself, along with many others, in the case of Mrs. Piper. He thinks that the communications made by her can be explained only by telepathy or the existence of spirits. He chooses the spiritistic hypothesis as much more reasonable and in better accord with the facts. In a second volume⁵ Professor Hyslop aims to enlighten the general reader upon questions of psychology involved in "psychical research." Since this is his purpose, it is unfortunate that he does not write more clearly. Many of his sentences are so obscure and confused as to be almost unintelligible. The closing chapter contains an earnest plea to the scientist to sacrifice his "aristocratic" tastes and take up the problem of a future life which has vital interest for all mankind.

Mr. Joseph Hamilton thinks that we have not only proof of the existence of a supernatural world, but also knowledge of its inhabitants and governing laws.⁶ He bases his views almost entirely upon the accounts given in the Bible of angelic visitations, miraculous events, etc. It is astonishing what an elaborate structure he rears on their foundations. The supernatural world he conceives on the analogy of the natural. Apparently it is located somewhere in space; for we are asked to imagine that visitors from this supernatural realm have had sight keen enough to "steer their course through labyrinths of suns and systems until this earth was discerned as a faint speck of light on the far horizon." The angelic beings who inhabit this sphere have bodies like the human, only more ethereal; senses like the

⁴ *Science and a Future Life*. By James H. Hyslop. Boston: Turner, 1905. x+372 pages. \$1.50.

⁵ *Borderland of Psychical Research*. By James H. Hyslop. Boston: Turner, 1906. viii+425 pages. \$1.50.

⁶ *The Spirit World*. By Joseph Hamilton. New York: Revell, 1906. 274 pages. \$1.50 net.

human, only more refined; and are nourished, not by food taken in the mouth, but by elements absorbed from the atmosphere. Fancies like these are multiplied, and curious speculations abound. It would be useless to bring up the question of evidence here, for the author says he has no common ground with those who do not accept unreservedly every statement in the Bible. Moreover, one is bound to respect the reverence with which he approaches his subject, and the frank and earnest manner in which he avows his beliefs. But he should be reminded why other inquirers, as little materialists as he, will regard his conception of the supernatural as not merely unfounded, but also thoroughly unreasonable. If the progress of thought has taught us anything, it is that the existence of the supernatural can be established only by proving that the finite categories of science (matter and motion, cause and effect, etc.) are inadequate to explain reality, and hence must be supplemented by higher principles. The final interpretation of reality, we thus maintain, must be in terms of spirit and personality. How illogical and absurd it will be, therefore, to conceive of the supernatural in those very terms whose imperfection and finitude we have recognized—as a realm in space where bodies act and interact as they do in the present world!

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RECENT MISSIONARY LITERATURE

In his massive volume¹ Dr. Dennis completes a work begun twelve years ago, namely the endeavor to present an encyclopedic view of the social betterment and uplift which have everywhere gone along with Christian missions. To this end he has made, with incredible labor and patience, a vast accumulation of facts and figures, and has sifted and marshaled this material under such topics, to cite from the volume in hand, as "The Introduction of Educational Facilities," "The Development of Industrial Training," "The Abolishment of Objectionable Social Customs," "Results Touching National Life and Character." A copious "Bibliography of Recent Mission Literature" is appended, together with an index of nearly a hundred closely printed pages, the apparatus indispensable to the usefulness of a book which surveys so wide a field. That no pains might be spared to enhance the value and attractiveness of the work, it is abundantly illustrated with photographs of missionaries, their assistants and pupils, and

¹ *Christian Missions and Social Progress: A Sociological Study of Foreign Missions.* By James S. Dennis. In 3 vols. Vol. III. Chicago: Revell, 1906. \$2.50.

of the buildings, churches, hospitals, schools, and shops which go to make up the varied mission "plant."

No one but an expert who should rival Dr. Dennis himself in his own field is competent to say that the topical arrangement which he has chosen is not, on the whole, the most convenient and satisfactory for the student. One might wish perhaps that all the information Dr. Dennis has to offer regarding, for example, the amelioration of China, political, social, educational, industrial, through Christian missions had been brought together into one chapter. But another student will thank Dr. Dennis from the bottom of his heart for the ninety consecutive pages in which a systematic account is given of the introduction by Christianity of "educational facilities" into many widely separated lands, and the founding of schools and colleges in India, China, Korea, Japan, Turkey, Africa, and the islands of the sea. In either case the information wanted is somewhere furnished, and the search for it will be abundantly rewarded.

One asks himself, as he closes this volume, whether a more convincing apologia than this has ever been offered for missions understood in the large sense of an endeavor to "plant Christianity for permanency." Dr. Dennis has furnished an arsenal, well stored with weapons of many kinds, but all effective for both offensive and defensive warfare. He has done a noble and memorable service for the kingdom of Christ. Let the timid soul who reckons up the enormous sums of money that have been expended in sending the gospel to the heathen during the last century, and bewails the scanty returns in the statistics of converts enrolled and churches organized, lose himself for an hour in these fascinating recitals of social redemption wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, and forget his fears. If Christian missions after a hundred years can meet the searching and probing tests to which Dr. Dennis subjects it, we may look forward with confidence to its ultimate triumph.

What should be our attitude as Christian men, Dr. Hall asks, toward races and religions not our own? Certainly it should accord with the example and spirit of Jesus Christ. For we learn the actual attitude of God toward the world in the impartial interest in humanity which Jesus showed, and in his recognition of the unqualified value of human life and of the essential unity of the race. From this premise Dr. Hall draws an argument for Christian missions, the more persuasive that it is implied throughout the entire discussion rather than formally proposed and urged. The

² *Christ and the Human Race; or, The Attitude of Jesus Christ toward Foreign Races and Religions.* Being the William Belden Noble Lectures for 1906. By Charles Cuthbert Hall. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. \$1.25.

heart of the book is found in the chapters entitled "The Essential Unity of the Human Race" and "Religious Insight and Experience Outside of Christianity." Marked as are the temperamental contrasts between the West and the East—and these Dr. Hall sets forth at length—the underlying unity of the race is still plainer; and the religion of Jesus Christ therefore, holding within itself "an amazing balance of oriental and occidental qualities," offers a revelation of God to all mankind; and that "religious insight and experience," that "spirit of large tenderness, moral earnestness, and true reverence" discoverable outside the limits of occidental Christianity, are prophetic of the future comprehension in one spiritual loyalty and worship of all men who with a true longing seek for the living God. The closing chapter, "Christian Missions and the Modern World," offers, although with disappointing brevity, certain practical considerations bearing upon the missionary question. To present a single illustration. The "policy of non-action" urged by the opponent of the missionary enterprise with the serenest confidence in its reasonableness, the advice that "the zealous West let the East alone, joined comfortably to its idols and its philosophies," is answered conclusively in words that must be quoted:

One can no more prevent Christian influences and Christian efforts from flying eastward than one can keep carrier pigeons from their homing. Christianity came out of the East; to the East it must return. . . . Furthermore, one cannot divide East from West in the matter of religious interaction any more than in the matter of commercial interaction.

Dr. Hall does not speak of non-Christian peoples and their religions in the words we have been accustomed to hear from missionaries. When he recommends "a reverent reserve of criticism in the presence of matters and manners pertaining to the ancestral religious institutions of the East," or describes popular polytheism as "relatively disastrous to the ethical sense" and the self-immolation of widows in the *Sati* as an "august surrender," he is using language that would have been amazing indeed from a Christian man to Christian hearers a generation ago. That he is heard with sympathy now and not with indignation is an indication that the church of Christ is considering more deeply and patiently the attitude of Jesus Christ toward foreign races and religions, and is coming to a better understanding of its own responsibility to them and the means by which it must be discharged.

The Nashville Convention appears to be reported in a stout volume of seven hundred pages completely and in detail. Every paper read, every address delivered, is presented in full, even to the occasional trivialities of

extempore speech. But perhaps none of these utterances is altogether unimportant to one who wishes to understand the temper and spirit of this great assembly. It is easy, in turning these pages, to understand the profound impression made by the convention upon the hundreds of young men and women in attendance, so serious, so simply religious, were its appeals; so free from the narrow theological presuppositions and the crude interpretations of Scripture by which their force might have been weakened, if not destroyed outright. The arithmetical argument was happily all but unused. No one undertook to enforce the missionary obligation by an estimate of the number of unsaved souls passing daily into eternity; though one speaker ventured the computation that it is possible to evangelize the whole world—that is to say, “to give the world the chance to know of Christ”—at an average cost of two dollars per person. Does a single proclamation of the gospel message offer this “chance,” or is patient and painstaking teaching required? Who is to decide, and how, at what precise moment a particular person born in a non-Christian community has had his “chance”? Mr. Mott made a vigorous explanation and defense of the Volunteer watchword, “The Evangelization of the World in This Generation,” but otherwise it was not insisted upon. Mr. Mott is doubtless right, however, in his claim that this element of urgency has been “one of the mightiest factors in the influence exerted by the Volunteer Movement.”³

The discussions of the conference left hardly a single aspect of missions untouched. They dealt in the main with vital topics, such as the relations of institutions of learning to missions and of Christianity to the non-Christian religions; the preparation of the missionary for his task, physical, intellectual, spiritual; with the home base and the new opportunities; with evangelistic, medical, educational missions. Upon this last, as was unavoidable before such an audience, stress was repeatedly laid. There were special conferences of many sorts—of teachers, of editors, of pastors, of laymen; and groups of men and women who had themselves seen service presented reports from mission fields. Behind all these reports and addresses, infinitely varied as they are in theme and expression, lies the one conviction that the gospel of Jesus Christ is a possession so precious that it must be shared with all who can be persuaded to accept it.

The list of speakers at the Nashville convention is an imposing one, comprising men eminent in educational affairs, in the business world, in

³ *Students and the Modern Missionary Crusade*. Addresses delivered before the Fifth International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Nashville, Tennessee, February 28–March 4, 1906. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1906. 713 pages.

the professions, and in diplomacy, as well as the bishops and clergymen who are thought by some foolish scoffers to be the only supporters of that strange fanaticism of which the twentieth century is witnessing the slow but inevitable decay. But if we may accept the testimony of the Nashville convention, the Volunteer Movement is just now in the freshness and enthusiasm of its youth.

Students and the Modern Missionary Crusade is a big book, and the most conscientious reader will wish to know what of its contents, always interesting, is also of marked importance. Whatever else he skips, let him not fail to read the historical sketch by Mr. Mott, "The First Two Decades of the Student Volunteer Movement," the entire section entitled "Missions and Their Wider Relationships," and the addresses before the Conference of Professors in Colleges and Universities by Professor Edward C. Moore, of Harvard University, and President King, of Oberlin College.

David Hill went out to Hankow, China, in 1861, under the direction of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, "the free and proud gift of his father," and in China, in 1896, he died. He was a man of wealth, well trained for his chosen career, convinced that he was called to a celibate life, single-hearted, modest, faithful his life long to many arduous and varied tasks. When tidings came in 1877 of the dreadful famine in the northern Shensi, he started at once upon a twenty-days' journey of relief inland, carrying on pack mules three-quarters of a ton of lump silver, the most portable form of currency, and largely his personal contribution. On his return to China from his first visit home he was made general superintendent of a missionary district, with all the powers and responsibilities of a bishop, and in this responsible service he continued until his death. We read of beautiful forms of philanthropy, quite apart from the conventional missionary duties, in which his private fortune allowed him to indulge himself—of almshouses where a few old men are given shelter because they are poor and needy, not because they have accepted a Christian creed; of a school for blind beggars and children, gathered out of the streets, where they learn to read and are taught a self-supporting trade. It was characteristic of David Hill that he chose to work so far as possible along with native charitable organizations, "claiming for such work, imperfect and unenlightened in motive though it might be, the beginnings of that which finds its crown in Christianity." He wore for months together the Chinese dress and ate Chinese food. Possessing the great gift, in which missionaries are sometimes sadly lacking, of spiritual imagination, his attitude toward the Chinese creeds was that of sympathy with whatever truth they might contain. The people among whom he worked were not idolaters, but children of God from

whom the Heavenly Father was strangely hidden. "He went about always expecting to find traces of the work of God's Holy Spirit." And this sympathetic spirit made him equally a welcome and honored guest among the European residents and visitors, between whom and the missionary a great gulf is too often fixed.

This unusual and interesting story⁴ is written compactly, with considerable literary skill, in an attractive little volume that might be read through in an hour.

*Christus Redemptor*⁵ forms the sixth in a series of mission-study textbooks, of which *Via Christi* was the first, prepared for the use of the Women's Missionary Societies of the United States. This volume, like its predecessors, is furnished not only with the indispensable map and bibliography, but also with useful illustrative quotations and suggestions of topics for further study.

The subject-matter, in itself, picturesque and interesting, is well selected and well arranged, and the narrative flows on in an easy and agreeable style.

The preface to *Religions of Mission Fields*,⁶ in which Judaism and Roman Catholicism are included, explains that this textbook supplements the treatment of non-Christian religions in two books already published, and is intended primarily for students who expect themselves to be missionaries. To this class of readers it will offer, perhaps, some assistance; but the book may easily disappoint even moderate expectations. Its workmanship is rather clumsy; some chapters are overloaded with needless detail; the arrangement of topics is often confused. The most useful portions are those which treat of the present-day aspect of non-Christian religions, in which the missionary authors use material gathered from personal observation and experience.

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BRIEF MENTION

ELEUTHEROPOULOS, ABT. *Das Schöne*. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1905. xv+272 pages. M. 5.40.

In this work the author, following the empirical method, proposes first to examine all judgments of aesthetic value both in the ordinary human consciousness which

⁴ *David Hill, an Apostle to the Chinese*. By W. T. A. Barber. London: Kelly, 1906. 128 pages.

⁵ *Christus Redemptor: An Outline Study of the Island World of the Pacific*. By Helen Barrett Montgomery. New York: Macmillan, 1906. 282 pages. \$0.50 net.

⁶ *Religions of Mission Fields as Viewed by Protestant Missionaries*. New York Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1905. 300 pages. \$0.50.

appreciates beauty and in the special artistic consciousness which produces it. He would then proceed to draw general conclusions concerning the significance of beauty, and the truth contained in the judgment of aesthetic value. The conclusion reached is that the aesthetic judgment depends upon a relation between the *form* and the *content* of an object. Both of these factors have objective existence. Form is that which defines an object, its shape, symmetry, and inclusion of difference in unity. Content is the sum of the qualities, material and spiritual, which are essential to it. Beauty signifies a harmony between the two. As such it serves no external end or utility. The beauties of nature are nature's necessary self-revelation. Likewise the beauties of art reveal by internal necessity the impulses of the artist's consciousness. Whenever an object thus possesses aesthetic value we intuitively perceive and admire its beauty.

BLANC, ELIE. *Dictionnaire de philosophie ancienne, moderne et contemporaine*. Paris: Lethielleux, 1906. xvi+1247 pages. Fr. 12.

The four thousand articles in this dictionary are designed by the author to cover the field of ancient and modern philosophy. Especial attention is paid to contemporary thought and to recent philosophy in France. The principal aim of the dictionary, however, according to M. Blanc's frank avowal, is not to present history or bibliography, but to inculcate doctrine. For philosophy, from the Catholic standpoint, is not an intellectual diversion to be followed for its own sake, but a means to the attainment of positive truth. Such *dogmatisme moderne*, we are further informed in the preface, need not prevent a writer from giving a fair and accurate account of all views, even those most hostile to the accepted doctrine. Whether or not such fairness and accuracy have been attained in the present volume is a matter of opinion. The articles are clearly written and contain much valuable information. But the space given to even the greatest systems in such a book is necessarily limited, and the impartial reader is irritated to find so large a portion of it given to criticism that the exposition of the theories themselves is rendered still more incomplete and inadequate. Very slight notice is taken of the earlier English empiricists, particularly Locke and Hume, although Mill and Spencer are more fully treated.

JACKSON, H. L. *The Fourth Gospel and Some Recent German Criticism*. Cambridge University Press, 1906. xiv+247 pages. 3s. 6d. net.

The author is an English clergyman. The book, a recast of Sunday lectures, does not claim to be "a contribution to what Soltau speaks of as 'das Hauptproblem aller Bibel-Kritik.'" It is, however, a very useful compendium of many aspects of the problem and of widely gathered opinions for its solution. The language is popular, but sometimes wanting in clearness. The frequent summaries are helpful to the reader and make amends for some needless repetition. Unfortunately there is no index.

KURTZ, G. H. *Abriss der Kirchengeschichte: Ein Leitfaden für den Unterricht in höheren Lehranstalten*. Sechszehnte, revidierte Auflage. Leipzig: Neumann, 1906. M. 2.20.

The fact that this useful compendium has reached the sixteenth edition is a sufficient guarantee of its excellence.

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THE MOTIVE OF MODERN MISSIONARY WORK

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There has been an undeniable tendency on the part of liberal theologians to disparage, or at all events to be decidedly lukewarm in supporting, foreign missionary effort. And in this matter a good many persons who, without much knowledge of or sympathy with any definite form of liberal theology, vaguely plume themselves upon their enlightenment or common-sense, are of the same mind. The fact is, strange as it may appear, that serious enthusiasm for missions tends to be associated with a rather narrow theology. The greatest of the missionary societies of the English church is largely in the hands of the narrowest section of the narrowest party in that church. The authorities of the Church Missionary Society have been known to refuse an admirably qualified candidate of otherwise evangelical opinions on account of a measure of sympathy with critical theology which few of our present bishops would disclaim. Other very energetic missionary societies and missionary orders which could be mentioned tend on the whole to represent the opposite extreme of theological opinion. In defense of a hostile or lukewarm attitude toward missions it is often assumed that recent changes of theological opinion have weakened the arguments upon which the duty of missionary effort on the part of the church depends. I propose in the present article to inquire how far this is the case.

It cannot be denied that many of the arguments frequently used in defense of missionary work in the past are arguments which do not appeal to the modern mind. How far orthodox people of the last generation really did believe that the whole heathen world was doomed to everlasting torments unless they heard and accepted what is technically called "the gospel," I will not attempt to inquire. If we go back far enough, there certainly was a time when such a creed was held. It is astounding to find cultivated fathers of the church living on terms of familiar intercourse with virtuous pagans, and assuming all the time that their friends' virtues were quite incapable of saving them from the inevitable doom. Sometimes we find them making little jokes on the everlasting punishment which was in store for their friends. Medieval philosophy succeeded to some extent in reconciling the authorities which appeared to demand such an eschatology with the natural instincts of the unsophisticated moral consciousness by placing men like Socrates or Aristotle technically in hell, but still in a very tolerable quarter of the same—by no means the hell of ferocious theologians like Tertullian or Calvin. Modern orthodox theology has given a more uncertain sound upon this matter; but it cannot be denied that missionary appeals have frequently assumed that some awful fate was in store for the heathen, no matter how fully they acted up to their lights and no matter how great the measure of that light, if they died without having accepted the gospel message. And it is impossible to deny the effectiveness of such appeals when they fell upon minds to which such a view of the universe seemed really credible. It would be a waste of time to argue against such a view at the present day. There are probably large numbers of persons—conservative theologians and by no means illiterate clergymen as well as the wholly ignorant—who would refuse definitely to disclaim the possibility of everlasting punishment befalling relatively good men who die without having heard of the gospel of Jesus Christ; still more of them would admit that such a fate might be in store for those who have heard, but not accepted, the "terms of salvation" contained, or supposed to be contained, in the New Testament—a possibility which has sometimes, with undeniable logic, been actually twisted around into an argument against missions to the heathen. It has been argued that by preaching the gospel to

the heathen we are involving them in a doom from which involuntary ignorance might otherwise exempt them. But in practice such theories make little real impression on modern minds. To most people it has become almost incredible that they were ever really believed by the people who professed them. And it seems undeniably the fact that the abandonment of this appalling theology has sometimes been supposed to relieve churches and individual Christians from the duty of missionary effort. And yet surely such a line of thought might just as well be used against home missions, against the ordinary work of a clergyman in an ordinary parish, against every effort to make other people better Christians or better men, or even against being a good Christian oneself. If the theory of eternal torments for non-belief is the only reason for attempting to make heathens into Christians, why be Christians at all? It is possible, no doubt, that those who are not saved here may be saved hereafter, but it is equally possible that every good thing that we might do now may afterward be done by God through some other agency. The line of thought which would postpone doing a good thing because, if we do not do it, it might be done hereafter by someone else, might be urged with equal force against any possible form of beneficent human activity.

Another line of argument which still finds favor with some who would not deny the "salvability" of the virtuous heathen is that which founds itself on the express commands of Christ. The risen Christ, it is said, commanded his disciples to go "into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." It is not, we are often told in sermons, for Christians who believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God to inquire into the reasonableness of such a command:

Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.

It is difficult to dispute the logic of this position upon the theological premises of those who employ it. Yet it may be doubted whether, even among those who have no definite theological or critical objections to the rather drill-sergeant theology which it implies, this kind of appeal is very effective in modern times. It is vaguely felt

that it cannot be wrong to think, to demand a reason for what we do; and the modern man who is not convinced that missions are really a good thing on their own merits will seldom be converted into a hearty or enthusiastic supporter of them by insistence upon the positive commands of Christ, even though he may not theoretically deny either the fact that Christ uttered the words attributed to him or the infallibility of such utterances. But unfortunately the words in question are among the most disputed of all the sayings attributed to our Lord in the Synoptic Gospels. Even if they form part of the true text of the present Gospel of Matthew, their historical character is open to grave suspicion. Wherever baptism is alluded to in the Epistles and Acts, it is always baptism in the name of the Lord; in the earlier part of the *Didache* we find the same phrase. Even in the ninth century we find a pope recognizing that the formula, "I baptize thee in the name of Jesus Christ," might be valid. Such a state of things would be hardly conceivable, had our Lord ever commanded baptism with the trinitarian formula. To say that baptism in the name of the Lord means simply "Christian baptism"—i. e., baptism in the name of the Trinity—is a palpable subterfuge, which will convince no one whose critical sense is not hopelessly distorted by the desire to bolster up traditional views. And now Mr. Conybeare has shown that the passage is frequently quoted by Eusebius in another form: "Go ye and make disciples of all nations in my name, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you." This points either to an earlier state of the text or to the existence of some gospel—perhaps the "*Logia*"—earlier than the present Matthew. It is true that even in the Eusebian form of the saying there remains the command to preach the gospel to all the world. But the transformation which the words have undergone suggests the possibility of earlier growth. Such growth has undoubtedly taken place in other cases, as may be ascertained by the simple process of comparing one Synoptist with another. This particular saying is open to objections on two grounds. In the first place, there is the general doubt whether our Lord contemplated definitely a mission to all the world. He had undoubtedly before the close of his earthly life so far abandoned Jewish ideas as to the limitations to the Jewish nation of God's fatherly love that his gospel was eminently fitted to be preached to

all the world. A gospel based upon the idea of God's impartial fatherly love to all mankind was in its essential nature a universal religion; but it is doubtful whether Jesus expressly thought of himself as more than the Messiah and savior of his own people, though I should myself be far from categorically rejecting all passages which seem to suggest a wider conception of his mission. Secondly, there is the doubt attaching to all recorded sayings of the risen Christ. The earliest record of the resurrection—that of St. Paul in I Cor., chap. 15—says nothing of any spoken words; and the sayings attributed to the risen Christ by the evangelists differ among themselves. Then again, it may be urged, as the general result of synoptic criticism, that sayings peculiar to St. Matthew's Gospel which suggest the point of view of a developed theology and a developed ecclesiastical organization are probably among the very latest additions to the gospel narrative. The truth is that no one who has realized the actual effect of critical research into the process by which the gospels came into their present form can any longer rest an important practical duty exclusively upon any single or isolated saying of our Lord. That the general picture of our Lord's character, teaching, and personality given us by the Synoptic Gospels (whatever may be thought about the Fourth) is a trustworthy historical picture is being more and more conclusively proved, and more and more universally accepted by sane and sober critics; but here and there criticism has detected the growth of touches—often representing true developments of the real spiritual meaning of our Lord's teaching in its bearing upon the problems of a later age—to an extent which makes it impossible to appeal to this or that isolated saying of our Master when it does not come home to the reason and conscience of the modern man. It is impossible, for instance, to ascertain whether the prohibition of divorce did or did not except the case of adultery. We accept our Lord's general moral teaching just because it does come home to us. It is because the teaching of the Jewish prophet of two thousand years ago still appeals to us as the highest religious teaching which we know, that we regard it as a unique, and in a sense final, revelation of God, and Christ himself therefore as the unique Revealer. The general effect of his teaching, the general impression which the gospels give us of his unique moral and spiritual

insight and intimate communion with the Father, is, indeed, such that we might reasonably rely upon his authority in isolated cases, even if we did ourselves see the objection to something which he forbade or the reason for something which he commanded. But the doubt as to whether he said any particular thing which does not bear the indefinable *cachet* of originality is such that practically this method of resting morality upon mere exegesis is impossible to us. And perhaps it is morally best for us that it should be so. "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you." As things are, the duty of mission work cannot be rested upon a text. It must commend itself to reason and conscience, or it will no longer be recognized as a duty by modern men. It must be shown to rest upon and spring from that moral ideal which Christ taught, and which as a whole does so thoroughly commend itself to the moral consciousness of the modern world or of all that is best in it. The question is: Does mission work commend itself to us on those grounds?

What, then, are the considerations which commend themselves to the mind of the modern man as adequate motives for corporate effort and pecuniary contribution on the part of the many, and for the severer self-sacrifice of the actual missionary? I answer: Every motive which is sufficient to induce a man to subscribe to, or personally to take part in, the work of the church at home. Every consideration which leads a man to value Christianity for himself must lead him to value it for others; and, if he has at all entered into the meaning of Christianity—into its fundamental idea of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man—all the considerations which commend Christianity to him as a good thing for his own countrymen must lead him to regard it as a good thing for members of other nations and races, and a duty therefore on the part of those who possess that good thing themselves to try and extend it to others also. The essential principle of Christian ethics is that it is a duty to promote the good of all mankind. The only way in which it could be made out not to be a duty to promote the spread of Christianity among other nations would be to show that, though good for us, it is not good for others—good for westerns perhaps, but not good for easterns; good for civilized men, but not good for the uncivilized. The thesis that Christian-

ity is a religion specially and exclusively suited for western men is a difficult one in face of the fact that it grew out of, and has absorbed into itself, the religion of an eastern and Semitic people, and that its Founder—whatever else he was—and its first apostles were without exception members of that same race. The contention that it demands a high level of civilization and is not suited for the uncivilized is a slightly more plausible one, but the unfortunate thing about that line of argument is that it proves too much. It proves that missions are not only a mistake now, but that they always have been a mistake. The missions that excite the most furious hostility on the part of our anti-missionary Christians are perhaps the missions to the natives of India. Now, it can hardly be seriously denied that the civilization of India is on at least as high a level as that of our Anglo-Saxon forefathers, of the German races converted to Christianity in the course of the Middle Ages, or even of the bulk of the inhabitants of Gaul before their Christianization. If the anti-missionary principle had always been acted upon, how many Christians would there have been in the world now? With regard to the lowest races of mankind, it is slightly more plausible to suggest that they are not yet fit for Christianity; but then it is just in these cases that it is easiest to prove by actual appeals to experience the enormous benefits which Christianity confers upon those who accept it, and the practicability of promoting its acceptance, not by isolated individuals here and there, but by whole tribes and districts. The existence of a native Christian sovereign like Khama,¹ and the enormous superiority of his régime to that of any other native ruler in South Africa, would be a sufficient demonstration of that. Moreover, to insist that a people shall be civilized first, and then be presented with a religion fit for civilized

¹ "Born about 1830, he is by far the most remarkable Kafir now living in South Africa, for he has shown a tact, prudence, and tenacity of purpose which would have done credit to a European statesman. He was converted to Christianity while still a boy, and had much persecution to endure at the hand of his heathen father, who at last banished him for refusing to take a second wife. What is not less remarkable, he has carried his Christianity into practice, evincing both a sense of honor as well as a humanity which has made him the special protector of the old and the weak, and even of the bushmen who serve the Bamangwato."—Bryce, *Impressions of South Africa* (1898), p. 264. The chapter of this work which Mr. Bryce has devoted to missions may be commended to readers skeptical about the practical effect of mission work.

men, is about as reasonable as it would be to insist that no man should enter the water until he knows how to swim. It assumes that civilization and religion have nothing to do with one another. To put it at its lowest, Christianity is one of the forces which make for civilization; and in particular it may be said to be historically one of the most powerful agents for extending the civilization and culture of a higher civilization to those hitherto upon a lower plane of civilization. It was through their acceptance of Christianity that a measure of old-world culture and civilization was diffused among the barbarous invaders of the Roman Empire. Had the arguments of our anti-missionary Christians prevailed, we at the present time should be—so far as we can see—neither Christian nor civilized. If it was right for the civilized and Christian inhabitants of the Roman Empire to communicate their civilization and their Christianity to our barbarian forefathers, how can it not be right for us to attempt to extend the advantages both of civilization and of Christianity to peoples whose capacity for receiving it there is no reason to believe to be lower than our own?

At the bottom of the anti-missionary sentiment of the average cultivated or half-cultivated person there lies a vague and confused idea that all religions are much the same, or at all events that it is enough for each individual or race to act up to the precepts of its own creed. And yet this is a notion which hardly admits of serious defense. Are we to say even that speculative truth is of no importance—no part of that true good of humanity which morality, to say nothing of Christian morality, requires us to promote for all mankind? Do we in the education of children or of grown-up men consider that it is of no importance whether we teach them truth or falsehood? It would be a duty to teach what we ourselves believe to be a true account of the ultimate origin and nature of the world, even if it had no practical effect on conduct. And yet I freely admit that it would be scarcely possible to arouse much enthusiasm for the diffusion of religious truth among distant races, if we did suppose that it would make no difference to their conduct or to their happiness. But will anyone—I do not say of professedly Christian belief, but with any knowledge of the actual movements of human thought—seriously declare that men's theory of the universe has no influence upon

their conduct? I can quite understand, of course, the position of those who say that the Christian view of the universe is a false one, and exercises a more or less injurious effect upon conduct; but to suggest that what people believe about the universe exercises no effect upon their ideals of character and conduct is a contention which I can hardly believe that any reflecting man will seriously adopt. There is the closest possible connection between man's theory of the universe on the one hand, and their ethical practice on the other.

The Brahminical ideal of life is closely connected with the Brahminical theory of the universe; so is that of Christianity, of Buddhism, and of any other religion. If we regard our ideals of conduct as superior to those of Brahminism, it is our duty to diffuse those views of the universe which we ourselves believe to be most calculated to produce the highest ethical ideal and the highest ethical practice. In point of fact we are already, by our government and our system of government education in India and elsewhere, as well as by the mere contact with western literature, undermining both the theology and morality of the native religions; the only question can be whether we are to make the attempt to put anything in its place. Even if we understand by the duty of philanthropy or benevolence merely the duty of promoting human happiness, it would be easy enough to show the closest connection between theories of the universe and the happiness of those who hold them. Missionaries really familiar with the savage mind tell us how much sheer misery is caused by superstitious terror, and by the cruel rites which still demand their victims wherever savage theology holds undisputed sway. The injurious effect (in different ways) of Hindu and Mohammedan beliefs upon the happiness of women, and of those whom such religions place beyond the pale of ordinary humanity, would be quite a sufficient consideration to inspire humane persons with the desire that their place should be taken by a religion which recognizes the equal claims to due consideration of male and female, slave and freeman, even if they cared nothing for character or ideals for their own sake. But I cannot undertake here to argue the case for missions on the basis of any other ethic than that which recognizes moral well-being as part of true human good, and therefore the duty of promoting such moral well-being for all mankind.

Much of the vague talk about the practical unimportance of religion which we meet with in newspapers, since they have taken to allowing their columns to be made an instrument for enabling uneducated persons to instruct the world on fundamental questions, is the result of pure ignorance. I remember one correspondent who gravely informed us that every religion consisted of two parts: one part consisted in "dogma," which varies in different religions and is of no importance; while the other part consists in morality, and that is the same in all religions. I cannot stay here to demonstrate elaborately the fact that the lower religions of mankind—though undoubtedly they have their points of connection with ethics—are not to any considerable extent ethical systems at all, and that they do not always supply a sanction for any kind of ethics—least of all for the highest kind of ethics. The tendency of many primitive religions, or of elements in them, is positively (from our point of view) anti-ethical. No doubt it is true that the higher a religion becomes, the closer is its connection with morality. It is connected with it in two ways. In the first place, a man's view of the universe influences his attitude toward morality; and, in the second place, each of the great historical religions of the higher kind actually contains an ethical system. I will not stay to illustrate the close connection between the theory of the universe and the associated ethical creed. What I want most to insist upon here is the simple fact that the ethical ideals of different religions are not the same. The Christian apologist has no reason whatever for seeking to minimize the elements either of theological or of ethical truth which are common to all or many of the higher religions. But there are elements in them which are different. Even when they contain the same precepts, their practical effect is neutralized by the existence of much which is inconsistent with them. Judaism taught the duty of love to one's neighbors, but it neutralized it in practice by the stress which it laid upon sacrifices, upon ceremonial purity, upon the sanctity of an immoral oath, and the like. The teaching of Mohammedanism about our duty to women, to slaves, and to unbelievers is fundamentally inconsistent with the teaching of Christianity. Buddhism agrees with Christianity in its humanitarian precepts, but its whole outlook upon the world, and consequently the motive even of the philanthropy which it recom-

mends, are different. To the orthodox Buddhist life is an evil; the object of moral effort is to escape from the burden of personal consciousness; the highest moral ideal is that of the self-centered contemplative monk; charity is recommended rather because it implies renunciation on the part of the charitable than because it benefits its object. The practical results of a religion which finds its ultimate goal in death can hardly be the same as that of a religion which finds it in a more abundant life. If there are such differences of ethical ideals between those higher religions which have most in common, it will be unnecessary to say a word about the enormous contrasts between Christian morality and the ethical ideas of savages. It is enough for me to insist that, if we believe the morality acknowledged by Christianity to be true, it must be a duty to teach it to other nations also. A non-missionary Christianity is a contradiction in terms; it denies those very ideas of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of all men which are the most essential content of the Christian religion itself.

Whether we look to the theological or to the purely ethical side of the systems known as religious, the advocate of missions is under no obligation to take up the position that Christianity is true, and all other religions simply false. I assume that we have all by this time applied the idea of evolution to religion. We acknowledge the relative value of much that is contained in the lower religions, and the large amount of positive religious and ethical truth which is contained at least in the higher ones. But, however close we suppose another religion to approximate to Christianity, that approximation constitutes no reason why we should not endeavor to correct what is false and to supply what is lacking in it. In the abstract it might no doubt be conceivable that two religions should actually teach the same truths, though under different names, by means of different forms, and in connection with different historical revelations. As a matter of historical fact, there is no such practical identity between Christianity and any other religion. Neither the view of God which Christianity teaches nor its view of human duty is the same as that of any other religion.* The duty of teaching the full truth about the nature of

* Almost the only case in which this could plausibly be contended would be in the case of Judaism in the form in which it is believed by liberal Theists who have prac-

should not be regarded as the only or principal test of success. The vague diffusion of Christian ideas which has resulted from missionary work in India and in Japan should be considered as of quite equal importance with the making of actual converts — both on account of the actual improvement in the character and conduct of the persons influenced, and of the probable influence of such a vague Christianity in the future. I do not mean for a moment to suggest that the missionary should give up the attempt to make actual converts. The man who believes in Christianity himself cannot regard with entire satisfaction any state of mind which falls short of convinced Christianity — still less a state of intellectual conviction which is unwilling to face the social penalties of an open adhesion to the Christian community. A vague Christianity in the many is only made possible by a definite, convinced, courageous Christianity in the few. The hope of ultimately Christianizing whole nations must obviously lie in the work of native missionaries; and missionaries, it is needless to say, must be whole-hearted and courageous believers in Christianity. But the influence which Christianity may exercise, not merely upon individual adherents of other religions, but upon the religions themselves, should be regarded as a matter of infinite moment. It is acknowledged that Japanese Buddhism has become more theistic in its theology, and that its ethical ideal has approximated more closely to that of Christianity, through the indirect influence of Christian missions. We find non-Christian Japanese of the highest education admitting that the only alternative to Christianity as the future religion of Japan must be a Buddhism made more definitely theistic and otherwise largely influenced by Christian ideas. The change that has already taken place in Japanese ideas of religion and morality must be regarded as of vast importance for its own sake, and on account of the hope which it suggests of a more definite Christianity in the future. And all this has been done by missionaries most of whom were quite unfitted by ability or training to grapple with the difficulties of educated men who (to say nothing of their ancient national culture) have learned all the secular knowledge that the West has to teach them. Enough has been done to suggest the infinite possibilities that are open to a liberal and cultured Christianity that should be as zealous as the illiberal and uncultured Christianity which has

played so large a part in the mission work of the past and the present.

I have not attempted in this paper to discuss those actual defects of our present missionaries or their converts which play so large a part in the criticism of missions which one hears from the average globe-trotter, or the army officer who has been quartered in India and has not always found professedly Christian servants satisfactory.³ Such criticisms, even when well-founded, are no more arguments against missions than the defects of Christian ministers and Christian congregations at home are an argument against Christianity. All they point to is the duty of getting better missionaries, educating them better, and modifying in certain ways the policy of missionary societies when they are obscurantist or fanatical or unintelligent. But such an improvement in the character of missionary activity is not likely to be accomplished if the more thoughtful, more sensible, or more theoretically progressive members of Christian churches hold altogether aloof from missionary work, or at least leave that enthusiastic support of it which gives practical control over missionary agencies to the more narrow-minded sections of their respective denominations. One of the tasks which awaits the progressive Christianity of the future is to show that enthusiasm for Christian teaching has no association with intolerant narrowness. One of the best ways of doing that would be the foundation of a mission or a missionary college to be conducted on liberal lines.

³A frequent difficulty in more thoughtful critics of mission work is a complete ignorance of any but the crudest version of their own religion. Had the author of *The Soul of a People* understood Christianity as well as he understands Buddhism, the result of his comparison of the Buddhist ideal with the Christian might have been different.

RECENT CHANGES IN THEOLOGY IN THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH¹

A series of articles on the theological changes in the various ecclesiastical bodies of Christendom must have been interesting, if they presented with scholarly care and intelligent sympathy the changes brought about by the rapid progress of thought which has characterized the last forty years; and the articles which have preceded this have fulfilled the splendid promise of such a series.

It could not but be clear to anyone following the course of scientific and theological thinking, and particularly the developments of the historical and higher criticism of the Bible, that sooner or later that criticism and its results must enter into the thinking and living of the churches, certainly in great democratic communities like England and America. In Germany, owing to the character of its institutional life, it was for many years possible to hold within the circle of the universities—or perhaps one should say within that of scholars, scientists, and philosophers—the implications and results of scientific and historical investigation into religious documents and problems, as well as into those problems of things and of mind which bear upon theology. Such a condition would be impossible in America, both because of the intellectual democracy which characterizes American life, and also because of that attribute of the American mind which Guizot has pointed out as having been once the peculiar attribute of the French mind. Says Guizot:

There is in the genius of the French something of a sociableness, of a sympathy—something which spreads itself with more facility and energy than in the genius of any other people. . . . Their ideas, being more popular, present themselves more clearly to the masses, penetrate among them with greater ease. . . . In a word, clearness, sociability, sympathy are the particular characteristics of France, of its civilization.

As in France, so in America, the mind of the people is characterized, not only by the ease and rapidity with which ideas and sympathies penetrate and diffuse themselves through the whole social body, but

¹ By request of the author, and for special reasons, the *Journal* departs from its usual rule and publishes this article anonymously.

by a kind of practical logic which commits the active life of the people to the ideas of the intellect and the aspirations of the spirit. It is impossible for a vital democracy like ours long to hold ideas in the mind without expressing them in daily life. The churches have already come—or, if they have not already come, are rapidly coming—to recognize the pervading force of great sympathies and ideas, and the consequent necessity that they seek for an adjustment of the daily feeling and life of the people, especially of their own members, to the discoveries and the ideas of the intellect. Such adjustment will come anyway, but it is the duty of the church to aid in making it true. Churches are *per se* the most conservative of human institutions. They are, like all other forms of human institution, historical growths, but perhaps more than others they derive the main body of their vital content and of their appeal to men from their rootage in history. They all have a common origin in ideas and events which were uttered or which happened nineteen hundred years ago, and these ideas and events largely determine the intellectual content of Christian thought. Again, though churches have at times failed to perceive the necessarily universal inclusiveness of their thinking and their work, yet that inclusiveness has been, whether or not consciously perceived, a fundamental necessity; and that makes them conservative institutions. They cannot quickly accept and incorporate into themselves new discoveries, ideas, and forces, lest they commit themselves to ephemeral error, and so alienate the conservative temperament and judgment which are characteristic of so large a body of the people. They must also be slow in committing themselves even to new truths, because the popular mind is slow in apprehending truth, and their fundamental appeal is to populate feeling and judgment. They are, consequently, under special obligation to “prove all things and hold fast that which is good.” They must retain the approved old, and must be sympathetic to the new. They must be rooted deep in the past, and must have large power of sympathetic and vital assimilation of the present.

From these considerations affecting the church in general we proceed, in studying the theological changes in the Episcopal church, to the query as to what that church really is, how she defines herself, and what she apprehends to be the law of her organization and life.

She is historically the daughter of the Church of England, and the fundamental concepts of her life are those of the life of the mother-church. Two concepts may be selected from a number determining and describing the church as a whole, and as related to particular peoples, which are primary and fundamental in determining and describing the Anglican church: first, historic continuity of idea and organization from the New Testament church to the present time; and, secondly, the expression by the historically continued church of the essential religious genius and life of the people or of the state. The Anglican church claims authenticity by reason of historical continuity with New Testament Christianity, and by reason of her true and vital expression of the life and genius of the English state. We need not enter here into the disputed question of the validity of that claim, of the regularity of episcopal ordination, and the legitimacy of ecclesiastical continuity of the church in England previous to the Reformation, or into the question of the determinative or the non-determinative character of the work of Henry VIII. Suffice it to say that the English church claims to have existed, completely and historically organized, with episcopal supervision and through episcopal ordination, before that time when the Church of Rome made as the essential test of catholicity the consecration of bishops and the ordination of priests by specific consent and with the specific authorization of the bishop of Rome. The Church of England assents to the Roman proposition that the historic continuity of the church is conditioned upon the transmission of doctrine and orders from that early episcopal order which, though it was historically an evolution of the presbyterate, fell heir, according to the theory, to apostolic authority and function. There is, to be sure, a large body of the Church of England which lays very little stress upon this material symbol of historic continuity, but there can be no question that the Anglican church as an official body is committed in one form or another to the idea that the historical continuity of organization and doctrine has been maintained and expressed in an unbroken chain of inherited beliefs from the theology of Jesus, John, and Paul, and a consecutive series of ordinations from those of Timothy and Titus to the present time. It would be interesting, if there were space within the limits of this article, to ascertain how the various parties in the

church, particularly the broad-church party, have interpreted this conception of historic continuity. We may stop only to mention one interpretation which illustrates the ingenuity of the intellect in interpreting old doctrines in the terms of modern consciousness of reality. According to this interpretation, the historic episcopate means in the church what pride of ancestry means in the family: it transmits ideals and functional sentiments. It is a kind of ecclesiastical analogy to the legal conception that a man may be judged only by his peers. Bishops as bishops and priests as priests are, and they only are, competent to transmit the functional obligations and sentiments of their office, the norms both of doctrine and function which belong to their office. But in whatever sense this conception of historic continuity is held in the Anglican church, it is a fair statement that the Anglican claim to be a branch of the Catholic church is founded primarily upon this conception of historic continuity in thought and in ordered organization.

The other concept, true and vital expression of the life of the state, is one which is not primarily churchly or theological in its nature, but has been evolved out of the growth of nations. According to Anglican principle, this conception of a state church is not, however, an arbitrary hypothesis or weapon forged out of immediate necessity to justify the separation in the time of Henry VIII. The claim is that in the state churches of pre-Reformation days the necessity of true and vital expression by the church of the religious life of a people or a state, and a large power in the rulers of the state to determine the personnel of church organization, were recognized as a part of the certification and working policy of the Catholic church for centuries before the Reformation schism. Nevertheless, it is not claimed that the state-church idea is any part of the New Testament tradition, but rather an evolution from political necessity after the disintegration of the Roman Empire as the political expression of the Catholic church.

We now come to a more definite characterization of the Anglican church, and hence of the Episcopal church. Properly speaking, the Anglican church, according to her own doctrine, is not a church at all, but is a branch of the Catholic church, her catholicity being determined by historic continuity, and her actual organization by the necessity of true expression of the religious life of the English

people. These ideas of theoretical catholicity and of national limitation are fundamental to an understanding of the doctrinal position of the Anglican church and her daughters throughout the world. To repeat, the Anglican church is not a church, but a branch of the Catholic church, and the Catholic church is in a state of suspense. That church does not practically exist in the world today, the reason being that catholicity is not only historical continuity, but actual universality; and no church fulfils these two conceptions of catholicity. The schism of the Greek from the Roman church and of northern European Christianity from Latin terminated the actual material existence of the Catholic church, or rather suspended it. These three great divisions of the church have no means of communication and common action. We may describe the situation, speaking in terms of law, thus: The Anglican church, like the Roman and like the Greek, is unable to get a quorum, and therefore unable to act. Not even a quorum, however, would fully satisfy the demand of catholicity, that demand involving universality of time and place and unanimous consent—*quod semper, quod ubique, et quod ab omnibus*. Consequently, the Anglican church is unable either to make or to modify doctrine. She is bound as respects doctrine to the last utterance of the materially existing Catholic church—in other words, to the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. To be sure, she uses the so-called Athanasian Creed; but that creed, though it probably originated in Gaul as early as the beginning of the sixth century, perhaps in the middle of the fifth (for it seems to have been commented upon by Venantius Fortunatus of Poitiers)—before the final schism between the Greek and the Roman churches, which did not occur till 787—was due largely to the influence of the Augustinian school and was never officially used by the Greek church, never having been acted upon by any of the ecumenical councils. It did, however, find its way into some portions of the Greek church in Europe in the eleventh or the twelfth century. Schaff calls it the last of the ecumenical symbols, but it certainly is not officially such. The Anglican church also uses the Thirty-Nine Articles, which are subsequent to the second great schism; but those articles issued out of a certain necessity for the restatement of theology under the concept of a state church, and also out of a desire of the leaders of the church in England at the time of

the Reformation to harmonize as far as possible the theology of the Anglican church with the theology of the Reformation, though great care was exercised neither to destroy the Catholic faith nor to add anything thereto. According, then, to a rigorous interpretation of her own fundamental principles, the Anglican church is in the last resort bound by, and only by, those doctrines which were formulated and officially accepted before the schism between the eastern and western churches. Strictly speaking, the Apostles' Creed itself is not a catholic creed; that is to say, it was never used by the Greek church, and there is no evidence that in its making the Greek church had any voice. It first originated in Rome, in a simpler form than we now have it, and we know the earliest form of that creed under the appellation of "The Old Roman Symbol." It was slowly enriched by the amplification of old clauses and the addition of new, but that process went on entirely in the western church. However, its theological identity with the Nicene Creed, and the fact that its use in the western church has never been objected to by the eastern church, permit us to treat it as a catholic creed.

Creed-growth in the Anglican church is thus inhibited, because the Catholic church of which she is a part is in a state of suspense. Nevertheless, the very origin of the Anglican church as actually and officially a state church, and the necessity of relating the church both to the religious life and thinking of the English people and to the religious life and thinking of continental Europe, required a means and method of expressing that relation. She could not change her creed, and she was consequently obliged to resort to an increase of the function of interpretation. Only by such increase of that function was she able to justify her desire both to be in harmonious relation with the reformed thought and life of Europe, and to adapt herself to the rapidly developing and growing experience and thought of the English people. The Reformation, both on the continent and in England, was not merely a reformation of religious doctrine and practice, but was the result of an aspiration for intellectual and spiritual democracy. Its origin was due as much to the intellectual renaissance of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as to the moral awakening of the sixteenth century; and it therefore became necessary for the English church to respond quickly to the aspirations and

movements of the intellectual and spiritual democracy which was so rapidly developing, and with which, if she was to live and grow in it at all, she must be in ready and vital sympathy.

The method of this increase of the function of interpretation was, in accordance with the English national genius, the rise and interaction of parties—the High Church and Low or Broad Church parties; and these parties in the church were expressions in the ecclesiastical and theological sphere of party spirits and conceptions of which the national life in general was made up, and with which the student of political and social history among all peoples is familiar. The High Church party was that party which insisted with special force on the centralized and authoritative dogma of catholicity, and from the very beginning of the Anglican church as a state church has never been reconciled to the schism either from Roman or from Greek Christianity, holding itself in an attitude of more or less patient waiting for the material restoration of that universalized and centralized body of the Catholic church by which dogma shall be made all-definite and all-compelling. That party accepted the schism from Rome on the ground of political necessity, and because by its nature and instinct it could hold itself with passionate devotion true to a series of dogmatic official pronunciamientos, though the voice that uttered them had become silent. It must have definite and rigid authority, and because of that necessity it was able to live upon a definite, though ancient, conception of catholicity, and upon the hope of the future realization of a church which should again universally and materially express that conception. This party did not come immediately after the separation of the Anglican church from the Church of Rome into full consciousness of itself. It was implicitly in the mind and genius of the English people, but did not come to a conscious recognition of itself till, by force of reaction from the Presbyterian and Puritan movement in England during the time of Laud, it became more or less a definitely organized party within the church. The dominant ecclesiastical influence in the English Reformation was that of the Low or Broad Church party, restrained, however, by the native tendency of the English mind to compromise. It is pertinent to remember, in view of much of the discussion which is going on now, that the Anglican church as a state church did not commit

herself formally, or perhaps one may say even implicitly, to the conceptions which underlie today the High Church position. Presbyterianism, certainly as a form of thought, if not of polity, was officially recognized in the Anglican church in the days before Laud. Practical provision was made, for example, for Presbyterian worship in parish churches in the afternoon, and freedom of conscience both as to doctrine and polity was widely recognized.

And in this connection it should also be noted that, though the Catholic creeds were accepted as sufficient and authoritative statement of Christian belief, it is nevertheless true that the Protestant doctrine of the Scriptures as the final resort for the testing of belief had wide acceptance, and really underlay much of the Reformation movement in England. The proof of this statement is found in Article VI of the Articles of Religion, in its provision that whatsoever is not read in Holy Scripture, "nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." Earlier even than that is the provision in the ordinal that bishops and priests are required, "out of the Holy Scriptures to instruct the people" committed to their charge, and "to teach nothing as required of necessity to eternal salvation" but that which they "shall be persuaded may be concluded and proved by the Scripture." The Ordinal and the Article both show convincingly how important and how fundamental to the English Reformation and to the organization of the state church was Scripture authority—indeed, how exclusive that authority was of any other authority which might be in contradiction with it. Furthermore, attention should be called to the official recognition here given of the large function of interpretation accorded, not simply to the church as a whole, but to the individual bishop or priest. Indeed, it may be said that, though the church conceived herself bound by the utterances of the Catholic church, she conceived herself so bound only by reason of the admitted fact that those creeds were and must be in accord with the Holy Scriptures, and must contain nothing as requisite and necessary to salvation which the bishop or priest was not persuaded could be concluded and proved therefrom. All of this goes to show the decisive influence of the Low or Broad Church party, the characterization of which, apart from this citation

of its fruits, is reserved to the discussion of the Episcopal church in particular.

We now come to the Protestant Episcopal church, and we note two remarkable conditions which govern the formation, if one may so term it, of the Protestant Episcopal church in the United States of America: First, the necessity of bringing the church into accord with the political conditions incident to the establishing of a new nation independent of England, the church consequently to some extent independent of the English church. The demand for catholicity was as strong in the establishment of the Episcopal church as it had been in the reformation of the English church; and the same ideas with respect to the Catholic church as a whole obtained in the establishment of the Episcopal church which had obtained in the reformation of the state church of England; with the exception, however, of the new doctrine of the total and necessary separation of the state from the church. It was considered as important that the Protestant Episcopal church represent the religious genius of the American people as it had been that the English state church represent the religious genius of the English people; but that representation was to be strictly moral and spiritual, not political and official. The second condition was that created by the new spirit of religious toleration which animated the founders of the republic. It was probably not with full consciousness on the part of the church that this sentiment of religious toleration and breadth with which the founders of the republic were inspired influenced so positively as it did the doctrinal origin, if one may so speak, of the Protestant Episcopal church.

But that such influence was of great force in the formative processes of the Episcopal church is clearly evident both in the discussions and in the conclusions of the Convention of 1789. That convention, after long and exhaustive discussion, distinctly refused to be bound by the Thirty-Nine Articles; and also took another remarkable step, the importance of which has not been recognized in current discussion as to the theological position of the Episcopal church, and particularly as to the large interpretative function which she accords, not simply to bishops and clergy, but to lay people as well. The step to which we refer is the change in the formula of creed

subscription in the Baptismal Office, which is the primal, the only official creed-subscription of the Episcopal church. In the "Order for Baptism" in the English Prayerbook the formula of creed subscription reads: "Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth? And in Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son, our Lord? And that he was conceived by the Holy Ghost; born of the Virgin Mary;" etc—each article of the creed being stated as categorical fact, with subscription thereto specifically required. The Convention of 1789 changed that form to the simple form: "Dost thou believe all the articles of the Christian faith, as contained in the Apostles' Creed?" That form of creed-subscription was taken by the convention from the Presbyterian formula, and is therefore to be interpreted, not by Anglican, but by Presbyterian, theological history. Presbyterian scholars are unanimous in their agreement that that form does not require explicit and detailed acceptance of each article or statement either of the Westminster Confession or of the Longer or Shorter Catechism, but only of all the articles of the Christian faith as contained in the Confession and in the Longer and Shorter Catechisms. Whether or not the Convention of 1789 was definitely conscious of the importance of this change is not to the point. The important fact is that the change was deliberately made, and can hardly have been made without some intelligent purpose. A curious error is frequently made in the statement that the Thirty-Nine Articles constitute a part of the creed of the Protestant Episcopal church, because they are found bound within the covers of the Prayerbook. Such a step was never taken by the Episcopal church. The convention of 1801 simply ordered their printing and binding within the covers of the Prayerbook as an established statement of the Articles of Religion, but with no official action incorporating those articles into the liturgy, which, and which only, expresses the doctrinal requirements of the church.

These two facts are most important, and indicate clearly how deep and forceful upon the organizers of the Protestant Episcopal church was the influence of the Broad Church sentiment of the founders of the republic. They also indicate a keen and vital response on the part of the church to the spiritual as well as political democracy out of which the republic issued.

But before taking up the interpretative development of the ideas of the creeds, we note the continuation in the Episcopal church of the method of development characterizing the Anglican church; namely, growth and influence of parties. We have sufficiently characterized the High Church party in England to have characterized it also in America; but the Low or Broad Church party, which we have for convenience treated as one, is not and has not been one. The Low Church party was in its origin really a Protestant party, and was in an important sense even more conservative than the High Church party. Philosophically considered, no more rigidly Protestant party has ever existed in any Christian body than the Low Church party in England and America. Its position with reference to the church idea was rather negative than positive. It denied the High Church claims concerning the church; and, while it accepted the Catholic creeds and used them, it denied any authority belonging to them by reason of the evolution of Christian belief and experience, but limited their authority only to an unelastic, iron-clad conception of the total theological sufficiency of the Scriptures. The Low Church party existed, for most of the years of its history, mainly by means of protest. Though springing from the democratic and social impulse, allied by sympathy to a progressive political and social democracy, and on that side of it an expression of liberalism in social and political, and somewhat also in intellectual, life; on the other side of it it was in some degree unprogressive, iconoclastic, and reactionary. No more curious anomaly in the intellectual and moral constitution of a social or religious party ever existed in the world than that which has characterized the Low Church party in the Church of England and in the Protestant Episcopal church—a party politically liberal, anxious to voice and express the social aspirations of democratic society, yet theologically unelastic and non-progressive. It is easy to see that, as soon as the world became unified under the reign of science and commerce, its thought focusing at every important center; as soon as the various departments of life and activity came to be recognized as simply fields of operation of the one human spirit, such an anomaly in a party must have become *impossible*: and the fact is, the party was destroyed. Only here and there are small coteries of individuals and parish churches that are

held by the intellectual and spiritual conceptions of the old Low Church party. As a vital force in the evolution of the church's life and thought it is dead, and has been largely replaced by the Broad Church party, or, as it is perhaps better named, movement.

It is not, however, meant by the foregoing to say that the Broad Church movement originated after the death or disintegration of the Low Church party; for Broad Churchmanship has always existed. It is not a party, not a code, or a creed, but an ideal and a spirit; and that ideal and spirit have existed and operated in the church from New Testament times till the present day. But as a definitely recognized force in the evolution of Christian and church thought Broad Churchmanship may be said to have come into being in very recent times. Allied at first with, and taking many of its premises from the Low Church party, it declined to accept the politico-ecclesiastical conception of the church as an organization, and laid its chief emphasis, not upon doctrines which are characteristic of High Churchmanship, but upon the social and spiritual principles of religion and their practical application to the daily life of men; yet it differentiated itself essentially from Low Churchmanship by its recognition in the realm of theology of the same laws and forces, the same conceptions and ideals, the same spiritual aspirations and influences, which animate and govern the political, economic, and social realms of thought and life (the lack of which recognition in Low Churchmanship resulted in that curious anomaly which has been noted), and also by a richer and more vital conception of the church than that held by Low Churchmen. It originated partly in the new social consciousness which began to characterize English and American religious life about the middle of the nineteenth century, and partly also in the new intellectual and religious consciousness which resulted from the increased control by science of the thought and life of men. Springing as it did from so complex a situation, reacting from much that it found in both of the existing parties, yet sympathizing with and sharing some of the principles of both, it was in the best sense eclectic and spiritual, both in principle and method. Its genius was necessarily comprehensive. It refrained from organization, aiming to infuse new spirit and power into the doctrines it found, and to apply them to the practical life of men. It was a new

humanism, derived from a new consciousness of God and man; and consequently it rather called into the deeper nature of man for his own religious truths, than applied artificially God's truths to man. Though out of it came the Christian-Socialist movement in England, it was at first more spiritual than concrete in its methods. Its great leaders believed in preaching. They conceived of their work as taking the great truths of God, and showing them to be the great truths of man, and the great truths of man to be those of God. They aimed to interpret in the light of the new social and scientific consciousness the spiritual values of religion, of the life of man, and of the natural world; and thus to make the Broad Church principle and method an agent in the process of religious and theological interpretation, and in that of realizing the spiritual democracy of the kingdom of God. But to do that Broad Churchmanship had to grasp and fuse together the essential truths of Low Church ecclesiastical democracy and of High Church faith in the church. It had to conceive of the church as both free and vital—truly democratic, in that she gives to the individual heart and mind free access to God and to truth; and truly sovereign, in that she has the compelling power of vital organization by and through the forever indwelling spirit of God.

So much has been said of the Broad Church movement, because mainly through and by means of that movement the process of interpretation of creeds has been carried on in the Episcopal church; and that fact is due to three fundamental descriptive characteristics—the conception of religious development by evolution as well as by revelation, profound sympathy with universal humanity, and love of truth. These characteristics are themselves, however, the result of three great propositions of faith, two of which at least are cardinal faith-propositions of the Episcopal church—faith in God, faith in the incarnation, and faith in man as the child of God. The conception of the church is in a sense hardly less important than the other principles of Broad Churchmanship; but as distinct from the High Church conception, which practically co-ordinates the church with the other objects of faith, the Broad Church conception is of the church as an agency and method of realizing other, and perhaps higher, ends. It may be said to be regulative rather

than determinative of thought and activity, providing not an end, but a means. Certainly it has conditioned in an important degree the course of theological development in the Anglican and Episcopal churches, serving as a regulative concept for that development, which naturally ran along the lines of the Catholic creeds and was concerned with the specific statements of those creeds as church utterances, rather than with the more abstract theological dogmas with which Protestant thought has been so much concerned. Of course, Protestantism has exercised, by reason of the Protestant element in both the Anglican and Episcopal churches, positive influence upon their thought, and there has been at certain times in their history a general consensus as to the more abstract doctrines of Christian theology, such as the fall, sin, atonement, predestination, inspiration, etc.; but, with the exception of that time and spirit in the history of the Anglican church out of which the Thirty-Nine Articles grew, it may be said that those churches have never had an official doctrine of sin, or of the atonement, or of predestination, other than that expressed in the Prayerbook; and that can be elicited only in the form of interpretation. The Episcopal church in particular has never had any official, other than Prayerbook, doctrine pertaining to those matters; though in sermons and theological essays by churchmen those matters have been treated as revealed theological propositions, or in the light of the evolution of the Christian consciousness; but a general consensus has always been unofficial. It may be pertinent right here to say that the pronouncement of the bishops, issued a few years ago, declaring that fixity of interpretation is of the essence of the creed, is entirely out of accord with the historic liberty of the church, and is exactly contrary to fact. There is no authority competent to give fixity of interpretation, and no authority may be created by a body which makes no claim to having a quorum. What many persons regard as the absurdity in the judicial system of the church—namely, the fact that she has no court of appeals, but that that system is a headless trunk—is an accurate representation of the real situation. A court of appeals, instead of securing catholicity, would destroy it, since such a court could not represent the Catholic church.

It is not necessary to trace in detail the development in interpre-

tation of the theological propositions of the Nicene Creed as the typical Catholic creed, since the present dominant conceptions of the theological propositions in that creed are probably known to every reader of this *Journal*, and are common to the thinking of the whole body of American Christianity, as is also the history out of which they have come. In so far as the evolution and interpretation of theological belief are peculiar to the Episcopal church, they may be said to have been so differentiated in accordance with that regulative concept of the church which has been mentioned. This concept is and must be important in such interpretation and evolution, because it gives to church scholars and thinkers a kind of sense of safety—a consciousness that their own intellectual freedom and the results of their thinking cannot be permanently injurious, because they will always be subject to the corrective law of the church's own life and growth. To the mind of a churchman the right to blunder theologically, if he blunder honestly, is as sacred as is to a democrat the right to blunder politically; for he feels that the free life of the church is sufficiently powerful to restrain and combine in healthful growth the free life of her individual members. The democracy of the church, like the democracy of the state, is safe only as the church or the state is a free and living body. It is for this reason probably that there is in the present theological situation in the Episcopal church a radicalism which is not found to the same extent in the evangelical bodies of Protestantism. The concrete faiths of the Episcopal church root in the all-comprehensive faith in the vital institution of the Father's family, and those theological doctrines which are of primary interest to the church today are the doctrines which are fundamental to the constitutional doctrine of the divine family; namely, God, his incarnation in mankind, the glorious regeneration and salvation of mankind by that incarnation in the perfected kingdom of God. The Episcopal church accepts, in common with American Christianity, the modern idea of God as an infinite eternal Spirit, immanent in the world, which is in some undefined way his creation or outbreathing; the Father of mankind, naturally and necessarily, not by artifice or adoption—the Father of mankind in general and of all men in particular, whose love is the all-sufficient source of moral and spiritual power, and

obedience to whose will is the perfect obligation and destiny of mankind.

This doctrine of God is philosophically the essential and fundamental element in Christianity, and the primary duty, both intellectual and spiritual, of the Christian is expressed in the phrase *ecce deus*. But in the order of time that conception and that duty follow the belief in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, or the incarnation. It is perhaps with reference to the doctrine of the incarnation that there is going on today the most interesting phase of interpretation and evolution. The Episcopal church never held more firmly than she does now the belief in the incarnation as a fundamental fact of Christianity. The religious and philosophic content of the idea of God, and the same content of the idea of man, immediately and necessarily involve a conception of the incarnation. The present experience and thinking of the church coincide absolutely with the revealed message and the revealed life of God in Jesus Christ. That God was in Jesus Christ reconciling the world to himself is the unquestioned belief of the whole Episcopal church, of the Broad Church party as widely and as deeply as of the High Church party. Indeed, out of the very necessity and intensity of faith in the incarnation has come that phase of evolution to which allusion has been made; namely, a distinction between the incarnation as a fact and any specific method of that incarnation. Accordingly, the opinion is widespread in the Episcopal church, not only among Broad Churchmen, but among many High Churchmen, that the "virgin-birth," for example, is not of the essence of the incarnation, or necessary to it. Quite recently so eminent an authority as the dean of Westminster, who is a thorough-going believer in the virgin-birth, has declared that it is a confusion of thought to identify the incarnation with that method of it which is known as the virgin-birth. The dean expresses himself as being willing for the time being to leave the question of the mode of the incarnation in the background, and to consider only the doctrine that the Son of God took human flesh, was incarnate, and was made man; and he appeals with sincere hope of conviction to that in the nature of man's mind and heart which the incarnation, and that only, satisfies. It is a notable fact that practically all the theological literature which the Episcopal church

is producing today treats the matter of the incarnation as a spiritual principle and fact issuing necessarily from the idea of God, and from the thought and experience of man, not as a conclusion from a reputed miracle. Perhaps the most important book which has appeared within recent years from a churchman is Dr. Du Bose's *The Gospel in the Gospels*; and though Dr. Du Bose is a believer in the virgin-birth as a literal fact, and much of his thinking is influenced by that belief, he yet treats the whole matter of theological dogma as a conclusion from the necessities of life, and not from a certified miracle or series of miracles, or, as after the manner of Calvin, from the laws of abstract thinking. Only after working through the thought-implications of the life and the character of Jesus does he come to theological captions such as "The Trinity," "The Deity of Christ," etc. One realizes that, in discussing a matter so delicate and so much in dispute as this, he incurs the danger of voluminous contradiction; and yet it may be said with a good deal of confidence that the Episcopal church, though not committed as yet to an apprehension of the incarnation such as has been here indicated, contains a body of men—a large minority, if not (including the laity) a majority—indispensable to the church, because they are doing a very large part of the church's active work for mankind, who do so apprehend the incarnation; to whose thought the virgin-birth as a method is not an essential part of the incarnation, but is to be determined as to truth or falsity by the issues of scholarship; who are satisfied with the philosophical and spiritual apprehension of the incarnation as a necessary postulate of history and present experience. In so far as the virgin-birth seems to them not to be a necessary part of the incarnation, and thus to be out of essential relation to the heart and life of Christianity, they feel that it is pedagogically and morally false to attempt to force it upon the intellect either of clergy or of laity; and they leave it either to be proven by scholarship or to issue again, as it issued at first, out of the intellectual and moral necessities involved in the unique and transcendent consciousness and character of Jesus Christ. They recognize, as scholars must recognize, that the virgin-birth formed no part of the original Christian tradition. They do not argue conclusively from the silence of the first and fourth gospels, and from that of Paul, that it is thereby disproven; but they do

argue that it is thereby proven not to be a necessary part of the doctrine of the incarnation.

And in this particular the Broad Church thought in the Episcopal church does, in accordance with the ideal of history, really exhibit the national temperament and thought in the sphere of religion. To the religious consciousness of our time the doctrine of the virgin-birth is not essential; in other words, it is out of relation to that consciousness. The great body of lay people outside the Roman Catholic church are indifferent to it, and to no small body it is irrelevant, if not slightly antagonistic. That does not, however, mean that the doctrine is not true; but it does mean that the temper of religious thought of this day is very similar to the religious temper in the time of Paul and the early Christians. Religion was to them a way of life; such it is to the religious mind of today. It involves primarily, not intellectual definition, but moral and devotional attitude. We are again learning the first lessons of Christianity; namely, those of love to God and of love to man, of struggle against sin—or, speaking anthropologically, against the beast—and of salvation from sin through obedience to the spirit of God, and through righteousness and service to the brotherhood; which salvation shall become perfect in a restored humanity governed by the principles of the kingdom of God. The doctrine of the virgin-birth was a poetic and scientific attempt to relate the unique consciousness and character of Christ to the natural world. The age of its making was pre-eminently the scientific age of Hebrew thinking. When the early church had come to apprehend the meaning and obligations of the "Way," they next formulated a doctrine of the Person who declared the Way, and related his origin and life to their scientific conceptions of the world about them. The Broad Church conception contains no denial, except here and there in sporadic instances, of the virgin-birth; but it does distinguish between the incarnation as a spiritual fact necessary to our conception of God and man, and the mode of its realization, which is matter to be determined by scholarship and science.

Another interesting evolution of interpretation not peculiar to the Episcopal church, and yet perhaps having a phase peculiar to that church, is that of the doctrine of the Trinity. In this age, which finds it so difficult to make the rigid theological distinctions

of the Nicene and post-Nicene periods of church history, we should expect, as we find, an intellectual impatience with the refined and arbitrary distinctions made, particularly by the Athanasian Creed, in the definitions of the nature of God and of the relation of the persons in the Trinity to one another. Catholic theology was in those days of abstract thinking, in spite of the difficulties involved in the doctrine of God, able to keep itself monotheistic; but the Puritans in America had not an equal ability. Their thinking was decidedly more concrete than that of the Catholic thinkers, and they became consequently tri-theistic. The Unitarian reaction in America could never have spread so widely as it did, or have influenced so deeply the intellectual and spiritual consciousness of New England, unless it had been a legitimate reaction, and had in it profound truth. It made an important contribution to the doctrine of God, and that contribution has now entered into the thinking of evangelical Christianity. The contribution was first made use of by New England Congregationalists such as Bushnell, but it soon entered into the thought of the Presbyterian and Episcopal churches. It has especially influenced Broad Church thought in the Episcopal church. Dr. Vinton and Bishops Huntington and Brooks, by their intimate contact with New England Unitarianism, contributed in an important degree to the infusion of the monotheistic conception of God peculiar to Unitarianism into the Episcopal church; and the result, if it can be characterized at all, though it has never yet been formally stated and is not likely to be, may be perhaps considered as a renaissance of the old conception of the modal Trinity. The arbitrary distinctions in the divine essence and the conception of the relation of the persons, which were apparently so clear to the ancient catholic mind, the modern mind does not conceive of as expressing intelligible thinking, or as having any particular pertinence in the practical application of religious truth to the life of men. The Broad Church thought of the Trinity is content to rest with the New Testament thought of the Trinity. It does not find the Athanasian definition of the Trinity explicitly declared anywhere in the New Testament, but it does find God operating in three ways or modes: as the Creator of the world and the Father of mankind, as the model Teacher and Example of human life divinely conceived and divinely lived, and as the Spirit

and Power by which the life and spirit of the Son of man and the Son of God are to be realized in man himself. This conception of the Trinity of revelation, or the threefold revelation of God, has never been distinctly or officially stated either in the Episcopal church or in any other Protestant body in which it obtains, and is therefore not to be identified exactly with any of the ancient or mediaeval so-called heresies. It leaves definition and description to the science of theology, taking the historical and spiritual principles of God's revelation as sufficient for practical use in making God's love in Christ and God's power in the Holy Spirit known to men.

The immediate question in the theological thinking of the Episcopal church today is that of the method of the incarnation, the one concerning which there is most speculation and excitement. But to the Broad Church spirit and thinking the issue, whatever it may be, is irrelevant as respects the practical application of religion to life, the incarnation itself being not involved in that discussion. But there is another question likely soon to be a matter of discussion which is more complicated, and is more vital not only to thought but to life, and that is the question of the resurrection; for that question is indissolubly connected in modern thinking and feeling with the belief of immortality. Furthermore, as a dogma of historic Christianity it stands on different ground from that of the virgin-birth. Whereas the virgin-birth is recognized as not necessarily belonging to the incarnation, as not the foundation of apostolic preaching, the resurrection is generally so regarded. There can be no question that Peter, Paul, and John—particularly Paul, to whom Christian theology is in deepest debt—did found their preaching upon the fact of the resurrection. Paul goes so far as to say that, if the resurrection be not a fact, Christian preaching is vain and men are without hope. He knew nothing of the Greek doctrine of inherent immortality which later crept into the thinking of the Christian church, and he therefore could have no other ground for belief in personal immortality than the historically accredited resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Fourth Gospel evidently knows nothing of the Greek doctrine of inherent immortality; for it clearly represents Jesus as teaching conditional immortality; that is to say, personal immortality growing out of belief in him and spiritua^l

identification with him. The issue has been considerably confused by the fact that the Greek doctrine later became almost universally identified with the Christian doctrine of immortality, though it was not the Hebrew doctrine, and apparently not that of Jesus or of the New Testament. The Broad Church movement, by reason of its free and courageous acceptance of the scientific view of the world, has led some individual Broad Churchmen to look askance upon any doctrine resting in the miraculous; but that attitude of mind cannot be said to be characteristic of Broad Churchmanship in general. The Broad Churchman need not be and is not *per se* skeptical, particularly concerning the miraculous which is justified by moral exigency, though he would be skeptical of the miraculous not so justified.

This whole question is too doubtful and too complicated to discuss in an article which has for its purpose to indicate theological tendencies in the Episcopal church, but three facts may be noted: first, that the doctrine stands on very definite and well-accredited New Testament evidence, and is without question the foundation of all of the apostolic preaching; secondly, that Christianity, interpreted apart from Greek philosophy, promises personal immortality only in and through spiritual identification with Jesus Christ as the Son of God resurrected from the dead; thirdly, that there is an incipient tendency to distinction between a spiritual resurrection of Jesus Christ unmistakably manifested to the intellect, if not to the senses, of his disciples, and the conception of the empty grave or of the material resurrection. What will be the outcome of this matter no one knows; but so much is certain, that the Episcopal church, including Broad Churchmen, is absolutely committed to a real though spiritual resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, convincing to the disciples and causal to the Christian church. The Broad Churchman considers the mysterious problems involved in the forty days between the resurrection and the ascension as not susceptible of any definite scientific answer in the light of present knowledge; but he believes that Christianity is founded upon a real resurrection.

The foregoing two cardinal instances of the use of the interpretative function illustrate clearly the process of theological evolution in general. The other doctrines of the creed, such as the ascension, the resurrection of the body, and the more abstract doctrines of evan-

gelical theology, such as the fall, sin, the atonement, etc., are all interpreted in the light both of their spiritual values as life-principles and of modern scientific knowledge. That is to say, they are considered as expressing, though not literally and explicitly, a spiritual truth which is of practical value in the life of men. Even a doctrine such as the ascension, which primarily concerns Christ himself, gets its spiritual value for the modern world by reason of its implications and results for mankind. The modern doctrine of the resurrection of the body, in so far as it formalizes itself today, may perhaps be said to have returned from the mediaeval and Nicene conceptions to the Pauline conception, its practical spiritual value for the modern mind being that it expresses a belief in the continuation of the personal identity of the Christian as he lived and was known among men on earth. The acquiring of knowledge, and of consequent moral responsibility, involved for mankind, as a new departure in the evolution of life always involves, some disadvantage or fall. The "beast," or hereditary sin, is a fact both of biology and of moral character. Man is prone to evil as the sparks fly upward, and needs the power of God, not only to forgive his personal sins, but also to overcome the beast in him. In other words, "atonement," or at-onement with God, is a moral necessity as well as a theological doctrine; its method is left where it properly belongs—to the councils of Almighty God. The Episcopal church has escaped, by virtue of the church idea, any arbitrary definition of the doctrine of inspiration, because she has believed in the spirit of God as operating, not merely in the Bible, but in the history of the divine society, and in the life and teachings of modern as well as of ancient prophets. It is this belief which gives the Prayerbook authority, and which also subjects the Prayerbook as well as the Bible to the interpretative process.

To sum up, if there be among the shifting currents of thought and the manifold interpretations of experience a dominant tendency, it may perhaps be said to be that Scripture, tradition, the creeds, and the Prayerbook are the expression and history of the relation of God to mankind, of God's activity in the heart of man and in the world, and of man's apprehension of and search for God. They seem less likely to be treated as precise and arbitrary forms of contract between the church and the clergy, or between the church and the

laity, and more likely to be treated as divine records, brought together through human agency, and limited as to authoritatively exact expression to the times of their making, of the life of God in the human soul and in the world; yet as symbols forever valid, through the process of truthful interpretation, for the guidance of devotion and of faith, and the upbuilding of human character in the knowledge and love of God as revealed in his Son Jesus Christ—truly born, truly living, real Son of man and Son of God, the Example and the Way, whom to follow in spirit and in truth is to attain to everlasting life and to the fruition of perfect character

MYSTICISM IN THE EARLY CHURCH

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The word "mysticism" has been used in many and widely different senses, but it always implies some sort of immediacy of relation between the human and the divine. Taking the term in this general sense, without attempting here to define it more narrowly, I wish to ask to what extent mysticism may be said to have existed in the early church, and in what forms it appeared. I shall confine myself to the first century and a half of the life of the church.

The earliest Christian of whose mysticism there can be no doubt is the apostle Paul. However broadly or narrowly the term may be defined, it cannot fail to include him. His mysticism is of an extreme kind. The Christian man is he in whom dwells divinity. By faith, the mystical bond of union, he is brought into complete oneness with God, so that it is no longer he that lives, but the divine Christ that lives in him (cf. Gal. 3:27; 4:19; Rom. 8; Eph. 2:22; 3:17; Col. 1:27 ff.; 3:3).

It is a genuine physical or metaphysical unity of which Paul speaks—not simply a oneness of spirit, or disposition, or will, but of substance. Jesus Christ, who is himself divine, or the Spirit of God, who is one with Christ, enters into the believer and substitutes for his fleshly nature a spiritual and divine nature, so that he is a new creature altogether. The result of the divine indwelling is not simply union, but identity. It is not that the man and Christ are brought into intimate association, but that they become one, so that the man dies with Christ unto the flesh, and rises with him unto a new life, unto the spirit; so that what Christ does he does, and what Christ has he has.

But it is not simply that Paul held a mystical theory of the Christian life; his own personal religious experience was genuinely mystical, and out of it his theory grew. Compare, for instance, what he says in Gal. 1:16: "When it pleased God to reveal his Son in me" (cf. also Gal. 1:11 ff.; 2:20). And in II Cor. 12:2-4 he recounts a particular experience which is typically, we might almost say technically,

mystical and has innumerable parallels in the history of mysticism: "I know a man in Christ fourteen years ago (whether in the body I know not or whether out of the body I know not, God knoweth), such a one caught up even to the third heaven. And I know such a man (whether in the body or apart from the body I know not, God knoweth), how that he was caught up into paradise and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." (Cf. also II Cor. 2:6 ff. and I Cor. 14:18.)

The fruit of the union of the divine and human natures which is so emphasized in Paul's epistles is the believer's complete moral transformation. His life is no more an earthly, but a heavenly, life; no more carnal, but spiritual; no more corrupt, but holy (cf. Rom. 8:1 ff.; Gal. 5:22 ff.; Eph. 2:10; 3:14 ff.; 5:9; Phil. 2:13; 3:8 ff.; Col. 3:1 ff.).

Moreover, the Christian man—being no longer fleshly, but spiritual; no longer human only, but divine—is a free man, over whom the law has no dominion. He is in possession of the completest ethical liberty, because, being spiritual and divine, his nature is its own law and needs no other. "Where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty." Thus Paul's mysticism results in an ethical position of the loftiest sort—perfect holiness in perfect liberty, the moral spontaneity of a holy will. It is here that his chief interest lies. He is above all else concerned in his own and his brethren's moral perfectness, and in his mystical doctrine of the divine indwelling he finds its guarantee. It would be a mistake, therefore, to think of him as a speculative mystic, concerned primarily with religious metaphysics. He was above all a practical man, who wrote all his epistles with a practical purpose; and his mysticism, thoroughgoing as it is, was not end, but means.

The influence of Paul's thought made itself felt in the First Epistle of Peter, whose author, though not so controllingly mystical as Paul, yet reproduces, somewhat obscurely to be sure, the great apostle's mystical conception of redemption and the Christian life, and also his principle of Christian freedom (cf. I Pet. 2:16, 24; 4:1, 6, 14; 5:14).

Much more thoroughly mystical than I Peter is the author of the Johannine writings; that is, the Fourth Gospel and the epistles of John. Whether the Fourth Gospel contains the views of its writer

only, or also the views of Jesus, who is represented as speaking so largely in it, in either case it is full, as the first epistle is too, of a mysticism very closely related to that of Paul. It is true that there is no such explicit reference to the author's own personal experiences as we find in the case of Paul, but there is the same fundamental idea of the Christian life as the divine life in man. By faith or love we become united to Christ in such an intimate way that he actually enters in and takes possession of us; or we enter into him and abide in him, and our life becomes of one substance with his (cf. John 3:5 ff.; 15:1 ff.; 6:48 ff.; I John 2:24 ff.; 3:24; 4:12 ff.; II John, vs. 9).

John's mysticism is of the same general nature as Paul's, involving a complete and permanent union between the believer and Christ, and so between the believer and God; for Christ is himself divine, and by his indwelling imparts the divine nature to those who are united with him. But when we turn to the fruits of this divine indwelling, we find a difference between John and Paul. The interest of Paul is controllingly ethical, and the principal fruit of the divine indwelling is the complete moral transformation of the believer, involving his perfect holiness and his release from the bondage of all law. In John, too, we have a marked ethical interest, and he lays considerable stress upon the sinlessness of the true Christian; but of Paul's magnificent gospel of liberty there is no trace. In fact, the Christian man is as much bound, indeed one may say more bound, by law than anyone else. But the difference between them does not lie simply here. We find in John more controlling emphasis than in Paul upon religious knowledge. The principal fruit indeed of our mystical union with Christ is knowledge of Christ and of God. "This is life eternal that they should know thee, the only true God, and Him whom Thou didst send, even Jesus Christ" (John 17:3). The redemption brought by Jesus means to John primarily the transfer of believers from the realm of darkness to the realm of light. (Cf. I John 4:21; 8:12; 12:36, 46; 1:5 ff.)

John is thus closely allied to the principal mystics of all ages; for a controlling element in most mysticism is the emphasis upon knowledge of the divine, this knowledge being attained commonly by contemplation, carried in its highest stages even to ecstasy. So far as this John does not go, as Paul does in the passage already quoted

from II Cor., chap. 12; but his general emphasis on religious knowledge as the fruit of union with the divine is characteristically mystical.

Another mystic of the Pauline school, closely related in his fundamental conceptions both to Paul and John, is Ignatius, bishop of Antioch in the early part of the second century. He was a man of striking personality and fervid enthusiasm, whose letters are the most profound and effective writings of primitive Christianity outside of the New Testament.

There is an interesting passage of a decidedly mystical type in his Epistle to the Philadelphians (chap. 7):

For even though certain persons desired to deceive me after the flesh, yet the Spirit is not deceived, being from God. For it knoweth whence it cometh and whither it goeth, and it searcheth out the hidden things. I cried out, when I was among you; I spake with a loud voice, with God's own voice: "Give ye heed to the bishop and the presbytery and deacons." Howbeit there were those who suspected me of saying this, because I knew beforehand of the division of certain persons. But he in whom I am bound is my witness, that I learned it not from flesh of man; it was the preaching of the Spirit who spake on this wise: "Do nothing without the bishop; keep your flesh as a temple of God; cherish union; shun divisions; be imitators of Jesus Christ, as he himself also was of his Father." (Cf. also Eph., chap. 20.)

Ignatius, therefore, had had his mystical experiences as well as Paul, though there is no evidence that an initial experience, such as Paul's, created and dominated his theory of the Christian life, as was the case with the great apostle. At the same time, probably under Paul's influence, perhaps under that of John as well, he viewed the Christian life in as mystical a way as either of them did. To him as to them the Christian life means union with the divine (cf. Eph., chaps. 4, 10, 11, 15; Magn., chaps. 12, 14; Phil., chap. 7; Polyc., chap. 8; Trall., chap. 2; Rom., chap. 6).

But though he shared with Paul and John a mystical conception of the Christian life, Ignatius' interest was not primarily ethical like Paul's nor intellectual like John's, but physical. What he is chiefly concerned in is the endowment of our mortal bodies with immortality. The one thing he hates is death, the one thing he desires is life; not earthly life, which he is ready and eager to sacrifice in the arena at Rome, whither he is going to be thrown a victim to the beasts; but heavenly, and particularly eternal, life—life which will never end.

To him the great mark of contrast between divinity and humanity lies just here. Not that God is holy and man unholy, or God wise and man ignorant, but that God is immortal and man mortal. And so the chief fruit of our mystical union with Christ is immortality. We shall be holy, yes and we shall be wise, but above all we shall be immortal, for we shall be divine, when we have become completely one with, and so transformed by, Deity.

Closely connected with Paul, John, and Ignatius are the Gnostics, the most famous heretics and the ablest thinkers of the second century, who represent the later Platonic tendency in philosophy. The Gnostics, like all the later Platonists, were dualists, primarily interested in the redemption of the spirit of man from his material environment; and they became Christians because they were convinced that in Christianity were to be found as nowhere else the means of such redemption. Christ, they believed, in revealing God to man, had placed redemption within the grasp of those capable of receiving and understanding his message, and through the knowledge imparted by him he had brought about a union with God, which means ultimately a complete and permanent break with the flesh and the world, and an eternal life in the spiritual realm.

The Gnostic conception of redemption is as mystical as Paul's, for it involves the indwelling of a spiritual and divine nature, the possession of which alone makes escape from the flesh and an immortal life in the spirit possible. Thus Hippolytus (*Phil.*, X, 13) says of the Gnostic Valentinus: "He asserts . . . that Christ came down from within the pleroma to save the erring spirit who resides in our inner man, which they say obtains salvation on account of the indwelling Spirit." Again in Book V, chap. 7, a Gnostic of the sect of the Naassenes is referred to as follows: "For mortal, he says, is every generation below, but immortal is that which is begotten above, for it is born of water only and Spirit, being spiritual, not carnal." (Cf. also VI, 32; V, 8, 17.) Irenaeus says of Ptolemaeus and his followers (*Adv. Haer.*, I, 6, 2): "As to themselves they teach that they shall be wholly saved, not by means of conduct, but because they are spiritual by nature." Salvation is not an external gift, the reward of virtue, but a mystical process whereby the spiritual nature of man is carried back to the higher realm where it belongs.

The union with the divine by which the redemption is accomplished is effected principally by means of knowledge, which only the man possessed of a spiritual nature can gain. Thus Irenaeus (I, 21, 4) says of the Marcosians:

They hold that the knowledge of the unutterable greatness is itself perfect redemption. For, since defect and passion were caused by ignorance, the whole structure based on ignorance is destroyed by knowledge, so that knowledge is the redemption of the inner man. And this is not corporeal, for the body is corruptible, nor is it animal, for the soul is the fruit of defect and is as it were a habitation of the spirit. Therefore the redemption must also be spiritual. For the inner spiritual man is redeemed through knowledge, and the knowledge of all things is sufficient for him, and this is true redemption. (Cf. also I, 24, 4 and 6.)

The invocation of the Gnostic Marcus, uttered in connection with the Eucharist, ran as follows: "May that incomprehensible and unutterable grace, which is before all things, fill thy inner man and increase in thee the knowledge of it, sowing the mustard seed in a good soil." (Hippolytus, *Phil.*, VI, 40.) The knowledge thus emphasized is mystical knowledge in the fullest possible sense; not natural knowledge open to the ordinary man, but spiritual knowledge given to the spiritual man by revelation, mediated by holy rites of initiation, and involving an apprehension of elaborate mysteries hidden from all others. Compare the oath of the Justinian sect (Hippolytus, *Phil.*, V, 27):

I swear by Him who is above all, the Good One, to guard these mysteries and to divulge them to no one, and not to relapse from the Good One to the creature. And when he has sworn this oath, he enters in unto the Good One and sees what eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of man, and he drinks of the living water which is to them a bath, as they suppose, a fountain of living, bubbling water.

Compare also the following extract from a hymn of the Naassenes (*Phil.*, V, 8), in which Jesus is represented as saying:

On this account send me, O Father,
Bearing seals I will descend,
Whole aeons will I travel through,
All mysteries I will explain,
And forms of gods will show.
The secrets of the sacred way,
Called gnosis, I'll impart.

Of the Valentinians, Irenaeus says they teach that "the consummation will take place when all that is spiritual has been transformed and perfected by knowledge; that is, spiritual men who have perfect knowledge concerning God and Achamoth. And they claim that these are they who have been initiated into the mysteries" (*Adv. Haer.*, I, 6, 1 f.; cf. also Hippolytus, *Phil.*, V, 8). A good idea of the nature of the Gnostic mysteries may be gained from the third-century Gnostic works known as *Pistis Sophia* and the *Books of Jeu*. There is in Gnosticism also the same emphasis on magic rites, theurgic practices, and symbolism that we find so common in oriental theosophy, and in many other extreme forms of mysticism. (Compare Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.*, I, 24.) An example of Gnostic symbolism may be found in Hippolytus, *Phil.*, VI, 43 f.

The Gnostics, or at least the majority of them, were the most consistent and thoroughgoing Paulinists of the early church, carrying Paul's dualism of flesh and spirit even farther than he carried it himself, and following him as no one else of the age did in his conception of the Christian life as a life of release from the trammels of the flesh and of liberty from the bondage of all law. At the same time, in their emphasis upon knowledge they were nearer to John than to Paul, and represented the same Greek tendency to find in the intellectual sphere the means of attaining the victory over all the ills of life.

Thus we have in the early church a group of men—Paul, John, Ignatius, and the Gnostics—differing in many respects, and the last repudiated and cast out as heretics, yet all mystics of a very profound type; mystics, not in the mere loose and general sense of the term, but in its strictest meaning; for they all represent a mysticism so complete as to involve a divine indwelling which brings about an actual transformation of the nature of man. It is clear that all these men are thinking in terms rather of substance than of personality. To be sure, they represent God and Christ as persons, but the salvation of which they conceive is accomplished, not simply by personal influence, and in the sphere of personal relations, but by physical indwelling. This, of course, is mysticism of the extremest possible type.

But mystics so thoroughgoing as these we find nowhere else in

the church of their day. In fact, the tendency which they represent was but isolated in that age. By the other early Christians known to us man and God are pictured in strictly personal relations. God is an individual, though almighty, person, the creator and ruler of the universe; and we are his subjects, related to him much as men are related to an earthly potentate. We may receive his messages and feel his influence, and his commands may be imparted to us; but he is without, not within, us, and our lives are human, not divine. It is the legal tendency which is in control of all of these writings, and it involves an externality of relation no less ethical than the tendency of Paul and the others I have spoken of, and in one sense no less religious; for the authority and will, and even the assistance, of God are recognized, but its governing principle is certainly not mystical. This legal conception of Christianity became a part of the thought of the church at large at an early day, and has existed ever since. And it is this idea which is chiefly controlling in the writings of the primitive church down to the close of the second century.

But it is interesting and instructive to notice that even where this tendency prevailed in primitive days, there was commonly a marked mystical element also present. It was not, as a rule, the same kind of mysticism which we have found in the group of writers already considered; not a metaphysical conception of divine indwelling, resulting in a real transformation of nature. It took the form, rather, of a divine influence making itself felt now and again, and more or less controllingly, in the life of the Christian; and it found expression in references to the Holy Spirit, the belief in whose immediate presence and activity is one of the most striking and characteristic features of the life of the primitive church. But this conception as it appears in early Christian writings needs examination. Just how much is meant by it, and in what sense and to what degree is it to be regarded as mystical? We can study it best in the Gospel of Luke, and especially in the Book of Acts, where it appears more frequently than in any other early Christian writing. It is clear, first of all, that the author of these two works conceived of the Spirit, not as the permanent possession of all believers, but rather as the special endowment of certain peculiarly distinguished persons. Thus

in the gospel the possession of the Spirit by Jesus is emphasized as something remarkable, with the evident assumption that he is thereby raised above the generality of his fellows (cf., not only Luke 1:35, but also 3:22; 4:1, 14, 18). And in Acts, chap. 6, the Christians of Jerusalem are directed by the apostles to choose seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Spirit and wisdom; and Stephen is spoken of in the same connection as a man full of faith and of the Holy Spirit, as if he were thus distinguished from his brethren (cf. also 11:24).

Still more commonly the Spirit is spoken of as given either to distinguished persons or to believers in general, on particular occasions and for a particular purpose. Thus it appears frequently as the Spirit of revelation or prophecy. In the first and second chapters of the gospel Elizabeth, Zacharias, and Simeon receive the Holy Spirit, and immediately prophesy under its influence. In Acts, chap. 2, the words of Joel referring to the pouring-forth of the Spirit in the last days, and the prophesying which will result, are quoted by Peter as fulfilled at Pentecost. It is because Stephen is filled with the Holy Spirit that he can look into heaven and see Jesus standing at the right hand of God (7:55); and for the same reason Paul can discern and denounce the character of Elymas the sorcerer (13:9). In Acts, chap. 11, the Spirit reveals to the prophet Agabus the coming of a famine; in Acts, chap. 21, the bonds that await Paul in Jerusalem; in 20:23 it testifies to Paul himself of the same bonds, and through the disciples of Tyre advises him not to go to Jerusalem (21:4).

Closely connected with such manifestations are the guidance and direction received on various occasions or in connection with particular emergencies and crises. In the gospel, chap. 12, it is said that the Holy Spirit shall teach the disciples what they ought to say when arrested and brought to trial for their Christian faith. So the Spirit directs Philip to join the eunuch, and after the interview is over carries him away again (chap. 8); instructs Peter what he shall do in response to the invitation to preach the gospel to Cornelius (chaps. 10, 11); directs the church of Antioch to set apart Paul and Barnabas for special missionary work, and sends them on their way (chap. 13); makes the older brethren of Ephesus overseers of the church (20:28); leads the apostles and elders of Jerusalem to write to the brethren at

Antioch about the terms of Christian communion (chap. 15); and forbids Paul to preach in Asia and Bithynia (chap. 16). The strengthening and inspirational influence of the Spirit is also emphasized, as in the first chapter of Acts, where its coming means the bestowal of power, which shall enable the disciples to be effective witnesses of Christ (1:8); and in chap. 4 it is the Spirit which enables Peter in one case, and the assembled disciples in another case, to speak the word of God with boldness. The comfort and joy brought by the Spirit are also emphasized, as in 9:31 and 13:52. The Spirit is also represented as an avenging power in Acts 5:9, with which may be compared Luke 3:6 and the parallels in Matt. 3:11. Finally, the coming of the Spirit is sometimes pictured as attended with strange phenomena, such as speaking with tongues and prophesying (cf. Acts 2:4; 10:46; 8:15 ff.; 19:6).

It is evident, in the light of all these passages, that the Spirit is not thought of by Luke as the abiding presence in which and through which a man becomes a Christian and lives all his Christian life. The influence of the Spirit, except perhaps in the case of certain eminent persons, is occasional only, not permanent (cf. also Luke 11:13, where "Holy Spirit" is substituted for the phrase "good things" of Matt. 7:11).

The same general idea appears in other primitive Christian writings, though much less frequently than in the Book of Acts. Thus, in addition to references in the parallel passages in Matthew and Mark identical with some of those already referred to, we have the promise of Christ, in Matt. 18:20, that where two or three are gathered together in his name, he will be in the midst of them, the reference being to his presence in the meetings of the Christians for worship; and at the end of the same gospel occurs the promise that Christ will be with his disciples always even unto the end of the world, where the particular purpose of his presence is evidently to inspire and strengthen them in their work of teaching and witness-bearing. (Cf. also Matt. 12:28, where the phrase "Spirit of God" appears in place of "finger of God" of Luke 11:20.) In Heb. 2:4 the author refers to the gift of the Holy Ghost bestowed upon the early apostles, together with the signs and wonders and miracles wrought through them by God. The spiritual endowment of the Hebrew prophets

and of the apostles is referred to in I Pet. 1:11, 12, as also the special gift of the Spirit to those suffering persecution in 4:14. (Cf. also I Tim. 4:14; II Tim. 1:6.) In the Book of Revelation the author is taken possession of by the Spirit of prophecy, and the letters to the seven churches contain its message to those churches. Similar references are found also in the Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, written almost at the end of the first century. Thus, when referring in chap. 2 to the early days of the Corinthian church, he says: "An abundant outpouring also of the Holy Spirit fell upon all." In chap. 42 he refers to the apostles as having gone forth to preach the gospel, "with full assurance of the Holy Ghost;" and in chap. 59 he implies that he believes himself to be speaking under divine inspiration. In the *Didache* also, which dates from the early part of the second century, the Spirit appears as the Spirit of prophecy. In chap. 11 it is said: "Any prophet speaking in the Spirit ye shall not try, neither discern, for every sin shall be forgiven, but this sin shall not be forgiven. Yet not every one that speaketh in the Spirit is a prophet, but only if he have the ways of the Lord;" where the reference is apparently to speaking in an ecstasy, that is, in such a strange manner as to suggest the controlling influence of a supernatural power. (Cf. also references to prophets in the following chapters.)

In the *Shepherd* of Hermas, a prophetic work which consists of various parts written in Rome at intervals during the first half of the second century, the Spirit is mentioned frequently, and the common primitive conception of it appears in one passage (Mandate II), where there is an elaborate discussion of true and false prophecy, which may be compared with *Didache*, XI. On the other hand, there are some passages in Hermas which suggest the Pauline idea of divine indwelling; e. g., M. III, J, X, and Sim. IX, 24 f. At the same time, his general view of the Christian life is external and legal to the last degree, and as far as possible from the controlling conceptions of Paul, so that it is difficult to suppose that he really accepted Paul's profound mysticism, and on examination of some of his statements makes it clear that the Spirit as he pictured it was only one of many supernatural beings who took up their abode in man. This appears from the passage in Mandate V, already referred to, and also from the following words in the same mandate:

But angry temper is in the first place foolish, fickle, and senseless; then from foolishness is engendered bitterness, and from bitterness wrath, and from wrath anger, and from anger spite; then spite, being composed of all these evil elements, becometh a great sin and incurable. For when all these spirits dwell in one vessel where the Holy Spirit also dwelleth, that vessel cannot contain them, but overfloweth. The delicate spirit therefore, as not being accustomed to dwell with an evil spirit, nor with harshness, departeth from a man of that kind, and seeketh to dwell with gentleness and tranquillity.

When one conceives of the Spirit in this individual fashion as simply one of a number of supernatural beings who come and go in a man's life, it is clear that one is not moving in the same sphere of thought as Paul, to whom the divine indwelling means the real deification of the Christian's nature. Doubtless the influence of the latter's emphasis upon the divine indwelling was felt by Hermas, but it is his own and not Paul's conception which appears in his writings, and, while more nearly allied to the apostle's doctrine than the references to the Spirit in the other works we have just been considering, it is still of another type.

There are also in some of those other works a few passages suggesting the influence of Paul, as, for instance, II Tim. 1:14; 2:10; Titus 3:5; Heb. 3:14; 6:4 ff.; 10:29; II Pet. 1:4; Jude 19 ff.; *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, 14; Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.*, V, 1, 10, 23, 34, 42, where he quotes from the letter of the churches of Lyons and Vienne describing the persecution which took place in those cities under Marcus Aurelius. To these may be added the interesting passage in II Clement, chap. 14, which runs as follows:

Wherefore, brethren, if we do the will of God, our Father, we shall be of the first church, which is spiritual, which was created before the sun and moon; but if we do not the will of the Lord, we shall be of the Scripture which saith: "My house was made a den of robbers." So therefore let us choose rather to be of the church of life that we may be saved. And I do not suppose ye are ignorant that the living church is the body of Christ, for the Scripture saith God made man male and female. The male is Christ and the female is the church. And the books and the apostles plainly declare that the church existeth not now for the first time but hath been from the beginning, for she was spiritual as our Jesus also was spiritual, but was manifested in the last days that he might save us. Now, the church being spiritual was manifested in the flesh of Christ, thereby showing us that, if any of us guard her in the flesh and defile her not, he shall receive her again in the Holy Spirit, for this flesh is the antitype of the Spirit. . . . This

therefore is what he meaneth, brethren, guard ye the flesh that ye may partake of the Spirit.

Such passages, however, in view of the general legal and external conceptions of the works in which they occur, cannot be regarded as evidence that the writers held the genuine mystical ideas of Paul, but are to be interpreted in the light of the common notion of the Spirit which they all share. The passages are so isolated, in fact, that they cannot be taken as representing the general position of the writers. The same may be said of the *Apology* of Tatian, written soon after the middle of the second century, in which there are also two passages of a mystical type (chaps. 13 and 15), while in general his tendency is very far from mystical. The Epistle of Barnabas, chap. 16, is interesting in this connection as showing how, in the absence of the underlying mystical conception of Paul, one might treat the idea of the divine indwelling.

In general it may be said that the mysticism of most of the Christians is of an altogether different sort from that of Paul, John, Ignatius, and the Gnostics. It involves a recognition of the presence and power of the Spirit, and in so far is mystical; but the Spirit is not the very substance of the Christian's constitution, as to Paul and his group, and not even the abiding power of the Christian life, but a divine visitant who comes to our aid under special circumstances, or who interferes in one way or another at certain crises, and who dwells more constantly with some than with others. The presence of the Spirit is a secondary, rather than a primary, element of the Christian life. It does not constitute its warp and woof, but its occasional adornment and embellishment. And this, too, even in an age when the power of the Spirit was felt with peculiar vividness.

It is clear that the kind of mysticism we have just been considering is rather of a personal than of a metaphysical character. Man is brought into direct relationship with God when he feels the immediate power of the Spirit; but the relationship hardly transcends that of personal influence, and at any rate involves no such transfusion and transformation of substance as we find in the thought of Paul and of his group. If among them we have a distinctly metaphysical idea, here all is of a purely popular and unphilosophical character. It may be called mysticism, inasmuch as it involves

direct communication between the spheres of divinity and humanity; but it is not of a metaphysical type, and should not be confounded with the many forms of mysticism in earlier and later days which are distinctly such.

In view of the sharp contrast we have seen existing between the mysticism of Paul, John, Ignatius, and the Gnostics, on the one hand, and that of the Synoptic Gospels, the Book of Acts, and other early Christian writings, on the other, there is difficulty in supposing that the teaching of Christ himself is accurately represented in this matter at once by the Synoptic Gospels and by the Gospel of John. If, then, we follow most modern scholars in drawing our portrait of Christ rather from the Synoptic Gospels than from John, we must conclude that, if he is to be called a mystic at all, it is not in the Pauline, but in the more general, sense of the word. That is, his mysticism is not of a metaphysical, but of a personal, type.

But can the Jesus of the Synoptists fairly be called a mystic? The question is worthy of a more extended treatment than can be given it in this article. It falls naturally into two parts: Was his own relation to God, as he conceived it, what may be called mystical? And did he teach a mystical relation between his disciples and God? Taking the latter question first, the number of passages in the Synoptic Gospels which carry a mystical suggestion is very small. One of them is Mark 13:11 (and its parallels Matt. 10:20 and Luke 12:12, with which may be compared an echo of the same saying in Luke 21:15). The words of Mark are as follows: "Whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye, for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Spirit." Another passage is Matt. 16:17: "And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jonah, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven," whose authenticity is doubtful, as it does not occur in the parallel passage in Mark. But, waiving the question of the genuineness of the latter, in any case both of these passages suggest the same idea of the Spirit as guide and revealer which we have found common in the writings of the primitive Christians, and neither of them carries us farther. Two other passages, in which Christ speaks of his own presence with his disciples in a way to suggest the thought of John, are found in Matthew only, and are

both of doubtful authenticity. The one is Matt. 18:19, 20: "If two of you shall agree on earth as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven. For where two or three are gathered together in my name there am I among them;" which refers to the gatherings of the disciples for worship. The other is 28:19, 20: "Go ye therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you. And lo, I am with you alway even unto the end of the world." In this the author has in mind the inspiration and help which the disciples receive from Christ for their teaching and witness-bearing. Even if we were to admit the genuineness of all these utterances, they would hardly carry us beyond the mysticism of the primitive Christians in general, and it is a very striking fact that among all Jesus' words recorded in the Synoptics, whether authentic or not, there should be so few which carry as far as that.

When we turn to Jesus' own religious experience, we face a question of insuperable difficulty. The words of Jesus himself bearing directly upon the subject are very few. In Luke 4:18 he is represented as quoting from Isaiah: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he anointed me to preach good tidings to the poor," etc.—a quotation which he may well have applied to himself (compare Matthew's use of a similar quotation in 12:18 ff.); for that he regarded himself as a prophet seems clear from such passages as Mark 6:4 and Luke 13:33, and his belief in his own messiahship would naturally carry with it the conviction of the possession of divine inspiration for his work. And so there is no difficulty in supposing that he said, as recorded by Matt. 12:28: "But if I by the Spirit of God cast out demons, then is the kingdom of God come upon you" (the parallel passage in Luke 11:20 has "finger" instead of "Spirit" of God). And the account given in Mark 3:22-30 may also be accepted, according to which he warns those who accuse him of demoniacal possession that they are guilty of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, implying his own endowment by the Spirit. (In the parallel Matt. 12:24 ff., the matter is not quite so clear, and Luke 11:15 ff. is very different.) The most striking of all the passages bearing on our

subject is Matt. 11:27 (with its parallel in Luke 10:22): "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father, and no one knoweth the Son save the Father, neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." Just how much this involves it is impossible to tell. The reference to knowledge gives it a peculiarly mystical sound, but the most that we can certainly say about it is that it gives expression to a fact which runs through all the gospels, and is the most characteristic feature in Jesus' life—his belief, namely, that he knew the will and purposes of God, his Father, as his fellows did not know them, and was sent by God to do his work. There are no other synoptic passages which carry us beyond this. The account of the baptism, to be sure, suggests that the divine Spirit came at that time to abide permanently upon Jesus, and the account of the virgin-birth involves a genuinely physical connection of Christ with God; but the latter tells us nothing of Jesus' own belief, and whether the former represents an actual vision enjoyed by him, or is only the figurative expression of an inner spiritual experience, we do not know. We may easily suppose that he came then to the conviction of his own messiahship and of his divine inspiration for the task; but more than this we cannot say. It is very significant that we have so little light upon the subject from Jesus himself. What we have in the Synoptic Gospels does not carry us beyond his conviction that he was called and inspired of God to do Messiah's work, and that his equipment included a knowledge of God's character and purposes greater than that of his fellows. This intimate acquaintance with God we may recognize as the dominating element in his religious experience. It enabled him to speak with authority, to state the conditions of entrance into God's kingdom, to forgive sin, to summon men to follow him in fulfilling God's will. If this is mysticism, then the Jesus of the Synoptics was a mystic. But it is to be distinguished from all forms of physical and metaphysical mysticism, such as held by Paul, John, Ignatius, and the Gnostics, and by all the most celebrated mystics of ancient and modern times. For the thought of Jesus moves in the personal, not in the physical or metaphysical, sphere. And since the term "mysticism" traditionally belongs in the latter, we shall probably best avoid misunderstanding if we refrain from calling Jesus a mystic. In saying this

however, it is not meant that there was any lack of directness and immediacy in his relation to God; for such a oneness of purpose as he was conscious of may mean as complete a unity in another sphere as is involved in metaphysical identity. It is only meant that we do not find in his teaching, as set forth in the Synoptic Gospels, either the ecstatic tendencies (and this in spite of Oscar Holtzmann's book, *Was Jesu Ekstatiken?*), or the ontological implications of mysticism in general. The most significant of all facts about Jesus as a religious teacher is that he made communion with God consist, not in contemplation, or in ecstasy, or in the exaltation of so-called spiritual knowledge, but in coming into sympathy with God's purpose, and making it the controlling purpose of life.

I have said that in early days the presence and power of the Spirit were widely and vividly felt. But as time passed the consciousness of his activity steadily waned, and the literature of the second century in general shows far less trace of it than the literature of the first. That there were still prophets through whom the Spirit continued to speak was believed for some generations (cf., e. g., Justin, *Dial.*, 88:821; Irenaeus, II, 32, 4; III, 11, 9; and Celsus in Origen, *Contra Cels.*, VII, 11), but it was largely a theory, unrealized in fact; and it involved, even so, not the widespread endowment of earlier days, but at most only the rare gift of a prophet here and there in whom the spirit of the earlier age was supposed still to live on.

It was the spirit of this earlier age which the Montanists of the second half of the second century tried to revive. They constitute a very interesting and significant phenomenon in the history of the early church, striving as they did, in opposition to the growing secularity and externality of the church, to bring back the primitive enthusiasm, and the belief in the immediate presence of the Spirit. Montanus, the founder of the sect, and two companions, Priscilla and Maximilla, claimed to be divinely inspired prophets, through whom God spoke to his people, summoning them to live in a much more rigorous and ascetic manner than was common, in order to prepare for the speedy return of Christ. The Montanists thus believed in and emphasized the presence of the Spirit of prophecy, which takes possession of a man and speaks through him, the man himself being passive in its hands, and receiving his revelations com-

monly in an ecstasy. Thus Eusebius, quoting from an anonymous attack upon the Montanists, says of Montanus: "He became beside himself, and being suddenly in a sort of frenzy and ecstasy, he raved and began to babble and utter strange things, prophesying in a manner contrary to the constant custom of the church handed down by tradition from the beginning." (With the Montanist prophesying as thus described may be compared, in spite of the opinion expressed by the anonymous author, the glossolalia of earlier days, and the prophets referred to in the *Didache*, XI, and Hermas, M. XI.) Montanus himself says, of the Spirit (according to Epiphanius, 48, 4): "Behold man is like a lyre, and I fly to him as a plectrum. Man sleeps and I awake. Behold the Lord is the one who puts the hearts of men into an ecstasy, and gives a heart unto men." And Maximilla exclaims (*ibid.*, 48, 12): "Do not listen to me, but listen to Christ;" implying that it is Christ who speaks through her. And again (according to Eusebius, *H. E.*, V. 16-17): "I am driven away from the sheep like a wolf. I am not a wolf; I am word and Spirit and power." And Priscilla says, according to Tertullian (*De exhort. cost.*, 10): "For purity works harmony, and they [that is, the pure] see visions, and turning their face downward they even hear audible voices, as salutary as they are occult."

The Montanists were thus mystics in the same sense in which so many of the early Christians were, believing as they did, in the presence and revealing activity of the Spirit, and emphasizing the continuance of prophecy; but they were no more mystical in their general conception of the Christian life than were the majority of those whom we have been considering. It is true that the divine indwelling is taught by Montanus, according to a saying quoted by Epiphanius, 48, 11: "I am the Lord God Almighty who dwelleth in man." But this really carries us no farther than the other passages, for the Deity may easily be thought of as dwelling in those through whom the Spirit speaks; and no farther than various isolated passages in primitive writings already referred to. And, in fact, the Montanists' idea of the Christian life was external and legal to the last degree, so that it was not the Pauline mysticism which they reproduced, but the common popular mysticism of primitive Christian circles, and even that only in a very limited degree.

The Montanists, though entirely orthodox in doctrine, and though genuinely primitive in their spirit and tendency, were condemned and cast out by the church of their day because, with their emphasis on the continuance of divine revelation, going in its practical teachings even beyond Christ and his apostles, they threatened the authority of the newly formed Scripture canon, and of the newly established Episcopal organization, which had been created in the fire of conflict, and to which the church owed its victory over the many feared and hated Gnostic sects. The condemnation was inevitable under the circumstances, but it meant the permanent passing of the primitive age, the age of revelation and inspiration, so that the great Origen, writing in the middle of the third century, could say that there were no prophets in his day, and could even deny that there had been any in the time of Celsus; that is, in the latter part of the second century (cf. his *Contra Celsum*, VII, 11). The church, in condemning the Montanists, elected to live without the spiritual guidance and illumination which it had once enjoyed; but it could not have taken this step had not the primitive spirit been already widely forgotten, and dependence upon external authorities of one kind and another become already widely prevalent.

Reference should be made finally to one of the most important figures of the early Christian centuries—a man who stood upon the confines of two ages, the primitive and the Catholic, and to whom, more than to any other, is due the historic theology of the church. I refer to Irenaeus, the great bishop of Lyons in southern Gaul, at the close of the second century. His significance lies in the fact that he made the combination between Paul's mystical doctrine of the Christian life and the legal view of the church at large. These two conceptions have already been contrasted. According to Paul and his group, the Christian life is the divine life in man. According to the others, even though the Christian may enjoy the influence of the Spirit in many ways, his life in its essence is human only, not divine. This latter tendency found its complete development and its extremest expression in Justin Martyr, and such apologists of the second century as Aristides, Athenagoras, and Theophilus, who represent salvation as a reward given in return for independent merit on man's part. Unless man's merit is his own, it is no merit. Of course, this idea

rules out completely Paul's mystical view; indeed, there is no place in it for mysticism of any kind. Belief in the continued activity of the Spirit of prophecy, bringing revelation and illumination, may still persist (Justin, for instance, mentions Christian prophets in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, chaps. 82, 88), but the Spirit cannot be given any real influence in the inception and promotion of the Christian life itself; and, as the primitive period passes, even the prophetic Spirit becomes more and more a denizen of a former age, and divinity seems to withdraw itself altogether. With Justin's strictly ethical, anti-mystical conception was combined by Irenaeus the mysticism of Paul and his group, the combination being made possible by the recognition of two stages in salvation, the one freedom from sin, or the control of the devil, the other the attainment of the divine life, which alone is complete salvation (cf. III, 18, 6-7; V. 21). Irenaeus was thus enabled to make a place for both the moral and the religious, for both the efforts of man and the activity of Christ. A man must work out his own salvation, which is a reward of virtue (cf. IV, 12, 3-5; 15; 33, 15; 37; 39, 1); yet he cannot attain true life unless his nature be transformed by the indwelling of Deity—an indwelling made possible by the incarnation of the divine Christ.

A few representative quotations will illustrate the mystical character of this side of Irenaeus' doctrine:

This, moreover, is his Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, who in the last times was made a man among men that he might join the end to the beginning, that is man to God. Wherefore the prophets, receiving the prophetic gift from the same Word, preached his advent according to the flesh, through which a mingling and communion of God and man, according to the good pleasure of the Father, has taken place. (*Adv. Haer.*, IV, 20, 4.)

How can they be saved unless God is the one who has wrought out their salvation on earth? And how shall man pass into God unless God has passed into man? (IV, 33, 4.)

But as many as fear God and believe in the advent of his Son, and through faith establish in their hearts the spirit of God, such men as these shall justly be called pure and spiritual and alive unto God, because they have the Spirit of the Father, who purifies man and raises him up to the life of God. (V. 9, 2.)

Jesus Christ our Lord, who because of his great love was made what we are, that he might bring us to be even what He is Himself. (V, praef.)

Since the Lord therefore redeems us by his own blood, and gives his own soul for our soul and his own flesh for our flesh, and pours out the Spirit of the Father

for the union and communion of God and man, imparting God to men through the Spirit, and again attaching man to God through his own incarnation, and giving us firmly and truly at his own advent immortality through communion with God—all the doctrines of the heretics perish. (V, 1, 1.)

But now we receive a certain part of his Spirit, looking for the perfection and preparation of incorruption, little by little becoming accustomed to receive and bear God. (V, 8, 1.)

As those who see the light are within the light and receive its brilliancy, so those also who see God are within God and receive his brilliancy. Moreover, the brilliancy gives them life and therefore those who see God receive life. . . . Because it is impossible to live without life, but the means of life comes from participation in God. But participation in God is to see God and to enjoy his goodness. Men therefore shall see God that they may live, being made immortal by the vision, and attaining even unto God. (IV, 20, 5-6.)

For the glory of God is a living man, and the life of man is the vision of God. (IV, 20, 7.)

If a man will share in the benefits of the incarnation, he must not simply believe and obey; he must receive the sacrament of baptism, through which a new immortal nature is born within him, and must gain the nourishment to be had from feeding upon the body and blood of the divine Christ in the Eucharist. (Cf. I, 21, 1; III, 17, 10; IV, 18, 5; V, 2, 2.)

The transformation of man's nature brought about by his union with the divine extends even to his flesh, upon the salvation of which Irenaeus lays the greatest stress (cf. Book V, *passim*), in this respect all unconsciously disagreeing with Paul, to whom salvation meant release from the flesh and a new life in the spirit. But, in spite of this difference, the essence of Paul's mysticism, involving the transformation of man's nature by his complete union with the divine, is given by Irenaeus a permanent place in Catholic theology, while at the same time the un-Pauline legal tendency, which sees in salvation only a reward of human merit, is likewise conserved. It is true that in the combination Paul's magnificent gospel of liberty is completely lost, and all ethical meaning taken out of his doctrine of mystical union with Christ by its virtual reduction to a mere participation in certain sacraments. But the combination was fraught with consequences; for to it we owe ultimately the fact that Christianity has been through all the centuries at once ethical and mystical, a law and a religion.

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF GOD

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However it came about, and whatever the significance of the fact, man is religious. We are worshiping beings. But it is a commonplace of reflective thought that we do not all worship the same God. It is a far cry from the crude, instinctive, inarticulate worship of the savage, to the reverent, deliberate, awe-inspiring self-dedication of the developed man. Mankind does not all worship the same God. Development is here, as everywhere, the law of God's world.

And so the central inquiry of every religious study must be: How did the worshiper conceive his God? What God did he worship? For whether he names his God Jove, or Jehovah, or Jesus, we appeal from the name which the worshiper gives to his deity, and we ask what his conception of his deity was while he prayed. Everything in his religion will be relative to that conception. For names are quite as apt to conceal our convictions as to reveal them.

This principle is apparent when applied to religious history in general. The savage man has a savage God; the cruel man has a cruel God; the effeminate man has an effeminate God; while the good man everywhere lifts up holy hands to a God who rewards goodness.

Pursuing our inquiry further, we may make the same generalization within the limits of Christian thinking. Christendom does not all worship the same God. We do not all hold the same conception of God and of his relation to his universe. The conviction of God is native to our thinking. But the *form* of our conviction varies with age, education, character, and all that enters into the personal equation. We are developing persons. The units of our thought are for the most part fluid and not fixed. Intelligence is a marvelously complex and ceaselessly unfolding fact, not a self-identical quantity. From boyhood to manhood we outgrow the old, and put on the new. "When I was a child I thought, spoke, and understood as a child; but when I became a man I put away

childish things." And even when we come to manhood we all see through a glass, darkly, ever straining to get a more perfect glimpse of the God who "wondrously hides himself;" ever getting one-sided glimpses of the Majestic One, and then carrying these cherished, broken gleams of truth down to the world and calling them philosophies of religion!

There are three great typical conceptions of God and his relationship to the universe which are current in Christian thought today. Corresponding to these three conceptions, there are three typical world-views, or philosophies, or theories of reality. The conception of God and the world which a man embraces will shape all his thinking, will enter into his character and conduct, will give the form to his theology, and content to his doctrine. We are dealing with the nerve of religion—nay, its very throbbing heart—when we consider the conceptions of God which control us. Constructive work in theology today will not offer an eclectic revision of doctrines, but will follow the religious fact back to its source in the vital conception of the supreme fact—God. The theologian's interpretation of the spiritual facts will be largely influenced by his dominant conviction of God's relationship to his world. The three conceptions which I will successively characterize are known as supernaturalism, naturalism, and immanence.

I

Supernaturalism is the type of philosophy which conceives two distinct realms of reality, which it denominates, respectively, nature and the supernatural. Nature is this common world, the world of fixed causes and effects which God created in the primeval day, and which has been remorselessly grinding on through the centuries, upheld by divine power. It is the world of geology, astronomy, and physics; of this solid earth and its natural vegetation, and its natural creatures. Nature is the world which God brought into being by the creative fiat of Genesis; the familiar world of our common experience, in which we are born, live our life, and die. God in his heaven beneficently administers the government of nature. It would be blasphemy to deny his intimate knowledge of natural processes or to affirm that any part is independent of his will. And yet it is a relatively independent world which God conducts as a

system, sitting meanwhile on his heavenly throne. His real presence is in heaven. He is present in his universe only in his power to control the immensity of this cosmos and to keep it smoothly working, executing that original plan of the Almighty. For the religious mind the world of nature is indeed a series of parables to conduct our thought to a higher realm, namely, a spiritual. God's goodness and love and care are all symbolized here to the initiated, and we are thus led to reverent thoughts of the Father above. We are even bidden to get a conception of life that enables us to feel that "we cannot drift beyond his love and care." The all-seeing eye follows us whether we flee with the wings of the morning or hide beneath the mountains. But it is, after all, the care of a God who rules in deistic fashion, rules from without, through the medium of secondary causes, hampered in some sense by the irrevocable outworking of world-laws with which he may not interfere.

This is supernaturalism—a conception of God not without a real relationship to this world, but ruling from without. God is a "transcendent" God, is the theological form of this conception of the divine relationship. "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world," is the song of a religious heart who thus conceives that even in this world-system God's loving superintendency controls.

Now, there is something majestic about this conception of God and his relationship to his world. When one reads the Hebrew chronicler's reverent account of the creative days, or follows the Hebrew psalmist's majestic imagery setting forth the glory of God manifested in his works, the religious nature utters a reverent "Amen." The reality and the vividness of the heavens, the world, the sea, and all that is therein, all sheep and oxen and cattle, and all that is on the earth and under the earth—all the works of his hands! It is an awe-inspiring conception of God's relationship to his world. And the appeal is so true to our deepest convictions that our hearts echo those words of the ancient psalmist uttering the instinctive call to worship: "O, come, let us bow down; let us worship before the Lord our Maker. For we are the sheep of his pasture, and the people of his hand." Who can be unmoved by the truth of that heart-cry?

Supernaturalism became the current philosophy of the Christian

church. Right down through its history you can trace this conception of God and his world, in the ecclesiastical rites and doctrines. There is a natural order and a spiritual order, a sacred and a secular, a human and a divine. There is a line of cleavage between the natural order and the supernatural order. In his general, impersonal, beneficent way, God administers to every man who is woven into the web of history. But to visit a personal heart, God is required to transcend the natural order; and lo, a miracle, a departure from nature! The miracle is the token of God's immediate presence, whether in nature-miracles or in the miraculous conversion of the human heart.

The marvelous leaven of Jesus' gospel has accomplished its work for the most part within the conceptual forms which possessed men's minds. It did not pause for a better philosophy, but it eagerly sought to save men from sin to eternal life. Its aim was first of all practical. Jesus' gospel was a fresh revelation of the blessedness of life lived in communion with God. Men eagerly appropriated the gospel of the divine relationship with men, but they conceived of this gospel under the old forms. God in heaven condescends to men on earth. He dwells in heaven; he visits on earth. The natural order—this is God's ordinary, secular handiwork. The supernatural order is where God makes personal revelations to his own; transcending the natural order, transcending men's thoughts and the forms of their daily life, he appears in prodigies and marvels. A "natural revelation"—this only symbolizes the nature of God. A "special revelation"—this is the only token of God's very presence. Nature may set forth a divine *meaning*: but only the supernatural order attests the divine *presence*.

Permeated by this idea of a dualistic order, men have sought both speculatively and practically to bridge the chasm that separates humanity from divinity. Practically, this effort is exemplified in the gospel of otherworldliness which led multitudes to renounce the world, and in convents and monasteries to sever as far as possible the ties that bound them to the natural world, and, if possible to achieve a fellowship untainted by the world, that should ultimately win them a part in the heavenly life.

On the theoretical side the miracle has played a large part in the religious education of the race. It was the necessary unit of thought

in a world-conception or philosophy by which men construed their convictions of God's relationship to the world. The miracle was the token and proof of divine presence.

But it must be kept in mind that the gospel, the religious conviction, simply affirmed that the loving God is in very truth related to our world and to our lives. This alone is the indestructible core of the vital religious creed. All else is interpretation, philosophy, theology. *How* God is related to his universe—this is the problem that men have struggled with. We *are* related to God—this is the vital heart of all religion. Supernaturalism—that is simply one conception of how we are related. Alas for scholarship, that men are ever confounding their explanations with the thing explained. Religion abides; philosophies change. God is related to his world. How?

This theory of God and his world, so picturesque, and withal so adequate to the earlier faiths, passed into the history of the Christian church. It typified and shaped the religious conceptions of centuries of saints. The church became a supernatural organ through which God uttered his authoritative voice. Thus we have the doctrine of Roman Catholicism. The authority of the church is God's authority. The sanction of the church makes sacred whatever it elects to sanctify. What crimes against the moral sense have been committed in the name of supernaturalism! For what is the theory of the Romish church but a concrete expression of the supernatural mediated through an organized sacrament to the natural order. God and his supernatural kingdom over all; men in the natural order here below; and between, the church holds the keys of death and of hell. God is far away; the machinery of the church must bridge the distance. Popes and confessional and absolutions grow out of this need. That beautiful, majestically simple conception of the reverent Hebrew which mediated his conviction of the divine relationship has been turned into a ceremonial barrier against which the tide of human protest has dashed and thundered.

But we need not go outside the camp of Protestantism to see the fruit of the supernaturalistic philosophy. When Luther nailed his theses to the church door in Wittenberg, when he organized the forces that protested against the scandal of a despiritualized church,

his voice was like an echo of the Nazarene teaching us that life is lived in the presence of the Heavenly Father. Like Jesus, Luther called the church back to the religious fact that underlies all theology—God related to his world. He called men back to individual fellowship with God. The flame of religion blazed up. Luther's followers protested against this unspiritual supernaturalism, and exposed the unethical concept of communication with an absentee God. Thus Protestantism was founded upon a faith that brings God into the individual heart.

But, like that earlier Moses who led the tribes out of bondage only to find the sense-bound people clamoring for a visible God and making for themselves a golden calf, so was Luther, the Moses of the Protestant deliverance, besought. Holy church, the visible, tangible representative of the transcendent God, was renounced in the passion of their religious enthusiasm. But the people were not yet ready for the full conception of a God apprehended by naked faith. They clamored in the mount of God's presence for another outward token that should mediate the supernatural God to the natural world below. And the old philosophy largely prevailed. Supernaturalism was the regnant conception still. Luther indeed taught that salvation is by faith, and that every man may come to the heart of Jesus Christ and find God. But every prophet's message is beyond the ken of his followers. And when the current of history flowed on, a Holy Book had taken the place of a Holy Church within the communion of the mighty Protestant movement. The logic of the Protestant programme is not far to seek. Here is the Bible, a veritable word of God; the record of conquering saints of many ages; the record of sin and penitence, of shame and folly; of holy men, of deeds of faith; of God manifesting himself in the lives of these men and women, hearing their prayers—yes, and answering their prayers; the record of religious experiences and religious history. And, most precious of all, here is the picture of Jesus and his marvelous life among men, the record of his gospel of God's love and of human salvation; this is a Holy Book, the Word of God! And to this day we have not outgrown it. We never shall. The richest, most blessed record of God's way with the human life, and the incomparable gospel of Jesus Christ!

And yet, when with the scholar's conscience and the scholar's insight we interpret the history of the church for the last four hundred years, we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that the supernaturalistic conception of God's relation to his word has shaped the history of the church and determined our interpretation of the Bible. Here again criticism demands that fact and explanation be discriminated and held apart. Explanation must not be confounded with fact. Truth may be a very different thing from a theory of the truth.

It is significant that we have not yet fully outgrown the supernaturalistic philosophy as we read our Bibles. A "supernatural book," an "infallible guide," an "inerrant Scripture"—these are phrases in common use. Mark how men search for the record of supernatural deeds. Note how Christian evidences have been largely synonymous with the record of miracles. See how men read the supernaturalistic view into the simple record; how the Bible itself from a simple, faithful record has been distorted into a volume of infallible "proof-texts," or regarded as of magically uniform texture of truth. Indeed, this is the avowed theory of some schools of theological learning today—supernaturalism as the principle of biblical interpretation.

Even in the record of Christ, men will turn hastily the pages that speak of Jesus living divinely the common life of lowly men, and pause with their finger on the page that records how he called Lazarus to life, or made a barren fig-tree wither. Why? Because they seem to see stronger evidence of God's working in these latter passages. Is Christ diviner when he calls to dead Lazarus than when he fathoms human need and loves common men? Is God nearer to men in death than in life? Is God in the spectacular and not in the common? If the world really thought so, it would seek another God! No, we are only in bondage to a theory of interpretation which we have not wholly outgrown. Nature and the supernatural are conceptions that haunt our thinking and warp our vision. The extraordinary, the miraculous, the intermittent, the supernatural—these are the forms under which our philosophy allows us to see God revealing himself. We are all familiar with some of the difficulties that have arisen in the field of Christian theology during these latter days. Science

and theology are supposed to clash; higher critics are anathematized. Critical science in general is looked upon askance in many religious circles. There are restlessness and distrust in ecclesiastical work. Scholarship is often regarded as synonymous with skepticism. Schools of learning are said to lead to atheism; and even theological colleges are seats of heresy.

There *is* unrest. This is a transition period in thought. I am concerned here to point out only one fundamental cause of the ferment. *We are outgrowing our old conceptions of God's relationship to his world.* Supernaturalism as a philosophy no longer satisfies thinking men, and we are all engaged in achieving a better philosophy, and in adjusting ourselves to the new view of the facts. Scientific thinkers have discovered a new world, a larger world, and we are trying to find an explanation to fit the facts. Even in theology some of us can no longer make the facts fit our explanations, and so we are reverently seeking a more adequate theology. Supernaturalism as a theory of God, of the Bible, or of the individual religious life, is being outgrown. We can vociferate, and quote authorities, and invoke the saints against the scientists, and finally, closing our eyes, take refuge in a church or a Bible. But the work of human thought moves on. The religious message that God has for men of our times must harmonize with their deepest convictions of truth. Mystery we must admit; but contradictions—never! The God whom we call men to worship must be seen to be a reasonable God. Religion has not changed. Our message has not changed: God's love and fatherhood; man's childhood and brotherhood; the saviorhood of Jesus Christ! This gospel is as high and as deep and as broad, as convincing and inspiring, as it ever was. But we dare no longer identify our gospel with our theology, our Bible with our theory of the Bible. We must no longer identify facts and explanation. Religion is a fact—the most vital, urgent, inspiring fact of human life. And if our supernaturalistic conception of religion must give way, and our supernaturalistic conception of the Bible must change, that does not alter the fact that religion is a vital experience to me, nor does it alter the fact that in Jesus Christ and his gospel I find God, and salvation in a blessed experience of communion with him.

The whole difficulty here, and the cause of the unrest and confusion, lies in the fact that religion has failed to discriminate its vital interests and its legitimate field of inquiry from the interests and fields of other sciences. It has dogmatically presumed to dictate the limits of all other scientific research because of this indiscriminate and unscientific assumption *that religion must be identified with one general conception of religion*; i. e., supernaturalism.

But modern science, in the name of astronomy, geology, physics, chemistry, and other accredited branches, has been discovering and verifying the laws of reality. In many cases these have turned out to be quite other than the uncritical assumptions of other days. Order and law are first principles on which these sciences build. A critical study of history has disturbed the easy confidence with which another age superimposed a supernatural order on the natural at will. A miracle in the sense of external interference with natural laws is so far discredited as to become the starting-point for skepticism rather than faith. Our whole modern way of conceiving the world makes it difficult, or logically impossible, to retain the traditional supernaturalistic view. The alternatives are to ignore science or to ignore religion, if religion is identical with the supernaturalistic world-view. This age of natural science does not hesitate to make the choice to the utter confusion of the religious nature.

Has the Christian religion no alternative except to ask men to stultify themselves in order to be religious? Is faith merely a miracle of credulity? Can we not dissociate the kernel of religion from its husk, and exhibit it as consistent with the vital convictions of our keenest thinkers? May not religious truth be illumined and not extinguished by our current world-view? Is there not a better view where the interests of our cognitive natures and of our religious natures will be seen to harmonize? Such a work as Andrew D. White's *Conflict of Science and Theology* is not the mere record of a battle, but of a prolonged civil war, pitiful and useless, and demoralizing. If peace has been declared, the tidings have not yet reached some of the warring factions. Certainly faithful scientists and faithful theologians may be permitted to do something to promote the propaganda of peace by emphasizing our common principles, and exposing the mistakes on which the conflict rests.

II

The dissatisfaction with supernaturalism as a theory of reality has found expression in two reactionary directions, each of which offers the outlines of a philosophical explanation. The first of these explanations is so-called naturalism. It is a form of conception which has crept into our thinking in this age of natural science. It is an explanation that is indigenous to the atmosphere of the scientific spirit, and may be characterized as the attempt to impose the natural-science method and the natural-science limitations on all phenomena. Naturalism is the natural-science method aspiring to be the exclusive world-philosophy. It expresses a serious and widespread attitude of mind today toward the questions of theism and allied theological problems: naturalism, positivism, or even materialism, as it is variously called.

A modern examination of naturalism¹ opens with this paragraph:

Sir Isaac Newton concludes his famous *Principia* with a general scholium in which he maintains that the whole diversity of natural things can have arisen from nothing but the ideas and the will of one necessarily existing being who is always and everywhere, God supreme, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, absolutely perfect. A little more than a hundred years later Laplace began to publish his *Mécanique céleste*, which may be described as an extension of Newton's *Principia* on Newton's lines, translated into the language of differential calculus. When Laplace went to make a formal presentation of his work to Napoleon, the latter remarked: "M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe and have never even mentioned its Creator." Whereon Laplace drew himself up and answered bluntly: "Sire, I had no need of any such hypothesis." Since that interview another century has almost passed. Sciences that were then in their infancy—such as chemistry, biology, geology, and even psychology—have in the meantime attained imposing proportions. Anyone who might now have the curiosity to compare the treatises of their best-attested exponents with the great work of Laplace would find that work no longer singular in the omission which Napoleon found so remarkable.

God is not a necessary hypothesis today in writing science.

In naturalistic philosophy God is not a datum, but a hypothesis, if indeed he is not bowed out as superfluous. Modern psychology, pursued by this method, reduces personality to a complex of delicately adjusted nerves. The spiritual and personal fade into shadows, and become negligible factors. Naturalism needs neither the hypoth-

¹ Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.

esis of God nor the hypothesis of any person. Given forces and laws and atoms enough, explainers of this type leave nothing to be desired. It all becomes a matter of cause and effect, of description and history. All mysteries yield to the crucible, or the test-tube, or the historic method. God becomes a name we have coined for the unknown, or simply a collective term to designate the logical all. A man reduces to a piece of protoplasm which develops according to a given norm. But his whole pedigree—i. e., his explanation—is written in the books of the scientist. His total *meaning* is comprehended in this explanation. There is no need of the hypothesis of personality, whether human or divine. "Fact I know, and law I know," wrote Huxley; "but what is this necessity save an empty shadow of my own mind's showing, something illegitimately thrust into the perfectly legitimate conception of law?"

Now, such is the spirit of false naturalism which rises like a cold fog and hovers with a materialistic chill over the laboratories of science. It is a spirit and a view-point not wholly comprehensible to those quietly sheltered in the religious atmosphere of the church. But it is a spirit which in protean shapes enters very largely into the intellectual life of today. Out in the world where men are thinking through the great intellectual problems of our generation the naturalistic current is a mighty factor to reckon with. By contact we have all absorbed something of the scientific spirit; we breathe it as the climate of our age. It is a mood toward life which meets all our intellectual workers as they go out to seek the solution of life's problems. Materialism, sugar-coated, is the theory of the universe which many an educated leader offers. And when the theory works down into the masses, it becomes less scientific, the sugar-coat rubs off the intrinsic doctrine, and it becomes bald atheism. And there is not much inspiration in the creed of atheism in whatever dress. It withers life at its roots and issues in pessimism.

Naturalism conceives the world as mechanism, and studies it as a complex of causes working according to definite laws. Its assumptions are the assumptions of natural science: the reality and finality of force and matter, and the validity and universality of natural laws. Mechanical law is the omnipresent fact. The structure of a molecule is a marvel of organized law; and the worlds of astronomy

are poised in space and regulated in their orbits with a nicety of adjustment to law that awes the scholar. All life down to its minutest details, on analysis, proves to be thus organized—organized in terms of unvarying law. Chemistry and physics and astronomy have opened up an amazing physical world, marvelous in structure, infinite in extent. And the other sciences are swiftly coming into line with the scientific method. The structure of a crystal is no more perfect than the regular structure of the world itself, and all of its parts. Biology, zoölogy, botany, and even psychology and the social sciences, are organizing their data in conformity to this ruling conception, law. Life in all its extent is an expression of law, and can be comprehended in terms of law.

The scientist finds his fascinating task made to his hand: to approach this orderly cosmos at some point, and within the limit of his own particular science to experiment and tabulate and formulate the cosmic laws. He is a discoverer and a describer. In this universal reign of law he makes one little kingdom his own by right of discovery and conquest.

But in this splendid task, legitimate naturalism is in danger of a metamorphosis into false naturalism. Forgetting that he is a discoverer, and awed by the magnitudes with which he deals—the magnitudes of law and force and matter—the scientist is likely to proclaim these discoveries as the limits of knowledge itself. Rather, he hypostatizes these magnitudes into self-sufficient quantities; and law and force—mere descriptive names for what he observes—harden into metaphysical realities. His forces are generalized into the Eternal Energy; and somehow the capital letter has turned description into metaphysics. And law itself becomes an independent entity carrying its own power to act. Now, the false naturalist has all the paraphernalia for constructing a world. He conjures with forces and laws in this illegitimate sense, and lo, a self-running cosmos, a system, a universe! And he need call in no other fact. Natural science has issued its manifesto of independence. Explanation can go no farther. "Fact I know, and force I know," he says with Huxley; and, with Huxley, he intimates the superfluity of any further explanation. With Laplace he says: "I have no need of any hypothesis of a God. My laws and forces—are they not sufficient forces and powers?"

And, thus led on by the exigencies of his method, the mechanical ideal becomes the all-sufficient hypothesis for accounting for a universe. And when "development," and "evolution," and "natural selection," and other abstract terms are admitted as dynamic entities at convenient places in the system, this form of naturalism is indifferent as between the claims of atheism and theism. Indeed, atheism would seem to be the more scientific hypothesis, according to the law of parsimony. Thus the fallacy of abstraction has done its perfect work. Science is falsely erected into a virtual argument against theism, and, in the atmosphere of mechanical science, all spiritual quantities, and the religious convictions and experiences by which men and nations live, are felt to be unable to meet the familiar tests of truth.

Thus it is that the student-spirit, breathing this atmosphere of naturalism, goes out to feel a sense of distrust of religion; a sense of unreality in prayer; a sense of insecurity in the domain of personal and ethical values; because the world of his study has a self-sufficiency of its own without the assumption of a God. Thus confusion over-spreads his religious life; and often the most cherished sentiments and convictions of life take wings and vanish, because they are felt to be alien to the scientific spirit.

But naturalism as a philosophy *is not intentional atheism*, any more than it is the intentional denial of the reality of self. I am considering it here rather because it is a form of conception of God and of his relationship to the world. Natural scientists are not godless. They are performing an inestimable service for the world. Moreover, science serves a ministry to reverence and religion. It is an aspect of truth which bulks large in our thought-life today. But it is the misapplication of the methods of science which issues in the philosophy of naturalism. It is the misconception of science which issues in skepticism. As a description of the orderly method of the world, science in all its branches is doing invaluable service. But when that method hardens into an ultimate explanation, and purports to be a philosophy of life—to give the final and total conception of reality—it loses its way and perverts its end. After science has accurately described and classified its remotest data, the task of explanation is incomplete. Total experience has not been fathomed.

The rational nature of a man will still demand that the facts described be construed in terms of the ideals of intelligence. Construe this omnipresent fact of causality: What is the power that works? What is the ultimate nature of law? What is the ultimate nature of these units with which science works? Until these queries are answered, the mind is not satisfied. It is here that a conception of God and his world comes into view. And when a descriptive method challenges the interpreting powers of intelligence, and denies that we can know aught of God or his world save to rehearse the processes of history and experience—this is method gone mad. Thus scientific method that has lost its way issues in the naturalistic philosophy. The world becomes a mere mechanism; God is the "Unknowable," the "First Principle," the "All," or an "unnecessary hypothesis." And our relationship with him can be reckoned only in terms of sequences of necessary causes and effects. There is little room for personal values. The truest account of the moral and religious life is a catalogue of the moral and religious phenomena. In the language of the physical laboratory, the verities of religious experience are no longer "Facts," and even God is a "Hypothesis." Such theorists, I repeat, are not primarily irreligious; they are only slaves to a method. But that method, misdirected, becomes a false method; and it reacts with serious consequences in a thousand ways upon thought and life. *For even if the religious nature faithfully asserts itself in the face of this disconcerting mood, and calls back its God, he is likely to be placed in some unreal realm of pale spirits, or on a distant throne. Meanwhile we are environed by the great reality—Mechanism!*

I am confident that students of philosophy and theology will recognize the reality of this type of thinking which I have thus briefly characterized. As a world-view it has some eminent representatives, whose systems are already self-refuted. But as a mood, a spirit in religious interpretation, it is far-reaching in its effects upon the student-mind, and must be reckoned with by the theologian who would do constructive work.

Can this view of the world prevail? In a word, no; because it theorizes for the scientific mood and not for a *man as a man*. I am much more than one of my interests. This view is too narrow and barren in its psychological analysis, and it is too limited in its method

of inquiry. The content and realities of life are far richer than the naturalistic method allows; and the tests of reality and truth are far more complex than its formulas allow. Life is much more than the scientific interest. *I am a man.* And the life which I explain by my philosophy must be as many-sided as personality. Laws and forces and causes and motion—these are indeed facts. But so are prayers, consecrations, sacrifices, purposes, and character. So are worship and holiness and love. So all personal values are facts in terms of which I live my life. And the theory of reality which neglects these facts is doomed by default. I must find an interpretation of life which satisfies me, and brings life and explanation into accord.

Naturalism, then, fails to satisfy the religious demand. Mechanical relationships, as the final terms of our thinking emasculate life of all higher meanings, and thus contradict the great catholic convictions of the race, and stultify the practical controlling ideals of life. This is its condemnation as a practical philosophy. Moreover, the place of God in such a world-scheme is so remote or so doubtful that religion can live only by a desperate act of "faith" which is either meaningless or a contradiction of the naturalistic philosophy. In its most religious estate it could offer only Deism as the solution of God's relationship to the world. But Deism has long ago been cast out as a philosophic outlaw. It fails to comprehend the real problem involved. God as "a First Cause," a sort of omnipotent Reserve Power, an "Unknowable" prodigy, who has sublet the universe to secondary causes in a mechanical system, is a puerile attempt to satisfy the imagination. It not only fails to satisfy the religious need for the presence of a living God, but, worse still, it offers no account to the rational nature of the present causal fact. Mechanism itself as dynamic cause is the real problem, and not what we may imagine behind it. How to construe the causal relation of God to his world is precisely the problem. To posit God behind this mechanism is equivalent to positing x behind it. For religious thinking it would seem that naturalism is a more barren and inadequate theory than supernaturalism; for in effect it denies the possibility of a personal relationship with God, which supernaturalism provides for by the device of miraculous departure from the natural.

The theologian today is thus caught between two conflicting cur-

rents of thought. Supernaturalism is largely the bent of the churches and the creeds. Naturalism is at least the implicit philosophy of the scientific world about us. Both forces are significant, but both philosophies are confused and largely self-contradictory. Amid these two currents of thought the theologian must sail a course which promises to reach the haven of truth. These are difficult days for the theologian. A vital philosophy of life must underlie all vital theology. Shall he pour the wine of his convictions into the old bottles, in default of a better containing-vessel? Will no successor of Immanuel Kant arise to achieve for us a theory of knowledge which will dispel our confusion and give us some solid foundation principles on which religion and science may alike build their structure, in mutual respect and confidence? For the end must be harmony and symmetry and consistency of building, if both together are to constitute the temple of Truth.

Thus scientific thought cancels the pretensions of supernaturalism. But the demands of life and religion easily expose the barrenness and inadequacy of naturalism. How shall we conceive of God and his relationship to us in terms that shall preserve the truth of both naturalism and supernaturalism, and yet more adequately illumine and construe the facts? For both types of thought contain abiding truth. Law, development, the orderly working of the universe—this supreme element of truth in science we must hold as a fundamental principle. The value of the scientific emphasis on law is incalculable, and its consequences for ethical and religious meanings are only beginning to be seen. A moral world must be a world of consistency and law. A lawless world would be both irrational and immoral. On the other hand, personal relationships, eternal values, volitional determinations, cosmic meanings—these are the abiding elements in supernaturalism. Can we see the outlines of the larger view, where life's methods and life's meanings will not clash?

III

This leads me to characterize the second reactionary tendency of which I spoke. I believe we are able to forecast the conception within which these aspects of truth must harmonize.

In the conception of the world-order as identical with the activity

of the divine will, we find the emphasis of modern thinking. Reality is but another name for God in action, expressing himself in terms of regular laws. This is the doctrine of the divine immanence. It is the view of the world which transcends the crude, anthropomorphic dualism of supernaturalism, and the equally untenable materialism of naturalism. God and his world are not mutually exclusive terms. He is immanent at every point of his creation. "He is the omnipresent ground of all finite existence and activity. The world, alike of finite things and of spirits, is nothing existing and acting on its own account, while God is away in some extra-sidereal region; but it continually depends upon, and is ever upheld by, the ever-living, ever-present, ever-working God." The system of nature is but another name for the order in which God acts, in the unique and inscrutable fact which we call creation. And the laws of nature which the scientist studies, and the orderly procession of cause and effect and of historical unfolding—these are but the human view of the rational forms in which the Supreme Person incessantly works his will. Cosmic processes are all alike evidences of the Immanent Agent at work.

In this view we have eliminated the supernaturalistic problem of passing from the supernatural to the natural order. For the natural order is only the familiar form in which the supernatural power works. An unfamiliar phenomenon, however "miraculous" in effect, could be no more supernatural than a familiar phenomenon; for the order and the dynamics of each are equally expressive of the energizing of the one supreme will. On the other hand, naturalism is complemented with the fact without which it can only be a formal or modal philosophy. That is, the abstract notions of cause and law are construed in terms of mind and endued with a real dynamic explanation. Law is an abstraction from the orderly way in which something works. But what is it that works? "Cause" is a word to express the dynamic problem. But what is cause? The doctrine of an immanent God provides a meaning for cause, as an immanent agent acting; and interprets law as merely the method of his regular acting.

The doctrine of divine immanence is not a new doctrine, but it is finding new formulation and new application in the exigencies of

the thought-life of today. Paul's doctrine that God is all and in all is being reinforced from every branch of human inquiry. The historian, the psychologist, the metaphysician, as well as the theologian, are finding this conception to be the magic key which fits the riddle of life—the missing element around which all facts and principles crystallize into harmonious unity. The divine transcendence, on the one hand, baffles the longings of religion and scandalizes the philosopher. On the other hand, the world as mere mechanism is an affront to a man's sense of value and a sterile principle for reason. But if thought can grasp the living God as the personal Principle who forms the core of reality in the whole mechanical world, organic and inorganic, then law and development become merely the forms of his creative life, and fellowship and fatherhood are consistent with the fact of his immediacy and control.

Divine immanence as a philosophic doctrine transcends the dualism of supernaturalism where God visits men or breaks into the order of nature. The ordinary distinction between natural and supernatural is obliterated in this view. Both the active and the formal principle of nature, the law and the force, are simply expressive of the fact of the Eternal Agent realizing himself in the forms that we regard as the natural. In the final sense mechanical nature is as much supernatural as any celestial order could be. That is, the only final fact here is divine action. Creation involves no surplusage over this, no crude "stuff" apart from the orderly incessant action of divine volition. God is all as well as in all. The only point in the cosmic order where this conception of creation does not seem to suffice for thought is in the case of finite personalities with a measure of freedom or self-determination. But in the case of these personalities the dependence upon the divine activity is just as real and absolute as in the case of things. The doctrine of immanence is in no sense relaxed. Only we must think of the creative act as so conditioning the nature of the created person that he possesses a measure of self-determination which involves real freedom in thought and conduct. This is the distinction between thinghood and selfhood. Finite persons, like things, express the creative act and have no being apart from that act. But persons are in the "image" of God.

The "system of nature" thus becomes supernatural, and the super-

natural, so far as we know it, becomes the natural. More exactly stated, both are equally divine, so far as "divine" calls for the power, purpose, and presence of God. And this is a great gain for consistent thinking, in that the scandal of conflict between science and religion is seen to be baseless. For, verily, "the undivineness of the natural, and the unnaturalness of the divine, is the great heresy of popular thought respecting religion."

On the other hand, divine immanence as a philosophic doctrine informs and supplements mechanical explanation. From a description of endless being and becoming, it becomes a description of the mode under which a "supreme rational Will forever founds and administers the order of the world." The limitation of the function of natural science to inductive description is recognized. And the rational demand to construe the ultimates of science in terms of the highest ideals of mind must be conceded as a right and necessity. "Law," "force," "cause," "necessity," when seen in their true proportions, are not dynamic facts, but only formal descriptions that call for further interpretation. To hypostatize these into self-sufficient entities is the temptation of the naturalistic mood, and is possible only on an inadequate analysis of the general problem of knowledge. The doctrine of immanence supplies a conception of the active dynamic principle which science describes, but does not construe for the ultimate categories of thought. "Cause," then, from being a mere abstraction to conceal our problem, becomes a name for the omnipresent Will realizing his plan under the forms which science describes as mechanism. "Law," becomes, not the name of a power, but a method. And even "force" is seen to be a generalization that leads to no insight. Personality becomes the ultimate conception everywhere; and thus mechanism is transformed into the activity of an omnipresent Will; while natural and supernatural lose their contrast, and express the one fact of men living in the immediate presence of God. And there is no other reality.

On this view of causality and law, the philosopher would have no insuperable logical difficulty in admitting the possibility of a miracle. Or, rather, the form of that haunting problem is so transformed that it must be discussed in terms of other conceptions. The incommensurability presupposed in the antithesis of natural law and

supernatural purpose no longer exists. The natural is not only as divine as the "supernatural," but it must be thought as equally purposive. And when law has no other meaning than the orderly mode in which a purposing God chooses to act, there seems to be no a priori ground for affirming that God cannot act in any way he chooses in the interests of his purpose. That is, law can no longer be thought of as one of the dynamic "necessities" with which naïve thinking has compassed the problem of revelation. And, in religious explanation, purpose is confessedly the supreme conception, not mode. As to whether the miracle is a historic fact as well as a logical possibility, that must be left to historic considerations. It is noticeable, however, in discussions even of this phase of the subject, that the conclusion is likely to be determined according as the personal emphasis of the critic is upon *order* or upon *purpose* as the supreme consideration in the world-view. "Pure logic" in this field usually reflects the personal convictions of the theorist. The real grounds of the argument are sub-logical, in the personal presuppositions that underlie all logic.

On the other hand, the religious theorist, on this view of immanence if the eyes of his understanding were opened, would feel no call for a miracle to aid his faith, for all alike would be equally divine to him: A miraculous event could not be more divine than a common event; since all alike are acts of God, and express both his purpose and his presence. Indeed, the religious thinker would see in the marvel of law a factor to appeal to his sense of awe and worship for a trustworthy God. But he might conceive a departure from the common order as a worthy pedagogical device chosen by a God for whom purpose is supreme over law, for the instruction of an undeveloped race; or for an age so lost in the ideals of natural science that natural law is a more sacred conception than purposive goodness. But, in general, his faith and his philosophy might be symbolized in the conception that affirms:

From Horeb's bush the Presence spoke
To earlier faiths and simpler folk;
But now each bush that sweeps our fence
Flames with His awful Immanence.

Such, in faintest suggestion, I conceive to be the type of philosophic conception which is coming to control men's minds. It is a

developed form of the idealistic conception of the world. Paul's thought of the present God "in whom we live and move and have our being"—this is finding acceptance as our best metaphysical conception of reality. The heart is leading the intellect—Faith is leading Reason—in the quest for a tenable philosophy. But then it has always been so. We believe what life demands, and then our reason construes our belief.

The implications of such a view, and the far-reaching consequences for theology, I cannot even hint at here. But such a conception, thoroughly naturalized in the world of modern thought, would have a transforming power little short of epochal. It would enrich our religious conceptions, and bring a sense of reality in religious acts for which religious preachers and teachers cry out. It would show that religion is to pervade all life, and is not chiefly a matter of churches and of prayers. For who would not feel the call to worship, if he felt that in very fact all life is lived in the divine presence? Might we not hope that our daily task would be performed and our common life lived with the air of men "who serve in a Temple"?

For the makers of theology, I have already pointed out, the conception of God is central. It shapes and points all other doctrines, and determines the appeal of these doctrines for the thinking man. The conception of God as immanent seems to me suited to the temper of our age. It satisfies the rational nature by construing reality in terms of the ultimate conception of intelligenec—personality. Thus I stand before a fact which I cannot resolve, and cannot explain away—God in every fact of life. The scientist, each in his respective field, will have unlimited freedom for his fruitful inquiry. Reality does not become less real, nor substance less substantial, nor do the laws of nature grind less remorselessly. The scientist will question the laws and the facts at every point, and unfold the science of every realm. But his science will be only the description of the way in which the personal, immanent Cause works.

And the religious nature is satisfied by the conception of an immanent God, for it means that in the mystery of personal fellowship I need not violently abdicate the convictions of scientific cognition. I am always in touch with the Infinite. In working out my own life-plan and in tracing the sequences of history, I must interpret all

in terms of this principle of a God who is immanent and active in it all. Fellowship with God is not achieved by some telepathy with heaven, or magical ascension to the holy of holies. God is unspeakably near to me at every point of life. I do not ascend into heaven, nor do I summon his spirit to my need; but, resting in the conviction of the eternal presence, I confidently command my own soul,

Speak to him thou, for he hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands or feet.

There are two or three points at which the doctrine of the divine immanence is peculiarly liable to misinterpretation and must be guarded. First of these is the ready query: Is not this view pantheistic in its consequences? Does it not so identify God and the world that it confuses the sense of responsibility involved in the moral and the rational life? We point out in reply that this identification has been clearly and explicitly avoided by two postulations. First, the world as an act of will is no necessary aspect or part of God, as pantheism involves. The world is a free creation. We affirm, not that God and the world are identical, but that God identifies himself with the world in the volitional act of creation. Second, created personalities are given freedom or self-determination as a part of their native endowment. A measure of independence and of real responsibility is characteristic of the created person. Whatever the difficulties of this view, it is no more opaque than the doctrine of creationism in general, to which reflective thought shuts us up. Here individual finite freedom obviates the necessitarianism of pantheism, and makes room for finite responsibility.

Again, our language may lead some to feel that we have identified essential religious relations with cosmic relations that obtain universally. To affirm a theory of reality in which God as the ground of reality is "nearer than hands or feet," must not lead us to ignore the distinction between the good and the bad, the religious and the irreligious. In the ontological sense God may indeed be the One in whom I live and have my being. But this fact does not make me religious. Religion is a distinctly individual act, and depends upon a personal initiative which establishes a new set of relationships between God and me which I can only call personal. These relationships are

ethical, growing out of my character; and not merely implications of my existence. But even so, some theories of reality administer to the religious fact, while some do not. Some theories of reality are inconsistent with the affirmation of confidence in religion. Psychological unity demands consistency among the articles of my belief, if one is not to cancel or confuse the other. All that we claim for the doctrine of immanence is that it is first of all a consistent theory of reality. And, second, in the unity of consciousness, it is not only consistent with, but administers to, religious life, by presenting conceptions contributory to both confidence and awe. The vital act of individual communion with God which is the heart of all religion is not affirmed in the doctrine of immanence, but the doctrine is shown to provide for the religious life. It makes the same emphasis that supernaturalism does upon the special nature of the soul's relationship to God in the religious act. But, unlike supernaturalism, it does not create an artificial chasm between scientific thought and religion. And, unlike supernaturalism, it does not encourage the intermittency of the religious life so characteristic of the conception which does not see God's presence in all the forms of life. Both immanence and supernaturalism alike make faith necessary to bring God near to the worshiper. But supernaturalism also requires credulity; immanence does not. Unity of consciousness is thus provided for.

It is perhaps worth noting here that there is a hysterical aversion, on the part of a few, against admitting metaphysical considerations into religious explanation. This hysteria is rapidly healing. It originally arose as a protest against the scholastic fallacy of identifying metaphysics and religion. But the protest having been once made against this identification, its extravagant form, as exhibited in Ritschl and others, must be abandoned. Modern psychological study, as well as a better analysis of the problem of knowledge, forbids such absolute and mutual exclusion of metaphysics and religion. To those who would characterize the divine immanence as a profoundly "metaphysical" view, and therefore to be eschewed, it is sufficient to indicate that supernaturalism, or any other theory of reality, involves metaphysics. Prejudice and false theory aside, there is an implicit metaphysical view in every theory of reality,

including those which explicitly disavow such alliance. As a final word to such theorists we summarize as follows:

The intelligent acceptance of the doctrine of the divine immanence is not itself the establishing of the personal religious fact. The essentially religious attitude is always an individual act of the person. "The inner life of religion in the last resort is something secret and incommunicable." But in the unitary life of intelligence this personal act of communion with God, which is the essence of religion, is best construed and best promoted from the standpoint of the man who holds the immanence of God as an ultimate explanation of reality. Remoteness of "natural" relations with God in no way administers to the intimacy of the religious relation. The other conceptions discussed may indeed be held by a truly religious man; though we have endeavored to show that their ministry is not to mental consistency and "peace in believing." Religious explanation is not indifferent to metaphysics, nor can be in a sound psychological analysis.

The practical consequences of the theory of the divine immanence for theological interpretation would be manifold. Not least of these consequences would be the clearer discrimination of the method and field of theological study, the frank recognition of the competency and finality of every science in its own limited field, and the disclosure of the unreason of "heresy" trials. Purpose would become the controlling conception everywhere, and a frank facing of the evolutionary unfolding of law would transform many a venerable doctrine, with the result of giving it a vital meaning now obscured or discredited. The doctrine of sin is a case in point. Both ethics and evolution may justify their conceptions of sin without canceling each other. And the high meanings of the Christian doctrine of salvation from sin are only enhanced. The doctrine of God expressed in the Christian conception of redemption, and its relation to the non-Christian religions, would be deepened and broadened. The missionary motive will be quickened, as men grasp the purpose of God in all history. History studied in the light of the conviction of an immanent God would take on new lessons, and some of the old lessons would be discredited. "Through the ages one increasing purpose runs." That purpose is not arbitrarily confined to one age or one people. Historical science, from being a mere catalogue,

becomes an unbroken revelation. Revelation will take on a less technical and more vital meaning. Inspiration will disregard our theological classifications. Bible interpretation will frankly accept the "historic method," without thereby losing one whit of its revelation value. And in the unfolding of the religious life of the individual Christian, technical "evidences" and doctrinal "tests" will give place to a vital personal growth in the life of the spirit. The work which Luther began will be completed in the renewed confidence that all life is lived in the divine presence. Religion itself will be increasingly seen to include every phase of life. The "natural" aspects will be seen to have supernatural significance. Systematic work and impulsive experience, growth by law and the surprises of communion, will be equally religious. In all the normal aspects of life God is equally expressing his one consistent purpose which never falters. Religion which realizes the immanence of God in all the forms of life will seek not so much to locate him in a holy mount, or a holy city, in churches and formal prayers; but will rather worship everywhere in spirit and in truth. The last vestige of other worldliness should disappear for religion as men realize that in the normal and wholesome functions of life in this world, communion with God is completed and the fulness of God's life becomes the confident possession of men.

And so our changing philosophies are ever conceiving new heavens and a new earth. We are trying to get better conceptions of God's relationship to us; but of the *fact* of that relationship our hearts never permit us to doubt. Religion abides, while theologies change.

Our little systems have their day,
They have their day, and cease to be;
They are but broken lights of Thee,
And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

The supernaturalistic theory of reality is symbolized by the paintings of the Middle Ages, where the gods are seated on the clouds, while the earth below is the habitation of men. A scientific age has analyzed the clouds, and the traditional conception of a heaven in the skies, whence angels descend, no longer appeals to the imagination. Naturalism has compelled us to relocate the habitation of God. And in this our best revelation and our best philosophy agree, that wher-

ever there is life, there God is. He is immanent in all his works. His habitation is with men.

A cross-section of cosmic life would not reveal heterogeneous evidences of God's purposiveness, a natural and a supernatural. But all would equally express him and his purpose. Even a historical incarnation brought him no nearer to life, but only revealed him more adequately. This is the doctrine of the divine immanence; and theology orientated to this truth has an inspiration for our age.

ACTS VERSUS GALATIANS: THE CRUX OF APOSTOLIC HISTORY

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The relation of the Pauline epistles to Acts, and especially of Paul's own synopsis of his career in Gal. 1:11—2:21 to that of Luke in Acts 9:1—30, 11:19—30, and 12:25—15:39, is such a well-worn battle-ground of critics that it can be approached only with hesitation and self-distrust. Yet the very causes which have made it such continue to force an independent judgment upon every competent investigator. No one sharing the spirit of the true historian can be satisfied to leave unsolved the discrepancies which attach to our two accounts of the most vital points in the origin of gentile Christianity. No modern critic can be satisfied with the obsolete harmonistic method which sacrificed the individual intention of the sources considered separately to the dogma of inerrancy; nor with results which are, or seem to be, affected by its taint. No conscientious historian can be satisfied with critical results which dismiss any element of the testimony as valueless until full justice has been done it.

New light on the crucial point of Paul's visit to Jerusalem to confer with the "pillars," its nature, date, and relation to the second (or third) related in Acts, is at least as urgently called for today as ever before. The only reasonable hope of it lies in the application of a historical criticism which shall be more rigidly scientific than heretofore by virtue of avoiding on the one side the harmonistic bias, on the other the hypercriticism which pours off too much of the genuine metal with the dross. The present essay sets forth certain results of historical criticism which explain the discrepancies between Galatians and Acts mainly on the ground that our Acts is the fruit of revision and readjustment of older material from the standpoint of a loyal representative of the church of Antioch, in 90—100 A. D., and that in Antioch sentiment on the two great questions of the Pauline epistles, the independence of Paul's apostleship, and the equal rights of believers of the uncircumcision had yielded at that date to the growing influ-

ence of ecclesiasticism and the desire for definite rules laid down on apostolic authority. The older element coincides with Pauline principles and with the Gospel of Mark on the question of the inherent indifference of meats (Acts 11:1-18: cf. Mark 7:1-23); but its champion of this liberty and founder of gentile Christianity is Peter (Acts 9:32-11:18 15:7); the cradle of it, Caesarea. Acts, as we have it, makes Paul the principal hero, but rather as agent of the church in Antioch than in his own right, and substitutes for the radical Paulinism of the epistles a compromise between Antioch and Jerusalem on the chief point at issue. It is not easy to combine lucidity with brevity in stating these results, and at the same time avoid the dogmatic tone unsuited to hypothesis. As hypothesis, at all events, we would put them forth, aiming to commend them to the reader on the basis of a critical comparison of the data, subject to the following principles: (a) Paul's account is first to be interpreted in complete independence of Acts, in and by itself, without any discount whatever in the interest of harmony. (b) Luke's account is to be similarly interpreted, with such discount from the assumed accuracy of his narrative as is admittedly required by his work elsewhere, and can be fully accounted for by his demonstrable interests. (c) If after such treatment the sources do not fall of themselves into reasonable agreement, it is possible that confidence in the traditional authorship of Acts may have to be restricted to the underlying elements of the travel-document in 16:10-28:16. The failure to effect a harmony will not justify violence in interpretation on the one hand, nor violent rejection of the Pauline epistles on the other. Explanation of the discrepancy will have to be sought in accordance with known tendencies of the Lucan tradition to vary, but without unnecessary sacrifice of any statement.

A. 1. In applying the principle of independent interpretation to Gal. 1:11-2:21, we are forced first of all to dismiss the harmonistic device current since Lightfoot's day, that Paul is omitting reference to a visit of himself and Barnabas to Jerusalem which had taken place in accordance with Luke's report of "relief" sent by the church in Antioch.¹ None is clearer on this point than Ramsay, the ardent apologist of Luke. Even if the "ministration" of Saul and Barnabas

¹ Act 11:29 f.; 12:25.

in Jerusalem lasted a much shorter time than the six months Ramsay thinks it reasonable to allow, omission of mention of it in Gal. 1:18-24 is inadmissible. Either Luke is misinformed, or the visit is that so emphatically declared to be Paul's *second* in Gal. 2:1. Today one can scarcely read without a shock of surprise the quibbling comment of Lightfoot on Gal. 1:22, "I was still unknown by face to the churches of Judaea which were in Christ:" "*Judaea generally, as distinguished from that of Jerusalem.*"² Drop the harmonistic interest, and the reader cannot fail to ask: If Paul is not still interested throughout 1:21-24 to prove the impossibility of dependence for his gospel on his predecessors, what is the object of the strong expression, "I was unknown by face"? And if we attempt to maintain with Lightfoot, on the ground of Acts 9:26-30 and 12:25, that Paul's face must have been perfectly well known to the churches both in Jerusalem and in Caesarea, what becomes of the argument? Where else, pray, were the teachers on whom he might have been dependent? If no further alternative exists, it surely is better to reject the representation of Acts than to bring the oath of Gal. 1:20 so near the brink of perjury.

2. Separate consideration of Gal. 1:11-2:21 tends to make clearer the author's geographical outlook in 1:21. Special citations to prove in how real a sense Paul felt the gentile world to be his divinely appointed province would be superfluous; but he is also particularly given to territorial retrospects. One who could speak of its accomplishment "from Jerusalem round about unto Illyricum" as only preliminary to more distant labors for which Rome would be headquarters and Spain only an outer province,³ displays not only a largeness of view befitting the "Traveler and Roman Citizen," but a strategic mind, such as there is abundant reason to attribute to the Missionary to the Gentiles on other grounds. Among the passages which evince Paul's disposition to review his "course" as an "ambassador for Christ" by great divisions of the Roman Empire is Gal. 1:16 ff., leading up by successive steps to the memorable conference in Jerusalem, 2:1-10. "Damascus" seems to have been headquarters for the period of "three years,"⁴ Antioch and Tarsus served no doubt in the same capacity for "the regions of

² *Commentary on Galatians ad loc.*

³ Rom. 15:19-29.

⁴ For purposes of general review of Paul's work the period of retirement in Arabia,

Syria and Cilicia" during the further period of eleven (fourteen?) years. Both expressions mark zones of Pauline activity measured geographically and chronologically from Jerusalem. In 2:1-10 we stand on the threshold of the third and broadest. Thus Paul's geographical habit is opposed to the idea that "Syria and Cilicia" can be used loosely in 1:21, to cover Cyprus and South Galatia as well. The broader zone comes into view, but not in 1:21. It is viewed in prospect—not in retrospect—in 2:1-10. In 2:1-10 even the debate about circumcising Titus is subordinate, parenthetically interjected (vss. 3-5). The narrative presents Paul's own "running" as the occasion for the conference, and the issue of it as the decision that he and Barnabas "should go unto the gentiles." Judging the apostle's description of his "course" without the surreptitious side-glance at Acts, the great campaign on Greek soil in company with Barnabas can fall only after 2:10.⁵

3. Gal. 2:1-10 knows no "apostolic council." Separate interpretation does not deny that the reactionists who urged the circumcision of Titus at Jerusalem had already acted the part of "spies" on gentile liberty at Antioch,⁶ nor that it may have been to forestall attempts at "subjection" that Paul "took Titus along." It does exclude, however, the idea that he could or would have submitted to a public assembly (whose jurisdiction he must deny) the question of the obligation of his converts to keep the Mosaic law in whole or in part. His statement implies that he avoided submitting the questions at issue to public debate, purposely securing "in private" the indorsement of his "running" by the admission of those whose *testimony* was authoritative that his gospel was not different from,⁷ nor his vocation

Gal. 1:17, ignored in Acts, probably of brief duration (four months?), and in the present writer's judgment of significance only to Paul's inner life, may be left out of account.

⁵ Authorities no less weighty than Weizsäcker (*Apostolic Age*, p. 177) and Pfeiderer (*Christian Origins*) regard the phrase "regions of Syria and Cilicia" as decisive in favor of placing the first missionary journey after the Jerusalem council, although they are thus forced to invert the order of Acts, chaps. 13, 14, and 15; because they make Gal. 2:1-10=Acts 15.

⁶ Against Weizsäcker, *Apostolic Age*, pp. 152 ff. (English translation pp. 183 ff.). In the second edition (1890, p. 154) the statement that the "spying on our liberty" must have been in Jerusalem is corrected to admit the alternative ("also etwa in Antiochien"). Of course the liberty spied upon was in the gentile church. * *ῥαπεισμός* (Gal. 2:4) does *not* necessarily imply a previous collision.

⁷ Cf. I Cor. 15:3 and Gal. 2:16-21 for the nature of this common gospel.

inferior to, their own. The common harmonistic device of assuming a second meeting, at which, after the really decisive action in private, the church as a whole was permitted to go through the motions of deciding, runs counter to Paul's wise avoidance of implied "subjection." To him the demand regarding Titus, and its refusal, is an episode. The purpose of the conference had regard to his own unobstructed "running." Its issue was an agreement of non-interference. If there were other meetings in Jerusalem at this time, they had no bearing on the issue settled in Gal. 2:1-10, nor that settled in 2:11-21, and fall outside our consideration.

4. Gal. 2:6-10 would in themselves be conclusive against the imposition at this visit of the four "decrees" of Acts 15:20-28 f. Enactment or indorsement of them by the "pillars," whether at the private conference or at a public session, would be excluded, even if Paul's later epistles did not positively repudiate their authority, and Peter's conduct at Antioch show that at first he had no such rules.⁸ Here single-eyed interpretation of Paul's statements makes our decision more peremptory than in the former case: If there is no further alternative, Luke's "decrees" regarding the four "necessary" rules to be observed by gentile believers as the basis of their admission to full communion with Jewish believers, must be regarded as fictitious. Better the admission that an unknown writer of ca. 95 A. D. is advancing his own theory of how the debated question of "the pollutions of idols" ought to be settled, under the guise of decrees by an apostolic council, than impute such misrepresentation to Paul as Gal. 2:6-10 will then imply. As Lightfoot well says: "The result (according to Acts) was a compromise."⁹ In our understanding of the word "compromise," this is exactly what Gal. 2:1-10 explicitly denies: "By way of subjection [conceding such a right as is

⁸ Failure to appreciate the intrinsic bearing of the decrees has obscured this point. On their purpose of settling the disputed question of *table* fellowship, see below, p. 461. (1) Peter's vacillation at Antioch. (2) Paul's insistence in Gal. 2:1-10 that beyond the point of recognition of a church of the uncircumcision of equal rights with the circumcision, (3) his ignoring of any agreed *modus vivendi* in Gal. 2:11-21, (4) his express founding of abstinence in I Cor. 6:12 f.; 8:1-11; Rom. 14:1-15:13 on voluntary consideration for the overscrupulous, exclude the supposition that Paul at Jerusalem had concurred in an official joint request (to say nothing of "decrees for to keep") to the uncircumcision.

⁹ *Commentary on Galatians*, edition of 1896, p. 126.

implied in the word ἐπαναγκές of Acts 15:28] we yielded, no, not for an hour." Gal. 2:11 f. shows how the latent contradictions implied in the agreement inevitably came to the surface and caused another disagreement. Luke's account leaves no room for this. If he delivered to his gentile churches the decrees to keep (Acts 16:4), Paul made the very concession which he vehemently upbraids Peter for making in Gal. 2:18. According to Luke, further disagreements after the Jerusalem conference were avoided by a "compromise," involving a concession "by way of subjection" on Paul's part. Paul emphatically denies such action. Weizsäcker's attitude¹⁰ toward the harmonization of Lightfoot on this score seems fully justified.

5. Between Gal. 2:10 and 2:11 we have an absolute break. To insert here the first missionary journey is supremely natural for reasons already stated. In that case, Peter's coming to Antioch will have been during the absence of the missionaries, perhaps in part on this account. At all events, it is certain that Paul has not inverted the order of events in this chapter, but that those who propose this extraordinary device of inversion are themselves the authors of confusion. Gal. 2:11-21 deals with an unexpected check which the cause of gentile liberty received *after the liberty had been recognized*.¹¹ How otherwise can we justify Paul's charges against Peter of inconsistency with his professed principles ("hypocrisy") and violation of the agreement (πὼς ἀναγκάζεις)? The question raised by the episode of Titus, and settled by the indorsement of Paul's gospel and the agreement of non-interference, was the question: Must *gentiles* keep the law of Moses? The nature both of the question raised in the incident of Gal. 2:11-21, and of the argument applied, is such as to prove both a later date and a gentile milieu. The question now is as to the obligation of the Mosaic law upon *Jews*. The whole incident revolves around the question whether Peter and other Jews shall be absolved from Mosaic requirements to the extent necessary for table communion with believing gentiles, which implies

¹⁰ *Apostolic Age*, pp. 211 f.

¹¹ Not "conferred." Galatians is explicit in its representation that Paul's "gospel" to the gentiles without the yoke of the law had always been the same and always admitted. He went to Jerusalem, not to ask reconsideration of this complete liberty, but for an indorsement which would silence those who had begun to create obstacles to his "running."

the previous recognition of gentile discipleship. Paul insists (1) that their refusal to give way is a breach of the compact (vs. 14); (2) that the law is null and void *for Jews also*, if they have put their trust in Christ (vss. 15-18). It is hard to see how Weizsäcker's lucid explanation could have left room for subsequent confusion, as if Peter and Barnabas (!) in Antioch could have been aiming to bring their gentile converts under the yoke of the law. How could Paul be more explicit in indicating that the dispute in Antioch is no longer as to whether uncircumcised gentiles shall be received, but as to whether *Jews* shall be dispensed from the law to the extent of eating with them. The delegates "from James" manifestly hold that they may not; and this might be, from their point of view, a logical inference from the division of the mission field (vs. 9). For if the apostles of the circumcision are not to preach legalism in gentile territory, Paul is not to preach the life "without the law" among the circumcision; and if Peter's refusal to eat with gentiles was "compelling them to Judaize," the converse pressure, to which he had at first yielded, might be called "compelling the Jews to heathenize." Here on neutral territory the Jerusalem compact inevitably issued in a deadlock. How the delegates from James proposed to reach a *modus vivendi* without concession on the part of the Jews, Paul does not inform us, Acts does. How *he* would reach it is obvious; but could not be expected to appear self-evident to conservative Jews. Only on the deeper ground of the invalidation of the law for both Jew and gentile which Paul now proceeds to maintain against Peter (Gal. 2:16-21), but which we may be very sure he had not advanced in Jerusalem (cf. Acts 21:20-26), can it be made to appear the duty of Peter, in consistency with his professed principles, to become, like Paul, "as without the law to them that are without the law."

6. Just as Gal. 2:1-10 leaves Paul and Barnabas at the threshold of the great, strictly gentile, mission field, so 2:11-20 leads up to the seven years' conflict in which Paul is seen engaged in all the major epistles. It seems, on the whole, more probable that Paul failed on this occasion to carry with him the majority. For if Peter and the church in Antioch and "even Barnabas" relinquished, on Paul's appeal, the attitude they had assumed in response to the delegation "from James," it would be surprising that Paul should neglect to

mention so great a triumph of gentile liberty. Moreover, the question of "meats" and "the pollutions of idols" was not settled. It remains still in debate in I Cor., chaps. 5-10, and Rom., chap. 14, between the "strong," and the "weak."¹² Paul's solvent as before is not "subjection," but "consideration." It is probable, therefore, even on the basis of the Pauline epistles alone, that the churches of "Antioch and Syria and Cilicia" continued to maintain their own *modus vivendi* as between Jewish and gentile believers, in the matter of meats; basing it upon representations which had come "from James," and which required the concessions to be made from the gentile side. This *modus vivendi* was then and thereafter accepted by Peter and Barnabas, as consistent with the Jerusalem agreement, but was repudiated by Paul.

B. 1. If now we turn to Acts for the ecclesiastical tradition of these events credibly reported to derive from Antioch itself, it is as significant as it is astonishing to find that the author knows nothing of any gentile mission-work of Paul previous to the great enterprise of the first missionary journey; and that even in this "the apostles Barnabas and Saul"¹³ go forth strictly as agents and representatives of the church in Antioch. In the few verses (9:19-30) devoted to the period between Paul's conversion and his being brought by Barnabas to Antioch, we hear nothing except that his attempts to proclaim Christ "in the synagogues," "to the Jews which dwelt at Damascus," and "to the Grecian Jews" in Jerusalem, where the same Barnabas becomes his patron before "the apostles," were frustrated by Jewish hatred (cf. 22:17-21). A gentile (?) church arises in Antioch quite independently of Paul, to which he is brought by Barnabas from the refuge in Tarsus found for him by "the brethren in Jerusalem."¹⁴ On the initiative of the leading men in this Antioch church, among whom Barnabas is mentioned first and Saul last, and as a joint undertaking, the great enterprise originates. The historian has exhausted every means in his power to describe

¹² In the former case the disputants would seem to be those "of Paul" and "of Cephas" respectively.

¹³ Acts 14:14. This is the only instance in Acts in which Paul receives the title "apostle."

¹⁴ Note, however, the divergent implications of the β text in Acts 11:25, where the material has not yet been so fully conformed to the official point of view.

the solemnity of its inception (13:1-3), the divine significance and greatness of its success, and the momentousness of its consequences in the three chapters 13, 14, 15, which form the core and crisis of his history. But from beginning to end he has carefully guarded himself from intimating that Paul had till now ever approached a gentile with the gospel. There is not here so much as one word by which the reader might guess that Paul was conscious of such a mission.¹⁵ Where it is a question of establishing the principle, Peter, the pre-eminent apostle of the universal mother-church, both is (9:31-11:18) and declares himself (15:7) the specially and divinely chosen Apostle to the Gentiles. Paul is the "apostle" of Antioch, the mother-church of the gentile world. Almost superhumanly great as the figure of his missionary hero looms before the historian's mind in the latter half of his work, nevertheless the initiative of Paul in this vital point, and the nature and coequality of his apostleship with Peter's, are absolutely sacrificed to the author's ecclesiasticism.¹⁶

2. It is only the same interest, to claim for the church in Antioch the initiative of gentile missions, which can account for the extraordinary, yet amply attested, reading "Hellenistic Jews" in Acts 11:20, where the sense so clearly requires "Greeks" as to have led to its insertion, not only by all modern, but by many ancient, authorities. Manifestly "the report concerning them" which "came to the ears of the church which was in Jerusalem," and led to the sending of Barnabas, was a report of *gentile* conversions. But our author is not ready yet to deal with this question. The objectors, if there are any, must control their impatience and wait until the Apostolic Synod is ready to sit on the outcome of the Galatian mission. As a result the church, which in 15:23 is addressed as "the brethren *which are of the gentiles* in Antioch and Syria and Cilicia," is regarded as composed of "Grecian Jews" in 11:20. Or are we to read "Greeks," and ignore the fact that the report of their conversion in Jerusalem leads to nothing more than the sending of Barnabas to their aid with the comforting exhortation "that with purpose of heart they would cleave unto the Lord"? The evidence is overwhelming that the real progress of

¹⁵ See the preceding note.

¹⁶ The representation of Paul's subordination still controls the narrative in 16:4. The travel-document begins in 16:10. But compare even after this 18:22 and 21:25.

the gospel among the gentiles is covered up and held back by the historian to the point of contradiction, not only of Paul, but of his own narrative.¹⁷

3. In spite of the seeming independence of the enterprise of 13:1 ff. of anything in the preceding narrative, the account of the mission of Barnabas and Saul to "the brethren that dwelt in Judea," with relief for the sufferers from the famine, has one trait of connection: John Mark, the nephew of Barnabas, will hardly have been brought from Jerusalem without any regard for the enterprise in which he becomes an active participant in 13:5. Were it possible to suppose that no design of mission work among the gentiles was in the mind of Paul or Barnabas previous to the revelation of 13:2, Mark's presence in Antioch in the nick of time might be regarded as fortuitous, as the narrative implies. In view of what we know of Paul's career, it suggests a deeper significance for the visit than Luke intends to allow.

4. A number of minor indications in Acts 11:19-30; 12:25 corroborate the impression that the later history has been enriched here at the expense of the earlier and conversely.

(a) Notoriously Luke obscures the whole significance of Paul's great peace-making journey to Jerusalem by suppressing its principal object as described in Rom. 15:25-28, 31. The intention to suppress is apparent from the language put in Paul's mouth in Acts 24:17, the only allusion to the great contribution in the book. It is impossible to suppose that the companion of Paul was ignorant of the real purpose for which Paul himself was risking his own life and asking the prayers of the church in Rome (Rom. 15:31). He must have had a motive for transforming this "ministration" (*διακονία*) for the saints in Jerusalem into the mere customary "alms for my nation and offerings" of Jews of the Dispersion attending the feasts.¹⁸ Since we know from the Corinthian correspondence that

¹⁷ A holding-back of the gospel from gentiles on theoretic grounds is historically inadmissible. Josephus himself records and approves conversion of gentiles without circumcision (*Ant.*, XX, ii, 4). Even without Paul's reiterated representation of his consciousness *from the start* of the abolition of the law, with the implied distinction of Jew and gentile, our knowledge from Philo of broadly humanitarian Judaism would make Luke's notion of a confinement of evangelization to the circumcised for a period of twelve years or more incredible.

¹⁸ For the harmonistic explanation of Acts 24:17, see e. g., Meyer, *Commentary*, *ad loc.*: "Paul *might* so speak, for the Greek and Asiatic contributions which he had

Paul's motives in making the contribution had been impugned, and from fragments of the Ebionite literature can infer that the nature of the accusation was that he was attempting to obtain recognition by bribery,¹⁹ this might well be among the motives suggesting to Luke a transposition by which the "ministration" (*διακονία*) to the poor saints in Jerusalem would be credited to the church in Antioch "by the hand of Barnabas and Saul," and thus the famous philanthropy of Helena of Adiabene paralleled.²⁰ To place the "ministration" before the outbreak of opposition, and make Antioch the contributor, instead of Galatia, Macedonia, and Achaia, disarmed opponents of Paul and turned a reproach against the unity of the church into the opposite. No doubt such considerations would weigh with Luke. But if we ask what actually is the demonstrable *tendency* of Acts, we shall see that by it the transposal was inevitable. "The conversion of the gentiles" is transferred by the author from Paul's personal account to that of Paul and Barnabas as agents (*ἀπόστολοι*) for the church of Antioch. According to Luke, there was no Petro-Pauline rupture nor even estrangement, because the whole question of the relations of Jew and gentile in the church was settled by direct negotiation between Antioch and Jerusalem, in which again Paul and Barnabas were not parties, but mere agents. According

brought were destined for the support of the Jerusalem Christians, who for the most part consisted of native Jews. If he conveyed alms for *these*, he assisted in them his nation." Even if we are prepared to accept the imputation to Paul of a somewhat Jesuitical statement to the court of the purpose of his journey, the failure of Luke to reveal its true purpose to his readers remains. In face of the misleading statement of 24:17 it becomes more marked than ever.

¹⁹ In the anti-Pauline Clementine fragments Paul, under the mask of Simon Magus, is confronted by Peter. Cf. the Simon Magus story of Acts 8:18-24 and 13:6-11.

²⁰ Luke himself cannot have failed to see in Jerusalem the magnificent tomb of Helena by which her benefaction is still commemorated. His ideas of the famine and the date of its occurrence (47 A. D.) are very vague—so much so as rather to argue against acquaintance with Josephus (*Ant.*, XX, i, 1-v, 21). In placing it before the death of Agrippa († summer, 44 A. D.) he shows inability to correlate the story of chap. 12 with his Pauline data. In making it world-wide and dating it "under Claudius" he shows traces of acquaintance with Roman history, where the great jetties at Ostia commemorated the *assiduæ sterilitates* (Suetonius, *Claud.*, 18) of his reign, but more especially that of 51 A. D. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, xii, 437), much as Helena's Tomb that of Judea in Jerusalem.

to Paul, contrariwise the contribution is a peace-offering from the churches of the gentiles, *his* churches, in accordance with *his* personal compact (Gal. 2:10); and he begs the Romans to pray that this "ministration" in which he acts as a "ministrant priest" for the gentiles (vs. 16), conveying their offering at the risk of his own life (vs. 31), "may be acceptable to the saints." If it is acceptable, the great object of his ten years' labor will be accomplished, the healing of the schism between Jew and gentile. But if all such division was forestalled by direct negotiation of the church in Antioch with the church in Jerusalem, where is there room for the "ministration"? Manifestly only as Paul and Barnabas act as agents of the bounty of the mother-church of the gentile world; and that not, of course, after the threat of a rupture which never occurred, but in the course of their first friendly mutual recognitions.

(b) "Agabus" in 11:28 is quite too early for his rôle. In the travel-document, Acts 21:10, he appears quite as if for the first time ("a certain prophet named Agabus") at Caesarea, to warn Paul against a visit to Jerusalem. He "came down from Judea" as if he belonged there, and talked as if he knew the conditions. Any indication that he had ever been to Antioch or had ever had anything to do with "ministrations" of Paul to the poor saints at Jerusalem, is completely lacking.

(c) "Prophets who came down from Jerusalem to Antioch" (11:27) are found later (15:32); but there they are mentioned by name. Here they can hardly be included in the list of "prophets and teachers" who "were in the church that was there," and who are enumerated by name in 13:1. But, if not included, they hold a position which from the point of view of literary criticism seems precarious, inasmuch as the provenance of Lucius of Cyrene is clearly mentioned, and we have at least a hint in 11:20 that either Symeon called Niger, or Manaen, was from Cyprus. In short, 13:1 ff. connects with 11:19-26 and leaves very narrow footing for 11:27-30; 12:25. Its prophets are strangers indeed; its "ministration," like them, has relation only to later days.

But was there no visit to Jerusalem at this time? Are we to throw out entirely this datum of Luke, as do those who react most strongly against the harmonistic method? Against such a course

two data already protest: (1) vs. 22 and the true sense²¹ of vs. 20, proving that the controversy over the admission of gentiles was not really so deferred as the author would have it appear: (2) 12:25, where the bringing of John Mark from Jerusalem stands quite apart from the author's representation of the subsequent origin of the plan of the missionary campaign. It remains to be seen whether the later sections of Acts will give evidence of material transferred conversely from earlier to later date.

5. In chap. 15, if we follow the *author's* perspective, the "decrees" twice enumerated (vss. 20, 29) and subsequently promulgated as authoritative even to the Galatian churches (16:4), are the main point of interest. These "decrees ordained by the apostles and elders that were at Jerusalem," and addressed to "the brethren which are of the gentiles in Antioch and Syria and Cilicia," are to him the ultimate and final settlement of the whole question of Jews and gentiles in the church. The tribunal of decision is "the apostles and elders" (15:2, 4, 6, 22, 23; 16:4). Paul and Barnabas simply bear testimony as delegates with others from Antioch, and return as delegates with others from Jerusalem. They have no part in the decision, save to carry it out. The question is submitted by the church in Antioch, and the verdict delivered by the apostles and elders in Jerusalem. There is no more to be said.

Yet the two halves of Acts, chap. 15, do not agree. The question is as to one thing and the answer as to another. If regard is had only to vss. 1-9, the description might apply to such an interview in Jerusalem as is presupposed in Gal. 2:1-10. In vss. 1 ff. we see the "false brethren privily brought in to spy out" gentile-Christian liberty at Antioch. In vs. 3 the attitude of Phoenicia and Samaria is as in Gal. 1:24. In vs. 5 the demand for the circumcision of Titus (who, however, is never mentioned in Acts) shines through as in Gal. 2:3, and is met, as in Gal. 2:6-9, by an unqualified recognition of the validity of Paul's gospel on the part of the "pillars." Only vss. 10 and 11 go far beyond, and propose a liberation of *Jews* also from the yoke of the law, which it is certain Paul did not

²¹ The true *reading* is unquestionably that of the earliest MSS, "Hellenists." On this point the exhaustive discussion of B. B. Warfield (*Journal of Biblical Literature III*, 1883, p. 113) leaves no room for doubt. It is the alteration of the sense by the substitution of this word for "Hellenes" which proves the author's *Tendenz*.

propose at the conference, and which could not have been entertained. The passage is a faithful repetition of the argument of Gal. 2:16 *against requiring concessions from the gentiles to Jewish caste*, and is fundamentally irreconcilable with the concessions which James immediately thereafter proceeds to require.

In spite of the speech, the author of Acts never reaches the Pauline standpoint at all.²² On the contrary, the Paul of Acts not only willingly accepts and promulgates the "compromise" of the decrees, and circumcises Timothy to conciliate the Jews of Galatia, but takes on him the rites of purification along with four Jewish devotees in the temple expressly to prove that he does *not* teach "the Jews which are among the gentiles" that circumcision and "the customs" are needless, and under such circumstances as those at Antioch ought to be disregarded. Consciously or not, the author of Acts occupies exactly the position of Peter, Barnabas, and the rest of the Jews at Antioch—the position, as we have conjectured, persistently maintained by that church itself; and he maintains it to the end. Even to the point of Peter's demonstrated inconsistency with his own principle of faith in Christ as superseding the law for Jews as well as for gentiles Luke is still an unwavering follower. He agrees to the argument of Paul on this score in 15:10, 11 = Gal. 2:15-18, and, with a logical inconsistency truly heroic, refuses to budge an inch from his demand in the rest of chap. 15 and in all the subsequent story (16:4; 21:17-26) that nevertheless the gentiles, and not the Jews, shall make the needful concessions.

6. Acts, chap. 15, then, if room be allowed between its parts, is not contradictory to Gal., chap. 2, but complementary; for as we have already seen, the resistance of Peter, Paul, and Barnabas to the demand for circumcision (15:1-9 = Gal. 2:1-10) belongs in 11:22 ff. before the missionary journey; and, as will immediately appear, the internal evidence of the decrees themselves proves them to be precisely the factor naturally missing from Paul's statement (Gal. 2:12), viz., the conditions of table-fellowship proposed by the delegates from James.

We note (a) that they are presented by James, not as contravening

²² On the inconsistency of the speech, and of the data of 9:31-11:18 on which it rests, with the "Lucan" standpoint, see below.

the agreement that gentiles shall be held free from the yoke of the law, but as supplementing it in point of regard for Jewish scruples. Peter's original attitude is approved (vss. 14-19). Only, on account of those who in every city hear weekly the ordinances of Moses read in the synagogues, four kinds of abstinence are enjoined (vss. 20, 21). So again in the interview of 21:17-26, at which Luke was himself present (vs. 18), the four "injunctions" are submitted to Paul, as if for the first time, in the course of James's plea that "the Jews which are among the gentiles" should not be induced "to forsake Moses." Freedom of the gentiles is *not* to be construed as exempting the Jews which are among them. (b) The four requirements provide for the case of "eating with (believing) gentiles." In regard to the first three, this is self-evident. If only *kosher* meat appears on the gentile's table, even the strictest Pharisee may eat without scruple. The first three ordinances provide that the gentiles shall eat only *kosher* meat. As regards the fourth, only ignorance of Jewish feeling regarding "the pollutions of idols" has made it possible to misinterpret its sense, as if "the apostles and elders" were attempting to regulate gentile marriage relations, or to select one among the requirements of Mosaic ethics to supplement the laxity of the gentile code, or even (so the β text) to enact an abridgment of the Ten Commandments! For the true explanation of this exceptional fourth provision we must look to the anti-Pauline Clementine literature, where the exceptional character of sexual sins justifying this apparent invasion of an ulterior domain is clearly stated. Fornication and adultery differ from all other sins, says the Jewish Christian author, in that these "not only destroy the person himself who sins, but also *those who eat and associate with him*."²³ From this point of view one can understand why Paul also forbade the Corinthians to eat or to associate with fornicators,²⁴ in the same connection wherein he prescribes "concerning things offered to idols."²⁵ The subsequent history of ecclesiastical requirement "concerning meats" shows that the attempt to

²³ Clem. Hom., III, lxviii.

²⁴ I Cor. 5:9-11, probably referring to the letter of which the fragment II Cor. 6:14-7:1 remains.

²⁵ I Cor., chaps. 5-10. The apostle is answering a communication in which his own professed adherents (11:2), "they of Paul," had applied the Pauline principle of liberty, "All things are lawful," but without sufficient regard for its complement, con-

carry through the "decrees" was only a very partial success. In Rev. 2:14, 20, 24 "no other burden" is required than to abstain from *idolothuta* and fornication, the two things Paul also forbade. The *Teaching of the Twelve*, probably representing Antiochian practice ca. 120 A. D., leaves it open to the disciple to "bear what he is able concerning foods" so long as he abstains from these.²⁶ In the second century this rule has become fixed. Abstinence from fornication and *idolothuta* is the only "burden."

In Acts 15:13-35 we have, accordingly, the abortive attempt of "the apostles and elders" at Jerusalem to settle the question of the terms on which "the Jews which are among the gentiles" may "eat and associate with them." This portion of the chapter is certainly historical; for it supplements Gal. 2:12 at just the needful point of the terms demanded by the delegates from James. But it does not agree with the first half of the chapter, where Peter, Paul, and Barnabas are present, and where the question is strictly confined to the obligation of the law upon gentiles; because the proposal of the decrees in the presence of the three could have led only to just such a rupture as actually took place at Antioch, where Paul urges the very argument of Acts 15:8-11 as a reason why the Jew has no right to require the gentile to respect his caste. As Gal. 2:11-21 makes apparent, a considerable interval elapsed after the compact before the rise of the implied questions of the protection of Jewish caste. Paul consistently and persistently maintains that Jews among the gentiles not only may, but to the extent necessary for table-communion *must*, disregard Mosaism. Acts inconsistently but persistently maintains that they shall not.²⁷ The spurious verse, Acts 15:34, only invites attention to further evidences of confusion and readjustment in 15:40, where Silas, though just re-despatched to Jerusalem, departs with Paul to Galatia. This, and the suggestion of 21:25 that the assembly of "the apostles and elders" in Jerusalem

sideration for the scrupulous ("they of Peter"). Note that the settlement of the question by "decree" from Jerusalem is wholly excluded. The consideration for the "weak" is from love, not because the weak brother has a right to bring in his "doubtful disputations" (Rom. 14:1-3).

²⁶ Διδ. c. vi.

²⁷ Since the point is vital, it may not be superfluous to exhibit the contradiction in parallel columns. Question: Shall a Jew among gentiles break caste by eating

was held in the absence of Paul, as well as of Peter and Barnabas, as required by Gal. 2:11-21, simply corroborates the view that all which in Acts, chap. 15, introduces the earlier question of the obligation of the law upon gentiles, and the presence of Peter, Paul, and Barnabas, is misplaced. It has been deferred from 11:26 ff. to bring the entire question under a single authoritative enactment by conference of the church in Antioch with "the apostles and elders in Jerusalem."

6. The decrees are certainly not fictitious, though Harnack has recently adduced strong linguistic evidence to prove the letter Luke's own composition. Even so, *the form of its address* is significant. In spite of the fact that the author attaches the scene of the Apostolic Council so closely to the gentile mission of chaps. 13 and 14, and has so altered his sources as to leave us wondering how there could be any "brethren of the gentiles in Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia," still it is to these and only these that the enactments are addressed. Consciously or unconsciously, the historian thus allows the fact to shine through that the controversy arose before the great provinces beyond the sea and the Taurus range had become involved. It was while Paul and Barnabas were absent on this great campaign that Peter came to Antioch. It was after Mark had withdrawn from them in Pamphylia and returned to Antioch that Jerusalem learned how liberal an interpretation Peter and the Antioch Jews were putting upon the compact, and that the delegation from James prescribed the terms thenceforth acceded to by Antioch and all its provinces.

7. While zeal for the authority and practice of his own church where "the disciples were first called Christians" may account for much misconception of Paul's most sensitive convictions on the part even of a companion and helper during the later journeys, still so complete a surrender to the authority of James as above implied with them, or may he require them to accommodate themselves to his standards? Answer:

Acts

He should not break caste. He may and should constrain the gentiles to live as do the Jews, to the extent necessary to maintain it. Paul himself accepted and taught this doctrine by precept and example.

Galatians

He may, and in the conditions at Antioch must break caste. He is a "transgressor" self-condemned if he thus "constrains the gentiles to live as do the Jews." To yield to such coercion is to surrender the liberty wherewith Christ has set us free

requires some further explanation than the mere desire to defend the memory of Peter and the *ecclesia semper eadem*. A stronger reason than any such predisposition to omit the painful scene at Antioch and its consequences is that which demonstrably controls the representations of the first half of Acts, viz., the use of a source in which the figure of Peter is the counterpart of that of Paul from Antioch onward. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is this so-called "Petrine source" which occupies as squarely and uncompromisingly the Pauline position of Rom. 14:14, as the "Pauline" element has been shown to occupy that of Peter! When in the thrice-repeated, twice-related vision of Acts 10:9-16 Peter's scruples against eating "anything common or unclean" are overcome by the *bath qol* declaring, "What God hath made clean make not thou common," it is simply another way of saying that Peter "knew and was persuaded in the Lord Jesus that nothing is unclean of itself; save that to him who accounteth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean."²⁸ Only, while the church in Rome may have come to attribute this sweeping and fundamental abolition of all "distinctions of meats" to Peter, and even maintained it in their Roman gospel as taught by Jesus himself (Mark 7:14-23), they are not really half so likely to have learned it from Peter as from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans.²⁹ Yet Acts 9:31-11:18 is a full, complete, and independent account of the whole controversy regarding the extension of the gospel to the gentiles and Peter's eating with them (11:3). It even narrates the holding of an apostolic council in Jerusalem which decides the whole matter in the full Pauline sense, and on Pauline grounds,³⁰ without so much as the mention of his name!

We have not space to indicate here the nature and contents of this "Petrine source" of Acts, whose relations to Mark are not limited to that already indicated;³¹ nor can we go beyond the bare suggestion that in its original order, Acts, chap. 12, in which Peter

²⁸ This attitude of would-be Paulinists who rise superior to distinctions of meats by virtue of their *gnosis* is criticized by Paul in I Cor., chap. 8.

²⁹ Rom. 14:14; cf. Acts 10:9-16; 11:3-10. Note that the section of Mark in which Jesus "made all meats clean," and himself preached among, and ate with, the gentiles, Mark 7:1-8:26 (including "Caesarea Philippi" in 8:27), is omitted by Luke.

³⁰ With Acts 11:17 cf. Gal. 3:2-5, 14; Rom. 8:14-17; Eph. 1-13 f.; etc.

³¹ Note 12:12 ff.

is driven out from Jerusalem by persecution, is likely to have preceded 9:31—11:18, in which he visits Jerusalem only in the interval of his "going about all parts" as an itinerant evangelist. The single point to be here emphasized is that in the story of Peter's missionary career, ending with the glad acknowledgment by the church in Jerusalem, "Then to the gentiles also hath God granted repentance unto life," we have both an anticipation and a model for the story which Luke undertakes to renarrate with Antioch in the place of Jerusalem and Paul in the place of Peter. It is not merely the details of Petrine and Pauline experience so often commented on which have been made parallel. It is the whole story of the extension of the gospel to the gentiles, foreshadowed in Luke 2:32; 4:16-30; 24:44-49, undertaken in Acts 1:8, triumphantly proclaimed in 28:28-31, wherein Luke had had at least one predecessor as well as in "the former treatise." And this predecessor's standpoint was the Pauline one of Rome, rather than the Petrine one of Antioch.³² In this earlier narrative (Acts 9:32—11:18) the example was already set of an apostolic council at Jerusalem, at which the two questions of the obligation of gentiles to keep the law (Gal. 2:1-10) and of the terms of table-communion (Gal. 2:11-21) were presented *in combination* for their decision. Moreover, the council assembles in consequence of opposition raised to Peter's missionary activity, so that he is obliged to leave his mission field³³ and go up to Jerusalem to meet and silence the reactionists, precisely according to the actual story of Paul. In view of Luke's incorporation of this source, with its direct and positive statements as to how Peter was led by divine revelation to "eat with the gentiles," and how the Jerusalem church had acted on the whole question, one cannot be surprised that he does not narrate the painful scene at Antioch, nor that he follows the example of this source in

³² Hence in part the inconsistency of 15:10-11.

³³ The greater originality (not superiority) of the β text is very apparent in 11:1 f. in the fact that it has not yet been accommodated to the changed position of chap. 12. Peter is no longer domiciled in Jerusalem, but, like Paul, on his mission field. The β text runs as follows: "But the report came to the apostles and brethren that were in Judea that the gentiles also had received the word of God. Now Peter had for some time desired to make a journey to Jerusalem, and having called the brethren and confirmed them, he took his journey, making a long discourse, teaching them on his way through the regions; who also arrived there, and proclaimed to them the grace of God. But the brethren that were of the circumcision contended with him," etc. Cf. 15:2-5.

depicting an apostolic council in Jerusalem disposing by enactment of the whole matter. Just as the council of 17:1 ff. pronounces on the mission work of Peter, so that of 15:1 ff. pronounces on that of Paul and Barnabas. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the positive declarations of Paul, and even the self-contradictions of the Lucan narrative itself, are proof that the two questions were not decided together, but the former on occasion of Paul's second visit to Jerusalem (his last before the arrest?) preparatory to the first missionary journey; the latter at Antioch after the return of Paul and Barnabas, when in the meantime James and the apostles and elders in Jerusalem had enacted and despatched their "decrees" to the "brethren of the gentiles in Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia."

C. The results above outlined have been reached by consistent application of the principles first formulated. They are novel and far-reaching, perhaps startling in some of their implications. But they call for no violence on either side to bring from the Pauline and the Lucan representations a self-consistent account of events. *Tendenz* on the part of Luke is implied, but it is such as is both natural in an Antiochian, as tradition represents Luke to have been, and is evidenced by his work viewed as a whole. Moreover, the *Tendenz* in question is that explicitly set forth by Paul as that of the authorities at Antioch. Transposition of material in the Lucan story is inferred; but it is such only as would be required by the fundamental principles of the work, and such as was already exemplified in the sources. Fiction, whether in the matter of the relief visit or of the decrees, need not be imputed.³⁴ It is more difficult to say whether the standpoint of the author of Acts, occupying as he does squarely and unyieldingly the position for which Peter, Barnabas, and "the rest of the Jews" were rebuked by Paul at Antioch for giving the lie to their Christian principles, is compatible with Lucan authorship. In former years the present writer has been disposed to answer this

³⁴ Whether the "ministration" of Paul and Barnabas in Jerusalem be only an anticipation of the real "ministration" of Rom., chap. 15, suggested by that of Queen Helena, or was actually a fact, is principally a question of chronology. The famine was in 46-8 A. D. The need for relief unquestionably continued. Gal. 1:10 speaks of the proposed "ministration" as if it might be in addition to a work already done. Under these circumstances there may have been more ground than radical critics allow for substituting the benefaction of Antioch for that of the churches of Hellas in Acts.

question in the negative. Since the recent contribution of Harnack the answer may well seem more doubtful. The opposition is an unquestionable fact; but so is also the actual reconciliation of the principals. Approximation was made from both sides. At Antioch the second and third requirements of the decrees were found practically incapable of enforcement and were first made optional ($\Delta\delta$. vi); next, at Ephesus, frankly dropped (Rev. 2:24). Paul on his part so qualified his fundamental position that "all things are lawful" by its complement of consideration for the weak brother³⁵ that the permission to eat *idolothuta* was for the matter of offense to Jewish scruples as completely ruled out as by the "decrees." On the subject of fornication he was even more peremptory. The distinction between Petrinist and Paulinist thus became in practice an academic one, even before the final visit to James, Acts 21:17-26. For the second century it was the simple Petrine rule which survived, not the Pauline discrimination. That Paul did not pursue the course described in Acts 21:23-26 to prove what is represented by Luke is certain. But it is equally certain that he could and did require his converts so to respect the scruples of their "weak brethren" that no "Jew among the gentiles" should be "compelled to live as do the gentiles." To prove this he might even pursue the course described, becoming "as under the law to them that are under the law," living up to the spirit of his compact of non-interference among the circumcision. By 95 A. D. the question of "meats" had become academic as between those "of Cephas" and those "of Paul."

It is not un-supposable that even a former companion of Paul, holding him still in devout, not to say glorified, remembrance, living and working in Antioch, should actually depict him in the very attitude presented in Gal. 2:11-21 as that of Peter, just as a still earlier writer, probably in Rome, had depicted Peter in the very attitude of Rom. 14:14. But, however academic the questions involved had become for ecclesiastical authors of 90-95, A. D., the true nature of Pauline vs. Petrine principles as illustrated in the comparison of Galatians with Acts is, as the genius of Baur divined, the key to the history of Christian origins. To advance the solution of this problem is the *raison d'être* of the present writing.

³⁵ I Cor., chaps. 8-10; Rom., chap. 14.

MODERN ITALY AND PIUS X

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"Fair art thou, with stars in thy hair, which gleam like glittering sapphires, and sweet thy breath, O rosy messenger of day. With the smile of satisfied yearning thou callest aloud from the rocks that the paradise of Italy is forever freed from the yoke." Thus sang the Italian poet, Gabriel Rossetti, of the dawn of liberty which seemed to greet his country in 1820. "Fair art thou, with stars in thy hair!" Indeed, it is almost as if the kiss of the dawn had imprinted its own beauty on the paradise of Italy. Something of the rosy glow of dawn, a wonderful play of color, of sunny gleams of light, lies across the valleys of Italy. Its very name is a word to conjure with. Like magic it summons up a thousand images. They emerge from the gray past, the spirits of the imperial glory of Rome. The ruins of Rome are once more peopled with life. On the Forum we see the crowd demanding its rights; in the Circus Maximus the people thirsting for the blood of the martyrs; and in the mystic darkness of the Catacombs the little band of Christians preparing their grave in the rocks. From the ashes and lava of Pompeii an entire city rises, as if its inhabitants had but now left it. The bread just baked still lies in the oven; we see the tools in the shops, the walls still ornamented with their glowing frescoes. Again, as the antique world vanishes, imagination sees mediaeval life flourish, end, and pass into modern life in the Renaissance. The golden age of art, of painting, sculpture, and poetry, opens its gates to us in Italy. Dante, the marvelous painter of heaven and hell; Petrarca, equally great as a man of learning and a man of feeling; Giotto, with his simple portrayal of the life of St. Francis of Assisi, so true to life and so pathetic; della Robbia, with his lovely frescoes; Michael Angelo, with the titanic force of his brush and chisel—they all have wrought here. And finally the entire age of the Renaissance seems to concentrate itself in the Florence of the Medici. Then again, in the long mantle and slouch hat of the traveler, Goethe appears before us in Italy, drawing new force

from the springs of antique life after the exhausting court life at Weimar. Though later he drew back in anger from the "brutalized nation," yet he left us that sweet maiden figure which calls us with the harp, and longs for Italy. The song of Mignon has become the song of desire for all who do not yet know that beautiful land. It calls up the images of antiquity and of the Renaissance, and it adds the modern charms—the typical figures of the people, the bronzed men with their straw-braided bottles of Chianti, the women with lustrous eyes and gay head-dress, the charming children in their sweet unconstraint; or the glories of Venice, with its lagoons, its gondoliers, and the doves of S. Marco; or an evening on the Corso at Rome, where carriages roll by with the glances and greetings of fair women. All this and more is contained in the name of Italy. The very word is full of dreams; of a *dolce far niente* that would steal the seriousness from life.

But this sunny Italy is not to be the object of our study. Not antiquity, nor Renaissance, nor the Italy of the modern tourist, but the concrete modern Italian state is to come before us from the point of view of political history; the Italian state as it has come to be and as it now is. The one cannot be understood without the other; for only he that knows the past comprehends the present.

The modern kingdom of Italy dates back to September 20, 1870, the day on which Rome became the capital of Italy. The exact historian would run back nine years farther and fix on March 17, 1861, as the day when the kingdom of Italy entered the family of nations. The road which led to this goal was strange and tortuous, perhaps even more devious than that which led to a united Germany in 1871.

At the end of the eighteenth century the map of Italy was checkered with a mass of states and statelets. There were the kingdom of Sardinia, with its main constituents of Savoy and Piedmont; Lombardy, with Milan, in the possession of Austria; the republic of Venice, asleep on her ancient laurels, but still of more importance than her sister-republic of Genoa; the two duchies of Parma and Modena; the grand-duchy of Tuscany, the heritage of the Medici in Florence; the miniature republic of Lucca; then the great territory of the Papal State, with the legations of Bologna, Romagna,

and Ferrara—a state with two and a half million inhabitants ruled by the *Papa-Ré*, the papal king; still larger, embracing six million inhabitants, the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, ruled by the dynasty of the Bourbons. A mass of trivial states, with the typical symptoms of decay! In the republics a feudal nobility; in the monarchies princes who tried to drape their personal insignificance with the glamour of external splendor and the claims of absolutism; bigoted religion hand in glove with lust—figures such as Guiseppe Verdi has painted for us in his *Rigoletto*; *le roi s'amuse*, dancing through life with a step as light as the music of Verdi, but trampling on the holiest emotions of his court-jester. Neither monarchies nor republics recognized any higher task or aim; wherever an attempt was made in that direction, a relapse quickly followed.

But there came a sudden awakening when the tempest of the French Revolution swept over Italy. For the first time modern France thundered at the gates of Italy, and since then the fortunes of the two countries were bound together until Italian unity was complete. No other country owes so much to France as Italy. Its influence first came with the blast of a storm, but it was the useful storm which breaks away the old and rotten branches, and makes place for the sprouting of new life. Under the strong hand of Napoleon the little states of Italy crumbled and broke. A superior intellect now guided the figures on the political chess-board, and finally established new French states on the wrecks of the old. Even the pope bowed before the all-powerful Frenchman. But when Napoleon fell, his proud edifice fell with him. Yet he left behind him ineffaceable traces, the spiritual heritage of the French Revolution in that purified form which the great Corsican had given it. When we speak of the French Revolution, we are apt to think only of the scenes of terror, the execution of the king, and the blood of the citizens, and to forget that the Reign of Terror was only an episode, in which a vast force, newly unleashed, overleaped itself. Viewed in its larger connection with the evolution of civilization, the French Revolution is a magnificent unfettering of the spirit, in which ideas that had slowly been maturing were hurled among the people as by a volcanic eruption. The theories of learned radicals and the schemes of practical politicians fused with immense effectiveness. The third estate, the citizen and

peasant, so long despised, rose from their submerged powerlessness and advanced to the forefront of political life. Those who had formerly been good enough to drive out from the ponds the frogs that robbed the *grand seigneur* of his sleep now swung the scythe of death before the thrones of kings. In the French Revolution the people seized their political rights. The absolute monarchy by the grace of God was doomed. The natural rights which had long been the political theory of a philosophical school became the basis of a political system. Royal power was not eternal in its nature; it had grown, and what hands had built up, other hands could tear down. Kings are not irresponsible; the people can hold them to account and guard their own interests. The state of the future is the constitutional state built on the joint action of prince and popular legislature. But this was only one aspect of the great revolutionary programme: "Liberty, Fraternity, Equality." Equality of citizens before the law and equal rights for all implied the abolition of special privileges for special religious bodies. It meant a state neutral toward the religion of its citizens. That again implied freedom of science, freedom of public utterance and of the press; in short, an injection of democracy into a society which had hitherto been feudal and aristocratic.

This spiritual heritage, so infinitely rich and varied in its possible application, was left behind on the Italian peninsula after the French occupation. It worked like a fiery draught setting the blood of the people on fire, even though—or, rather, just because—a leaden pressure had long rested on the body politic. As everywhere else, the reactionary forces got control when Napoleon fell. The Congress of Vienna placed the peninsula under Austrian administration. Lombardy and Venetia became Austrian possessions. Parma and Piacenza were handed over to Marie Louise, the Austrian wife of Napoleon I. Modena also received an Austrian ruler. In the other countries the old dynasties were restored. The petty states had returned. Soon the Austrian premier could coin the contemptuous phrase: "Italy is only a geographical idea." From a superficial point of view that was true; but in the depths new forces were fermenting. The spirit of the French Revolution was at work. Under Napoleon's empire men had seen all Italy controlled by a single hand, even though Napoleon had bestowed the various terri-

tories among his relatives. For a short time there had been a united kingdom of Italy which embraced Lombardy, Venetia, Modena, the Romagna, and the Marches in a single state, and the blessings of such unity had been felt in a great uplift of commerce and industry, of agriculture and the arts. The Papal State had disappeared, and men had found that the pope and his secular rule were not inseparable. Property in the dead hand of the church had been confiscated, and men had seen it turn into productive capital in the hands of industrious citizens. Men had breathed in deep draughts the free air of French equality. All this was progress; reaction could overturn it, but could not overcome it. Driven out of public political life, it turned into secret paths and created the political clubs which, under the pressure of constant persecution, intensified the ideas of liberty to deeds of violence and murder. Even today Italy is the nursery of secret societies. They grew up during that time. The leaders of *Italia sotterranea* were the Carbonari, possibly an off-shoot of the Free Masons, with their black, red, and blue tricolor, who fought especially in Naples and Sicily for "God, King, and Constitution." Later there was a society which bore the proud name *Giovane Italia*, "Young Italy." Its founder, Giuseppe Mazzini, called himself simply but significantly "an Italian." Other societies followed, whose names have not been preserved in history. They were all precursors of the terrible Camorra and the Mafia, which today by dark deeds of assassination are fighting the very state which was then the object of desire. The more aristocratic Nationalists held off from this form of agitation, and either were sullenly silent or confined their efforts to literature; not the newspaper press, which was under strict police control, but the treatise or the novel. These years of reaction exhibit a remarkable productivity in books which sought to solve the problem of Italian unity. They were all one in seeking as the ultimate goal a united Italy, however they might differ in detail. D'Azeglio, Grossi, Manzoni, Balbo, Colletta, Tommaseo, wrote their novels during these years. At the beginning of the forties the abbé Vincenzo Gioberti, while in exile at Brussels, published his celebrated book *Il primato morale e civile degli Italiani* ("The Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians"), which in enthusiastic language prophesied a federation of Italian states under the leadership of the

pope. A party calling itself the New-Guelphs, in allusion to the mediaeval struggles between Guelphs and Ghibellines, adopted this as its programme. One year later Cesare Balbo wrote his book *Le speranze d'Italia* ("The Hopes of Italy"). He too hoped for a federation of states, but under the leadership of Charles Albert, the king of Sardinia. Another again wanted to create a kind of political trinity, a unity of three: in the north, Sardinia, and Piedmont; in the south, the Bourbons; in the middle, the pope. These thinkers were joined by poets who had the gift of uttering what they and their people were suffering. Niccolini in his tragedy called to life the popular hero of liberty in the Middle Ages, Arnold of Brescia. Giuseppe Giusti, scourging the tyrants in the spirit of the Carbonari, pleaded for liberty. Silvio Pellico glorified martyrdom. Giovanni Berchet sang of the Italian colors; they had first appeared in northern Italy in 1797: "Green is the hope which we have cherished for years; Red is the joy that moves us to tears; and White is the faith of fraternal love." The masters of music were nobly inspired by patriotism. Bellini, director at the Scala in Milan, composed his *I Capuleti ed i Montecchi* and his *Norma*. Rossini chose Schiller's glorious drama of freedom, *Wilhelm Tell*, as his musical theme. All these voices in harmony created public opinion—that indefinable force which is ever operative and ever elusive. Formerly it had played the rôle of the court-jester at whose sharp quips his Serene Highness could smile because they were harmless. Now, since the emancipation of the people by the French Revolution, it had become a power which none neglected with impunity.

The period of reaction lasted to the year 1848 in Italy, just as in Germany and France. Small insurrections, flaring up swiftly and suppressed with equal swiftness, were like the lightning flashes before the coming tempest. When the storm broke for France in February, and for Prussia and Austria in March, 1848, Italy too was swept into the revolutionary current. The hour of liberty seemed to have come. North and South rallied to arms, and the thrones of the reactionaries were tottering.

The leader of the Italian movement for unity was the Pope Pio Nono, Pius IX; Giovanni Mastai Ferretti was his family name. Since 1846 he sat on the throne of Peter, a charming and attractive

personality with many jovial and good-natured traits. He had read the *Primato* of Gioberti and the *Speranze d'Italia* of Balbo. Now he seemed called by destiny to realize the dreams of Gioberti. His reign began with a general amnesty for political criminals. This was followed by the appointment of a reform commission. Plans were made for the construction of railways. The pope even promised a constitutional government by the organization of a Council of State to be composed of twenty-four lay councilors—the first time that the laity were to be represented in the administration of the Papal State. And finally his plans reached their climax in the scheme of a dual chamber, checked by the College of Cardinals as Senate. Constitutional government and political liberty had arrived. With ever-increasing jubilation the people of Italy received these royal gifts. In its impulsive fashion the Roman people hurried from feast to feast. Flags fluttered, songs resounded on the streets and in the churches, and the Italians poured out all the hope and enthusiasm of their hearts in the joyous shout: "*Evviva Pio Nono!*" Whenever the pope appeared in the streets, that was the shout of triumph and acclaim about him. It was the watchword of all who hoped for the unity of Italy; for the joy of Rome ran like a contagion over the entire country. Perhaps no pope has ever been so popular. The parties seemed united. Even the revolutionist Mazzini trusted in the voice of Rome. Italy and its pope seemed to be one flock and one shepherd.

Then came the frost in the May night. The inevitable happened. Popular liberty and the papacy were incompatible. The rosy and glittering soap-bubble of Italian unity under the leadership of Pius IX burst. The pope had not realized what would be the outcome of his own actions. He had imagined it to be very easy to cater pleasantly to the people: there would be an amnesty and railroads, and the rest would be easy. In naïve simplicity he had never comprehended the tremendous and holy determination of a people demanding its constitution. Now he woke with sudden terror; after his first grants and concessions the people demanded more and more; a number of political clubs were organized; political newspapers began to appear, as if the liberty of the press were in full operation. Pius had not granted liberty of the press, and had no intention of granting it. He

still rocked pleasantly for a while on the tide of popularity, but the new constitution immediately opened up new difficulties. Even the papal sovereignty was attacked. In view of this dangerous clamor, the pope disavowed his own ministers. When his last hope for the hour of need, the former French ambassador Pellegrino Rossi, was assassinated on the steps of the parliamentary building, November 15, 1848, the bonfires indeed blazed once more because the terrified pope had summoned a democratic cabinet, but the torches were snuffed out when the pope fled from the city in the night of November 24, and now from the safe asylum of Gaeta repealed his entire work and—what was far worse—summoned the Catholic powers to help him to return. They were only too glad to come—Austria at the head, pleased once more to assume the rôle of the policeman clubbing the fair sinner, Italy. France followed under Louis Napoleon, whom the Revolution had made president of the French Republic. Thus began French intervention in Italy, so pregnant with consequences. The dream of Gioberti was ended. The papacy was not the savior of Italy. Under the protection of French and Austrian bayonets, Pius IX returned to Rome April 12, 1850. The republic which had been constituted by the people in his absence, with Mazzini at the head, had to yield to the old authorities; and now reaction ruled.

Pius IX in Italy and Frederick William IV in Prussia played the same rôle, in 1848. Both were romanticists on royal thrones. Both wanted to unite monarchy and democracy. The ride of the king with black-red-gold sash through the streets of Berlin is the counterpart of the rejoicing about Pius IX. Both made a swift turn—the king more disgracefully than the pope, for Prussian grenadiers were more dependable than the papal guards. Both were disavowed by their nation. The angry rattle of the swords of the Prussian officers in the marble hall of the Potsdam palace was the counterpart of the jeering laugh of the Roman people, which greeted the pope on his return with “*Evviva Pio?*” and answered “*No, no!*” But the pope was greater than the king. Out of the reaction he built up a temple of faith, in which he himself could sit enthroned as the Infallible. Pius IX became the pope of the Vatican.

The defeat of liberty in the Papal State was a defeat of the movement for Italian unity generally. All those in north and south who

had rallied to arms had to bow to the yoke of Austria or of their sovereigns. One of the last to sheath his sword was Giuseppe Garibaldi, a young sailor of Nizza.

But now out of the darkest night of quenched hopes slowly arose the wondrous star of Savoy. The revolution of 1848 had buried one scheme for unity; another now appeared. The rôle of leadership, formerly assigned to the pope, now seemed to fall to Charles Albert, the master of Piedmont. And he seized it with a spirit different from that of the pope, with steadfast determination to carry his cause to victory.

Charles Albert of Savoy, born 1798, had early aroused the attention of those who aspired to liberty among the Carbonari. He had been in Paris and had breathed the air of equality in France. It was even asserted that he had himself been a member of the party of the Carbonari. When he ascended the throne in 1831, Mazzini addressed a wonderful patriotic letter to him. He assigned to him a creative rôle, and bade him, like God, create a world out of chaos; to unite the scattered members of the nation, and to say: 'All Italy is mine, and all is happy. Then thou wouldst be great, like God the Creator, and twenty million men would cry: 'God is in heaven, and Charles Albert on earth.''' And the hopes of his people continued to center in him, even if they did not understand all his political actions in his shrewd tacking between reaction and progress. They called him *Re Tentenna*, the see-saw king. When the revolutionary year of 1848 came, it seemed as if he would be able to fulfil all the wishes of his people of Piedmont. Gioberti at that time published his book *Il Gesuita moderno*, a terrible scourging of the Jesuit order and of "the swallows of the Jesuits," as the Ladies of the Sacred Heart were called. He demanded the banishment of these parasites—the creation of a militia, and a constitution. Charles Albert granted this, and, what was more, he preserved these rights for his people, even when the war with Austria, which had been begun like a triumphal march under the leadership of the king, and had been resumed in 1849, when the allies of the previous year, Venice, Lombardy, and even Sicily, were already prostrate, ended in failure. The war had been begun with immense enthusiasm. The king himself had waved the Italian tricolor to the people from the balcony of his palace at

Turin, and had decorated the troops with the arms of Savoy and the tricolor. It was in vain. Enthusiasm begins wars; but victory is decided by military efficiency, and Austria was superior in that. On the field of Novara, Radetzky defeated the Italians. The noble-hearted king paid the price. He took the blame for the war upon himself and resigned in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel. The son carried on the task in the spirit of his father, and thus Savoy remained at the head of the Italian movement for unity. Gioberti's plan had come to nothing; the plan which centered in Savoy had not. It had only been checked. The newly appointed premier, Massimo d'Azeglio, said: "We shall begin again and do better." The young king, twenty-nine years of age, issued a proclamation safe-guarding the liberties of the country. In spite of the demands of Austria, he had resolutely refused to displace the tricolor, the symbol of unity, by the old flag of Savoy.

Thus the order of the day remained *Avanti Savoya!* "Piedmont will never make peace with Austria; it has only entered on a ten-years' truce." It was necessary to keep the peace without in order to concentrate all forces within. This task was clearly grasped in Piedmont. Gioberti drafted a new programme, *Del rinnovamento civile d'Italia* (1850), and preached to Savoy its duties in the leadership of Italy. The disastrous war had revealed deep-seated defects in the organization and administration of the state. They were now repaired. The army was reorganized by General la Marmora. The practical direction of the ministry was more and more manifestly assumed since 1850 by Count Camillo Benso di Cavour. He was destined to realize the programme of Savoy in brilliant fashion. To him most of all Italy owes its unity. He has often been compared with Bismarck. It is fairer to view him on his own merits. There are similarities. Both brought a nation to unity; both found their opponent in Austria. But the parallel fails in detail. The problems on both sides were too different to permit comparison. One might say that the task of Cavour was more complicated, more involved and subtle. There were too many factors and tangles with which he had to reckon, while for Bismarck his line of march was plainly marked out. In outward appearance certainly Cavour could bear no comparison with the Teutonic giant Bismarck. His figure was corpulent

and comfortable. One might take him for a shrewd lawyer. His little eyes twinkled slyly behind his glasses. His lips twitched with sarcasm. He was originally an officer, but soon engaged in politics and put his pen at the service of liberty. He had made use of the newly granted freedom of the press by publishing a newspaper *Risorgimento*, and in 1848 his paper had been the first to demand a constitution. Few equaled him in his appreciation of the importance of public opinion. He saw that national undertakings must have the masses behind them if they are to succeed; and the press was the instrument to create public opinion. His guiding idea at that time was: Whatever displeases Austria must necessarily please us. Austria disliked the idea of a modernized state of Piedmont; therefore Cavour built it. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction was abolished, and the way was paved for civil marriage; that is to say, the state became the sole administrator of law. Monastic property was confiscated in part. A railway was built from Turin to Genoa, and commerce began to develop. In 1857 the tunnel through Mount Cenis was begun, which made traffic between Germany and Italy possible. All this increased the power and importance of the little state. Here Italians saw their common hopes appreciated. Italian patriots drifted toward Turin. What the celebrated chemist, Justus von Liebig, said to Count Cavour began to be realized:

If in a mass of dead and amorphous matter there is only a single organized and living molecular force, that is enough to organize all the rest and revitalize it. It seems to me that this little country at the foot of the Alps is the living molecular force which is destined to overcome the power of death, and breathe new life and warmth into all the rest of Italy.

With the year 1855 Piedmont emerged from the quiet of its preparation. It participated in the Crimean war against Russia as the ally of England, France, and Turkey. The military success was moderate, the diplomatic success was immense. For the first time little Piedmont had raised its voice in the concert of the great European nations. Cavour was able to force a discussion of the Italian question in the negotiations of the Congress of Paris. At last that question had ceased to be treated as the fantastic dream of revolutionary leagues. It had begun to engage the attention of the powers. Especially Napoleon had begun to consider the prob-

lem which was destined to become classic: *Que peut-on faire pour l'Italie?*

The liaison between France and Italy now began. Cavour joyfully seized the hand stretched out to him, for only with the help of allies could he hope to win his game against Austria. The emperor of the French was actuated by various motives. He loved Italy, the ancestral home of his dynasty. At the beginning of the thirties he had himself fought in the service of Italian liberty. He had felt, to his cost, the angry passions of Italian patriotism when Felice Orsini in 1858 attempted to assassinate him because he had appeared to betray the hopes of Italy. Even stronger than these personal interests were the political motives. Was it not possible to withdraw Italy from the influences of Austria and make it a client of France? Might he not extort Savoy and Nizza as a price for the help thus given? Napoleon knew that he could charge the maximum price, because his aid was indispensable. Would that not signify a brilliant success of France on the Mediterranean? If he became the champion of Italy, could he not pose as the leader of the Latin nations and the champion of the modern principle of nationality? And would not such achievements unite in strengthening the foundations of the imperial throne in France, which was badly in need of strengthening?

In the summer of 1858 the emperor of the French and the Italian prime minister met in the watering place Plombières. They went driving together; Napoleon himself did the driving; and here the Franco-Sardinian alliance was arranged which was to have such profound consequences. Its political aim was: Italy free to the Adriatic! That is to say, Lombardy and Venice were to be united with Sardinia. That was the limit of the scheme for the present. Cavour had no idea as yet of uniting the whole of Italy in one state. His aim was simply a federation of states in which Sardinia would play the leading rôle. As a price of his aid Napoleon demanded Savoy and Nizza.

The alliance was kept strictly secret. It meant war with Austria. At the New Year's reception of the diplomatic corps in 1859 Napoleon publicly announced the war. The solemn engagement of the oldest daughter of Victor Emmanuel, the princess Clothilde, with the cousin of the emperor, prince Jerome, was the seal of the alliance. Piedmont mobilized its troops. In addition to the regular army, volun-

teer corps were formed. Garibaldi undertook their command. He, if anyone, could make the battle for liberty popular. The enlistments were immense; glowing enthusiasm raised the banners and sang the hymn of Garibaldi:

Uplifted the tombstones! Our martyrs arisen!
Brave Italy's bravest have leaped from death's prison!
Fair bays on each forehead, each hand with its steel,
Hearts beating and burning for Italy's weal.
Up, up, O my brothers, and chase from our land
The foeman, the alien, with sword and with brand!
Wave, wave your bright banners, the while glad and high
Throb hearts that so proudly for Italy die!

The allies marched victoriously from Magenta to Milan, from Solferino to Peschiera. But suddenly Napoleon turned about and made peace. It was arranged at Villafranca and concluded at Zürich. This was an evident discomfiture for Sardinia. The political aim of "Italy free to the Adriatic" was reduced to "Italy free to the Mincio." Venice remained in the hands of Austria. Lombardy alone fell to Italy, and the heavy price of Savoy and Nizza had to be paid to France, whereby the Sardinian dynasty lost its ancestral country. In view of this turn of affairs Cavour resigned. "Alliances are good; our own strength is better." But even the intensest development of Italian forces could not cope with Austria. Napoleon's sudden turn was possibly due to a fit of temper. The physical illness which was troubling him at that time had made him irritable. And at bottom he was secretly afraid that he would lose his controlling influence over Sardinia if Italy really became free to the Adriatic. But that controlling influence he was determined to maintain, whatever happened.

But even now the force of idealism in the movement for unity was to triumph over the selfishness of practical politics. In the Peace of Zürich it had been stipulated that Parma, Toscana, Modena, and the Romagna—that is, the territories adjacent to Lombardy—were to have autonomy in their own affairs. These territories of middle Italy now unanimously determined to unite with Piedmont. Napoleon suffered them to do so. Austria was too busy in Hungary to object. Thus, in spite of Villafranca and Zürich, the movement for unity had scored a magnificent success.

"In politics it is never wise to have more than one aim at a time. Our present task is solely to consider how we can eliminate Austria from Italy," said Cavour, before the beginning of the war. In a temporary fashion this task was now accomplished; not yet finally. The question of Naples and Sicily became acute. Now that the north and the middle of Italy were united, attention turned to the south. In 1859 King Ferdinand of Naples died. He was an ultra-reactionary. In the revolutionary year of 1848 he had re-established his government by bombs, and hence the people called him *Re Bomba*, and his son, who succeeded his father, *Re Bombicello*. Possibly the granting of a constitution would have saved his throne. When he refused it, the revolution broke out in 1860, fanned by the Mazzinists and led by Garibaldi. Francesco Crispi, the late premier, was among those who took arms. Cavour, who was prime minister once more, entered into relations with this revolutionary movement, but secretly, in order not to offend France, which was negotiating with the Papal State. Garibaldi was covertly encouraged and used in order to cut loose the former kingdom of Naples and Sicily from the reactionary party, and to bring it in touch with Piedmont. But affairs moved with unexpected rapidity. "The March of the Thousand," of the brave little band led by Garibaldi, was so brilliantly successful that any restoration of Bourbon rule was out of the question. The people demanded union with Piedmont. But Garibaldi and the Mazzinists aimed for more. The Sicilian revolution was the work of the radical wing in the movement for unity, of the revolutionists and demagogues who were not content with the slow diplomacy of Cavour and refused to stop short with the annexation of Naples and Sicily. They proposed to overthrow the Papal State and thus with one blow complete the unity of Italy. It was to be either a republic, or a monarchy under the sovereignty of Piedmont; on this point they were not as one. Cavour was thus in the unpleasant position of Goethe's *Zauberlehrling*; but at the right moment he succeeded in gaining control of the unruly spirits. Just when Garibaldi was on the point of invading the Papal State, Cavour marched the army of Sardinia into the Papal State and on against Naples. Thus the initiative was wrested from Garibaldi, and his part was played out. Sicily and Naples fell to Piedmont. He returned to his rocky island

of Caprera. He was not even made governor-general of Naples, though during the revolution he had been dictator of Sicily. In masterly fashion Cavour had succeeded in getting the revolutionists and republicans to pull the chestnuts out of the fire and in pocketing the gain, nearly the whole of southern Italy, for Sardinia. Sardinia-Piedmont, firmly established in the north, the south, and the center of the peninsula, was now constituted as the kingdom of Italy in 1861.

Thus one more task had been splendidly solved. Two more remained: to conquer Venice and to absorb the Papal State. The latter was the more difficult, but it could not be avoided. Quite apart from the fact that an ecclesiastical state in the midst of modern political life was an anachronism, the Papal State had forfeited its right to existence by its internal rottenness. Its financial management was the most dilapidated that can be imagined. Brigandage was so organized that bandits could venture to appear on the stage of a theater during the performance and hold up the audience. Moreover, a united Italy without Rome was unthinkable. Past history demanded this center, and contemporary idealism joined the demand. Cavour justly said: "Without Rome as capital Italy cannot be constituted. Rome unites all historical, intellectual, and moral conditions for the capital of a great state. The entire nation demands Rome as its capital." But as a practical politician he added: "We can get to Rome only under two conditions: first, we must have the acquiescence of France; second, the capture of Rome must not be the signal for the captivity of the church." But how were these conditions to be fulfilled? Overtures were made to the Papal State, but every thought of an Italian occupation of Rome was sternly repudiated. The consent of France also was not forthcoming. Napoleon could not do more than he had done, nor did he mean to do more. He did not mean to do more for the leadership in the movement for Italian unity would slip away from him if there were no more unsolved problems in Italy which brought him to the front as the decisive factor. If Italy were completely united, it was likely to be restive under his interference. Neither could he do more, for his throne rested on the balance of political parties in France, and the most powerful of parties was the clerical. It was out of the question for him to lend a hand toward the conquest of the Papal State. But

as long as these two conditions were unfulfilled, the Roman question was insoluble. Under the pressure of this situation, Italy was even compelled to punish an invasion of the Papal State attempted by Garibaldi, by the arrest of the leader on the heights of Aspromonte.

Now that little more was to be expected of France, we understand how it was that the eyes of Italy turned to another state which was also striving toward unity under similar conditions, namely Prussia. As early as 1858 Cavour had prophesied: "Prussia will inevitably be drawn into the sphere of the German national idea. The alliance of Prussia with the larger Piedmont is written in the book of the future." He was not to see the fulfilment of his prophecy. He died in 1861; in 1866 the alliance of the two powers was consummated. The common opposition to Austria cemented it. And now the jealousy of the great powers was to aid little Italy in curious ways. When war broke out between Prussia and Austria in 1866, Napoleon counted on the victory of Austria. But if Austria was victorious, the pre-eminence of France in European politics was threatened. In order to prevent this and to make the weight of his authority felt, Napoleon made an arrangement with Austria on the following basis: Austria was to cede Venice, whatever might be the outcome of the war; Austria was to resign the hegemony of Germany; in return for this France would remain neutral during the war and would protect the Papal State. In consequence of this play of interests among the powers, Italy was safe-guarded whatever the outcome might be. It stood to win in any case. This explains the curious fact that, in spite of the defeat of the Italians by land at Custoza and by sea at Lissa, Venice was ceded to Napoleon according to the treaty, and was then united by plebiscite with Italy. That solved the Venetian question.

Four years more were to pass before the last and most difficult part of the great work of unification was accomplished—the solution of the Roman question. When Prussia achieved its victory over Austria, the Franco-Prussian war was only a question of time. As early as 1866 it had been thought of in Paris. For Italy the difficult problem now arose: To whose fortunes should it ally itself in this impending conflict? Neutrality was out of the question for a state whose fortunes could be advanced only by taking sides. The sym-

pathies of Italy more and more plainly began to turn toward Prussia, since France remained inexorable on the Roman question. In the convention of September, 1864, Italy had been compelled to concede the protection of the Papal State, and had made Florence its capital in public testimony of the fact that Rome was no longer considered. Another insurrection, led by Garibaldi and fomented by Italy, had failed. French bullets had scattered his bands at Mentana. Italy again was compelled to arrest him. Had not France by this time forfeited all claims to the gratitude of Italy for Solferino? On the other hand, loud acclamations greeted the Prussian crown prince when he visited Florence in 1868 for the marriage of Crown Prince Umberto. Nevertheless, Napoleon, putting his trust in the amiability of Victor Emmanuel, hoped to achieve an alliance. Diplomatic negotiations began. But at the same moment Bismarck dug a counter-mine. As soon as an alliance should be perfected between Italy and France, Mazzini was to raise the banner of the Italian republic, and thus hold the royal troops in check. A masterly bit of diplomacy! But before the mine could explode, the Prussian troops had decided the future. The Roman question thwarted any union of interest between France and Italy. When one battle after the other was lost by Napoleon, and when his entire empire collapsed at Sedan, Victor Emmanuel with swift resolve commanded his troops to advance. On September 20, 1870, they entered Rome by the Porta Pia; it has since been called *Porta di Vicesimi Settembre*. "In Rome we are, in Rome we stay," were the words of the king when he solemnly entered on July 2, 1871. *Roma intangibile* became the watchword. The unity of Italy was complete. Rome was its capital.

We are at the end of a long and devious course. Italy did not travel it unaided. It had to work its way up amid the play and counterplay of interests among the powers. It was like a block of wood, which is pressed from the right and the left, and thus is forced forward. Its merit was that it exposed the proper surface to the pressure at the proper moment.

With remarkable rapidity the modern state of Italy has won its place. North and south have joined their forces, though differing widely in the character of their people and their historical development; the south, the soil for the revolutionists; the north, owing to

the long Austrian occupation, conservative in its spirit. Only when the cry of social distress sounds too piercingly from Sicily and receives no answer, do the old antagonisms awake, and Camorra and Mafia leap into new life. The strongest bond of unity is the monarchy. The royal family is popular. The people know how it has served the country. The memory of Victor Emmanuel, a charming personality and a gallant cavalier toward the fair ones of his country still lives in the heart of his people. Anecdotes and jokes, which if not true, are at least well invented, still circulate about him, and the son and grandson have inherited this sympathy. The two queens at present are even more popular, Margherita and Elena; the former highly cultured, with all the pluck of the new woman, a bold Alpine climber and autoist; the latter, in gentler womanly charm, surrounded with a certain romantic glamor as the daughter of the prince of the Black Mountains. The dynasty understands how to coin this treasure of popular love. The king is often among the people, especially when his people are in need. And royal help in the hour of trouble is remembered by the heart of the nation. In 1883 King Umberto personally visited the cholera hospitals and brought comfort and help to the sick. In the same way Victor Emmanuel III after the destruction of the recent earthquake personally directed the salvage work. One of the first acts of his reign was to grant support to the agricultural colony in the delta of the Tiber, which is to drain and utilize that swampy and fever-breeding tract. The crown cordially supports ideal purposes tending to strengthen and intensify the national consciousness. It has published the works of Mazzini at public expense, although this revolutionist was by no means a friend of the monarchy. But he was a factor in the movement for unity as well as Garibaldi, whose monument looks down on the city of Rome as guardian of the Capitol.

We in Germany always greet with satisfaction any return of the government to the maxims of Bismarck. Italy has remained even more faithful to the course mapped out by its great minister, Cavour. The understanding with Prussia initiated by him has taken enduring form in the alliance with Germany, and to Austria he said: "When the cause of our hostility is removed, we shall yet become good friends." But the people are not nearly so content with the Austrian alliance

as with the German. Certain circles, that stand by the motto *Italia irredenta*, have not yet become resigned to the fact that the southern Tyrol and Istria have been cut off from the body of the unified peninsula. The recent student riots at Innsbruck testify to that. On the other hand, the wound torn by the loss of Nizza and Savoy has healed. The old followers of Garibaldi who, like their master, could not forget it, have died out. When France openly courts the favor of Italy, the people at least are not backward in responding.

The Italian army has risen to the task which the Triple Alliance has set for it. The regular army of seven hundred thousand and the reserves of about three hundred and fifty thousand men are well trained. The cavalry is splendidly drilled for work on difficult territory. And the pets of the Italians, the handsome Bersaglieri with their waving feather crests and their guns carried horizontally in hand, are famous for their magnificent marching capacity. With the exception of battleships of the second and third class, in which the fleet is poor, both artillery and navy are in fair condition. The efficiency of the army is not to be judged by the disastrous outcome of Italian colonial schemes in Africa. If a single general, Baratieri, blundered, he is not the entire army. Other generals and officers, in spite of the crushing defeat at Adna, have rendered eminent service.

Industry and commerce have developed remarkably in Italy and are competing in importance with agriculture. Textile industry in silk and wool, and in the spinning and weaving of cotton, has shared in the modern development toward manufacturing on a large scale, though cottage industries, like spinning and straw-braiding, persist more tenaciously than with us. The Italian production of silk has been estimated as one-sixth of the total production of the world. Imports have decreased decidedly. A national industry has been created.

Remarkable work has been done by the young state in popular and scientific education. As long as the reactionary forces ruled, educational conditions were wretched. Since 1877 elementary education has been obligatory. There is no parish in Italy without its public school. Special stress is laid on instruction in history. The child is to be proudly conscious of belonging to a respected and power-

ful nation. It is to feel that it is a descendent of the ancient Romans. Thus pride in their ancient inheritance is early implanted in the soul of the young. Corporal punishment is unknown; appeal is made to the child's pride and sense of honor when it transgresses. Secondary schools, gymnasia, and universities—there are twenty-one of the latter—are highly developed. The girls share in their instruction. The University of Naples has more than five thousand students. Laboratories and libraries, at least at the larger universities, are well equipped. The reputation of Italian learning is crossing the Alps. Not to speak of poets and literary artists, such names as those of the great criminal psychologist Cesare Lombroso, of the historian Villari, of the political economist Messedaglia, have a wide reputation.

In short, with surprising rapidity the young nation has bent to its task and carried it to success. Italy had its era of wild speculation in the eighties, just as Germany did in the seventies. But that has been overcome. Only the ruins of those immense palaces, teeming with the proletariat, described in Zola's *Rome*, testify to that time of speculative intoxication. The Italian state has won its place in history. It is strong toward the outer world, and a well-organized body in its inner life is ready even to furnish its foreign visitors with aesthetic and social pleasures.

And yet a certain largeness and stability are still lacking to the Italian state. It seems impossible to form far-seeing plans. The state lives from hand to mouth. The social question is fearfully pressing. The antagonism between city and country, between rich and poor, is remarkably accentuated. The state has a colossal burden of debt, in part adopted with the absorption of the constituent states. To pay the interest indirect taxes are levied on the most indispensable articles of food, like salt and sugar. The administrative organization was copied from France, and is exceedingly cumbersome. Yet nothing is done to strike at the root of the evil by any radical measures. If the populace in Sicily is too turbulent, its mouth is stopped for a while by a grant of money, or its cries are silenced by military force; but that does not solve the social question, which still clamors for solution. The same incapacity holds in the educational system, in the problem of providing the agricultural

laborer with fair conditions of life; in short, in all domains of political interest. There is a lack of large and determined planning.

The cause for this deep-seated inability is Italian parliamentarism. The ministry is dependent on a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Senators, whose members are appointed for life by the king, is comparatively without influence. And in the election for the Chamber of Deputies the national concerns and duties are overshadowed by personal interests. Few nations are so deeply excited by their elections as the Italian. All the intensity of the southerner is brought into play. Houses, corners, walls, are covered with proclamations to the voters, often in the most screaming words and colors; but it is much ado about little. The personal advancement of the candidates is the real issue. We find a candidate soliciting the votes of the rifle clubs by promising state aid for rifle matches. But what can a parliament do for the welfare of the country when its members are concerned solely about personal issues? Hence the Italian Chamber is constantly hot with personal frictions. The oratorical duel between Felice Cavallotti and Crispi was typical. Thus the fundamental condition is lacking for any far-seeing national activity. And how can the ministers guide the representatives of the people toward larger plans, when they themselves are liable to be dismissed by a single adverse vote of the Chamber? Every guarantee is lacking for the execution of any large problems which may be undertaken. The ministers themselves count on the shortness of their official terms, for they reserve their right to return to their previous positions. To make the measure of trouble full, all the subordinate officials change with every change of the ministry, and every head of a department has to create his department anew. When a minister resigns in Prussia (and that is not very rare at present), the secret councilor still remains—the *Geheimrat*, who has grown gray in the civil service, and, as the Berlin political economist Schmoller recently said, playfully but truthfully, “the *Geheimrat* trains his minister.” The stability of the subordinate civil officers guarantees the stability of the administration in spite of changes in the ministry.

This parliamentarism in Italy is not really constitutional. According to the constitution the ministers are responsible to the crown

alone, but parliamentarism has grown up by usage in a state in which the transition from autocracy to democracy came about somewhat too hurriedly.

Whether the crown will avail itself of its constitutional rights to remedy this fundamental evil is more than doubtful. A usage of thirty-five years' standing acquires a great power of inertia, and Victor Emmanuel III at present does not seem to be willing to emerge from his political retirement. But recently a new vista has opened toward the future through portals that hitherto seemed hermetically closed to all that concerned the Italian state: the portals of Rome, of the Vatican, of Pius X.

The attitude which Italian politics ought to assume toward the church was laid down by Cavour. He considered it the great historical task to conciliate the pope in favor of united Italy. He believed that the problem was to be solved on the basis of a free church in a free state. To each its own; to the state, the political sphere, without limitation; to the church, the ecclesiastical sphere, equally without limitation. Cavour, without ever flinching, stood for this division of interests; *libra chiesa in stato libero*, were his last words. It was the ecclesiastical and political ideal of liberalism. Exactly the same ideal prevailed in Germany in 1848. The earlier idea of a state granting equality to all religions had advanced to the idea of a state neutral in all affairs of religion. The example of Belgium and the ideas of Lamennais had influenced Cavour. He firmly believed in the possibility of carrying out this scheme. He hardly feared any contradiction, and in touching simplicity he was convinced that, if the nation came before the pope and said to him, "Holy Father, temporal power is no longer a guarantee of your independence; be pleased to surrender it and we will give you the true liberty," the pope would obey the voice of the nation. Italy was sadly disenchanted if these were its hopes. We today, undazzled by the ideas of liberalism and trained by history, would say that the disenchantment was inevitable. Every office has its official spirit, and the official spirit of the Curia has been formed for centuries. Its conviction was: To the pope belongs the sovereignty of the world; the tangible proof of it is his sovereignty over the Papal State. To surrender that voluntarily would have meant to surrender principles

and a surrender of principles is impossible for the church which claims to be unchangeable. Thus the consistent *non possumus* of the pope was very comprehensible. But thereby Cavour's ecclesiastical policy was given a fatal turn; its actual outcome was so different from the scheme as planned. The spheres of church and state were indeed separated. The state simply demanded obedience to its laws from its clerical citizens as from others. But this was not such a separation of functions as still aims at a higher organic unity in the common work for the welfare of Italy. That had been the hope of Cavour's idealism. The actual result was rather a sharp separation of two forces which clash in constant antagonism, and Italy pays the costs of the quarrel. The Italian state is neutral in religion; it provides no religious instruction in the schools. Wherever there is such instruction, it has been smuggled in. The clergy are not eligible for civil office. The universities have no theological faculties. The church is a world by itself, and so is the state, and the sharp antagonism between these two worlds forbids any friendly interchange. Religion is an affair of the individual. Nationalists, on account of the hostility between Vatican and Quirinal, even regard it as a matter of honor to have no religion. As a result we have the peculiar stratification of the people: among the intellectual élite of the people, skepticism; among the mass, bigoted religion. A healthy, open-eyed enjoyment of religion is lacking. At the Congress of Free-thinkers, at the dedication of the monument of Giordano Bruno, during the visit of Ernst Haeckel at Rome, these hostile extremes collided and exploded. Thus it was under Pio Nono; thus under Leo XIII.

But now under Pius X, the former Cardinal Sarto, a new master has ascended the papal throne. Public opinion in Italy at once took a lively and unexpected interest in him. He was elected as a compromise candidate on account of Austria's objection to the intransigent candidate, Rampolla. He seemed to be a harmless man, as compromise candidates usually are, and likely to devote himself to charitable and social activity, in which he had been very diligent in his see at Venice. But soon the rumor spread: Pius X is seeking conciliation with the Italian state. The rumor became more and more concrete. We can now assert with fair certainty that negotia-

tions have been opened. Whether they will succeed, who knows? It is a fact that in the summer of 1904 Queen Margherita met the pope at the Vatican. It is a fact that Pius X has withdrawn financial support from the newspaper *Voce della verita*, and thereby compelled it to suspend publication, because it stood for the irreconcilable attitude. It is a fact that in 1904 for the first time an Italian bishop, the archbishop of Bologna, acting on instructions from Rome, participated in a festival of the king at Bologna and was received by Victor Emmanuel with distinguished honors. It is a fact that the father confessor of Queen Margherita, Monsignore Bonomelli, whom public opinion regards as the author of the touching prayer which the widow offered on behalf of her assassinated husband, is in high favor with Pius X. It is a fact that Pius X not only tolerates but demands the civil marriage of the state to be performed before the marriage is consecrated by the church. The public consummation of all these facts was the papal breve of June 11, 1905, which not only permitted but recommended the clergy to take part in the parliamentary elections. Leo XIII had still insisted on the prohibition of participation in the classic phrase, *non expedit*. It is true that the pope immediately modified his permission, but there was no intention to disavow it. The modification was simply an indication that the negotiations between Quirinal and Vatican are still unfinished. How they will end we do not know. The Curia will demand that the sovereignty of the pope be recognized; or rather that it be guaranteed; for since the laws of 1871 the pope has sovereignty, even though he has no territory. Italy at that time also allowed him an annual grant of \$800,000. Hitherto he has refused to touch it, and has lived on Peter's pence. The question is often discussed whether the Curia will demand the entire sum with interest compounded for thirty-five years, or whether the claim is outlawed by lapse of time. The Curia realizes that the international position of the papacy has steadily improved since the Papal State has been lost. Catholics in Germany have so far shared this realization that of late they have refrained from adopting any resolution in favor of the restoration of the temporal power; they are content with an elastic demand for the sovereignty and independence of the pope. Now Cavour's idea begins to be appreciated: "The pope will be more independent and

will exercise his sacred office more effectively after he has resigned the temporal power and has made a lasting peace with Italy on the basis of liberty."

For Italy the reconciliation of church and state would be a blessing. Only then could religion become an integral factor in popular education and culture. It is possible only in this way. Italy is bound to Catholicism; it cannot become Protestant. The success of Protestant missions, even of the faithful work of the Waldenses, is slight, and the leader of the Old-Catholic movement, Count Campello, shortly before his death laid down his arms and submitted to the church. The Latin race, the Italian people, with their southern vivacity, with their inborn instinct for splendor and glitter, where the poorest peasant decks his little donkey with a gay head-dress, cannot conform to Protestant austerity. The Italian loves churches in which candles are gleaming and clouds of incense rising; where the bright vestments of the priests fascinate his attention; where little dramas, Christmas plays, or the bambino presented in the temple exhibit action and evoke emotion. He loves to see the Holy Father borne on his throne over the heads of the people in St. Peter's with clapping of hands and shouts of *Evviva*. Thus only the Vatican can heal the breach between culture and religion.

In parliament the participation of strenuous Catholics at the elections will create a clerical party. This will at any rate infuse fresh blood into the Chamber. It is true the clerical party may become hostile to the state. It may make ultramontane demands with which the state cannot comply. But even then this new life will stimulate. The friction created may kindle the fire of progress; for large aims and principles will inevitably come under discussion when a power is represented which claims to rule the world. These large aims have hitherto been lacking. Italy will have to become mindful of its higher destiny and rise above the narrowness of personal interests. Her greater tasks will be taken in hand, and thus possibly through clericalism, or in spite of clericalism, the fundamental evil of Italy, parliamentarism, will be overcome.

Castles in the air? Certainly. Possibly they will remain such. The state and the church, Quirinal and Vatican, have not yet concluded their treaty of peace. The pope has not yet left his "prison,"

as it used to be called, and shown himself on soil belonging to the government. But his country palace, Castelgandolfo, has been repaired and is awaiting its master. His cardinal secretary of state has already made his inspection there. If peace is concluded, and if affairs develop along the lines we have traced, then Italy will owe thanks, not only to its king, whom it passionately loves, but to its pope, to whom it looks up in awe and veneration. Then Cavour's great aim will have been attained, even though it be only in the form of an opposition party: the Church will be an organic part of the State. That would be the capstone in the edifice of united Italy.

CRITICAL NOTES

THE GOSPELS IN THE LATIN VULGATE

In recent studies of the Vulgate version,¹ the conviction has forced itself upon me that, so far from being the work of one translator, it represents several hands, some of them at least of much greater antiquity than has been supposed. Especially in the case of the gospels has it become apparent to me that more than one translator has wrought upon them. As I have recently had occasion to say elsewhere, it is therefore quite wrong to treat the Vulgate of the gospels as a harmonious work, and it is clear that the text-critical value of it is greatly enhanced, seeing that the translation goes back into a time when the gospels were not yet united into one collection.

To this argument serious objection has been made, on the ground that uniformity in translation was not sought or considered by ancient translators. As this is a question of no mean importance, I beg to lay before the readers of this *Journal* some considerations bearing upon its decision.

Laying quite aside a priori reasoning I appeal to the statistics. Take the *Concordance* of Moulton-Geden and so simple a verb as ἀποκτείνω, "to kill." It occurs in Matthew 12 times; in Mark, 10 times (not in 3:4; here the Vulgate read ἀπολέσαι, *perdere*); in Luke, 12 times; in John, 12 times. Now, this word is rendered *occidere* in Matthew, Mark, and Luke *everywhere*, in John *nowhere*; *interficere* in Matthew, Mark, and Luke *nowhere*, in John *everywhere*. Is this accidental? Or does it suggest that John was translated by a different hand from the Synoptists?

Take ἀρχιεὺς. It occurs in Matthew 25 times; in Mark, 21 times; in Luke, 15 times; in John, 21 times. It is rendered *pontifex* in Matthew, Mark and Luke but once, among 61 cases; in John *everywhere*, except in the first passage (7:32), where the Vulgate has *principes* and seems to have read ἀρχορres instead of ἀρχιεὺς. Is this again accidental? Or does it prove diversity of translators? It is obvious that the translation of John is due to another hand than that of the rest.

But that also Matthew, Mark, and Luke were not translated by the same man is shown by the fact that in Matthew the regular translation of ἀρχιεὺς is *princeps sacerdotum*, and in Mark *summus sacerdos*. In

¹ *Novum Testamentum Latine*. Textum Vaticanum cum apparatu critico ex editionibus et libris manuscriptis collecto imprimendum curavit D. Eberhard Nestle. Stuttgart: Priv. Württ. Bibelanstalt, 190. xx9+657 pages; 5 maps. There is also a Greek-Latin edition.

Matthew there is not a single deviation from *princeps sacerdotum*; in Mark *summus sacerdos* appears 16 times (among 21), and is replaced by *pontifices* in 15:11, because the preceding verse ended in *summi sacerdotes* and it would have sounded very badly to go on again *summi sacerdotes*; in 14:35 by the simple *sacerdotes*, because *summus sacerdos* had occurred already in the same verse; by *princeps sacerdotum* in 2:26; 10:33; 11:18. But these are such exceptions as prove the rule.

Take a third example, *παρακαλεῖν*. It occurs in Matthew 9 times; in Mark, 9 times; in Luke, 7 times; in John, nowhere. It is rendered *rogare* in Matthew 6 times, *deprecari* nowhere; vice versa, *deprecari* in Mark, 7 times, *rogare* twice.

Further, *ἐπιτιμᾶν* occurs in Matthew 7 times; in Mark, 9 times; in Luke, 12 times; in John, nowhere. It is rendered *comminari* in Matthew nowhere, in Mark 8 times—i.e., everywhere but once (8:32); in Matthew and Luke the regular translation is *increpare*; in the Old Latin codex *a* in Mark everywhere *obiurgare*. See on this word, as well as on *δοξάζειν*, H. T. White's tabulated classifications in *Old-Latin Biblical Texts*, Vol. III, pp. xxiii ff. I think this again proves that Matthew and Mark are translated by different hands.

Anyone who would satisfy himself that Luke also is due to a different hand may carefully compare the history of the passion. In the Roman church, in Holy Week, this history is read first from Matthew, then from Mark, then from Luke. Following this rule, some years ago, I was struck by the observation that expressions which are quite identical in Greek are different in Latin. Take the one verse, "Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation;" Matthew 26:41, "*ut non intretis in tentationem*;" thus also Mark 14:38; but Luke 22:46, "*ne intretis*." To make sure of my conclusion, I took the *Concordance* almost at random, and found it fully corroborated. Jerome testifies himself, in the letter to Pope Damasus, that he changed as little as possible: "Quae ne multum a lectionis Latinae consuetudine discrepant, ita calamo temperavimus ut, his tantum quae sensum videbantur mutare correctis, reliqua manere pateremur ut fuerant."

The importance which the gospels of the Vulgate gain, when they are no longer considered the work of Jerome in the fourth century, but in the main the product of the second—perhaps the early part of the second—will justify my wish to win for my observation and conclusion, which appear to be new, a thorough examination, and if possible acceptance.

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SHEBNA AND ELIAKIM: A REPLY

In the *Journal* for last October Professor König did me the honor of subjecting my article on "A New Chapter in the Life of Isaiah," which appeared in the *Journal* for October, 1905, to a thorough, though kindly, criticism. It calls both for my sincere thanks and for a reply. A reformulation of the theories advanced in the light of the criticisms passed upon them may be of use in determining whether they are to be rejected as an unwarrantable speculation or to be raised to the dignity of a working hypothesis.

As my critic and I substantially agree on the exegesis of Isa. 22:15-18, I shall make only one correction in a particular in which I laid myself open to a not unnatural misapprehension. I did not make the denial of the genuineness of vs. 15b "a secondary basis" of my reconstructions. While holding that the clause is probably not genuine (p. 623), I distinctly postulate its historical trustworthiness (p. 634). I pass on to the really vital points in the discussion.

A. In the exegesis of vss. 24, 25 Professor König (p. 679) agrees with me (p. 623) that the subject of vs. 25 cannot be Shebna, but he claims (p. 677) that I deny that it refers to Eliakim. On the contrary, I argue for this with all the earnestness at my command (p. 626). Where we differ is in our views of the originality of vss. 24, 25. My contention is that, when once vss. 24 ff. are referred to Eliakim, their original connection with what precedes must be denied (*a*) because the admittedly (Professor König, p. 679) ironical reference to Eliakim is quite out of place in a prophecy against his rival Shebna, and (*b*) because such an ironical reference is equally out of harmony with the enthusiasm expressed for Eliakim in vss. 20-23. Hence, if vss. 24 ff. refer to Eliakim, they must be uttered by opponents of Eliakim and not by the writers of vss. 15-23. The attempt of Professor König to connect vss. 24 ff. with what precedes by construing them conditionally cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Granting for the sake of argument that the verses could be construed conditionally (which I really do not grant), yet a conditional force can be fairly given to a sentence not conditional in form only when the context necessitates it. But in the present instance the context actually forbids taking vss. 24 ff. conditionally. Shebna is the person addressed throughout vss. 15-23 on the usual interpretation. But what object is there in introducing even a conditional warning against Eliakim in a philippic against Shebna? If Eliakim were addressed, we might discover one; but he is not. Further, after the positive declaration that Eliakim is to be an honor to his father's house, we look for anything but a warning not to let the honor of his father's house hang too heavily

upon him, lest he fail. But if Professor König's conditional construction be rejected, the denial of the originality of vss. 24 ff. in this connection is the only alternative. The historical inference from this conclusion follows almost of itself. Shebna and Eliakim are rivals. As Shebna is opposed at the same time to Isaiah—i. e., is anti-prophetic—it is natural to suppose that Eliakim, his rival, is a member of the prophetic party. But the rivalry between these two leaders must have been very intense and have influenced the national life very profoundly. The intense partisan spirit of vss. 24, 25 testifies to the acuteness of the situation.

B. The second exegetical basis in my argument to which Professor König takes exception is that vs. 19 is a gloss and vss. 20-23 are to be separated from vss. 15-18. This position was founded upon the following considerations:

1. The change of person at vs. 19, which points to a possible break in the text. Professor König contends that the change of person is a frequent phenomenon in prophecy and does not necessarily witness to a faulty text. Granted. On the other hand, the change of person often is a danger signal. Is it so here? I think so, and for the following reason. Isaiah is tremendously wrought up in vss. 15-18. It is the one case in which he singles out a private individual for attack, and his language is severe in the extreme. In other words, Isaiah's own personality is emphasized in vss. 15-18 as in few other passages in his prophecies. Hence the change at vs. 19, where he is supposed to speak in the name of God, is in this instance psychologically unnatural. Yet I would not dare to rest my case on this argument alone.

2. But the argument from change of person is supported by the content of vs. 19, which says less than vss. 15-18. In vss. 15-18 death is promised; in vs. 19, only deposition from office. As Eliakim is promised the vacated office of Shebna in vss. 20-23, vs. 19 is most naturally taken as the introduction to what follows rather than as the conclusion to what precedes. Vs. 19 modulates the general and all-inclusive threats of vss. 15-18 into the specific threat of deposition from office, in order to lead on into the new theme of the promise to Eliakim in vss. 20-23. My point is that the author of vs. 19 has the interpretation of vss. 20-23 as a promise to Eliakim of the office of Shebna especially in mind. Vs. 19 is therefore the connecting link between vss. 15-18 and 20-23; but its logical connection is with the latter verses and not with the former, as it begins the subject of Shebna's punishment anew. It is not contended that there is even a formal contradiction between vs. 19 and vss. 15-18, and here Professor König is right as against Marti; but it is contended that just at the point

where we meet with a suspicious change of person, there we meet also with a break in the logical sequence of the passage.

3. At this point I would raise the question whether the interpretation of vss. 20-23 which is implied in vs. 19 is correct. The contention of my article was that, if vss. 20-23 are considered by themselves, they seem to promise something far higher than the office of major domo to Eliakim; viz., the kingship itself. In reply to the arguments adduced to support this view, Professor König (*a*) asks: Why, if the kingship was promised, was not מַמְלָכָה used instead of מְשָׁלָה? I might retort: Why, if *only* the office of major domo was intended, was not מַצֵּב used instead of מְשָׁלָה? On my view, which sees in vs. 19 the work of a glossator who misinterpreted vss. 20-23, we perceive how he felt under the necessity of interpreting מְשָׁלָה in a very restricted sense in order to suit his theory. (*b*) Again Professor König gives no argument to support his denial (p. 684) of my inference from אֲבִנֹת. (*c*) It is urged further (p. 684), that the description of Eliakim as a father to Judah and Jerusalem could apply to the major domo. I grant it, but it will apply even better to the king. (*d*) Professor König holds that the key (vs. 22*a*) distinctly points to the major domo. But vs. 22*b* points to a king as the possessor of the key. In the power to open and shut we have *absolute* power. There is no place for a king above the possessor of this key, and Rev. 3:7 is a far more accurate analogy to our present passage than I Chron. 9:27 which Professor König adduces (p. 686).

Professor König's final argument that Eliakim, son of Hilkiyah, was not of the Davidic line, and hence could not have been promised the kingship, will be considered later. But apart from this one argument it is claimed that vss. 20-23 considered by themselves are far more naturally interpreted as promising the kingship than as promising the office of major-domo. But if vss. 20-23 originally promised the kingship to Eliakim, it follows inevitably that the author of vs. 19, which connects this promise with the prophecy of the deposition of Shebna (vss. 15-18), has misunderstood vss. 20-23, and that vs. 19 is a gloss. But the arguments thus far employed—change of person, doubtful connection of vs. 19, internal impressions of vss. 20-23—would not be sufficient of themselves to support my constructions, and hence I introduced at this point the argument that to me is of most weight in corroborating the previous arguments, but the full force of which Professor König does not seem to have appreciated, for he apparently fails to take note of the way in which it was utilized.

C. My third main proposition was that, when vss. 15-18 and 20-23 are respectively examined *in the light of chaps. 36 and 37*, the discrepancy

between the two sections already suggested by what has preceded now becomes very obvious.

1. The crucial point is the chronological relationship of 22:15-18 to chaps. 36 and 37. I sought to show that vss. 15-18 can be understood only when placed *after* chaps. 36 ff. The position of Shebna as scribe (a cabinet position; cf. I Kings, chap. 4) and as a member of a special committee to treat with Isaiah in the most critical situation of Hezekiah's reign, is incredible after Isaiah's terrible denunciation of him. On the other hand, if 22:15-18 follows chaps. 36 and 37, we at once have an intelligible and illuminating sequence. The indignation of Isaiah is seen to be stirred by the fact that Shebna, who was scribe in chaps. 36 ff., had succeeded in supplanting Eliakim, the major domo. I fail to see what right Professor König has to say that, if this sequence of chap. 22 after chap. 36 is adopted, "it can be inferred neither from chaps. 36 ff. nor from 22:15-18 that Shebna actually did force out Eliakim . . . and we drift into the realm of baseless conjecture." If Eliakim is major domo in chaps. 36 ff. and Shebna is major domo in 22:15-18 and 22:15-18 follows chaps. 36 ff., Shebna must have entered into Eliakim's office, and the anger of Isaiah certainly justifies the conjecture that Shebna had supplanted Eliakim. Professor König urges against the proposed sequence (a) that my description of the anger of Isaiah is hyperbolic (p. 684). I suppose this objection is intended to weaken the discrepancy between 22:15-18 and chaps. 36 ff., if 22:15-18 is placed before chaps. 36 ff. The reader must be left to judge of my hyperbole at this point. (b) Professor König is also confounded at the amount of supposition which my theory of the sequence demands. But Professor König concedes (p. 685) that he must make assumptions also:

The threat against Shebna in 22:15-18 finds a sufficient explanation in the arrogance of Shebna which is indicated by the double "here" (22:16a) and *in other mistakes* of Shebna which had merited the appellation "thou shame of thy Lord's house" (vs. 18b). If we find the cause for the prophetic condemnation in the *encroachments* of which Shebna had been guilty, we can stand by the text as the trustworthy basis for our judgment. [Italics mine.]

But what are these *mistakes* and *encroachments*? Professor König does not tell us. My view allows us to specify them. They were upon Eliakim and what Eliakim stood for. Is this such an addition to the text? Is it not an inevitable deduction from the text? (c) Finally Professor König feels the difficulties of the usual view of the sequence. He admits that it requires one assumption, viz., "that the divine threat was actually fulfilled, though perhaps in a modified form." Unfortunately Professor König's article in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* is inaccessible to me, and I

cannot be sure of what he means by a "modified form;" but I imagine he refers to the view which sees in Shebna's position of scribe in Isa., chaps. 36 ff., the beginning of Shebna's degradation, he being at this time deposed from the major domoship; or possibly he holds that this supposed degradation is the *only* fulfilment, the threat in 22:15-18 being remitted, "modified," for some reason or other. In either case Professor König, like those who have preceded him, can find in chaps. 36 ff. a fulfilment *only of* 22:20-23, not of 22:15-18. In other words, chaps. 36 ff. are related to 22:15-18 and 20-23 in two different ways. While chaps. 36 ff. could be explained as following 22:20-23 as usually interpreted, though even this is unnatural, they cannot be explained as following on 22:15-18.

2. But if 22:15-18 are once located after chaps. 36 ff., then there are but two possible interpretations for vss. 20-23. These verses cannot be placed before chaps. 36 ff.; for *ex hypothesi*, Shebna had not as yet supplanted Eliakim. But Isaiah would not be promising Eliakim an office which he was already occupying. Hence, if vss. 15-18 are placed after chaps. 36 ff., vss. 20-23 will also be placed after these chapters. In that event vss. 20-23 must be either a promise to Eliakim of *restitution* to the office formerly occupied by him, as Calvin suggested, or vss. 20-23 is a promise to Eliakim of another office, namely that of the kingship. As there is no hint in vss. 20-23 that Eliakim had ever before occupied the office here promised him, but, on the contrary, since it is clear that he is promised something through which he was to gain a *new* dignity both for himself and for his family, we are shut up to the supposition that he is here promised the kingship. Thus, when vss. 20-23 and 15-18 are studied in the light of chap. 36, the suggestions previously advanced with reference to vss. 19 and 20-23 are abundantly confirmed. Verse 19 is now clearly seen to be a gloss connecting two passages, vss. 15-18 and 20-23, which originally had nothing immediately to do with each other.

Having reviewed all the objections urged by Professor König against my exegesis and criticism of 22:15-25, it remains to consider his critique of the historical inferences which I ventured to draw from this exegesis and criticism.

D. It is at this point that the speculative nature of my conclusions is most apparent, yet I must insist that, while inference never can take the place of documented facts, still on the basis of inference we may construct a helpful working hypothesis.

1. The surest datum from which to start is the position of 22:15-18 after chaps. 36 ff.; i. e., after the campaign of Sennacherib in 701. This sequence implies that the anti-prophetic Shebna succeeded in supplanting

Eliakim sometime after 701. But if 22:15-18 are once placed after 701, we must come down to the accession of Manasseh to find a suitable time in which an anti-prophetic person could push himself into office, for after 701 till the close of Hezekiah's reign the influence of Isaiah was certainly in the ascendant (pp. 637 ff.). At this point I would modify my theory in one particular. The prestige of Isaiah after 701 was not gained by Isaiah through the fulfilment of prophecies of deliverance; for there were probably no such prophecies and no deliverance in 701. Further investigation has convinced me that in 701 Isaiah was a prophet of doom, and that the reforms initiated by the prophetic party after this year were due to the repentance of the court because of Jehovah's visitation upon the kingdom in 701, and the influence of Isaiah was due to the fact that he had foreseen just what the outcome of Hezekiah's revolt against Assyria in 701 was to be. (Cf. my article, "The Invasion of Sennacherib," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, 1906.) Now, the success of Shebna can be understood perfectly if brought into connection with the antiprophetic reaction at the accession of Manasseh. If, therefore, the critical premise is accepted that 22:15-18 follows chaps. 36 ff., the historical conclusion that 22:15-18, implying a successful encroachment of an antiprophetic character upon one of the highest offices in the land, is to be placed in Manasseh's reign, cannot be deemed improbable.

2. My second datum is the rivalry of Shebna and Eliakim. This is admitted even on the old theory of the meaning of 22:15 ff. But if Shebna is antiprophetic and is opposed by Isaiah, it follows that Eliakim must represent the prophetic party. Again this inference is almost a matter of course.

3. My third datum is that this rivalry was of the intensest nature and must have profoundly affected the national life, as is seen in the fact that the opponents of Eliakim actually succeeded in getting their opinions of Eliakim incorporated into the biblical text. (vss. 24 ff.). But just what form did this rivalry between Shebna and Eliakim take? Was it a struggle simply for the office of major domo?

4. Here we arrive at my fourth datum—the fact that, when vss. 20-23 are taken by themselves, they seem to promise to Eliakim the kingship. From this it was inferred that Eliakim, as the head of the prophetic party, aimed at the overthrow of Manasseh, who was backed by the major domo Shebna, the head of the antiprophetic party.

5. This inference was finally supported by II Kings, 21:16, which was taken to refer to the bloody massacre by which this prophetic revolt was put down. Is there anything in this general construction that is in

and of itself historically improbable? Professor König himself admits (p. 685) the possibility of such a reaction. But he emphatically denies that such a revolution actually did take place in the reign of Manasseh. His objection to my proposed reconstruction of the historical situation is admittedly a serious one. He claims that Eliakim, *son of Hilkiah*, was not of the Davidic dynasty, but a revolution in Judah to unseat the Davidic dynasty is highly improbable. This I will have to concede. Hence, if my hypothesis is to be maintained, it must be assumed that Eliakim was of the royal family. This is indeed a disadvantage, as there is nothing apart from the interests of the theory directly to justify this assumption. Yet I cannot agree with Professor König that the fact that he is merely called the son of Hilkiah would exclude his Davidic origin. He was probably not closely connected with the court, and his family was in reduced circumstances, for his enemies were able to heap ridicule upon him (vss. 24 ff.); but, on the other hand, it may well be argued from his occupancy of the office of major domo in the reign of Hezekiah that he was of noble birth.

Whether or not Professor König's arrow has succeeded in piercing at this point between "the joints of the harness" of my argument and inflicting upon it a fatal wound must be left to the candid reader to decide.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

A NEW HEBREW AND ENGLISH LEXICON

Students of the Old Testament have been waiting eagerly for the completion of this book.¹ Before it appeared, there was no Hebrew lexicon, in any language, that could claim to meet the demands of modern scholarship. In German, aside from the admirable, but now antiquated *Thesaurus* of Gesenius (1853), students have the "hand-lexicons" of Gesenius-Buhl and Siegfried-Stade, which are good as far as they go, but leave a great deal to be desired. The most recent editions of Gesenius-Buhl, in particular, have been much improved, and serve excellently the needs of students beginning Hebrew, and of all those who wish to read the Old Testament in the original languages without attempting a thorough study. But for the purposes of experts these hand-lexicons are inadequate, and must be supplemented at almost every point by a search for material of which the most important part ought to be included in every first-class dictionary. The chief defects of the small dictionaries named have been: (1) The words are not grouped according to their roots. (2) The corresponding words and roots in the cognate languages are not adequately used. (3) The citations from the Old Testament are too meager, and the analysis of usage is not carried far enough. (4) Even the most necessary emendations of the text are often not included. (5) No satisfactory use is made of the writings of modern authorities in the field. (6) In general, it is evident that the process of revision, by which Gesenius has repeatedly been "brought up to date," has not been thorough enough; material has simply been taken over which should have been given a searching re-examination.

As for students dependent upon textbooks written in the English language, their condition has indeed been most deplorable, for there has been no Hebrew dictionary, small or great, which could be recommended for their use. The old translation and adaptation of Gesenius by Edward Robinson continued to be a much-used makeshift, down to the time of the appearance of the present work, and was perhaps as good as any other. Only those who are fully aware of the progress which Hebrew studies have made during the past half-century can appreciate the feelings of the instructor at the present day who sees his pupils tied to a lexicon which

¹ *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*. With an Appendix Containing the Biblical Aramaic, Based on the Lexicon of William Gesenius as Translated by Edward Robinson. By Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. xix + 1127 pages. \$7.50 net.

received its final form in 1854. It is true that the publishers of the book continued to issue "revised" editions, so that the unsuspecting beginner was led to suppose that he was being served with comparatively recent learning; but in reality the only thing revised was the date on the title-page.

The amount of new light, both from within and from without, which has been thrown on Hebrew lexicography since the time of Gesenius is very great indeed. A closer study of the text itself has had the result of reversing or revising a great many conclusions which once were hardly questioned. Advancing theories of the course of Israelite history and of the growth of the Old Testament literature have inevitably carried with them changing views of the meaning of single words and phrases. A better knowledge of the ancient versions of the Old Testament and of the principles of their use for the criticism of the Massoretic text has been exercising its important influence. The cognate Semitic languages are better known and more systematically utilized now than they were a generation ago, and the vocabulary of our Hebrew Bible is constantly receiving new illumination from them. The marvelous recovery of the long-lost literature of Babylonia and Assyria, in particular, has enriched our knowledge of classical Hebrew to such an extent that the older dictionaries are now long out of date, while even the most recent conclusions of scholars receive constant correction from the Assyro-Babylonian vocabulary. New monuments are perpetually bringing new material that can be made useful. In the languages still more closely related to the Hebrew, especially Phœnician and old Aramaic, a multitude of inscriptions have been unearthed within the past few decades, and it is only quite recently that the most important of these have been studied with such success as to assure, in the main, their text and interpretation. From all of these sources our knowledge of biblical Hebrew and biblical Aramaic has been considerably added to in recent years, and is sure to be increased still further, though doubtless to a less extent.

The *Lexicon* before us represents an enormous amount of labor; for Professor Brown and his colleagues, fully appreciating the present need, have set themselves the task of meeting it, not by a mere revision of Gesenius, but by compiling what is really a new work, planned according to the requirements of the present time and on an adequate scale. When to this is added that the compilers are thoroughly competent for their task, enough has been said to give an idea of the importance of the work to every serious student of the Hebrew Bible.

In grouping words under their respective roots, the editors have returned

to the method adopted by Gesenius in his *Thesaurus*. This is, of course, the only satisfactory way of compiling a dictionary of any Semitic language, and few will doubt that the time is ripe for using it here. The other (alphabetical) mode of arrangement had certain advantages, especially in the earlier stages of Hebrew learning, when conflicting theories of roots were in the field, and there was still uncertainty as to the true affinities of very many words. But the great advance in Semitic philology which has been made in the last half-century has reduced these uncertainties to such an extent that they cannot longer be given controlling weight. Every student should now be allowed the great advantage of that training in the structure of words which comes from constant familiarity with their systematic arrangement under the trilateral primitives. The expert scholar will be saved much time and trouble by having all the derivatives of a given root brought together in one place, each illuminated by its fellows, and all comprehended almost in a single glance of the eye. Of course, there will continue to be room for disagreement as to details; the present reviewer, for instance, sees many points in which he would dissent from the conclusions reached in this *Lexicon*, as to the origin of certain words and forms. But this occasional uncertainty, so far from being an objection to the arrangement adopted, really weighs in its favor. The investigation of roots and etymologies will receive a needed stimulus; and as for the doubtful words, no one will have difficulty in finding them, thanks to well-managed cross-references.

In the case of each word the editors have re-examined the evidence for the various usages and shades of meaning. What "the evidence" includes, at the present day, has already been partially set forth. In the Preface, pages ix f., there is a statement of the portion of the work for which each one of the three editors is responsible. For a very large number of words—indicated in each case by a dagger (†)—all the occurrences in the Old Testament are cited, at least by chapter and verse, generally with notation of the exact form, and often with the rest of the clause in which the word stands. That is, for all unusual and especially difficult words this *Lexicon* serves the most important purposes of an analytical concordance. The attempt is made to distinguish the usage of different periods in Israelite history, as well as that of individual authors; and the result, precarious though it must often be, is in the main very helpful. The new and thorough treatment of the Hebrew particles, pronouns, and adverbs, by Professor Driver, deserves especial mention. His discussion of the preposition ב, for example, occupies eight of these large and closely printed pages.

This dictionary far surpasses all its fellows in the extent to which its

compilers have made use of the cognate languages and of extra-biblical material as aids to Hebrew lexicography. For the knowledge of the meaning and history of both roots and single derivatives a great deal of help is given to the advanced student by illustration from the other Semitic languages. Much of the illustrative matter of this kind has never appeared before in any Hebrew dictionary, and the amount could be still further increased with profit. A similar and equally welcome advance is made in the use of the North-Semitic inscriptions which have been published. This is a field which has been unduly neglected by lexicographers and grammarians of Hebrew and Aramaic; though it ought in fairness to be added that many of these inscriptions have only recently been brought to light, and that it is largely through the acquisition of this new material that the monuments formerly discovered have been rendered intelligible. The fifteen years which elapsed between the publication of the first part of this *Lexicon* and its completion were years of very remarkable gains in this field, and more than one article which has its place near the beginning of the alphabet, and was given its final form in 1891, could now be written either with more confidence, or else with somewhat altered conclusions, thanks to recent discoveries. To mention, for instance, a single point among the many affected by the unearthing of the Hammurabi Code: it may well be that Dr. Briggs, if he could have seen the passages VII, 36; IX, 34 f.; XVII, 61; XVIII, 7; XX, 17; XXI, 18; XXXVI, 74; XXXIX, 90, in this document, would have decided not to give "judges" as one of the meanings of שֹׁפְטִים (namely, in Ex. 21:6; 22:7, 8 (twice), 27). In general, the editors have kept abreast of epigraphic investigation, and have made use of its assured results. But we could wish that they had given us even more, rather than less. Still another point of excellence in this dictionary is its recording of conjectural emendations of the Massoretic text. Though in general the received text is trustworthy, yet in some instances its readings are evidently faulty and can be restored to their original form with certainty or with a high degree of probability. All such emendations upon which a considerable number of the best scholars are agreed ought to find a place in any comprehensive dictionary. The writer of the present review has tested this *Lexicon* at many points and found it decidedly superior, in this respect, to its German rivals. That very much remains to be done in the critical study of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament few will deny. The methods of investigation and criteria of judgment which prevail at the present day will be replaced in due time by others which are sounder, and the result will be both to emend the text in many new places, and also to reinstate the Massoretic reading in many

passages which are now quite generally believed to be corrupt. But in the meantime all Hebrew scholars are in constant need of the best results which have thus far been reached, the tentative as well as the certain, collected with diligence and sifted with good judgment; and that is what we have in the work before us.

One important source not yet used in Hebrew lexicography ought soon to be made available, namely, the documents originally written in Hebrew, while it was still a living language, but now extant only in translation. After making every deduction for the many uncertainties of translation, transmission, and interpretation, there remains a considerable amount of material in I Maccabees, Judith, Baruch, and other extra-canonical writings, which can be used with certainty and made very helpful for our knowledge of the Hebrew of the canonical Old Testament. An instance of the kind is the use of **ד**, *χέρ*, for "force" (armed company), in I Macc. 5:6; 11:15; cf. the translation of the same word by *μεγαλειότης*, "might, greatness, authority" (*καὶ κατὰ τὴν μεγαλειότητα* = **וְכִיד**); cf. the Greek of II Chron. 35:4), in I Esdras 1:4. These passages are all needed for the interpretation of Num. 20:20; Isa. 56:5, etc. Another instance is the phrase in I Macc. 2:24, "his kidneys quivered" (with anger), where the remarkable use of **כליות** furnishes the best obtainable parallel to Prov. 23:16. Or, again, the word **ספָּרִים** (or **שׁוּפָּרִים**, *γραμματεῖς*, "muster-officers," in 5:42, employed exactly as in Judg. 5:14; II Chron. 26:11. Further, the use of **חסד**, "virtue," in 2:57, an interesting example; cf. Bar Sira 46:7; 49:3. The use of **על חֲנֹה** for "attack" in 5:27, 49, 50, exactly as in II Sam. 12:28. Or such other instances in I Maccabees as **פָּרָס**, "Macedonia," 1:1; 8:5; cf. Dan. 11:30; **הַחֲמֹכָר**, like I Kings 21:25, etc., in 1:15; **שְׁנַתִּים יָמִים**, 1:29, like Gen. 41:1, etc.; **כִּי אִם**, "except," in 10:38; **בֵּית דַּגּוֹן**, the temple of the god Dagon at Ashdod, 10:83; cf. I Sam. 5:2. These are only a few examples chosen at random out of the multitude that might be cited. And they would make a valuable addition to any Hebrew thesaurus. The vocabulary of biblical Aramaic (which in this *Lexicon* is given a separate place at the end of the book, as is most desirable) can be similarly enriched to a slight extent from the Story of the Three Youths in I Esdras, the only extra-canonical document in the Old Testament which has thus far been proved conclusively to be a translation from the Aramaic. Thus, the idiom **עֲבַד דִּינָא מֶן**, "execute judgment upon," which is given as occurring only in Ezra 7:26, is found also in I Esdr. 4:39. The editors of the present work certainly cannot be blamed for failing to include material of this sort (where, indeed, has it been used?)

but it is time that attention was called to its importance, and its availability.

Especial praise is due to the compilers of this *Lexicon*, again, for the thorough use which they have made of the very extensive technical literature that has grown up during the past fifty years. How well they have performed this task is only partially indicated by the long list (more than six pages of three columns each, printed in small type) of titles of works and names of authors consulted; for this list includes only those works to which frequent reference is made. Thanks to an elaborate system of abbreviations, the references to these names and titles have been crowded into the minimum of space, and so also has all of the material which constitutes the framework of the dictionary. The volume thus contains far more than other books of its size, as the user of it will soon learn. The abbreviations are somewhat inconvenient, but the inconvenience is more than compensated for by the added material.

This suggests the further remark that this dictionary does not quite fill the need of a hand-lexicon for beginners. Theological students (who constitute the major part of those who study Hebrew) do not need so extensive a work as this, and are likely to find the use of it somewhat difficult; nor can any considerable number be expected to pay so high a price for a book which the most of them will probably never use after they leave the seminary. For all those who are not, and do not aim to be, expert scholars, a volume of less than half the extent of this one would amply suffice. On the other hand, it may be that some insatiable specialists will wish that the work could have been made still more exhaustive, suggesting that for an ideal "thesaurus" it would have been better to use larger type, with more space, to omit the most of the abbreviations, to include more illustrative matter, and add an English-Hebrew index, and to make at least two volumes of it. But the editors, it is needless to say, appreciated fully all these requirements, and under the conditions by which they were controlled they undoubtedly did the best thing that could be done, in deciding to publish a one-volume dictionary containing everything that could possibly be packed into such compass. It is, indeed, a veritable thesaurus, and will not fall far short of meeting the most exacting requirements. It is safe to predict that it will be a long time before it is superseded; and in the meantime it will remain what it is now, an indispensable helper. As for the students' hand-lexicon, we are assured that it will appear in due time, as an abridgment of this larger work, and that arrangements to this end have already been made with the publishers.

In conclusion, it is a pleasure to congratulate Professor Brown and his

colleagues on the completion of this great work, by the performance of which they have rendered a priceless service to Old Testament learning, and have put all students of Hebrew and the other Semitic languages under a heavy debt of gratitude.

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CORNILL'S JEREMIAH

Jeremiah is one of the prophets who deserves the very best work that one can put upon him. Cornill states that in his student days back in 1873 he planned a commentary on this book which is so full of human interest. Graf's commentary (1862) held the field in those days, and continued to do so until 1890. Haupt launched his scheme for a polychrome Bible in 1890, and engaged Cornill to prepare the volumes (text and translation) on Jeremiah. Since the days of Graf, biblical science has advanced by strides, and brought into prominence textual-critical problems, elements of minor importance in earlier times. Cornill vigorously undertook his task, and in 1895 his critical text of Jeremiah was published in Haupt's series, but his translation prepared simultaneously still awaits publication. In 1896 the publishers of Graf's commentary (long out of print) asked Cornill to produce, not a second edition, but a new commentary on Jeremiah. Just on the heels of his accession to this request appeared the announcement of Duhm's commentary on the same book in the "Kurzer Hand-Commentar" series. This caused the postponement of Cornill's work until the summer of 1901, when he began his task, the results of which lie before us.¹

The Introduction, covering more than forty pages, embraces the times of Jeremiah, his life, his book, Jeremiah as poet, Jeremiah as prophet, and the literature. The treatment of the times and life of the prophet is merely lucid, vivid description, such as a writer and scholar perfectly familiar with the facts would narrate, embodying nothing new. But the section discussing the book is especially timely and instructive. The document we call the Book of Jeremiah was constructed out of the words and acts of Jeremiah (דברי ירמיהו) and the memoirs of Baruch. The fourth year of Jehoiakim marks the date of the destruction of the original roll, and its reproduction and amplification by Baruch at the dictation of Jeremiah.

¹ *Das Buch Jeremia*. Erklärt von Carl Heinrich Cornill. Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1905. lii + 536 pages. M. 10.

Now, the problem that Cornill as well as other modern scholars is trying to solve is this: What was contained in that original roll? Cornill finds in it chaps. 1-6 (except 2:14-17 and 3:6-18), 7-10 (except 9:22-10:16), and 25 with 46:1-49:33. To the period before the destruction of the roll (605 B. C.) belong the "I-form" in 13:1-8, 11, which should immediately follow chaps. 2-6; and also 18:1-4, which should stand after chaps. 7-10. Of discourses that belong to this early period (before 605) we have 31:2-5, 9b, 15-22; 22:10. Chapter 25 is the best conclusion to the original roll, though we must include the prophecies against the nations.

All these prophecies, except those against the nations, give us about 250 verses, a book a little larger than that of Zechariah.

To the war times of Jehoiakim, after his revolt against Nebuchadnezzar, are attributed these portions of the prophecy: 12:1, 2, 5, 6; 11:18-22; 15:10-21; 16:1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 17, 18, 21; 17:1-4, 9, 10, 14-17; 18:13-17, 18-20; 20:7-10. The minute distribution of sections in this manner extends to the remainder of the book not already treated above. In some of these passages the reason for the analysis or partition is not so evident to the student as to the author. For example, 20:14-18 would seem much more appropriate as concerned with the fall of men who were plotting the prophet's death, than with a time when he was vindicated by the fulfilment of his prediction of the overthrow of the city. Again, 31:31-34 is not so appropriate at the time after the fall of the city as it is just when he is making declaration of the personal responsibility of the people, in the face of the siege. Each one shall bear the burden for his own sins, and under this new individualism a new covenant shall be entered into which shall be written on their hearts, be a part of their natures, and hence cannot be broken as the old covenant which they have discarded. However these partitions may be made, the entire book is a compilation of the *דברי ירמיהו* and of the memoirs of Baruch, rather miscellaneously pieced together.

The poetical character of the book is not disputed. Cornill, however, does not go so far as Duhm. The latter attributes real poetical genius to Jeremiah, and makes his standard consist of four lines alternating three and two beats. The poems are mostly short songs, aggregating about sixty in the book, and totaling about 250 verses. Cornill's standard is eight lines, allowing some little freedom, however, in some lines because the production of poetry was not the prophet's first purpose. The principles of Ley and Duhm are the basis of Cornill's conclusions.

The literary physiognomy of Jeremiah reveals him as "the poet of the heart." His whole life marks him as gentle, sensitive, tender-hearted, an

intense sufferer, and a hero of patience. His feelings dominated his thinking and his expression of his thoughts. His words show him to have been always practical and concrete, and never abstract in his thinking. Jeremiah occupies a central position as a prophet, closing the older roll and pointing out the way for the younger. Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah grow directly out of him; both have taken up his thoughts and expanded them. Religion with Jeremiah is a *personal* matter, that binds the individual to his God.

The commentary proper presents us with a translation at the top of the page of the text adopted by Cornill. This is printed in various kinds of type to indicate its source, whether Hebrew or Greek, and whether found in one or the other, or both. Each chapter's comments are preceded by a brief analysis of the contents of the chapter or section under consideration.

The general method of Cornill is to take up a verse at a time, examine its Massoretic text, and the Septuagint, Syriac, and Vulgate when these have any light to shed on the Hebrew. In his dealing with the text-critical side of the work he now and then varies from his position taken in the Haupt series. This is notable in 11:15, one of the *crux* verses of the book. In the Haupt series he adopted the Septuagint as undoubtedly containing the original text. In his commentary he concedes several variations therefrom. The second word (דִּיד) is read feminine, after Giesebrecht, the Septuagint and Syriac. The sixth word (דָּרְבָּיִם) is made to read דָּרְבָּיִם in Haupt's text, but now Cornill reads, after Hitzig and Ewald, דָּרְבָּיִם. The verse then reads: "What business has my beloved in my house? She has done wickedly. Can vows or holy flesh cause thine evil to turn away from thee? Then mayest thou rejoice." The last clause is cut out because it does not harmonize metrically with the verse—a very insufficient reason when standing alone.

Another verse that gives textual critics and exegetes perpetual trouble is 15:11. In the Haupt series Cornill cuts out vs. 11-14 of this chapter, on the ground that it is an unfortunate and unskillful interpolation. The commentary endeavors faithfully to solve the difficulties, but is required to omit vs. 12. The difficulties of vs. 11, says Cornill, are largely removed by following the Septuagint. This involves the use of אֶמֶן for the first word; the third, fourth, and fifth words must be derived from either אִשָּׁר or אִשָּׁר, and לְטוֹב should be transferred to the end of the verse. But in order to make for himself a grammatical and translatable verse, he conjectures a transfer and substitution of letters for אִשָּׁר לְטוֹב אֶמֶן that seems less likely than the simple change suggested by Duhm, of reading the phrase אִשָּׁר אֶמֶן.

But the reading that best satisfies the context and gives a good sense to the verse is that which practically follows the Massoretic text, substantially as is done by Ewald and in the Revised Version. In this case the first expression, "saith Yahweh," is treated as an oath, and reads: "Saith Yahweh, surely I will strengthen thee for good; surely, I will cause the enemy to make appeal to thee in the time of affliction, in the time of distress." This rendering is faithful to the Massoretic text, except that שְׁרִיתָּךְ is read שְׁרִיתָּךְ from the Aramaic root שָׁרַר, as is done by Driver.

The temper and tone of Cornill as revealed in this book are far in advance of that displayed in his Ezekiel (1886) or his text of Jeremiah (1895). Here he has a broader vision of life, and of the possibilities of expression in the Hebrew language. He is not so ready to cut out passages that present stubborn difficulties, and is far more considerate of the opinions of those who have worked on the same problems, and who may differ from him. An exegetical treatment of a passage requires broader measurements than one that is purely and coldly textual.

The warm, soulful side of Cornill's work appears when he discusses Jeremiah's inner life, his attitude toward Yahweh, and his own spiritual experiences. Here he discovers the very kernels out of which grew the chief doctrines of Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah. Jeremiah's life, in the midst of such national decline and disaster, such international revolutions and policies, gave him experiences that touched every phase of life and thought. These many-angled views of men, God, sin, punishment, responsibility, are found as little germs scattered through all the narratives, discourses, and poems of his book. Cornill is quick to detect these first buddings of new truth, and to treat them as a commentator should. In other words, the scattered threads of Jeremiah's theology are pointed out, their color specified, and their significance noted.

I have no hesitancy in saying that this is the best piece of work, everything considered, that Cornill has yet turned out. It will take its place among the very best commentaries that have appeared on this important book.

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THE METAMORPHOSES OF GILGAMESH

The stout volume in hand¹ fills the thoughtful reader with various emotions: admiration for the courage of the writer, who, though an able

¹ *Das Gilgamesch-Epos in der Weltliteratur*. Von P. Jensen. Erster Band: Die Ursprünge der alttestamentlichen Patriarchen- Propheten- und Befreier-Sage und der neutestamentlichen Jesus-Sage. Strassburg: Tübner, 1906. xviii + 1030 pages. M.40.

Assyriologist, dares to attempt the solution of the most delicate problems of both the Old and New Testaments; admiration, too, for a kind of relentless pursuit of his theme in a manner which gives his treatment a quasi-scientific appearance; wonder at the lack of insight which sees no difference between narratives vouched for in contemporary documents and narratives contained in documents written hundreds of years after the events which they profess to record; and finally relief when a study of the book makes it clear that the work is, in large parts of it, but the unsubstantial dream of an Assyriologist. We have had a *Babel-Bibel* dream and a *Jerahmeel* dream, and now we have a *Gilgamesch* dream—that is all. We have learned to expect from the author of *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier, Hittiter und Armenier*, and *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, Vol. VI, the exercise of learning, ingenuity, and courage; and in this volume he maintains his reputation for the possession of all these qualities.

The book opens with a statement of the substance of the Gilgamesh Epic, tablet by tablet (pp. 1-54). Professor Jensen here maintains the positions reached just as *KB*, VI, was nearly out of press. In the body of that work he held that the mountains of *Mashu* were to be looked for in the east or southeast (p. 467), the "park of precious stones" was to be looked for in South Arabia (p. 469), the "salt river" was the Persian Gulf (p. 473), and the "waters of death" lay beyond. Before the book was quite beyond his power, however, he changed all this (see p. 575 ff.). *Mashu* he conceived to be the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon ranges, "the park of precious stones," the Phoenician coast, "the salt river," the Mediterranean Sea; and "the waters of death," the ocean to the west of the Straits of Gibraltar. These changes were made in part because Jensen had reached the conclusion that Gilgamesh was a sun-myth, and the course of the sun must be from east to west. These views are reasserted and reinforced in the work before us (pp. 24, 34, and Map II).

After showing (pp. 55-76) that the stories of battles with lions and serpents go back to the same material, so that the Gilgamesh Epic absorbs the Creation Epic, our author proceeds (pp. 77-124) to compare the epic with the zodiacal signs, and to conclude that its principal stories—the quest of Gilgamesh for Eabani, the enticing of Eabani to the city, the advances of Ishtar to Gilgamesh, her flight to heaven, the fight with the bull, Gilgamesh's journey to the land of the dead on which he encountered the scorpion-men, the experiences of Par-napishtim or Xisthuros, etc., etc.—are all either sun-myths or myths connected with different parts of the zodiacal system.

All this is introductory. On p. 125 the real business of the book

begins with a treatment of "Die Gilgamesch-Sage im Stamme Levi," in which it is maintained that Moses is a Gilgamesh who delivers Israel from Egypt as Gilgamesh delivered Erech from the Elamites. He is also a Xisthuros, since he goes up into the Mount of God. Zipporah is a "Hierodule" of Ishtar. Aaron is Eabani, who dies before Moses-Gilgamesh, who is really a sun-god. Next "Die Gilgamesch-Sage in Ephraim" is set forth, and it appears that Joshua's crossing of the Jordan and overthrow of Jericho is a version of the story of Xisthuros and the flood catastrophe; his various battles against Amelek, Ai, etc., are versions of the fight of Gilgamesh and Eabani against Elam. It further appears that the Jeroboam stories are a complement to the Joshua stories. "Die Gilgamesch-Sage in Nord-Juda" follows. The material here treated is I Sam., chaps. 4-6. A Joshua appears in I Sam. 6:14, and the name Beth-Shemesh plays a part in it, so the whole episode becomes a Gilgamesh sun-myth. Jensen reverts next to the tribe of Levi once more, and to his own satisfaction proves that Joshua and Ezra, the post-exilic priests, as well as Daniel and Azariah, are simply forms of the ever-present Gilgamesh sun-myth. Daniel lends himself to it readily because of the story of the lion's den, the lion being a zodiacal sign. A more elaborate treatment is then given Jeroboam, his episode with the prophet Ahijah (I Kings 11:26 ff.) revealing under the magic touch of Jensen its real nature as a sun-myth.

But lack of space forbids detail. Suffice it to say that the alchemy of our author turns to sun-myths the stories of Hadad, the Edomite (I Kings 11:17 ff.); of Jacob, Esau, and Joseph; of Abraham and Isaac; of the servant Eliesar and the journey to Haran; the story of Judg., chaps. 10 ff.; the stories of Samson, Saul, and Samuel; of David, Nathan, and Jonathan; of David and Absalom, and David and Sheba; the history of Solomon; of Elisha; of Ahab and Elisha; of Gideon and Abimelech; of Jephthah; the story of Tobias and Tobit, and of Baasha and the prophet Jehu (I Kings 16:1 ff.). The male heroes are all either representations of Gilgamesh or Eabani or Xisthuros, while Sarah, Dinah, and other women of the characters become Ishtars or "Hierodules." More than 200 pages at the end of the book are devoted to "Die Gilgamesch-Sage in Sebulon," where Jensen locates the "Jonas-Sage" and the "Jesus-Sage." We are told here that the story of Jonah is but a version of the flood-story, and that Jesus is but a Gilgamesh-Xisthuros. The stories of the birth of Jesus are regarded as an element foreign to the main source. John the Baptist is, however, an Eabani, whom Jesus-Gilgamesh seeks. Jesus' temptation by Satan in the desert is but a form of Eabani's intercourse with the sun-god in the desert—a story which had previously traveled to India, where it appears as the

temptation of Buddha. As Eabani returned to Erech, Jesus returned to Nazareth. He moves his residence to Capernaum, so that on the Sea of Galilee versions of the flood-stories—crossing the sea in a storm, etc.—may be told of him. Similarly the sending of the demons into the herd of swine, the feeding of the four thousand with seven loaves, the feeding of the five thousand, the transfiguration on a mountain, the entombment, resurrection, and ascension, are all mythical, being forms of the hydra-headed Gilgamesh Epic. Even Herodias is an Ishtar and her daughter a Ukhat. Jesus was crucified at the Passover and not at Tabernacles, because as a sun-god the autumn festival would have been unsuited to his resurrection!

In putting forth such views Jensen apparently thinks that in every case he has shown the narrative to be a pure myth, rather than a bit of history heightened by myth; for at the conclusion of his treatment of what he calls the *Ahab-Sage* he has (pp. 701-4) a discussion of the fact that Omri and Jehu are mentioned in the inscriptions of Mesha and Shalmeneser II. Jensen here declares that Jehu was the son and immediate successor of Omri, and that Ahab, Ahaziah, and Joram are unhistorical names inserted in the list under the influence of the myth! This he holds in spite of the fact that Shalmeneser mentions *A-ha-ab-bu*, the *Sir'ite*. (*KB*, I, 172), whom Jensen, contrary to the opinion of most scholars, refuses to identify with Ahab, the Israelite.

What shall we think of this *magnum opus*? It must be confessed that there are points in which Jensen is right. The Babylonian flood-story, which is a part of the Gilgamesh Epic, is, as has long been recognized, a part of our Bibles. It is to be expected, too, as the Hebrews and Babylonians were derived from the same stock, that the same myths and ceremonies should sometimes appear.² We should look for such material, however, in the stories of the patriarchs, or in narratives which go far back of contemporary history. There are, accordingly, elements of truth in Jensen's theory. As a whole, however, the work cannot be commended. His theory is greatly overworked. Those facts only are noted which coincide with it, and other facts are ignored. At least five fundamental defects of method render the work, in the judgment of the present reviewer, unscientific.

1. The supposition that most of the stories of the world are nature-myths—or, to be more accurate, sun- or astral myths—although once popular, and although it has been recently reaffirmed by another distinguished Assyriologist (Winckler), is, in the judgment of a growing number of

² This the reviewer recognized some years ago; see his *Semitic Origins*, p. 289.

scholars, untrue. The work of the late W. Robertson Smith, as well as of the school of writers who follow anthropological methods, has demonstrated that often terrestrial events lie at the bottom of ancient stories.

2. The assumption that where an astral element enters into ancient stories it exists unmixed is, in the opinion of the reviewer, contrary to probability. The astral element was usually grafted on to a terrestrial substratum, and to ignore this leads to false results. If we grant that in the Babylonian Gilgamesh-stories there are elements of sun-myths, it is altogether probable that these elements would never have been preserved had they not attached themselves to accounts of real men or tribes, so that they heightened the deeds of some half-legendary hero.

3. Human experiences are limited in number. This is especially true among simple oriental folk; their life centers about fountains and streams, about struggles with wild animals or with other tribes, about the mystery of death and the life of the shades. In such communities is there any valid reason why everyone who sits by a well or who lives by a stream must be Eabani? Or why everyone who crosses a river or a lake must be Xisthuros? Or why everyone who fights a battle must be Gilgamesh? Or why everyone who has an encounter with a wild beast must be Eabani? Or why one who seeks to communicate with a departed friend must be Gilgamesh? If Jensen's principle holds good, Gilgamesh and Eabani have been incarnate in many a modern man—in Oyama and Roosevelt, in Stanley and Professor Hyslop, and in scores of others.

4. One may admit, as the present reviewer is inclined to do, that in a number of instances—as, for example, the stories of Samson—the deeds of a real hero may have been embellished by the addition of mythical elements; but, even if this were true, it would not follow that these elements were borrowed from Babylonia, so that Samson could be said to be Gilgamesh. It has long been recognized that similarity of psychological processes can create such resemblances, and to overlook this fact is unscientific.

5. The greatest defect in the work is the failure to distinguish between mythical periods and periods which have a solid historical background. This defect appears in his treatment of several Old Testament characters, but is most painfully apparent in his treatment of Jesus. Ignoring the scientific work which has been done on the gospels, ignoring the early date of Mark, he treats the whole material with as much freedom as he would the oral traditions of an Australian tribe. Such treatment is not in accord with scientific methods of dealing with historical documents. One may be a great Assyriologist, and yet lack the training necessary to distinguish myth from history. Had Jensen confined his treatment to

certain of the eschatological and messianic features of the gospels, where, through the Jewish apocalypses, Babylonian material may have influenced the shaping of messianic expectations, his work would have been very different; but to dissolve Jesus into a Gilgamesh and Herodias into an Ishtar, when both are vouched for by documents as nearly contemporary as we can hope to obtain for anything in ancient history, out-Jerahmeels Jerahmeel!

In the next volume Greece and all her myths will be annexed to Gilgamesh.

GEORGE A. BARTON

BRYN MAWR, PA.

THE JUDAISM OF NEW TESTAMENT TIMES

In the treatise¹ at hand the writer develops further the line of study marked out in his previous works, *Der vorchristliche jüdische Gnosticismus*, *Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik*, and *Antichrist*. In all of them he shows a wide knowledge of the Jewish literature, both Hebrew and Greek, of the centuries shortly before and after the Christian era. So far as command of material goes, he would seem to be well qualified to describe the religious movements within Judaism in the time of Jesus, the task he has undertaken in the present volume. Yet, after having read the book twice through, I am obliged to say that in my opinion the author has not succeeded in his task. He has not presented a picture of the religious movements in Judaism which carries conviction as being in accordance with facts. It is not always self-consistent, and it is marked in many places by a polemical tone which indicates a want of balance in the writer's critical judgment. I desire to be quite fair toward Friedländer, because he has devoted a good many pages to some remarks of my own in which I opposed his theory. He might say that the judgment of a hostile critic was already biased against him. I withdraw one charge which I formerly made, and to which he refers in a note on pp. 206, 207. I accept Friedländer's explanation there given, as showing that he acted honestly; though I still think that it was an error of judgment to deal as he admits that he dealt, with a text to be used in evidence. I believe that he is perfectly honest and sincere in all the statements which he makes; and if these words should ever meet his eye, I hope that he will feel assured that I have no personal animus against him, and that the criticism I offer upon his book is based solely on considerations of scholarship.

¹ *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu*. Von M. Friedländer. Berlin: Reimer, 1905. xxx+380 pages. M. 7.

If I am right in estimating the real purpose of the book, Friedländer undertakes to show how Christianity, a world-religion, could and did proceed from a religion which in the Old Testament literature is mainly national. And the answer is given that the line connecting prophetic Judaism with Christianity must be drawn through the Wisdom literature, the apocalyptic writings, and the Judaism of the Dispersion, and not through the legal Judaism of the Pharisees. It is certainly clear, and Friedländer shows it by abundant citations, that there is a closer affinity between the leading ideas of the apocalyptic writings and those of the early Christian documents than there is between such Christian ideas and those of the Pharisees, as contained in the Talmud, and the cognate writings. And Friedländer may fairly claim to have brought out into clearer view that aspect of Judaism which was concerned less with the obligations of the law than with the aspirations of the "eternal hope." Also, he has shown that this aspect of Judaism is abundantly represented in pre-Christian literature. But I think he has drawn the lines of division between the several elements in the Judaism he describes with far too great sharpness; so that what were at most only radical or conservative tendencies are represented as the watchwords of opposing parties, and those who held them as well-defined sects. This is borne out to some extent by the way in which the subject-matter of the book is laid out. The first main division (pp. 1-234) deals with the Judaism of Palestine, and includes chapters on the apocalyptic movement, the "Am-haaretz," the Essenes, and the Minim. The second division (pp. 235 to the end) deals with the Hellenistic Judaism, under the heads of doctrine, the Therapeutae, the Sibylline wisdom, Jesus, the mission of Paul. Curiously enough, there is no chapter on the Pharisees; and there should have been such a chapter, because a great part of Friedländer's case depends on the alleged contradiction between the ideas of the Pharisees and those of the apocalyptists and others. There is, of course, frequent reference to the Pharisees, and Friedländer is at no pains to hide his intense dislike of them. He uses them as a foil to set off the spiritual virtues of those who were not under the law. To him they stand for all that is narrow, hard, and blindly national, as contrasted with the larger-minded Judaism of the Dispersion and its aspirations toward a world-religion symbolized by the Messiah. So, too, he sharply divides the Pharisees from the Essenes, and again from the Am-haaretz, the people of the land, of whom he gives a rather rose-colored picture. In this last case there was, no doubt, a well-marked division, but not, I think, such as Friedländer represents. The "people of the land," as distinct from the Pharisees, were not a definite group with religious teachers of their own,

and a special outfit of religious ideas. At least it cannot be shown that they were. That they did not conform to the requirements of pharisaic practice is true enough, and their slackness in this respect is no doubt the reason why the Pharisees disliked them so much. But, in view of the undoubted fact that the Pharisees were on the whole supported by a majority of the common people among the Jews, either the Am-haaretz represented only a very small fraction of the nation, or else they were in general sympathy with the religious teaching of the Pharisees, though careless in acting up to it. For it is quite wrong to regard the Pharisees as having no religious ideas except the one of blind obedience to the precepts of the law. And Friedländer has not shown, what it was vitally important for his theory that he should show, that the Pharisees repudiated the ideas of the apocalyptists on the one hand, and those of the Essenes on the other. They did not do this. On the contrary, the most natural explanation of the term "pious" used in the apocalypses is that it represents just that religious quality which is characteristic of the Pharisees; in other words, the writers of the apocalypses were Pharisees, writing of other aspects of their religion than that expressed in Halachah. In like manner, Friedländer has not shown that the Pharisees repudiated the Essenes, or that the Essenes did any more than carry to an extreme the practices of strict Pharisaism in the matter of ritual purity and ascetic practice. Friedländer strongly denies these affinities; but he has not disproved them. I do not say that there was no difference between Pharisaism and Essenism, but that the one passed by imperceptible stages into the other. As already mentioned, Friedländer ascribes to the Judaism of the Dispersion all that is liberal and progressive; but I find it very difficult to form a clear conception of this Dispersion-Judaism, from Friedländer's account; and frankly I do not believe there was any great difference between the Dispersion Jew as such, and the Palestinian Jew as such. Both in Palestine and in the Dispersion there were those who were strict in their observance of the law (so far as their local situation allowed) and devout in their worship. There were also those who had more or less completely thrown off the restraints of the law. The solvent which loosened that restraint came through Greek influence, whether philosophical or social. Those, and they would be comparatively few, who represented the extremes of these tendencies, might be distinguished from each other as sharply as Friedländer distinguishes them; but there were so many intermediate gradations that even these extremes shade off one into the other without any real break. Friedländer appears to me entirely to have failed to see this, and to have presented a picture by no means in accordance with the facts.

The limits assigned to me prevent me from noting many details which confirm the foregoing judgment; but I must add a few words upon the subject which is the most hotly debated part of Friedländer's theory, the identity of the Minim. These are certain persons referred to in the Talmud and the Midrash; and it is maintained by some that they were Jewish Christians; by others, at all events by Friedländer, that they were free-thinking Jews not Christians at all, and already known by name before Christianity. Friedländer declares (p. 178) that in what he says about the Minim he only refers to the period ending with 135 A. D.; but he uses texts of the third and fourth centuries in support of his argument. He cites (p. 175), as manifestly a pre-Christian tradition, a famous passage from the Mishnah (Sotah, chap., ix), which, on the face of it, is later than the bulk of the Mishnah itself. And he rebukes one (p. 205) for not attending to talmudic chronology. He persists (p. 174) in claiming Elisha ben Abujah as a Min, in spite of the fact that the term is never applied to the particular studies for which he was famous. The crucial passage in which a certain person who taught Minuth declared, "Thus hath Jesus the Nazarene taught me," is dismissed as an interpolation, together with all other talmudic passages mentioning Jeshu b. Pandera. This is done by Friedländer in all good faith; but it makes one wonder at the kind of mind which can be satisfied with such reasoning. If Friedländer had gone about his work in a calm and dispassionate manner instead of showing temper against *Seminar-Theologen* and opponents generally, he would have produced a valuable and instructive book. As it is, the book which shall truly represent the Judaism of the centuries before and after Christ remains yet to be written.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT

PAUL AND THE APOSTOLIC AGE

Professor Ramsay has, after careful revision, grouped together various studies¹ of early Christian history, which originally appeared as magazine articles. Most of these are worthy of having a more permanent form. Perhaps the reviews of McGiffert's *History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age* and Baring-Gould's *Study of St. Paul* might have been dispensed with. And the complicated subject of Pauline chronology, if it is to be adequately treated, requires more space than the author was able to afford. The book

¹ *Pauline and Other Studies*. By W. M. Ramsay. New York: Armstrong, 1906. xi + 415 pages. \$3.

exhibits all those qualities which we are accustomed to look for in Professor Ramsay's writings: freshness of standpoint, flashes of insight only possible to a scholar of rich and varied learning, unflagging zest in the handling of his subject—a zest which communicates itself to the reader—and that lucid and forcible style which has done so much to popularize the results of his investigations. The letter-press is accompanied by a number of excellent illustrations.

The first three studies deal directly with Paul, his conversion, his personal charm, and his statesmanship. Professor Ramsay does valuable service by emphasizing the importance, for the interpretation of Paul's career, of the preliminary question: "Are we open to hear evidence?" The answer, in this age of historical criticism, might be supposed to be self-evident. As a matter of fact, too many investigators of the New Testament are apt to take up the position that "our ignorance is the real element in the world and to bound the possibilities of the universe by our own acquisitions and perceptions" (p. 23). The extraordinary break in Paul's life is decisive for all that followed. Our author, with true appreciation of the facts, refuses to see in this event "the culmination of a change that had been gradually working itself out in his mind" (p. 70). Paul's own testimony makes that explanation impossible. Hence the truly scientific attitude is to ask: "What can we learn from Paul's experience?" (p. 23). It is the reverse of scientific, as Kaftan has admirably shown in his recent brochure (*Jesus und Paulus*), to aim at knowing history, not as it is or was, but as it ought to be. We are glad to be able to quote a foremost representative of systematic theology in this connection, as Professor Ramsay seems to look askance at theological experts (see pp. 139, 321).

The *charm* of a great personality is a delicate quality to analyze. It is too impalpable for ordinary tests. Professor Ramsay finds Paul's fascination "in that combination of qualities which made him representative of human nature at its best: intensely human in his undeniable faults, he shows a real nobility and loftiness of spirit in which every man recognizes his own best self" (p. 36). To justify this position, there is much here which is truly and aptly said. It is difficult, by the way, to assent to the statement that Paul is "a more simply human character" than Peter. Surely both in the gospels and Acts Peter is "simply human" to the core. Paul is closer to us because we know him better, because he has so frankly unveiled himself. Professor Ramsay justly lays stress upon the delicacy of the position which Paul had to occupy among the early Christians, and the dignity, courtesy, and nobility of spirit which he always displayed. This estimate he contrasts with that of some modern scholars who make

Paul out to be "the least lovable and the most unlovely character in early Christian history." We are inclined to think that this is a somewhat extreme statement of the views held by any modern scholars of repute. But the author uses it as a starting-point from which to reach one of his favorite theories, viz., that Gal., chap. 2, and Acts, chap. 15, "describe two different events." In our judgment, this is an even more untenable position than the more famous South-Galatian theory. The latter is referred to, without being discussed, in the very interesting and suggestive study of the statesmanship of Paul.

Here Professor Ramsay moves in a region in which he is thoroughly at home. He treats the subject "as an episode in Roman history." All readers of his books and articles have felt the fascination of the new light he has shed upon old themes from this direction. In the present instance he makes lofty claims for Paul.

No other man exercised anything like so much power as he did in molding the future of the empire (p. 53). He was a maker and a statesman, but a religious enthusiast. He must therefore have had in his mind some ideal, some guiding conception, which he worked to realize (p. 54).

Professor Ramsay traces back this ideal into his pre-Christian experience. Paul was a Jew, a Tarsian, and a Roman. A man with a nature and capacities like his was bound to estimate the possibilities of his own nation. At that moment, so far as material success was concerned, "there was opened up before them a dazzling prospect of wealth and power." The same thing was true of their religion. The Jewish faith "exercised an extraordinary fascination on the Roman world, not so much on the purely Greek cities, but more on Rome and on central Asia Minor" (p. 57). The one danger was that the Jews "might slip back toward the pagan level." Paul must have recognized that there were "only two alternatives open to Judaism in the empire: either it must conquer the empire or be conquered by it." This victory, of which he felt assured, would be bound up with the coming of Messiah. Hence the bitter hatred with which he would regard "the impostor who had, as he thought, degraded before the Romans the Messiah and the nation" (p. 70). These are striking and attractive suggestions. In the light of them it is not difficult to see how his ideal received a new direction, and was realized in a fashion of which he could not have dreamed. Professor Ramsay, with great ingenuity, attempts to show that, when Paul cried out in the council, "I am a Pharisee, son of Pharisees," "he was asserting the continuity of his mental development from first to last" (p. 86). He was, in these words, answering a dangerous

accusation brought against him. We cannot say that we are convinced by the arguments adduced, and, in support of his position, Professor Ramsay is obliged to say that Luke (of whose veracity and accuracy he is usually so earnest a defender) did not understand Paul's intention in this case, and from his dislike of the Jews, gave a prejudiced picture of their attitude that day in the council.

Of remarkable interest are the studies of "Pagan Revivalism and the Persecutions of the Early Church," "The Worship of the Virgin Mary at Ephesus," and "The Permanence of Religion at Holy Places in Western Asia." The two latter really deal with the single phenomenon of "the unbroken continuance of religious awe attached to special localities from the dawn of historical memory to the present day" (p. 185). The former brings a good deal of important evidence to support the view that "a pagan revival accompanied almost every persecution, partly arising spontaneously from popular feeling, but partly engineered and guided by imperial encouragement" (p. 156). The most interesting testimony is that of inscriptions from the neighborhood of Pisidian Antioch bearing on a secret society called the Tekmoreian Guest-Friends, who worked against Christianity for "the revival of the old Anatolian religion in association with the imperial worship."

Exceedingly valuable for exegesis are the discussions of "The Lawful Assembly" (Acts 19:39) and "The Olive-Tree and the Wild-Olive" (Rom. 11:17-24). Enough has been said to suggest the rich and varied interest of this volume.

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In two hundred openly printed pages* Mr. Hall tells the story of Paul's life, and gives his view of the apostle's religious character and theological doctrines, in an interesting and instructive way. He accepts the Acts of the Apostles as "an invaluable picture of early Christian life; the only picture, at any rate, which the world possesses." He accepts also, though with different degrees of confidence, the ten epistles usually regarded as coming from the hand of the apostle. He finds no serious conflict between the historical statements recorded in the Acts and those made by Paul in his epistles. He interprets such passages as Phil. 2:5-8, and Rom., chap. 9, in the traditional way; but his book leaves the impression that these views which Paul held and taught may be regarded, as he says of another feature of Paul's teaching, simply "as an essential part of the religious spirit

* *Paul the Apostle as Viewed by a Layman.* By Edward H. Hall. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1906. 203 pages. \$1.50 net.

of the hour." The author, however, confines himself closely and conscientiously to a presentation of Paul's views, and does not attempt to give his own judgment concerning their philosophical or theological value.

Dr. Huebsch has made a good translation³ of Pfleiderer's *Die Entstehung des Christentums*, which contains the substance of a course of popular lectures delivered at the University of Berlin in the winter of 1904-5. The lectures present, in a clear and interesting way, the author's well-known views. The theme is thus stated:

The origin of Christianity is to be thought of as a developing process, in which various other factors were working along with the life-work of Jesus; these united and adjusted themselves gradually, but not without inner contradictions and struggles.

The author first describes briefly the intellectual and spiritual forces which prepared the way for the introduction and spread of Christianity, in the development of Greek philosophy, of the philosophy of Philo, and of that form of Judaism which prevailed at the beginning of the Christian era. He then considers the contribution which Jesus himself made to Christianity. The moral excellence and spiritual elevation of Jesus are emphasized, and his remarkable influence over his contemporaries, not only kindling their religious devotion, but resulting also in the relief of "certain sicknesses, particularly those caused by disturbances of the nervous system," is recognized. He did not himself, however, clearly apprehend the outcome of the movement which he was introducing. "The prophetic proclamation of the nearness of God's kingdom is the dominant note [of his preaching] from beginning to end," and this kingdom was to come in "a sudden and universally recognizable catastrophe," "before his generation had died, or even before the completion of the missionary work in the cities of Israel." In this expectation Jesus was mistaken. This led him sometimes to give instructions and commands which seem to conflict with those principles of social and domestic love which he elsewhere taught. "Two souls dwelt in his breast"—one "the hearty and heart-winning love for the individuals who trustfully approached him," the other "the enthusiasm of the prophet of God's kingdom." It is certain also that he "was not conscious of any superhuman origin on nature." The gospels contain much that is not historical; "the birth-story [in Luke] is a bit of transparent symbolism;" the stories of the appearance of the risen Jesus are compared with similar stories "in the legends of saints and martyrs;" and such words as are attributed to Jesus in Luke 10:22 do "not belong to the oldest tradition."

³ *Christian Origins*. By Otto Pfleiderer. Translated from the German by Daniel A. Huebsch. New York: Huebsch, 1906. 295 pages. \$1.75.

We must attribute them to the influence of Pauline theology, which owed much to stoic philosophy, Jewish apocalyptic writings, the ideas and rites of the Mithra religion, and other oriental cults.

It must be confessed that this learned and able treatise leaves the impression that in the attempt to solve the mystery of Christ and Christianity the brilliant author has raised more difficult problems than those which he has thus ingeniously been striving to solve.

Dr. Patrick has gathered and fully discussed in his book⁴ all references to James, the brother of the Lord, which are found in the New Testament; those found in the Gospel according to the Hebrews, and the quotation from Hegesippus preserved by Eusebius, he regards as of no historical value. All that is contained in the New Testament is, however, taken at its face value. And the statement concerning James found in Josephus is held to be authentic and trustworthy. The speech in Acts, chap. 15, is genuine, as is also the epistle which bears the name of James, and which was written between 47 and 50 A. D. "The evidence in its favor," he assures us, "is more than adequate to convince any reasonable man." The book will render a service, but it is somewhat dogmatic, is prolix and repetitious, and the author has an odd and wearisome habit of putting his own or other people's views into series of rhetorical questions; sometimes six or seven and, in at least one case, ten such questions follow one another without a break.

THE RELATION BETWEEN PAUL AND JESUS

We have in an interesting monograph⁵ a temperate and able discussion of the view suggested by Baur, and recently elaborated and defended by Pfeiderer, Weinle, Wernle, Wrede, Brückner, and others, that Paul's conception of Jesus the Messiah is derived, in its main and controlling features, not from the life and teaching of Jesus, but from various Jewish, Oriental, and Greek sources; the theory that, before his conversion, Paul had formed, especially from Jewish apocalypses, a conception of the Messiah as a heavenly being intermediate between God and man, who was to descend to the earth and work deliverance for the Jewish people; and that at his conversion he transferred this conception to the risen and exalted Jesus who appeared to him on the Damascus road; and that, instead of trying to

⁴ *James the Lord's Brother*. By William Patrick. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Imported by Scribners, 1906. x+369 pages. \$2. net.

⁵ *Die geistige Einwirkung der Person Jesu auf Paulus: Eine historische Untersuchung*. Von Paul Kölbing. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906. vii+114 pages. M. 2.80.

adjust this view to the earthly life of Jesus, he ignored that life, and neglected the traditional teachings of Jesus. Kölbinger frankly admits that Paul had ideas concerning the Messiah and his way of saving men which he certainly did not receive from Jesus of Nazareth, and which are not easily harmonized with Jesus' conception of himself and his mission, and of God's way of saving men. But he also shows that Paul held views of the fatherly love of God for all men, and of the ethical and spiritual nature of salvation and of the coming kingdom of God, which he could not have derived from Jewish apocalypses, but which must be traced to the influence and teaching of the historical Jesus, whose proclamation of a kingdom of forgiveness, hope, and joy for sinners was new. Even Paul's view of salvation without obedience to the law is a fair and necessary deduction from Jesus' proclamation of the universal love of God, and his exaltation of moral duties and love above the requirements of the law. Some parts of Paul's theology are more Jewish than Christian, but they are ways in which a man, trained as a Pharisee and converted in the maturity of his intellectual development, explains the great, spiritual convictions which have pervaded his soul through the knowledge he has gained of the spiritual greatness of Jesus. The author has certainly pointed out the weak point in the argument of the scholars whom he criticizes, and has stated clearly the weightiest argument against their position.

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In this little brochure of Kaftan⁶ we have a trenchant criticism of the biblical-historical writings of Bousset and Wrede and of their school. He accuses them of intermingling with the subject-matter their own world-view, and thus failing to reach pure, objective, historical reality. What they describe is history as it would be for the modern man, but not the history that actually happened. That which Bousset presents as a historical portrait of Jesus, Kaftan characterizes as the confession of faith of a modern man. Bousset assumes that Jesus must have experienced and reasoned upon his experience as the modern man does, and so he appropriates as historical all that appeals to his own reason and piety; but he neglects in the traditions of Jesus those features that do not fit in with modern presuppositions. For this reason, though he acknowledges that Jesus regarded himself as the Messiah, yet, he thinks it was a mere form of his thought, a burden which he carried that had no essential place in his prophetic activity and mission. But Kaftan asserts that this messianic

⁶ *Jesus und Paulus: Eine freundschaftliche Streitschrift gegen die Religionsgeschichtlichen*. Von Julius Kaftan. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 77 pages. M. o. 80.

consciousness was a living reality with Jesus, inspiring his entire ministry; that the difficulties which Bousset finds in the conception did not exist for Jesus at all; and that the failure of Bousset to appreciate the value of this consciousness for Jesus is the fundamental defect of his treatment.

Wrede's life of Paul is a misinterpretation of the great apostle from the same cause. Kaftan admits that Wrede is correct in making the doctrine of *redemption from the world* the central teaching of Paul, but his treatment is too formal, too objective, too intellectual; there is a vital religious experience, a deep subjective element, that he misses entirely. As a result of this unhistorical interpretation of both Jesus and the apostle, there is an unjust depreciation of the latter, who is charged with departing radically from the teaching of Jesus and with being in reality the actual founder of historical Christianity. The religion of Jesus, which, they claim, is of the "once-born" type, and lacking the sacrificial character in Paul, meets the needs of the modern man, and a return to him would mean a new epoch for Christianity. But Kaftan denies this difference between Jesus and Paul, which, if it did exist, would, according to his conception of religion, make the apostle the greater of the two. He regards the whole movement as an attempt to push into the background the central fact of redemption, the "twice-born" type of religion, to use the language of Professor James, which is the essence of Christianity. In opposition to this he points out that every great Christian reformer, every fruitful epoch of Christianity, has gone back to a greater appreciation of Paul, and it seems rather unhistorical to expect that the next epoch will be attained by a rejection of him. Further, the teaching and influence of the spirit of Jesus upon men, even apart from the doctrine of Paul, lead to a redemptive experience; religious psychology recognizes a redemptive experience as characteristic of the strongest religions, and the science of religion confirms this fact.

Kaftan has written an able criticism—one that needs to be read in these days when the historical positions of this school are so popular; but, at the same time, it is a question if it is not Kaftan the theologian who speaks, and if his own historical results do not reflect his theological presuppositions.

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THE FOURTH GOSPEL

No better evidence of the richness of John's gospel can be found than in the vital interpretation⁷ of this brief section of it as given us by Mr. Reid. It is only one of many sections that might thus be expounded. The

⁷ *Jesus and Nicodemus: A Study in Spiritual Life.* By John Reid. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Imported by Scribner, 1906. 288 pages. \$1.75.

conversation with Nicodemus peculiarly invites exposition, not only because of the far-reaching truth contained in it, but also because from our knowledge of the historical situation we are enabled to fill out the scene which the gospel gives in bare outline. Mr. Reid has become himself master of the historical situation, and has thus made luminous the mental attitude of Nicodemus. He has also given the right place to the reflective illumination of the mind of the evangelist as it came to a larger, fuller understanding of Jesus. Both of these helps are needed to a just interpretation of this passage. The one saves us from a wrong exposition of such a requirement, e. g., as "water and the Spirit" (vs. 5); the other, from referring the words in vss. 16-20 in their present form directly to Jesus. Originally given in the form of lectures or sermons to different congregations in Scotland, these expositions have a direct and forceful bearing upon life. They are not mere studies, but studies filled with a vital interest for those to whom they were addressed. They thus bring the great truths of this conversation to present application. Most of the critical questions are reserved for notes at the end of the volume. There is perhaps only one interpretation which will not meet with general acceptance. And that is the one given to the words, "The wind bloweth where it listeth." Mr. Reid prefers "The Spirit breatheth where he willeth." His interpretation is certainly suggestive. According to our author, the conversation proper ends with vs. 12. "In the second part (vss. 13-21) we have not so much a continuation of the conversation, as a presentation on the part of the evangelist of the heavenly things," or certain essential truths relating to the matter under discussion. They are set forth as they had taken shape in the mind of the evangelist from a completed view of the Master's teaching, and as they had developed through experience and reflection under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The whole interpretation of this latter part under this conception of its form is eminently satisfactory. It shows continually how helpful that way toward the solution of the Johannine problem is which allows for a decided element of subjectivity in the gospel. It is also careful not to postulate such a degree of subjectivity as virtually makes the gospel in large part a creation of the evangelist. The just discriminations which the allowance of a marked Johannine element require are here given. Would that we had more of such penetrating, illuminating, vital interpretations of the scenes of the Fourth Gospel!

Every student of the Gospel of John, and of the questions which that gospel calls forth, will read this thoughtful and stimulating book⁸ with the

⁸ *The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose and Theology.* By Ernest F. Scott. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Imported by Scribner, 1906. vii+379 pages. \$2.

keenest interest. It is a fresh, penetrating discussion of the contents of the gospel, with the object of making clear, not only the purpose of the gospel, but the actual theological situation in which that purpose was wrought out. The gospel came into existence in the "third generation after Christ," and is a "work of transition in which primitive Christianity is carried over into a different world of thought." We do not know who the author was, but he was a disciple whose fellowship with the living Christ gave him an understanding of the real mind of his Master, which was as valid as that of his immediate disciples. His work is not a mere speculative treatise upon the eternal worth of Jesus, but a large, full, appreciative interpretation of the facts of his earthly career in the light of a disciple's inward experience—an interpretation which shall show that the Christ of experience and the Jesus of history are one, and that in the recorded life there is an abiding import. While the facts are thus used, it is well to bear in mind that they are of subordinate importance. The evangelist comes to them with a certain conception of the person and life of Christ, and in order to make this clear handles the facts with considerable freedom. To such an extent is this true that it is questionable how far the old argument for the authenticity of the narrative—its vivid details—can be maintained. "The picturesque detail can be set down, not to the accurate memory of the eye-witness, but to the fine instinct of the literary artist." In the discourses a large subjective element is present. They are the words of Jesus plus interpretative expansions and additions made by the writer of the gospel. In all this there is no intention of falsifying; rather, the abiding purpose of making evident the eternal Christ, through whom men shall gain life, is what dominates the whole structure of the gospel. The necessity for this fresh and larger interpretation was in the time in which the evangelist was living, in the culture by which he was surrounded, and in the tendency to devitalize Christianity by either making it into a philosophy or treating it simply as a tradition. The earnest effort to meet this necessity has caused the incorporation of diverse elements which the writer has not successfully fused.

Again and again we meet with isolated ideas which cannot be reconciled with the characteristic Johannine thought. . . . The author is continually trying to find place within the same system for opposite types of thought and belief. . . . A revelation given through a historical life is interpreted by means of a philosophical doctrine with which it cannot in any true sense be reconciled.

From these statements and quotations the author's point of view can be readily gained. The whole book is occupied in making good these assertions. "Three main sources are traceable in the gospel—the synoptic tra-

dition, the writings of Paul, and the Alexandrian philosophy;" but the material from each has been stamped with the author's own genius. One is somewhat surprised, after the strong emphasis upon the unfused character of the gospel, to come upon an equal emphasis upon its organic unity. This latter is so clear as to make Wendt's theory of a double source wholly untenable. That the gospel has been influenced by the teachings of Paul seems unquestionable, but it is mere theorizing to discover in the story of Nathanael a symbolic reference to the great apostle. The whole section on the relation of the gospel to Paul is, however, worth most careful attention. So, too, is the discriminating estimate of the bearing of Alexandrian influences. "They do not affect the substance of the Johannine thought so much as the forms under which it is presented."

Before taking up the discussion of the leading doctrines of the gospel, the author devotes two chapters to setting forth the polemical and ecclesiastical aims which he discovers in it. There are at least three parties. The Jews, the followers of John the Baptist, and the Gnostics receive attention with polemical intent, and this fact makes the gospel strongly controversial. The critical question regarding the whole matter of these controversial features of the gospel is whether they have compelled a construction of the history, or whether they simply determined the selection of events in order to show the actual situation as it was in the days of Jesus, and thus make clear the innermost meanings of later and kindred antagonisms. We believe the latter to be the fact. The fidelity of the situations to the times of Jesus argues against the author's conclusion that we must find an adaptation of the history to the conditions of a later time. In the deeply interesting chapter on ecclesiastical aims the position of the author is revealed in such statements as these:

His conception of Christ as the Logos involves him in a view of Life which can only be described as semi-physical. . . . John accepts without question the ordinary church doctrine of the mystical efficacy of baptism. . . . Baptism is the necessary miracle by which this change [regeneration], half-physical in its character, is made possible.

It is needless to say that such interpretations will call forth sharp dissent. One of the persistently debated questions regarding the Fourth Gospel is the relation of the prologue to the rest of the gospel. Is it of the nature of a postscript, as Harnack maintains, or does its doctrine of the Logos mold the whole succeeding narrative? Certainly our author is right in declaring that "the theme of the gospel is not the Logos, but the Divine Person, Jesus Christ;" but when he claims that the evangelist has "so imported the doctrine of the Logos into the gospel record as to empty the

life of Christ of much of its real worth and grandeur," and that he is trying to interpret under the forms of philosophy what has been given him in the experience of faith, we must make an emphatic dissent. The only philosophic term which the gospel offers us is the Logos, and that is immediately filled in with content from the Old Testament, and from the evangelist's own experience. Nor is Jesus presented to us as omniscient or omnipotent. No gospel makes more real the true humanity of Jesus, so that such statements as declare that Jesus as Logos was incapable of human weakness forget the depictions of 4:6; 12:27; 13:21; and 11:33. Indeed, the author's endeavor to show that the whole presentation of Christ wavers between a metaphysical conception reaching back to Philo and the Greek thinkers, and a religious conception born of his own experience, is open to serious question. It will surprise the reader to learn that "in the true Johannine doctrine there is no logical place for the view of the death of Christ as an atonement."

In the two deeply interesting chapters on "Life" and the "Communication of Life" we are brought to see the same combination of metaphysical and religious conceptions—the same combination of Greek notions with those derived from experience—as appear in the unfolding of the doctrine of Christ. There is so much that is helpful mixed with statements that are open to objection that each chapter is worthy of separate review.

John involves himself in a view [of life] which may fairly be described as semi-physical. . . . The life was present in him as an ethereal essence, and is transmitted through the elements of the Eucharist which represent his flesh and blood. . . . Nowhere is John's affinity to the Greek thinkers more unmistakable than in the value he assigns to knowledge.

In a gospel which seeks to give us the purely spiritual meaning of Jesus and life, such conceptions seem strangely out of place. "Union with Christ is on one side a magical transaction involving a relation to Christ, which is almost physical in its nature; on the other, it is grounded in a moral fellowship."

John's spiritual interpretation of the return of Christ is finely set forth, and the true bearing of the evangelist's profound conception of the spiritual as opposed to the apocalyptic understanding of this great reality made helpfully evident. Because of his doctrine of a spiritual return of Christ, the author finds that there is no place in the Johannine theology for the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. It is difficult to distinguish between the work of the Spirit and the work of the exalted Christ. The teaching of the gospel regarding the Spirit is an attempt to combine the doctrine of Paul with his own regarding the exalted Christ. Paul had place for a doctrine of the

Spirit because of his conception of the parousia. One is led to ask if Paul with his doctrine of the "indwelling Christ" is not landed in the same confusion.

Such, in bare and imperfect outline, is the method of this earnest and thoughtful interpretation. One rises from its perusal wondering if the Fourth Gospel merits all the devotion it has obtained. Its rather crude combination (according to Mr. Scott) of diverse conceptions brings to us much that cannot be of permanent value. The evangelist

has recourse to the speculative forms which the thought of his time afforded him, and seeks to express by means of them the purely religious truths of Christianity. The result is that the genuine import of his teaching is, to a great extent, obscured. We have constantly to disengage it from the alien metaphysic which appears to interpret, but most often warps and conceals it.

Such a judgment seems fatal to the gospel as a gospel. Is not the basal error of this whole criticism in supposing that the evangelist ever attempted a metaphysical presentation of Jesus? All he aimed to do was to give us the religious value of his Master as the revelation of God to man. That stands unique and abiding. Metaphysics has earnest questions to ask regarding it, but the direct answer to them is not essayed in the gospel. Its view is wholly religious, and there is an interpretation of it all which finds no such imperfect harmonizations and crude jointures as are here required.

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THE APOCALYPSE

There is no part of the New Testament to which the "religious-historical method" finds readier or more justifiable application than the Book of Revelation. So much of its language and metaphor has undoubtedly a history rooted in the Old Testament that the attempt to seek the sources of other and stranger figures and ideas in extra-canonical or extra-Judaic literature is both natural and welcome. Neither is there any other book of the New Testament which more readily invites the application of critical methods for the discovery of "sources" of another kind, constituent documents of independent origin. There are so many abrupt transitions, apparent recapitulations, threads taken up only to be dropped at once and for good; there is such difficulty in securing a connected and coherent interpretation of what was in the writer's mind; the suggestion that he was not the prime author of all its contents is *prima facie*, a natural one, and remains so in spite of the ill success of so many attempts to work it

out in a convincing analysis. One almost inevitably looks for some application of both these methods in any modern commentary on the Revelation, and yet the two outstanding commentaries on the book which were published in 1906 offer in this respect a notable contrast. Bousset,⁹ of course, whose first edition has been in our hands for some ten years, frankly accepts both methods, but deprecates the extremes to which they have severally been carried. Swete, in principle at least, rejects them both as aids to the interpretation of the book.

The most that can be safely affirmed is that the writer shared with the Jewish apocalyptists the stock of apocalyptic imagery and mystical and eschatological thought which was the common property of an age nurtured in the Old Testament and hard pressed by the troubles and dangers of the times.

Dr. Swete's work¹⁰ is marked by all the care, thoroughness, and precision of scholarship in linguistic and grammatical interpretation which distinguish all his work and secure to him his place as a member of the famous "Cambridge" school. But to the present writer he appears, by the complete rejection of the methods applied, e. g., by Bousset, to exclude the only possible means of arriving at an interpretation of the book which is at once consistent and primary; i. e., an interpretation of what was in the mind of the author. On all philological and grammatical points this commentary is copious and exact. (We have noticed misprints on pp. 144 and 263.) Much use is made of the early Greek and Latin commentators, such as Andreas and Primasius, and the interpretation of individual passages, though it is often in the nature of secondary application of principles, is sober and just. Dr. Swete has not thought it necessary, even in the Introduction, to deal in any detail with the arguments on which the prevailing criticism is based. For him there is a simple dilemma between regarding the book as a mere "storehouse of first-century eschatology" and "a prophecy in the true sense of the word;" and given this dilemma his antecedent position leaves him no choice. On the questions of date and authorship he is more inclined to make concessions to prevailing critical views. With obvious reluctance he sets aside the view of his predecessors, Lightfoot and Westcott, which would place the book anterior to the fall of Jerusalem, and gives his adhesion to the Domitianic date. With this is connected the fact that Dr. Swete has a very open mind as to the author-

⁹ *Die Offenbarung Johannis*. [Meyer's "Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar."] 6. Auflage. Von der 5. Auflage bearbeitet von Wilhelm Bousset: Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906. 468 pages. M. 8.

¹⁰ *The Apocalypse of St. John*. The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Indices. By Henry Barclay Swete. New York: Macmillan, 1906. 335 pages. \$3.50.

ship. He does not overlook or minimize the affinities between the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse, but would rather explain the dependence of the gospel upon the apostle whose name it bears as indirect, leaving the authorship of the Apocalypse in the strict sense of the word to John. On the other hand, he takes up a position of indecision in regard to the question: Who was this John? The evidence which may be derived from de Boor's fragment and ancillary documents has plainly impressed him: if it be allowed to enter into our calculation, "it becomes a very important factor, for it disposes of the Apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse."

It is at this point that these two books, otherwise so diverse, come nearest to one another. For Bousset's second edition is remarkable for its frank acceptance of the early date for the death of John the son of Zebedee, and the full application of the inferences which follow. The first edition, though nominally a revision of Meyer, was practically an independent work, and has stood for ten years as the most thorough and trustworthy commentary on the Apocalypse at our command. It may be said at once that the new edition presents in nearly every aspect a decided advance upon the previous one. Of the things which have happened in the interval the two which seem to have been most significant for Bousset are the various confirmations which have been adduced in support of de Boor's Papias-fragment, and the brief but pregnant essay of Johannes Weiss. The former has led to the entire rewriting of the section of the introduction bearing on the authorship. The new material for judgment is already familiar, and has recently been skilfully marshaled afresh by Professor Burkitt. Bousset sets it out with great clearness, and draws certain far-reaching conclusions. "All points to the inference that John in the Presbyter-fragment of Irenaeus is 'John the presbyter' of Papias; the second and third epistles of John form the bridge from the Apocalypse to the gospel." "John of the Apocalypse cannot be identified with the apostle and the son of Zebedee, but was another John of high repute in Asia Minor." And he is probably the same as the presbyter of Papias, the unnamed, long-lived disciple of the twenty-first chapter of the gospel, the "presbyter" of the epistles, the "witness" of the Fourth Gospel, and finally the teacher of Polycarp mentioned by Irenaeus in the letter to Florinus.

It will be seen at once that this represents a definite acceptance of the new theory as to the authorship which has not before been reached by any commentator on the book; and the fact that Bousset has thrown the weight of his authority into the scale in favor of the early date for the death of the son of Zebedee will be felt in all subsequent discussion. That which has been felt as an objection by certain English scholars—viz., the considerable

amount of second-century testimony to the son of Zebedee as the author—gives Bousset little pause. He answers that the confusion between the two Johns, the apostle and the presbyter, began soon after the close of the Johannine writings, and spread rapidly; and he appeals to the corresponding confusion between Philip the apostle and Philip the evangelist; also to the silence of Polycrates and other authorities as to the presence of the apostle at Ephesus.

On other matters, including the date, Bousset adheres pretty completely to the views adopted in his first edition. But the whole work has undergone thorough revision, and every page bears witness to the care with which the writer has weighed the arguments of Weiss and others. The ultimate point at issue between them is one of the greatest interest for the valuation of the book. It amounts to this: Granted that two hands have been at work, which of them, the earlier or the later, is to be regarded as the truly creative or formative influence, so as to deserve the title of author? Bousset, ascribing a little more both of making and of shaping to the second, calls him the author, and dates the work in the early nineties; Weiss regards this as the hand rather of an editor, and, ascribing a good deal more both of contents and of coherence to the work as it reached his hand, would call the earlier of the two the author, and find the bulk of the book in a Christian apocalypse of the time of Vespasian. We cannot say that Bousset has convinced us that the first three chapters are necessarily late and due to "the last hand." And if they are seen to belong to the other large sections of the book which either may or must have an earlier date assigned to them, the arguments for assigning a Vespasianic date to at least the first edition of the Apocalypse will continue to gather force. Bousset's new addition marks a distinct advance over even his own first edition in the direction of sober and convincing exegesis; but a comparison between the two is so instructive that we should not care to be without either.

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RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Albert Rivaud has presented two excellent studies in philosophy. The first¹ considers the problem of becoming as found in Greek philosophy, and its relation to our modern notion of matter. By means of a historical analysis of Greek thought from the dawn of culture until Theophrastus,

¹ *Le problème du devenir et la notion de la matière dans la philosophie grecque depuis les origines jusqu'à Théophraste.* Par Albert Rivaud. 1 vol. Paris: Alcan, 1906. viii + 488 pages. Fr. 7.50.

it aims to prove that our conception of matter was unknown to the Greeks, though it was sometimes approached, and that its place was taken by the notion of becoming or change. The data upon which such a study must rest confessedly involve much of hypothesis; yet the author has made critical use of current literature and has justified his positions in valuable notes. He regards the Greek myth as presenting the elements of Greek science; it is an attempt to rationalize the idea of change. All that science could do was to complete the process with the aid of observation and logic. The rise of logic among the Eleatic philosophers; the various attempts to reconcile reason and experience on a theory of atoms or elements; the efforts of the Sophists, at the very head of whom our author places Zeno and Melissus, either to insist on the continuity of change or else to deny it entirely; the influence of medical science on the concept of body; the endeavor to state the order of change by some rational concept such as geometrical form, together with the notions of a hierarchy of forms and of a periodic return—all are carefully traced. But, "no term is met which can exactly correspond to our word 'matter.' . . . None defines the permanent substance, resisting and solid reality which subsists under phenomena." Such is the result of a critical examination of the vocabulary of physics up to Plato. There are, of course, many things that point toward a theory of matter, such as generation and decay, metamorphoses, religious conceptions of the body as the tomb of the soul, logical conceptions of being, and the medical notion of matter. The contribution of Plato and Aristotle was merely in the direction of giving coherence and unity to existent theories. Plato has no word equivalent to "matter." In fact, all Platonic physics is myth, for science arises in sensation and opinion. The suggestion is made that the *Timaeus* is capable of intelligent interpretation if *χώρα* be regarded as the theater where becoming takes place. The real problem of Plato is that of the participation of phases of disorder in order. The latter belongs properly only to the realm of ideas. The solution is, in the end, effected by a world-soul. Plato is the first to present a concept of nature. Aristotle follows Platonism. Matter is still becoming, even though it be regarded at times as a substratum. Matter is dynamic, and this force or power which is matter produces change in a definite order and unites being and becoming. Perfect being has no becoming, but everything else belongs to nature which is teleological. Each thing in the process of becoming realizes a form. What that form may be can be learned only from experience and induction. Real being consists, therefore, in a complex of matter (becoming) and form. In any primitive sense matter is an unknowable, negating everything of

reality; it is indeterminate, changing, disordered. Becoming is found somewhere between opposing qualities, so that matter would be the center of all oppositions and is a logical substratum rather than a reality in any true sense. To the visibility of Platonic body Aristotle adds tangibility. His teleology alone saves Aristotle from a thoroughgoing materialism. In the hands of his commentators only his method was conserved, and a more modern concept of matter was substituted.

The second study^a deals with the Spinozistic notions of essence and existence. The method is historical, successively dealing in chronological order with the various writings of Spinoza. All texts referred to are cited in the notes and, in connection with the index, form a desirable glossary of Spinoza's works. In the vast field of bibliography use has purposely been made only of the most recent works. The aim of the author has been to assemble and interpret the texts in Spinoza relative to the distinction of essence and existence. Such a task necessarily touches upon every point of Spinoza's philosophy, because of the centrality of the problem of being in his thinking. He both distinguishes essence from existence and confounds them. Yet in God alone does he regard essence and existence as identical. This is the justification for the ontological argument. Everywhere else the ideal and the real are distinct, so that the Spinozistic pantheism is not monistic. God is the immediate cause of essence and the mediate cause of existence. All true knowledge is of essence, but we know essence only through God. Eternity, and consequently immortality, belongs only to essence. God is necessary essence. He does not exist in time, but in eternity. He has no true perception nor thought. Spinoza uses the same expressions to describe both essences and existences. This implies the reality of the world of sense. Yet at other times he contrasts essence and existence. A similar contradiction is found in his conception of God as immobile, yet as producing or causing essences. All modes of extension are united under the concept of *Facies totius universi*, and those of thought by the *Intellectus infinitus*. Man is a microcosm. Each human intellect is a reduced copy of the universal intellect. Its essence is the divine intellect itself. Yet the fact that the body is perishable suggests a duality. As a matter of fact, however, consciousness of eternity is derived only through fullness of the sensuous life. God is found within, at the depth of the human soul. The result of our author's study is the conviction that it is a supreme interest in human immortality that leads Spinoza to confound existence

^a *Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de Spinoza*. Par Albert Rivaud. 1 vol. Paris: Alcan, 1906. viii + 216 pages. Fr. 3.75.

and essence in God, and very frequently in inferior beings who do not know how to live the life eternal, while he distinguishes them only in man.

The value of these two works for the theologian is not insignificant. The first contains a treatment of a historical phase of the problem of reality that must be taken into account in a scientific formulation of the sensible universe. Such a formulation is a necessary introduction to theology. The importance and worth of a careful analysis of the Spinozistic philosophy with reference to its fundamental concepts does not need elaboration. No modern thinker, and least of all in the theological field, can escape a reckoning with it.

A small pamphlet³ discusses interestingly the relation of Schiller to religion. Schiller never made religion one of his themes. He has no great religious characters. Problems such as soul-gropings after truth, nature in a narrow sense, the circle of childhood, the relation of man and woman, folk-study, did not enter his thought. Culture and thought were the only avenues of religion left open to him; hence religion was merely a derivative. Jesus' personality meant nothing to him. God was idea. Ethics displaced religion. Culture and reflection were the sole sources of his religious coloring. His idealism is akin to religion, but is not religion. God, faith, feeling, obedience, hope, lack personal meaning. Art and morality are united against religion rather than uniting with it into a perfect whole.

The posthumous volume of Shields's *Philosophia ultima*⁴ contains essays on "The Scientific Problems of Religion" and "The Christian Evidences of the Physical and Psychical Sciences." It is forty-five years since the publication of Shields's first essay, and nearly thirty since that essay was expanded into a larger work. This work, in turn, was republished in the present-day form. The first volume appeared in 1888, and the second in 1889. The author was intent upon establishing the harmony of science and religion on philosophic principles, in this way securing a *philosophia ultima*. Modern thought has passed beyond phases of Dr. Shields's problem. In the field of apologetics, for instance, he believes that "the great works of Paley and Butler with their acknowledged defects . . . are not likely to be very soon supplanted." Comte, Hegel, and Hamilton are his philosophic adversaries. In theology he is a conservative, and in epistemology a naïve realist. His real interest lies in the

³ *Schillers Stellung zur Religion*. Von Adolph Schmitthenner. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1905. 32 pages. M. 0.50.

⁴ *Philosophia ultima; or, Science of the Sciences*. Vol. III. By Charles Woodruff Shields. New York: Scribner, 1905. lxxviii+228 pages. \$3.

fact that he attempted, in the second volume of his work, a classification of the sciences which he urges as historical, logical, and practical. Religion he regards as the metaphysical complement of the sciences. In its day the author's doctrine was looked at askance because he suggested the fallibility of dogmas supposed to be based on Scripture. His programme for his work was never completed, nor does the present volume advance it toward completion. In a sense it is supplementary. Any who are curious may glean the essence of the former volumes, with some modern emendations, in the brief statement prefixed to this. The bulk of the work is taken up with extolling Butler, condemning Strauss, and presenting a scientific argument for religion. To our author the Bible "cannot but be infallible and inerrant, the very Word of God;" "it is only our human interpretation that is fallible and errant." He welcomes criticism that recognizes this canon. The practiced reader will recognize the result. The Bible is a source, not only of religion, but also of scientific teaching.

The biography of Dr. Shields which the volume contains is interesting as throwing light on the life of the writer, and as giving the motive for his work. Thought, however, is advancing so rapidly that this volume seems like a voice from the past.

WILLIAM THEODORE PAULLIN

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KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Under the above title Professor Gwatkin presents to the public his Gifford Lectures of 1904 and 1905.¹ He deals with his subject in a comprehensive manner, seeking in the first series to bring out the contribution which natural theology makes to our knowledge of God, and in the second to sum up the salient contributions of history.

In the apologetical task the author starts with the argument for the possibility of a revelation of God.

If there is a God—a personal Being above us and not below us—I think we may take it as possible that he may have something to reveal; and then, if he is able to reveal it, if he may be supposed willing to do so, and if man is able to receive it—on these four conditions revelation is possible, and the question whether or how far there is a revelation in such or such facts is simply a question of evidence.

This sentence gives a very good idea of the method employed in the first series of lectures. Dealing first with the supposition of the existence of

¹ *The Knowledge of God*. By Henry Melvill Gwatkin. 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1906. Vol. I, 308 pages; Vol. II, 330 pages. \$3.75 net.

a God, the author points out that whatever tells us *that* God is informs us at the same time of *what* he is; that is, in the facts which convince us of his existence we have a revelation of his character. The existence of God cannot be demonstrated, since the "postulate of his existence is the necessary postulate of every argument instead of the logical conclusion of one argument;" but the virtual universality of religion, the influence of things upon each other, the moral necessity for a deeper reading of causation than science gives, the explanation of matter, life, and conscience, make belief in God very rational and convincing.

If we turn to the realm of nature, we find evidence of an "eternal person indefinitely great in power and intellect." And if we give up the idea of sundry special adaptations and deal with the laws of development itself, we may still employ the design argument to express the wisdom and power of God in nature. But a more adequate revelation of God is found in man, in the harmony of his conscience with his will. Further, it is here that we learn that sympathy and trust, the application of the feelings of the heart as well as the intellect, are essential to obtain the revelation conveyed in a person. So that, if God is a person, we must assume a personal relation to him.

In addition to this revelation of God, natural theology can determine in advance, from a study of the needs of man and the character of God, the peculiar nature of any special revelation which might be given by God to man. Such a revelation might arise from the fact of sin; it would have some quality of mediation necessary to remove sin; it would be a practical, serious, and moral revelation. Natural theology may also deal with such terms as "inspiration," prophecy," and "miracle," and one chapter is devoted to the examination of them in the first series.

In the second series of lectures Professor Gwatkin shows how in the sphere of religion knowledge of God has actually developed along the lines which he marked out in natural theology. Omitting the oriental religions of China, India, and Egypt, and passing rapidly over the primitive religions and the religion of Greece, he proceeds to sketch the salient features of the knowledge of God as they have emerged in the long historical development of the Hebrew and Christian religion.

In both its apologetic and its historical task this work is conservative and follows in the beaten paths of the traditional methods. In the philosophical thought one is reminded at times of Professor Campbell Fraser, to whom the author acknowledges indebtedness, though one misses the philosophic spirit and breadth and the dignity of expression that characterize the latter. On the historical side Professor Gwatkin is more at home,

though one cannot escape here the feeling of special pleading which does injustice to many facts and persons of history. Take, for example, such statements as these:

The gospel makes no outward acts unconditionally binding, but the two sacraments ordained by Christ himself. All further institutions and ordinances are ordained by men, and may for some cause be changed by men without disloyalty to Christ. . . . Personal infallibility is a tenable theory in the case of Jesus of Nazareth, because Christians believe him without sin. . . . The *prima facie* inference is evident that Jesus claimed to be the Son of God in the full Christian sense.

But, did Christ make the sacraments "unconditionally binding," or did the church? If he did, where, in principle, is the freedom of the gospel and its superiority to Judaism? Is the sinlessness of Christ a proved fact of history or a dogma of the church? Even as historical fact does it carry with it the infallibility of Jesus? If so where, again, is the freedom of the gospel? The last statement does injustice to biblical history, and we are not surprised that later Athanasius is represented as standing on biblical ground, while Arius is denied religious or philosophical or exegetical foundation.

The same looseness of expression and of thought characterizes his apologetic work. For instance, the supposition of God is regarded as a theory like the law of gravitation, but, since it is a "final theory," it cannot, like the latter, be subject to change. But if the business of a theory is to explain facts and unify them, it must be modified by the facts to which it gives meaning and unity; and a final theory—that is, one which seeks to unify universals—is subject to the same law of change. Otherwise it is useless; for it is not being used in actual life. Again: "If all things are not independent of each other, they must all (including ourselves) be dependent on something else." But why not regard them as interdependent? And if not, then must we not extend the causal relation *ad infinitum*?

In the design argument Professor Gwatkin strips off all the conditions that give rise to the origination and realization of a human design or plan, and then claims that the analogy holds when applied to God. But if one maintains this form of argument, must one not take with it the conception of God which it involves?

In *Christian Theism and Spiritual Monism* we have a very readable book.² Mr. Walker shows wide reading in science and philosophy, and states his position with clearness and force. On the principles of modern

² *Christian Theism and Spiritual Monism*. By W. L. Walker. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1906, 484 pages. \$3 net.

science and of the idealistic philosophy he seeks to establish a form of monism consistent with the Christian thought of God. He starts with the familiar idealistic argument that the existence of science or of knowledge implies the uniformity or rationality of nature—a rational universe—one that has a “Divine Mind as its source or producing Power.”

The causal principle demands such a conception to explain the existence of reason within ourselves and in nature. The reasonableness of such a position becomes even clearer when one considers such terms as “matter,” “mind,” “energy,” and “life” as science regards them today. For the scientific thought of matter is today that of electrons in motion; energy is the “manifestation of motion.” Thus what we have from all these terms is the conception of motion in which some “power is manifested;” and it is easy to think of matter as the “expression of spirit.” Corroborating this are the tendencies in evolutionary theory today which make it easy for us to believe in evolution by a rational power. The best example of evolution is that controlled by the conscious selective purpose of man himself, and in nature we must think that the process is controlled by a reason outside of man. And, since it is irrational to think of anything in the process which was not already in the source, we are led back to a rational, eternal God, a “God who must be Absolute Reality in himself apart from the developing creation,” who is “Infinite, Unlimited, Unconditioned, Perfect Being,” and yet who “has conditioned himself in our world and is realizing himself in finite forms.”

What we have here is evolution within limits. “The world is the scene of an evolution, but it cannot be the evolution of God.” But just what is the relation of God to the world, or of God as he is in himself to God as he has conditioned himself in our world and is realizing himself in finite forms? If God is unconditioned and perfect in himself, why does he undertake to condition himself and realize himself in finite forms? If God in himself is reality complete and apart from our world with its history and struggle, then the latter is pure illusion, and it is a problem to account even for the illusion. But if the processes of our world are real, if human knowledge and morality and goodness have value, then they must be included in reality itself, and reality must be evolving. Moreover, if the principle of causation arises within experience to account for the different elements in experience, it is a question if it is justifiable to apply it to explain experience itself.

Mr. Walcott has published a thesis,³ which he submitted to the University of Columbia for the degree of doctor of philosophy. It is a historical

³ *Kantian and Lutheran Elements in Ritschl's Conception of God.* By Gregory Dexter Walcott. New York: Columbia University, 1904. 121 pages.

study written in an impartial spirit, and forms a genuine contribution to the literature of the Ritschlian movement. In the first two chapters the author points out the essential elements both in Luther's and in Kant's conception of God, while the last two chapters deal with the conception of Ritschl and of its relation to these thinkers. Mr. Walcott regards Ritschl's primary interest the religious and historical one, and believes that his conception of God was formed largely from a study of the New Testament writings and from the religious teaching of Luther. Even his doctrine of the value-judgment goes back on the religious side to Luther's doctrine of faith. On the other hand, Ritschl was a thorough student of philosophy, influenced strongly by neoKantianism, and either directly or indirectly his value-judgment shows Kantian influence. This may have come, however, through Lotze, whose theory of knowledge Ritschl accepted. The position taken by Mr. Walcott in regard to Ritschl is similar to that of the reviewer in two recent articles in this *Journal* upon the metaphysical and religious presuppositions of Ritschl. We cannot quite agree with the mild and qualified criticism that Ritschl failed to "emphasize morality as an attribute of God." He may not make a clear distinction between the moral and the religious, or his statement of the distinction may not be tenable; but it is precisely the ethical attributes of the character of God which his theology makes prominent, and it seems to me it is just his type of theology that leaves place for the advancing conceptions of morality to be idealized in its conception of God.

W. C. KEIRSTEAD

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STUDIES OF ALLEGED MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SUPERNATURAL

These three volumes¹ are connected in that they deal with phases of the pathology of religion, with sides of the religious life which are more or less *outré* and, in different degrees, under the ban of suspicion of the Christian world at large. The faith-healing of Dr. Dowie and the other-world communications of Dr. Funk were anticipated by the cures through incubation and the oracles of which Miss Hamilton treats.

¹ *John Alexander Dowie and the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion.* By Rolvix Harlan. With an Introductory Preface by Franklin Johnson, Evansville, Wis.: Published by the Author, 1906. xiv + 204 pages. \$1.25.

The Psychic Riddle. By Isaac K. Funk, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1907. viii + 243 pages. \$1.

Incubation; or, The Cure of Disease in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches. By Mary Hamilton, St. Andrews, Scotland: Henderson, 1906. 223 pages.

A historical study of a movement like that of the Christian Catholic church in Zion and of a life like that of its founder, such as this volume by Mr. Harlan embodies, is of permanent value for the science of religion. It has to do with elusive mental and religious phenomena, upon which more light is sought precisely because they are of the pathological order. Most movements like that of Dowie rise and disappear before they can be registered in permanent form, and should be photographed, so to speak, on the wing. The comparatively recent works of Professors Coe and James reveal how important is now deemed an understanding of those drifts of thought which appear in the exceptional currents of religion. It is therefore so much to the good to have the contemporary material here put together by Mr. Harlan that criticism of form, arrangement, and typography is disarmed. Some may see in Dr. Dowie's life a repetition of those religious experiences which, beginning in sincerity, however mistaken, lead on to the point when that greatest of tests, success, shows the subject deteriorating till imposture and bluster furnish the only means of thriving. Certainly the movement illustrates what becomes of a structure reared on vicious exegesis and distorted views of the Bible, of early Christianity, and of modern science. Why may we not have a like study of Koreshanity?

Dr. Funk's work is a continuation of his *Widow's Mite* (New York, 1904), and registers what the author considers further evidence in support of the actuality of communications from the spirit-world. It is doubtful whether great cogency is added by this contribution, especially in view both of the fulness of Dr. Myers' *Human Personality* (New York, 1903), and of the doubt as to the supposed communications of Dr. Hodgson from the other side. Dr. Funk believes that "intelligences foreign to us . . . can and do communicate through the physical sense-organs with those . . . who are living in the flesh," but denies that these intelligences "identify themselves as those who once lived in the flesh." It would have been a knock-down blow for the unbelievers if Dr. Hodgson could have so communicated with his former associates in the work of psychical research that identification of his continuing personality was made undeniable. Dr. Funk honestly shows that this has not been done. He further complicates the matter by showing a conflict of testimony on the part of these "intelligences;" for instance, about the planet Mars, which involves either that some of them are competent liars, practical jokers, or (Dr. Funk quotes the opinion, p. 206) obsessed by evil spirits! Dr. Funk lightens the book by many jokes and by some humor which is of a Scotch character. For one thing, his sincerity shines out, and he refuses to allow an apology by a zealous defender which would compromise his intellectual honesty.

Incubation, as defined by Miss Hamilton, is the practice of sleeping in a temple or church for the purpose of receiving a cure from some malady, mental or physical, and it may in certain cases be vicarious. The present study takes account of materials dating from the fifth pre-Christian century and continuing with hardly a break down to 1906. It notes the connection of the practice with the earlier and well-known custom of visiting a shrine to secure information from the deity by vision or dream induced by sleeping in the place. It then follows the practice employed for purposes of healing, as registered in inscriptions and literature in the cults of Asklepios at various centers, of Amphiaros, Trophonios, Dionysos, and of Isis and Serapis. The transference of the custom to Christians prior to the extinction of heathenism is then shown, and the practice followed at the shrines of Saints Cosmas and Damian, Therapon, Thekla, Michael, Cyrus and John, Julian, and others. The account closes with notes of the present practice in the Greek and Roman Catholic communions. The evidence is dispassionately given and sanely treated. The operation of suggestion and auto-suggestion, subjects too little understood and too little employed in investigations in comparative religion, is discussed. Incidentally much evidence usable for other topics is adduced. The study is by a Carnegie Trust scholar, and is a worthy first-fruit of Mr. Carnegie's benefactions in this direction. The subject is practically new (cf. L. Deubner's *De incubatione*, Leipzig, 1900), and the volume is a welcome addition as a suggestive guide in one of the by-paths of comparative religion. The typography is good, the paper excellent, the binding substantial, and a serviceable index is furnished.

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ISRAEL OR JERAHMEEL?

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Although critical study modifies our conception of Old Testament history at many points, yet there is a firm outline on which the great majority of scholars agree. This outline embraces the following points: the sojourn of certain clans in Egypt; their exodus; a period of wandering in the borderland; the conquest of Canaan; the consolidation of the tribes into a kingdom by David; the division of the kingdom after the death of Solomon; the fall of the northern kingdom at the hands of Assyria; the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadrezzar of Babylon in 586 B. C.; the coherence of a remnant in Babylonia; the rebuilding of the Temple under the Persian power, and later, the rehabilitation of the city of Jerusalem. The scene of this history was Palestine, the land which lies between the Mediterranean on the west and the north Arabian desert on the east, bounded on the north by the well-defined Lebanon Mountains, and on the south by the desert of Sinai. Every intelligent Sunday-school scholar can locate the principal points of interest, both the natural features of the country—the Jordan, the Dead Sea, the Great Plain—and the political divisions, as well as the cities which figure in the narrative. Jerusalem we know and Samaria, Hebron also and Bethlehem, while Dan and Beersheba, Bethel and Shechem are less familiar by only one degree.

This being so, it is somewhat startling to meet a new theory both of the geography and of the history, a theory which is urged (we are tempted to say) with a courage and persistency worthy of a better cause. This theory may be outlined somewhat as follows: The clans were not in Egypt, but were in a north Arabian kingdom called Mucri; the main scene of Israel's history was not Palestine as a whole, but only the southern end of it called the Negeb; this region contained not only the twelve tribes of Israel but also the various powers hostile to Israel; even the alleged empires of Assyria and Babylon were not the great powers of the Euphrates Valley but certain north Arabian kingdoms; the so-called exile was a sojourn in this region, and the return was a return thence; the complaints of the psalmists were directed against enemies in this region, and allusions in them and in the books of *Judith* and *Enoch* show that to a late date the interest of the Jews was confined to the region in question.

Our first thought on becoming acquainted with this scheme of history is that we have before us a colossal mystification. The author (we say to ourselves) is trying to show up the frailties of the critics. Perhaps he has a desire to comfort the traditionalists by a *reductio ad absurdum*, just as Whately refuted Strauss by his *Historic Doubts Relative to Napoleon Buonaparte*. Or else, we think, it is just the author's little joke, a trifle thrown off in his leisure hour to show what can be done by way of paradox. But in all this we should be wide of the mark. To do the author justice, he nowhere betrays the slightest sense of humor. A series of practical jokes would be out of place in a work like the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, while the minute textual criticism embodied in the five hundred pages of the *Critica Biblica* shows a serious purpose which precludes the hypothesis of a mere *jeu d'esprit*. The author moreover makes earnest and repeated appeals to biblical scholars which show his entire sincerity, and which can hardly be set aside on the plea that he is not to be taken seriously, or that he does not mean to be so taken.

There seems to be no reason then why we should not at least give the new theory careful study. Most new discoveries are met by incredulity at first. The impression of strangeness in this case, therefore, is not without precedent, and is in itself no argument against the theory. The author himself remarks that it takes much hard

and self-denying work to get at a new point of view. Even if this new point of view were brought out by an unknown writer we could hardly refuse to examine it; much less can we refuse when the advocate is so distinguished a scholar as Professor Cheyne. His rank as an Old Testament specialist is incontestable. A series of works of the first importance, given to the world by him, places him in the front rank both for scholarship and for ability. His published works, including those we are about to consider, show immense erudition, untiring industry, acute observation, and a sincere desire to advance the truth. When such a man appeals for a hearing we cannot ignore the appeal.

The Jerahmeel theory, as we shall call it, is presented to the world in a number of publications¹ no one of which gives a connected account of the author's results. It is much to be desired that he present us with a complete history of Israel on the lines of his study. It would contribute to clearness also if he would publish a Hebrew text of one or more Old Testament books showing what he supposes to be the earliest form of the narrative. In piecing out his text and his history we may not always correctly represent him. But this will not be the fault of our intention.

First of all the Jerahmeel² theory gives us a radically reconstructed text. The author claims that his minute examination of the documents discloses earlier underlying readings which have been disguised or mutilated by later editors. 'So thorough is the mutilation that the original can be discovered only by the application of new methods and only by one who has a special key to its secrets. This key is made up of the two words *Jerahmeel* and *Mucri*. The first of

¹ Articles in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, especially in the third and fourth volumes; *Crítica Biblica*, of which five parts have appeared with consecutive paging; an article entitled "From Isaiah to Ezra, a Study of Ethanites and Jerahmeelites," in the *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1901; also "A Turning-Point in Old Testament Study," *Nineteenth Century*, January, 1902; "Pressing Needs of the Old Testament Study" and "Babylon and the Bible," *Hibbert Journal*, Vols. I and II; a sketch introductory to the history of Israel in the *Historians' History of the World*, Vol. II; *The Book of Psalms, Translated from a Revised Text with Notes and Introductions*, London, 1904; *Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel*, London, 1907. The last-named volume is a study of the Book of Genesis and of the early chapters of Exodus.

² I retain the form of the name known to us from our English Bible. Cheyne usually prefers the more exact Yerahmeel.

these we recognize at once; Jerahmeel is the name of a clan which sojourned in the southern part of Palestine. A district was called the Negeb of the Jerahmeelites and certain cities belonged to them.³ The Book of Chronicles treating the tribes of Israel genealogically made Jerahmeel one of the descendants of Judah,⁴ meaning simply that the clan had been absorbed in the tribe. There are also two individuals who bear the name Jerahmeel, and if we accept the reading of some Greek copies we may add a third. This is all the information given us by our current Old Testament. It shows that a subdivision of the tribe of Judah (with some Edomite affinities perhaps) bore the name Jerahmeel in the time of David. The fact is interesting, but can hardly be called of first-rate importance.

Mucri is unknown to the Bible reader, and was first brought before the learned world by the distinguished Assyriologist, Hugo Winckler.⁵ On the basis of some expressions in the inscriptions this scholar divined that there was a country called Mucri in northern Syria, and another of the same name in northern Arabia. He conjectured that the latter was referred to in many passages in the Old Testament which are usually supposed to mention Egypt. The confusion would not be impossible, for the essential parts of the two words (mcr) are the same, and the vowels were not expressed in the early Semitic alphabet. With the Assyriological argument we are not now concerned. It has been severely criticized by a recent historian,⁶ and we are justified in saying that the existence of a north Arabian kingdom of Mucri is not yet proved. Even if its existence were proved, the question would remain: How far was Mucri influential in the history of Israel? Professor Cheyne claims not only that it was influential, but that it was dominant. This is his thesis and the proof which he brings is his reconstructed text. Our first duty then is to examine his text-critical methods. For these methods he claims soundness with an emphasis that none can misunderstand.

³ I Sam. 27:10; 30:29.

⁴ I Chron. 2:9, 25, 26, 27, 33, 42.

⁵ Winckler's theory is stated in an essay entitled "Das nordarabische Land Musri," published in his *Orientalische Forschungen*, I, 1893; also in two further discussions, "Musri, Meluhha, Ma'in," published in the *Mitteilungen der deutschen Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*, 1898, and in *KAT.* 3, pp. 136-51.

⁶ Eduard Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme* (1906), pp. 455-71. Cheyne (*Traditions and Beliefs*, p. xi) criticizes, but does not refute, Meyer.

The first demand that we make on a sound criticism is that it take account of transcriptional probability. The textual critic aims to correct the errors of scribes, and these errors arise from omission or duplication of letters, words, and clauses, and from the confusion of letters which resemble each other in form. How far the Jerahmeel theory takes account of these causes of corruption may be briefly illustrated. Kadesh-barnea is corrected first to Kadesh-jerahmeel and then to Ashhur-jerahmeel; Mahaleel, a personal name, being obscure, is boldly changed to Jerahmeel; Amalek dwelt in the Jerahmeel region—it must be Jerahmeel in disguise; in the early tradition we find an Ararat of which we can make nothing, and so we substitute Jerahmeel. Nimrod's kingdom is said to have begun with Babel and Erech and other cities; but the underlying text probably mentioned Jerahmeel. The name of one of the pillars in front of Solomon's temple, which our text gives as Jachin, has long puzzled the critics; let us relieve them by changing it to Jerahmeel. The personal name Ichabod is equally obscure; the original must have been Jerahmeel. These examples taken at random show the way in which the alleged underlying text is discovered.

As for Muçri, or Miççur, as Professor Cheyne usually writes it, it is easy to insert it wherever we can make it support the theory. That it should replace the Egypt of our text in a large number of passages is taken for granted. A king of Egypt was hardly likely to give a daughter in marriage to Solomon; the princess must have come from Muçri—such is the logic of the new theory. But not only should we find Muçri under the Egypt (Miçraim) of our present text. Tyre (Çor) bears a name suspiciously like our Muçri. Therefore Hiram king of Tyre was really a king of Muçri. In fact wherever Egypt, Tyre, or Sidon are mentioned, our method finds reason to suspect the existence of the north Arabian Muçri. And, as it is only the first step that costs, when we have once begun to practice ourselves we find it easy to discover other north Arabian names underlying the text. Ishmael, for example, is now a much larger factor in the history than we had ever dreamed, being discovered in numerous passages which have heretofore escaped the critics.

The point here is that so great a variety of changes in the text cannot have arisen from the ordinary tendencies of manuscript

transmission. Professor Cheyne does indeed sometimes speak of the similarity of certain letters which he supposes to have been exchanged. But in the vast majority of cases no such similarity is observable. In fact his obliviousness to such considerations frequently stands out so conspicuously as to arouse astonishment. What can we make, for example, of such an assertion as this: "Now Havilah (elsewhere without the article, and so Sam. here) is certainly a popular corruption of Hamilah, i. e., Yerahmeel;" or this: "The fact is that סַבִּיר and מַסְבִּיר often stand for יָרִיחַ, i. e., יִשְׁמָאֵל;" or again that Reu "is to be explained like Reumah and Reuben, i. e., is a relic of Yerahmeel;" or of Abimelech that "its most defensible meaning is not 'Father-is-king,' nor 'Father of a king,' nor 'Father of counsel,' but 'Arabia of Yerahmeel.' It is therefore synonymous with Abraham, Abram, Malchiram (inverting), and with the Phœnician names Milk-ram and Ar-milk." The most patient examination fails to find any law by which these various changes may be explained. And that there is no such law is made obvious by marshaling the number of forms which are assumed to "underlie" the favored words. In the books of Joshua and Judges alone no less than seventy different combinations of letters are traced to an original Jerahmeel. In this proportion the whole Old Testament will show more than five hundred different words or phrases which have sprung from Jerahmeel. The case of Ishmael is less startling, but even he may be credited with half as many disguises. Is the ingenuity of any scribe or school of scribes sufficient to replace these two names by seven or eight hundred different equivalents? Or to put it in the reverse way: Conceding that these two names once in the text have been disguised in such manifold ways, is it possible for the most acute modern scholar to restore them with any certainty? To ask these questions is to answer them.

But we have understated the case. Many of the changes alleged are classed as recurrent types of corruption and other north Arabian names are said to have suffered from similar recurrent types. According to the theory, there once existed a text of the Old Testament in

¹ *Traditions and Beliefs*, pp. 93, 159, 210, 313. It is unnecessary to load down this article with references, as the places will readily be found for Genesis in *Traditions and Beliefs*, and for the other books in *Crítica Bíblica*.

which the names Jerahmeel, Ishmael, Miççur, Rehoboth, Zarephath, and Asshur (that is, Ash-hur, a north Arabian country) with their gentilics occurred more than three thousand times, and in ninety-nine cases out of every hundred (at least) these names have been displaced by new and plausible combinations of letters. So thorough a mutilation of an ancient document is without precedent or parallel.

But if the ordinary tendencies of manuscript transmission fail to account for the alleged phenomena, it is still supposable that some extraordinary forces have been at work. In fact Professor Cheyne assumes a complicated process during which the text has passed through at least four separate stages. First, there was the original, which dealt with the north Arabian peoples. This original was annotated throughout by a glossator, or rather by a succession of glossators, who inserted numerous notes in the margin of the manuscript. Their object was to tell the readers that the persons, peoples, or places mentioned belonged to Jerahmeel, Ishmael, or Miççur, as the case might be. These annotated documents were taken in hand by a conscientious but unintelligent copyist, who embodied all the marginal glosses in the text. This text came into the hand of a new school of editors, who discovered that there was redundancy in many places, who also were under the impression that Palestine was the true scene of Israel's history and that Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon belonged in the story. Moreover the manuscripts had become illegible in places, and the editors were compelled to guess at the reading. This they did under the historical bias just described, and the result was the accepted Hebrew text.

One or two examples may be given to show the process. According to Professor Cheyne, Josh. 7:21 originally read: "I saw a goodly garment of Arabian Ishmael and two hundred shekels of silver and gold." The glossator was not sure that the reader would know where Arabian Ishmael was, so he put Jerahmeel in the margin to make it clear. Later copyists added Jerahmeel and Ishmael, so that there might be no mistake. Then came the mechanical scribe who thought that everything in the margin ought to go into the text. When the copy left his hands it read: "I saw a goodly garment of Arabian Ishmael, Jerahmeel, and two hundred shekels of silver, Ishmael, and gold, Jerahmeel." We can hardly wonder that an

editor who had this text before him should undertake its reconstruction. After his labors it was in the form in which we now read it: "I saw a goodly garment of Shinar and two hundred shekels of silver and a wedge of gold." Similarly the account of David's conquests, when duly glossed, reads: "And David smote Miççur of the Jerahmeelites, *Jerahmeelites*, and subdued the Zarephathites, *Jerahmeelites*, *Ishmaelites*, *Jerahmeelites*, and Miççur became David's slaves" (II Sam. 8:2; the glosses are in italics). The editor, in his desire to make sense, radically altered the text, making it tell how David treated Moab with great cruelty. The Jerahmeel theory (says our author) "dissipates the description of David's barbarity into thin air."

Undoubtedly it does. But Professor Cheyne would be the last to defend his criticism on apologetic grounds, so this remark is irrelevant. The question before us is whether the textual transformation here posited is intelligible. Each step in the complicated process must have some plausibility, or we must reject the whole. Let us suppose that the north Arabian text once existed. Is it likely, in the first place, that a scribe would find it necessary to add such lavish glosses? It would seem evident that the early readers knew what tribes were the subject of the story and the persistent addition of Jerahmeel and Ishmael would be an impertinence. But conceding that this might be done, is the next step conceivable? Would any scribe, however stupid, embody in his text marginal glosses so unnecessary and so disfiguring? To realize what this means we must work our way through Professor Cheyne's mass of emendations. In one case we are asked to believe that a whole verse consisted merely of a repetition of the two names Jerahmeel and Ishmael, one of them being written nine times, the other three times. This is no doubt an extreme case, but we are assured that often "a string of ethnics which were no longer understood and had come down in a corrupt form was manipulated by an ingenious redactor." The string of ethnics is now in question and it strains our credulity to the utmost.⁸

But again, conceding that the overloaded text once existed, is it likely that later redactors would have changed it into something very different? One more example may make the question plain. A well-known passage in Genesis comments on the land of Havilah by saying:

⁸ For strings of ethnics in the glosses, transformed by "repeated bad shots of the scribes," see *Critica Biblica*, pp. 80 and 319.

"Where there is gold; and the gold of that land is good; there is bdellium and the onyx stone." The verse seems perfectly straightforward, and we can see no reason why it might not be the remark of an early Hebrew. But Professor Cheyne finds the strongest reason for criticizing it. His criticism results in the following: "Ashhur-Ishmael [Sobah]; now that land is Tubal [Ishmael], Arabia of Ishmael," and he explains that these are glosses and subglosses on the interesting name Havilah.⁹ The improbability of such a text having once existed is not now before us. What we want to know is how a late editor, having such a text in his hand, came to change it into the interesting statement about gold and bdellium. Such a change I, for one, find inconceivable.

But we have been dealing with matters of detail. Conceivably we have hit upon some unfortunate examples of an overworked method, whereas the whole historical picture which results from the north Arabian theory may be one that we can accept. It behooves us therefore to examine this whole picture. First of all as to its scene, for history is not to be separated from geography. According to the Jerahmeel theory, the history of Israel was enacted in the Negeb, the southern half of the territory traditionally ascribed to Judah. Let us be liberal and extend it to the whole of Judah. Professor Cheyne in fact admits that David made Jerusalem his northern capital. The hypothesis is that in the district south of Jerusalem and west of the Dead Sea, extending into the Sinaitic desert, were located not only the twelve tribes of Israel, but their enemies as well. Here were the Philistines, the Ishmaelites, the Amalekites, the kingdoms of Mucri, of Ashhur, of Jerahmeel—"not a mere petty under-tribe, but a truly great race, which carried its beliefs and sacred usages, its names, and its conventional phrases far away to southern Syria, and its names even to Babylonia." Here and not in Egypt the Israelites were in bondage. Here were the kingdoms, falsely identified by the Hebrew redactor with Assyria and Babylon, which carried Israel and Judah into captivity. Here lived the Phoenicians; here was Elam and here the Gog whose invasion was so vividly anticipated by Ezekiel.¹⁰ For all these peoples the territory seems too small.

⁹ *Traditions and Beliefs*, pp. 93 f. The reader should examine the whole paragraph.

¹⁰ See *Traditions and Beliefs*, pp. xiii, 157, 177, 187 f.

Moreover, the country is in large part desert and must always have been scantily populated. The story of Hagar shows that it was anciently what it is now. Abraham and Isaac dispute with the natives about a few wells as the things most valuable. Water is scarce. The numerous wadies are dry except after an extraordinary rainfall and then run only for a short time. Perennial stream there is none in the whole region. Yet by our theory the original narrator located the Exodus here, the leading feature of which is the miraculous crossing of a considerable body of water. The account of the invasion of Canaan in like manner throws into strong relief the miraculous crossing of a strongly flowing river. Without raising the question of historicity, we may well ask ourselves whether any narrator could have located these events in the region in question. As though to contradict the Jerahmeel theory, the authors of Genesis declare in set terms that the region of which they write is well watered everywhere, that it is a land of canals and water-courses, that it is a land where the cattle pasture by the side of the river. It is surprising therefore to find Professor Cheyne persistently correcting the Jordan into a hypothetical Yarhon or river of Jerahmeel, and to read his affirmation that the *River* often alluded to by the Hebrew writers cannot be the Euphrates, but must be "the river near which Rehoboth lay. . . . It is in short the Wady-el Arish, the border stream of the north Arabian land of Muçri."¹¹ The Hebrew well knows the distinction between a river and a wady or dry torrent bed. The Wady-el Arish never could have been distinguished as *The River*.

It is impossible to agree with Professor Cheyne further when he asserts that the original legends of creation were received from Jerahmeel, and that the streams which so abundantly watered the garden of Eden were located in the Negeb. The story of the Deluge, again, could not have been suggested by any experiences of the Bedawin in this region, and when our discoverer assures us that Jonah was sent to Jerahmeel, we see why his ship is changed to a caravan. The great fish still troubles us, nor are we altogether relieved when we are told that a separate legend has been combined with the original Jonah story. Had the Hebrew redactor, then, no sense of humor?

¹¹ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 3685.

If the various bodies of water of which the Hebrew writer tells us must have been located elsewhere than in north Arabia, the same is true of the mountain ranges on which Solomon drew for timber and which also our critic transfers to this region. If "Lebanon" means the Lebanon that we know we can understand the story, for the mountain ranges preserve their timber long after the lowlands have been denuded. There is no evidence that the Negeb or north Arabia ever was the source of merchantable timber. It is only the rigor of the Jerahmeelite theory which finds here the cedars which were cut down by Hiram, or the cedars of Lebanon and oaks of Bashan mentioned by Isaiah. With reference to these matters Professor Cheyne prefers not to be hampered by the facts. He confesses that his geographical remarks have been designedly vague and undogmatic. But when he uproots the whole history of a people and transplants it to a new region, we have a right to require something more than vague remarks.

Our traditional text presents us with a picture which on the whole agrees with our knowledge of the country. Amalek, Edom, Ishmael, and Midian appear as Bedawin similar to those who still occupy the region. In contrast with this, the picture drawn from the "underlying" text is full of features not only inconsistent with the geography of the country, but inconsistent with each other. Israel is Jerahmeelite, yet its chief enemies are also Jerahmeelite; its name of honor in the golden future is to be Sons of Jerahmeel, yet throughout its history it was dominated by fear and hatred of Jerahmeel; David is by origin a Jerahmeelite, yet he stigmatizes Goliath as a Philistine Jerahmeelite; the whole history of Israel was enacted in the Negeb, yet David's empire was so extended that he was obliged to appoint a viceroy over the Negeb; Jerusalem was in possession of David and his successors, yet, although it was the place best fitted to be their capital, they for the most part chose to dwell in some Kiriath-Jerahmeel, whose remains the most diligent explorer has failed to discover.

The silences of Scripture which have often been remarked upon now become more inexplicable than ever. They are so extensive that "a north Israelitish history in the proper sense of the phrase has not come down to us"—so we are assured. But here we have a right to ask: Why not? Why should the Israelitish historians have

maintained a dead silence concerning their immediate neighbors in Ephraim when they were so profuse in their information concerning those more remote in the South? We have to account also for silence even more impressive. The great empires of the Euphrates Valley were certainly known to Israel and the records of these empires are now in our hands. The inscriptions seem at any rate to confirm the Hebrew text current among us. Tiglath-pileser, Shalmaneser, Sennacherib, appear in the inscriptions as kings of Nineveh on the Tigris, and so they appear in the Hebrew record. They themselves describe their campaigns in such a way as to confirm what we read in our Old Testament. Yet we are asked to believe that in the original "underlying" text the kings that were mentioned were not what they now seem to be, but were princes of some otherwise unknown north Arabian country. The irony of the situation is seen when we reflect that the Jerahmeel theory (or at least the Mucri theory) owes its birth to the Assyrian inscriptions and now erases Assyria from the history of Israel.

The elimination of Egypt is equally incredible. Egypt was the great power nearest Palestine and from very early times claimed supremacy there. It had an acute interest in that country as its natural outpost against Asiatic encroachment. When we read that Shishak invaded Judah we find such a movement quite in the order of nature, and when the Egyptologists tell us that Shishak himself records the invasion and gives a list of the towns he plundered we are hardly surprised, though we are gratified. But the Jerahmeel theory assures us that this invader must have been a ruler of north Arabian Mucri, and adds: "There is *much evidence* in the Old Testament that north Arabian potentates were constantly interfering in the affairs of Palestine in the regal period, whilst most probably there is *no evidence* that Egypt even occasionally interfered until we come to Neco and Apries, and *even in the case of these kings* there is room for doubt whether the Hebrew editor has not fallen into misunderstandings."²² Such a declaration impresses us much more by its boldness than by its soundness of judgment.

One point remains to be considered—the time at which the supposed reconstruction of the text must have taken place. Let us

²² *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 4487. The italics are mine.

recall once more the extent to which the underlying text was saturated with north Arabian names. Jerahmeel shall be our guide. The first man was Jerahmeel, and his wife was called Ashhurah, because she was the mother of Jerahmeel-Ashhur. Abel like Jabal and Jubal is to be traced to Jerahmeel. Mahaleel and Mehujael among the early patriarchs—Lamech, Ham, Kemuel, Magdiel, Mahol, Reumah, Almodad, and Michael in the genealogies, are all more or less mutilated forms of Jerahmeel. Abraham was a Jerahmeelite patriarch, Amraphel, whom the misguided Assyriologists are trying to identify with Hammurabi, may have come ultimately from Jerahmeel. Moab, Phichol, Leah, Reuben, Levi, originally bore the ubiquitous name. Tamar, the heroine of Judah, was at least a Jerahmeelites. The narrative in Judg., chap. 4, told of a king called Jerahmeel or perhaps Ashhur. Jerubbaal and Elon among the Judges, Ichabod son of Phimehas, Joel, son of Samuel, derived their names from the same source. David being a Jerahmeelite, it was natural for him to call two of his sons (whom our text calls Baaljada and Solomon) by the all-pervasive name. Several of David's officers must be included among the Jerahmeels as must Hiram the Phoenician (really north Arabian) king, and his namesake Hiram the artificer. Habakkuk, Malachi, and Daniel among the prophets, Elihu and his father Barachel, who appear in the Book of Job, the allegorical characters Oholah and Oholibah, and the person called Oholiab in Exodus, all come into the list, as does the pillar in front of the temple and the allegorical staff of the prophet in the Book of Zechariah.

This list, which does not claim to be complete, is formidable enough, but we have not touched the subject of religion with reference to which the Jerahmeel theory makes new and startling affirmations. The worship of the original writers was paid to a divine duad, the Baal and Ishtar of Ishmael, or to a triad whose names were Yahweh, Ashhur (or Ashtar), and Jerahmeel. Most commonly the duad was represented under the compound name Jerahmeel-Yahweh. This was the glorious and fearful name which the Israelites were to fear.¹³ At the same time the god Jerahmeel was the Baal against whose worship the people were warned. He also bore the name Ishmael,

¹³ *Traditions and Beliefs*, p. 563.

and there was a myth concerning this divinity or his human manifestation, who was said to have died and risen again. The Rimmon of Damascus and the Ramman of Babylonia both come from this Jerahmeel. Jacob called his altar Jerahmeel-God-of-Bethel. How widespread was the worship of this divinity we may conjecture when we note that his name underlies the names read in the Syrian or Phoenician inscriptions—Rekubel, Eshmun, Melek, Hamman, Baal, Ramman, Naaman, and others. One of his titles was Dôd and another Son-of-Man. After this we are not surprised to find that the Spirit which at the beginning brooded on the cosmic egg was really Ishtar, and that the Ark and Tent popularity ascribed to Yahweh belonged by right to this goddess.

The Son-of-Man of the Book of *Enoch* has already been disclosed to us as Jerahmeel. The Elohim who appears so often in our Hebrew text is really the same divinity. So is Michael of the New Testament Apocalypse, so is the "Wisdom" of Proverbs, chap. 8, and the Logos (Memra) of late Jewish documents. Why Belial should be found in this company is not so clear, but his name resembles Jerahmeel at least as much as some of the others, and we have Professor Cheyne's vote in his favor.¹⁴ The cherubim, the angel of Yahweh, and the angels in general are so many forms of Jerahmeel and we reach the climax when we discover that the number of the Beast in Rev. 13: 18 has supplanted Asshur-Ishmael, the fuller name of the region called Jerahmeel or Ishmael. This is proved by the parallel passage (21:17) where in place of the words, "the man that is, the angel," we should read the corrected text, "Ishmael, that is Jerahmeel."

The problem which now confronts us is to find a date at which this text so thickly sown with north Arabian names, human and divine, could be changed into the Old Testament now in our hands. Proper names, both of persons and places, are tenacious of life, and while there might be a prejudice against some of the divine names once current in Israel, we are at a loss to discover why Jabal, Jubal, Mahaleel, Lamech, and the most of the others should not have been allowed to appear in their original form as Jerahmeel, or why Joktheel should supplant Jerahmeel as the name of a city, or why Beer-lahai-

¹⁴ *Traditions and Beliefs*, p. 53. For the other names in this paragraph see pp. 37, 38, 49, 60, 69.

roi should be forced into the place of En-Jerahmeel. And the date at which this could be done escapes our best efforts to fix it. The theory assumes that the Jerahmeel nomenclature existed in the latest of the Old Testament books and also in *Judith*, *Enoch*, *Jubilees*, and the Apocalypse—or the Jewish document on which this book is based. This brings us down to the beginning of our era, a time when the Old Testament was accepted as a sacred book to tamper with which would be sacrilege. It brings us to a time when the Greek version was current among the Jews of the Dispersion and when any extensive alteration of the text would have to be made in both Greek and Hebrew copies. There is no possibility of such a reconstruction being made at this time or indeed at any other time.

The improbability of such a reconstruction as is assumed by Professor Cheyne will be forcibly brought home to anyone who will examine his commentary on the Psalms. In our received text of the Psalter there is no single mention of Jerahmeel, but in Professor Cheyne's text the name occurs in all but fifteen of the hundred and fifty psalms,¹⁵ and, as in other "underlying" texts, Ishmael plays a good second. As the names occur several times in a number of the compositions, the radical nature of the expunging process to which they have been subject is plain. As an example let us put side by side one of the minor psalms in the translation of Professor Cheyne and in that of Professor Briggs:

CHEYNE

Yahweh has laid low Jerahmeel
By his chiding he has extinguished
Ishmael,
Yahweh has destroyed Ashhur.

He has also laid low Tubal and Maa-
cath.
Cush and Edom are abolished,
The Jerahmeelites thou hast made to
vanish.

BRIGGS

Yahweh doth reign in majesty,
Yahweh hath put on his apparel,
Yahweh hath girded himself with
strength.

He hath adjusted the world that it can-
not be moved.
Thy throne is established from of old,
From everlasting art thou (Yahweh).

¹⁵ The reader who verifies this calculation should not overlook the *corrigenda* and *addenda* at the end of the introduction.

CHEYNE

The Jerahmeelites are desolate,
 Consumed are the Arabians and the
 Ishmaelites,
 Yahweh has shown his glory on Jerahmeel.
 Thy purposes are abundantly fulfilled,
 The courts of thy house we shall enter,
 O Yahweh, for endless days.

BRIGGS

The streams have lifted up, Yahweh,
 The streams have lifted up their voice,
 The streams lift up their commemoration,
 More than the voices of many waters,
 Magnificent more than the breakers of
 the sea,
 Magnificent on high Yahweh.
 (Thy testimonies are exceedingly steadfast,
 To thy house sanctity is becoming,
 Yahweh, for length of days.)

Professor Briggs has no objection to critical processes, as is illustrated in this very psalm where he excises the last verse as a later addition. But the layman will ask how these two compositions can go back to a common original, and the special student will be obliged to admit that this sort of criticism, though it make the unskilful laugh, will make the judicious grieve.

Our inquiry has gone far enough to warrant a verdict. The Jerahmeel theory fails to approve itself to the textual critic, to the higher critic, to the geographer, and to the historian. It asserts an underlying text for which there is no adequate evidence; it assumes a violent reconstruction of the documents for which there is no adequate motive and which is against all analogy; it constructs an intermediate text which is a monstrosity; it locates the history of Israel in a region where such a history is inconceivable; it presents no clear and consistent picture of Israel's development; and it fails to show a date at which its assumed reconstruction of the text could be effected. Regretfully we thus pronounce on the work of an honored fellow-laborer; yet we are obliged to conclude that the Jerahmeel theory has made no substantial contribution to Old Testament science.

WHAT MODIFICATIONS IN WESTERN CHRISTIANITY MAY BE EXPECTED FROM CONTACT WITH ORI- ENTAL RELIGIONS ON THE MISSION FIELD?

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The topic assigned me is of great difficulty, so many are the factors and so indefinite are the terms. What is "western Christianity," and who shall describe the "oriental religions"? Had the question been asked a generation ago, the answer would not have been difficult; for then it was taken for granted that the truth of Christianity was expressed in the doctrine and maintained by the organization of one's own sect, and oriental religions, all alike, were corruptions of the original revelation of God through man's depravity, or were the inventions of Satan. This attitude has abundant illustrations in missionary literature, and it was quite generally maintained until recent years. For example, in January, 1882, a distinguished missionary in China attacked Max Müller as a foe to missions and as a heathen because he had instituted the series of translations of the Sacred Books of the East. The translation itself was an offense; but the use of the title *Sacred* definitely fixed Müller's status. Moreover, at even a later date, some missionaries in answer to the query from Chinamen, "Where now is Confucius?" were prompt to reply, "In Hell."

The change from this position to the one dominant in our day is complete. But can we consider it as the result of contact with oriental religions on the mission field? That this contact has had great effect is beyond question; for even less intimate knowledge produced important results. For example, in the eighteenth century in certain circles rumors about China affected the estimate of the Christian religion. In the deistic controversy two discoveries were influential, that of the heavens and that of the great eastern empire. It was asked "How can the creator of this vast universe be identified with the God of the Jews and how can the gospel be necessary, since the people of China have existed so long and, on the whole, so well without it?" Hence an

effort was made to find a religion of nature, simple enough and large enough for the new array of facts. The controversy died away, leaving little mark upon English Christianity, though it made a revolutionary impression upon the Continent; but in our day in other forms and more portentously it revives, for wider circles in England and the United States have taken the modern cosmology into their imagination, and prolonged contact with Asia has made its problem very real.

In the eighteenth century the greatness of the numbers played a part in the argument—three hundred million Chinamen! But we have multiplied this by four—such a vast array of heathen, such a vast mass of the lost! The greatness of the work is appalling. And the old missionary hymns lose their effectiveness. It is no longer—

Each wind that sweeps the ocean brings tidings from afar
Of nations in commotion prepared for Zion's war.

It is only the youthful enthusiasm of the Student Volunteer Movement which can retain as a motto, now twenty years old, "The Evangelization of the World in this Generation." With this apprehension is joined the conception, which forced itself long ago upon Macaulay, that in the presence of those who worship cows the differences which separate Christians are slight. Hence on a wide scale we have missionary comity and attempted federations of native churches, and even their combination into organic unity.

This expresses the attitude of the majority of missionaries as the sectarian spirit indicated in the first paragraph of this article passes away. Missionaries may indeed prefer their own type of organization, and believe that the doctrine of their sect more completely expresses the mind of the Spirit than do other statements, but they are conscious that the task is too great for their unaided efforts and that only in union is there strength. Moreover, the impression has become dominant that our forms of western ecclesiasticism are not final and that the orientals may be trusted, under the guidance of the Spirit, to evolve their own types of our common Christianity.

The change in these respects in thirty years has been so great that the missionary enterprise has passed over into a new stage. The older was typified by the missionary who was supposed to deliver the bread of life to people hungering for it and eager in their response.

He was to be the director, the guide, the formulator, and in general the apostle of the new dispensation. Excepting in distinctly stagnant fields, the missionary now counts himself to be the sower of a seed which shall in due time propagate itself; or, to drop the figure, having gathered together his little company of believers, he commits to them the gospel and remains as advisor and friend, but not as director or even as leader. His motto is: they must increase, but I must decrease. His highest hope is that his labors and those of others like himself shall be rendered unnecessary. It has become a maxim of missionary labor that a nation can be evangelized only by its own children, and that Christianity can become a dominant factor only as it is adapted to the needs and the traditions and the social organism of the people.

All of this involves a modification in the conception of Christianity; and this is characteristic of missionary preaching. The missionary deals with the fundamentals of religion and not with the points around which theological battles have raged. His faith becomes at once something less and something more than before; something less in its relative simplicity and something more in the thoroughness with which the fundamentals are grasped. Before the movement had taken its present definiteness in the West it was already common for missionaries, in fields like Japan, where the influences of progress were most strongly felt, to be looking for essential Christianity in the midst of the diversities of discordant sects and, even in other fields where complicated systems were held more vigorously in their entirety, the necessities of the situation caused the preaching to center in a few quite simple and definite propositions.

It is true that the missionaries were not always aware of the effect which this attempt was having upon their own faith. A young man, zealous for the system of doctrine in which he had been instructed and which he held as the truth of God, was compelled to assume an apologetic attitude. He found to begin with that he must approach his listeners from a point of view quite different from that which had been assumed in his theological seminary. He could reconcile this to his own mind by the example of St. Paul, who became all things to all men, and he could believe that after he had given the milk of the word he could proceed to feed his converts upon strong meat. But the constant effort to reduce Christianity to its fundamental propositions

and to cut off all superfluities, insensibly influenced the missionary, until by and by he was prepared to accept the position of his converts, who proved with further instruction, not to be better prepared for the whole system of doctrine, but to be the more insistent upon the simplicity which is in Christ. An eloquent Japanese in the synod of Japan closed the debate over the proposition for a simple creed and the rejection of our western complications in a paragraph which may be translated roughly thus: "These systems of theology and confessions of faith represent the conflicts of western Christianity, conflicts in which we have only a historical interest and which we would not repeat on this soil. They separate Christian from Christian, but all Christians are our brothers, one with us in a common fellowship. We would have a Confession of Faith which shall represent the living power which has changed our lives, a faith by which we may live and for which we would die."

I need not point out how this emphasis upon the essential features of Christianity in the mission field coincides with the great movement which is characteristic of western Christianity at the present time. But who shall say that the latter is the effect of the former, or fail to think that both alike are the offspring of great religious and intellectual movements, characteristic of the age in which we live, with sources too varied and too many for enumeration? Perhaps the missionary movement has been especially influential upon those more zealous for denominational peculiarities. The testimony of the missionary, his attitude of mind, his insistence upon our common faith, have affected many who are unapproachable by scholars who had arrived at somewhat similar results through the methods of scientific research. It is easy to regard these latter as rationalists, but it is hard to place with them missionaries who have given their lives to the evangelization of the heathen. Thus the modifying effect of the contact of the missionary is to be found in the realm of the ordinary and conventional church life. He has reached practically a position which is similar to that attained by scholarship, as both look to a greater unity among Christians and to an emphasizing of the common elements of the faith.

This contact with oriental peoples influences the missionary, and through him the church, in other ways. Only in a theological sense does he now sing, "Where every prospect pleases and only man is

vile," for this vileness is simply our common depravity. In the ordinary relations of life the missionary is ready enough to praise the people among whom he dwells, for even though some of his literature dwells chiefly upon the darker aspects, more intimate knowledge has begotten a broader charity. It would be easy to bring witnesses to testify to the sterling qualities and high ideals of many "heathen," men who shame by their virtues multitudes of "Christians." The problem becomes no longer one of East and West or of pagan and Christian, but of our common humanity. Thus again we are pressed back to a religion, not indeed of nature, as the eighteenth century thought, but of a world-wide validity and of a simplicity which admits of application to all mankind.

This process is furthered by the study of the oriental religions. We hesitate to sing, "The heathen in his blindness bows down to wood and stone." Missionaries have made large contributions to the scholarly knowledge of the ethnic faiths, and the general attitude is more correctly expressed by the words of St. Paul, "Whom ye in ignorance worship, Him declare I unto you," and, who "hath determined the bounds of their habitation that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel for him and find him, though he be not far from everyone of us." And once more, from the unknown author of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets"—by Confucius as by Moses, and by Buddha as by Ecclesiastes—"hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." So far it would seem the missionaries have come, and with them the more liberal portions of the church.

The missionary is more susceptible to these influences than are other foreigners, for he is most intimately in contact with the people. Other occidentals are shut into communities of their own, and they estimate the "natives" precisely as they minister to their own convenience and pleasure. They do not so much as think of taking these folks as equals. In India, for example, British disdain has increased as the years have passed. Exceptions there are, of course; men who really study the civilization which surrounds them. A few students become enamored of it—and proclaim its superiority—but they are not taken seriously by their fellows.

The West is still too far from the East for great mutual influences, and closer contact is not always happy in its results. The West is bolting its doors against the East, after forcing the East to open its gates. A century of British rule has not won India's affection, and China turns to western ways in self-defense. Japan is the great illustration of the transformation possible through a new acquaintanceship, but it is still a century too soon to speak of the outcome. And on our part—beyond a certain vague influence in the realm of art—one questions whether Japan has affected at all the great currents of European and American life, excepting in the political sphere, and there it would seem to be a rebound from our own policies and powers.

When we turn to other aspects of the problem we are met with a like difficulty, that is to say, while there are certain tendencies of the science, philosophy, history, and literature of our day which coincide with the tendencies observable in oriental lands, one hesitates to lay too much stress upon the direct influence of contact with these oriental forces. This statement will become clearer as we emphasize the elements in Christianity and in oriental religion which are most diverse, and where the mutual influence may be corrective and beneficial.

One hesitates to ascribe anything to "Christianity" without defining that disputed word. But we are on fairly firm ground when we regard our individualism as one at least of the prominent characteristics of Christianity. Erdmann, in his *History of Philosophy*, tells us that ancient philosophy was busy with the world; but that mediaeval philosophy turned its attention to the individual. The world remained only as the stage on which was enacted the drama of God and the human soul. Before the divine word, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" all interest in nature and in its problems vanished. From this has come our modern conception of personality, the insistence upon the value of the individual, the regard for seemingly worthless men and the notion that the self is a central point in the universe.

However we may differ from Erdmann's ascription of so much influence to this particular historical element in the development of the modern consciousness of personality, there is, I think, no question that the East remains at the earlier point which he indicates. It has never laid the same stress upon personality. This is indicated

in many ways: for example, there is not the same abhorrence of degradation through crime; that is to say, the criminal does not fall so far and the effects upon himself are consequently less marked. So too, the insistence upon the value of life is much less. One is amazed to note for what small reasons men will cast away their lives. Out of this disregard for the individual has come a certain relatively fixed type of society. Oriental annals are devoid of really great movements toward liberty and freedom and progress.

These two types of thought, the individual on the one side and what we may call, perhaps, the organic on the other, find their culmination in the ultimate idea as to God. In the West emphasis is centered in his personality and, notwithstanding the speculations of philosophical theologians and the denials of radical philosophers, what Tiele calls the theocratic type of religion prevails. That is to say, God is conceived of as the mighty monarch, the over-man of boundless wisdom and power, and our relationship to him is that ultimately of subject to sovereign or, at highest and best, of child to father.

Now it requires very slight knowledge of eastern literature to find many parallelisms to Christian thought on this theme, but nonetheless the prevailing conception in the Orient (excepting in the Mohammedan dominions) is widely different. The universe is not personal at its heart; it is a vast organism which goes on and on and on forever. It has its periods of evolution and of devolution; it begins, it grows, it comes to consummation, it decays, it returns to chaos, only that the cycle may be repeated and again repeated without end. In such a movement nations and families and individuals have their part; but they are for it and not it for them. In this movement the greater always has precedence. That is to say, the nation is more than the family and the family is more than the individual. Indeed, strictly speaking, the individual is of value only through his relationship to the organism. The man exists not for his own happiness or for his own individual consciousness, but as father, as husband, as son, as brother, his place in the order constituting in the profoundest sense himself. The conception is most nearly represented to our own mind by the military organism, where the man loses his own name and is a number in the line, it mattering very little whether as an individual he be happy or sorrowful, hopeful or discouraged, successful or a

failure, if only his efficiency as a soldier is not imperiled and if he be found in his right place at the right time.

The conception of virtue derived from this view works itself out in a twofold form: on the one hand, as a pessimism which regards the ultimate attainment of the orderly universe as an impossibility and recommends, therefore, flight from the world as the religious duty; on the other hand, as an optimism which insists that man is to stand in his place, to fulfil if possible his duty, even if it bring him suffering.

Doubtless in the East this conception of life has led to many and serious evils. As commonly interpreted, it takes away from the worth of the individual, not only in the eyes of others, but in one's own thought, for there would seem to be no most sacred place which may not be violated, even at the command of those near and dear. Indeed the paragons of virtue have given themselves unreservedly and without limit to the commands of their superiors, even when these commands have involved corruption and debauchery. Moreover, self-sacrifice itself does not attain its true significance when the individual is undervalued. It is only as man comes to know himself as the son of God that his sacrifice upon the cross has highest value for the redemption of the world.

While thus the relation of the individual to the organism may be ethically conceived—as in Confucianism—it may also be taken mystically. The end is absorption or a merging in the whole. The self is lost that it may be saved; as one feels his petty personality expanded by the influence of splendid scenery, or of great music, or of grand processions, until he blends with the vastness and gathers it into his consciousness. Especially in Hinduism and in Mahāyāna Buddhism does this yearning after the Absolute become the soul of religion. And with it comes an aloofness from the interests of men. The way of salvation is by flight from the world, and its attainment lifts the spirit into a region inaccessible to all excepting the elect.

On the other hand, who does not know that the tendencies of our modern Christianity in the western world are all in the direction of less emphasis upon the individual and more upon the social order? The coincidence of this movement with our knowledge of the thought

of the East might lead us to put them in the order of effect and cause, but again one hesitates. There are other influences at work. The conception of the immanence of God, of the necessity and power and value of the organism, or of ourselves as truly selves only as parts of the organism, can be traced too clearly to other sources to permit us to suppose that they have been derived from contact with oriental religions.

Besides, these ideals in East and West are not so similar after all. For example, modern Buddhists do not weary in repeating the statement that Buddha discovered "evolution," and thus proved his omniscience by anticipating modern science. But his doctrine had no scientific value and indeed bears no resemblance to the modern thought—at least wherein it has value. It is as a background of mystery, and of mazy metaphysics, and of symbolic poetry that the eastern literature has its value, and its influence in the future will be (to speak as a dogmatist), as in the past, in the emotional realm, in the region where aesthetics mingle with worship, and where the dim religious atmosphere is not adapted to the clearest vision, nor in the least congenial to scientific criticism. Even in this sphere the western influence for the moment is the stronger, as it is easier to point out representations of the Hindu faith whose writings show the effect of western studies than it is to name Christian scholars who have been deeply affected by oriental thought.

We write with India chiefly in mind, but China surely is equally representative of Asia, and more likely to come into intimate relations with Americans. In this country is another phase of thought, not mystical nor metaphysical but pragmatic, with its virtues firmly planted in the relationships of daily life, and its morality only slightly touched with religious emotion. A careful study of Confucianism would have its value as indicating the benefits and the defects of such a system. But one does not look for any immediate or widespread effect on us. The system is too dry—and the Chinaman to our western eyes too alien and too queer.

It is impossible to do more than to question the outcome of these converging movements. In any case, as already indicated, certain conditions in the foreign missionary field coincide with like conditions in western Christianity, and that surely is a cause for thankfulness and

hope. That while our missionaries have been learning lessons from their actual experiences in Asiatic lands, the church at home has been coming to like conclusions from its independent investigations and from the influences of the age in which we live, indicates that in this direction we are to look for important results. Indeed, the old conception of missions, like the old conception of Christianity, breaks down. It is impossible to win Asia to our modern forms of Christian doctrine and of Christian organization. It is not even desirable that our western Christianity should be transplanted to so alien an environment. We have come to see that God has not left himself without witnesses and that the Holy Spirit moves where and when it pleases; but all this is as true of ourselves at home as of the converts and the heathen in oriental lands. That is, a new confidence is begotten as one sees how God fulfils himself in many ways, and how Christianity in its living power may adapt itself to the varying needs of men.

For the future we need a franker recognition of these facts which officially are winked at rather than recognized by our churches. It is through the unreserved acceptance of the great modern movement at home and abroad that Christianity is to have the revival of its power in which we all believe. Moreover, the problem suggested of the relationship of the individual to the social organization and, in more recondite terms, of the individual to the universe, is a problem which contains within itself the very issues of life. What can we learn from the Orient which shall rectify our extreme individualism and our exaggerated emphasis upon the importance of personality, and how shall we, taught by the East, perhaps, learn this without losing our heritage?

Perhaps, finally, we lay too much emphasis upon this distinction of East and West and upon the question of our mutual influence. As already indicated, there are other forces at work of world-wide import; and the new age on which we are entering knows neither East nor West, but only our common humanity. The notion that we need some peculiar mediator between East and West or that East as East is to bear peculiar lessons to West as West is, in my judgment, mistaken. If the East had still remained secluded and we had felt no breath of its influence, still would our philosophers and poets have

taught us the immanence of God and still would our modern psychology have emphasized the importance of the organism, and still would the development of our modern cosmogony have taught us that God may be described in terms of a power not ourselves which makes for righteousness, though it be difficult for us to reconcile it with that which wells up in us as personal consciousness.

In science and philosophy we do not look for any peculiar contribution from the East. Truth is one and the method of its discovery is one. The Orient has had glimpses of truth—foreshadowings of important discoveries—but they have remained comparatively unfruitful. The learned world recognizes no distinctions of race or nation, but only differences in the application of the method which has proved itself to be effective. Why should religion be an exception? If it were the outcome of some special faculty, if it were the discernment of a sphere unknowable by reason and not subject to its laws, we might indeed anticipate discoveries by ascetics and mystics. But for us who have given up that position and believe that religion has to do, not with the abnormal and the mystical, but that it is the natural outcome of man's contact with his environment and the expression of his true nature, it is vain to look for peculiar contributions from men who have not adopted the modern point of view. In religion as in science there is one truth, and its discovery follows the application of definite methods. Any other position turns us back from the light of the present to the theosophy and the superstitions of the past.

WHAT CONCEPTION OF THE SCRIPTURES AND OF SCRIPTURE AUTHORITY SHOULD UNDERLIE THE WORK OF THE MODERN MISSIONARY?

REV. WILLIAM K. MCKIBBEN
Fourteen Years a Missionary in China

In this our day, for the first time in a millennium and a half, for the first time indeed since their first encounter, Christianity and the great ethnic religions stand confronting each other, face to face. A procession of new nations is coming on the stage, their religious systems continuing their ministrations unabashed in the presence of Christianity. Their commerce, politics, and literature, their merchants and travelers, their schools and science, their achievements in war and peace, all certify that the messengers of Christianity to these eastern nations are to encounter systems possessing the vital elements of religion in no small measure.

If these ethnic systems are stronger and purer than any Christianity ever met before, so also is Christianity better able to match herself with them than ever before. The distance that separates the men of today from the men of yesterday, which John Fiske tells us is an immeasurably wider gulf than ever before divided one generation of men from their predecessors, measures advance, not retrogression. The age, to be sure, is skeptical regarding the antique. It calls for the facts, and heeds no dictation. It has forgotten its theology, it doubts the divinity of church machinery. But it is inspired with a worthier conception of Jesus, with a clearer vision of the coming social order which, on the manward side, is the equivalent of the Kingdom of Heaven, and with a deeper consciousness of God, than any generation since the men who personally knew Jesus. It defines its missionary work as nothing less than bringing the world into living, personal relations with God, continuing, so far as in us lies, the work of Jesus, who, in the profound words of Adolf Harnack, sought to bring every man face to face with God—God and the soul, the soul and its God.

In rising to its new responsibilities, Christianity, when fairly confronted with the question, recognizes the propriety of leaving behind any elements that are local, temporary, or accretionary, that it may go unencumbered on its errand. If God were to give us a new Paul we hold it certain that he would refuse to carry abroad accretions dear to the western Christian heart, just as he would not carry to Europe the rites, sabbaths, and festivals dear to the Jewish Christian heart.

It need not be said that the missionary's conception of Scripture should be the best, the truest, within his power to reach; such as best comports with historical facts and with the spirit of Christianity, so far as modern research can establish them.

Time was, and still is, when the Scriptures were conceived of as a body of pure divine truth directly and miraculously communicated. Portions of them were traced by the finger of God on stone tablets. Other portions were dictated from heaven as to an amanuensis, or communicated as by a spiritualistic trance. If, as some prefer to say, the thought and language were suggested rather than dictated, the same result is reached: we hold in our hands, especially in the original manuscripts, the veritable dictations of the voice of God, inerrant, infallible, and of absolute authority, the only and complete rule of life and conduct.

Large parts of this body of oracles relate to cosmogony, astronomy, angelology, and demonology; beasts, birds, and reptiles discourse in human language; sea-monsters, sun, moon, and stars, storms, and oceans, act as allies of the representatives of God; governmental, priestly, and sacrificial systems are elaborated to the last degree; and all is by the direct voice and authority of God.

This conception of an inspired, inerrant, and authoritative scripture, a legacy from the rabbis, remained unchallenged down to the Reformation. For a time the reformers asserted a certain unorthodox liberty with the Bible, notably Martin Luther, who said portions of the New Testament were no better than straw; but the exigencies of controversy soon stiffened up the relaxing orthodoxy. The Catholics claimed the support of an infallible authority, the pope. The reformers replied, No, it is not the pope, it is the Bible that is the viceroy of God, authorized to speak in his behalf. Both parties,

it will be observed, assumed an absent God, unable to speak in his own behalf.

This bibliolatry has prevailed down to nearly the present time. John Wesley held that to give up witchcraft, for instance, was to give up the Bible. Present-day encroachments on the time-honored conceptions have just now—July, 1907—drawn from the Roman Vatican a Syllabus condemning some sixty-five “grave errors” in modern biblical study, breaking thus the silence of nearly half a century since the famous encyclical of Pius IX against modern errors.

Shall protestant missions defend and perpetuate the dogma of the inerrancy of Scripture?

1. The first voice to challenge an inerrant scripture, within the English world at least, came from a missionary. Bishop Colenso of the English mission in South Africa, while engaged in the '60's in translating the Old Testament, found that his native helpers became puzzled over certain practical difficulties, such as the animals taken into the ark, their numbers, how the wild creatures were secured, how all were provided with their accustomed food; of whom Cain was afraid when he was outlawed; where he got his wife; the age of the antediluvians, and like questions. We smile, perhaps inconsistently, at these trivialities; they were serious enough then. The missionary did not smooth matters over, nor did he rebuke the impiety of these free-thinkers of the jungle, but with such means as were at hand he investigated. The result was that he told his people the Pentateuch narratives were plainly unhistorical, and had no more connection with Christianity than the stories of the Apocrypha. This view of the subject was not adopted by the mission board in London. The missionary was adjudged a heretic and deposed from his office. England rang with “the defection of Bishop Colenso,” but the scholarship of Holland was aroused, and soon the learning of Europe confirmed and extended the bold conclusions of the missionary and his African converts.

2. If we hold to the conception of the Scriptures as an unerring rule of life and conduct, it is difficult to avoid extenuating or apologizing for the low standards of conduct of many who are held up as models. Deceit, savagery, cruelty, treachery, lewdness, bulk larger and more prominently in the narrative than we like to think. Jacob

and his mother cheating Esau; Lot; the destruction of the Canaanites; the wholesale abandonment of Gentile wives and children ordered by Ezra; the savage revengefulness of many psalms—these are but a few instances from a long catalogue. Use and wont have made our perceptions obtuse at home, else we should not still be giving prizes to children for reading the Bible through. But in the mission field these things stand out in all their native literalness. In China at least they stand in painful contrast to the decorum of native writings that originated in the same ancient periods, and they produce questionings always, and undisguised revulsion often. I recall how an old Christian quietly collected and concealed scripture portions containing so innocent a narrative as the Book of Ruth after we missionaries had distributed them. It was God's truth, we said, and God would take care of it. It would be well if the Old Testament were not published in its entirety for general circulation, but in compends. The only healthy reaction upon much of the narrative is disgust, repudiation, the same as if the offense were in the Vedas instead of inside Bible covers, but this reaction is difficult on the supposition that the Bible is the inspired rule for our life and conduct.

3. The view of the exclusively Hebrew inspiration stands athwart some of the noblest religious conceptions the modern world has reached. A truth long discerned obscurely but now gripping the world with a fixed conviction, is the immanent presence of God. Present in the universe everywhere, but above all, present in men, growing with their growth and strengthening with their strength, rejoicing in their attainments, grieving over their failures, but never taking his presence from them. And this pervasive Presence, this God with us, has been from the beginning the sole means of such advance as the race has registered, the pledge of future advancement transcending all power of thought.

This conviction renders impossible the conception of an exclusively Judean divine activity, a limited interest of God in peoples of other lands and ages. The modern man is a missionary because he believes that God has the same impartial love for the baby born on the Yangtse or the Thames as for the baby cradled by the Nile or the Jordan, the same regard for Illinois, Sze Chuen, or Telugu, as for Ephraim, Benjamin, or Judah. God has in all ages expressed

his thoughts through the sages of Occident or Orient as really as through the men of that great little land where East and West meet—just as really, even though not as deeply or completely. We need again a Book of the Prophet Jonah to smite our Jewish-Christian conceit and remind us that none of us is the exclusive object of the regard of heaven. It was God who spoke the Golden Rule through the lips of the Chinese sage. It was God who, in the Upanishads, taught that the law of sacrifice was the law by which the worlds were built and by which they are maintained. The early Christians with a truer heart felt no jealousy toward sages outside the sacred circle: the same divine spirit spoke in Socrates and Plato as in Isaiah and John. Truth should surely be known by its hall-mark, not by the book in which it may be printed. Why extol the glorious prophetic peace lyrics of Isaiah and fail to honor the Spirit of God in the modern prophet of the stilled war-drums and the furled battle-flags? Why say Micah was God-inspired when he demanded judgment and justice and the rights of the poor man, and withhold the like ascription from the Scottish peasant bard who in one of humanity's darkest hours dared hail the day "When man to man, the world o'er, shall brithers be"?

If God be father of all it is as impossible to believe in the Bible as the sole written depository of the Spirit of God as in the condemnation of the heathen which once we were constrained to believe it taught.

4. The tardy and grudging recognition of modern science on the part of some interpreters of the Bible has caused a wholly needless controversy of a generation's standing between the Bible and science, the unhappy outcome being the alienation of a too large portion of the schoolmaster class from the church, though not, it is believed, from Christianity. Do the true interests of the Bible require us to continue in the new East this attitude of suspicion and distrust toward science? If so, the revolt of the schoolmaster class will there be universal. At home many things hold discontent within limits—use and wont, the hallowing of sanctuary associations, religious convictions too deep to allow of one's being shaken from the church. Abroad kindly accessories are absent, and the English language is filling the reading-tables of ten thousand schools and colleges. Must

the boys in our missions, like the boys in our home Sunday schools, be brought up on conceptions of the Bible such that when they go to the university and hear of evolution they will "lose their faith"?

The assurance that mankind was not "wrecked in being launched," as those must hold it was who base Christian theology on the stories of Genesis, rather than on the teachings of Jesus, but that we have come safely thus far under the ceaseless urging of the Spirit of God, is a part of the debt we owe to the modern study of evolution. We have no nobler truth to carry abroad. Religion and science are absolutely at one, and like two friendly empires they unyieldingly refuse to be drawn into conflict, though it must be confessed there are hot heads on both sides. Since both seek the truth of God, why continue the tradition of an alienation, an incompatibility? Quite naturally there is a feeling that "conflicts between religion and science" do not arise on the mission field, few there hearing of science. No more fatal mistake could be made. The East may once have been kindergarten to the West, but that day is far past. Our missionaries must bring their message to scientists in every department of research, to the strategists who organized the victory of Tsushima Straits, to statesmen charged with the rehabilitation of China, to the leaders of the New India, to armies of students rapidly taking rank with any of our own. With what sentiment must these men regard a conception of our sacred books that would negative fundamentals of science as obvious as the alphabet? And how immeasurable the advantage if the artificial breach between science and the Bible might on the mission field be forever unknown and unimagined!

5. We should be perilously near to a great revulsion abroad if inadequate conceptions of the Bible should be broken in upon by unfriendly voices telling our people the conceptions they had been taught were at home outworn and being discarded. When Robert Ingersoll stumped the land, heaping cheap ridicule on religion, his whole stock in trade consisted in petty discrepancies of scripture, the alleged responsibility of Christianity for the barbarisms and uncouthnesses of ancient Semitic tribes. His blast would have been as harmless as a tin whistle if right conceptions of scripture had been prevalent. Oriental Ingersolls will undoubtedly drive our converts in multi-

tudes from their moorings unless they are forestalled by a candid and unreserved impartation of the new light which, as if in answer to the prayer of the Pilgrims, is breaking forth from the Scriptures.

How, therefore, positively, should we conceive of the Scriptures in relation to modern missionary work?

The Scriptures are the world's great book of religious experience. As the present age, as Professor Peabody points out, is deeply conscious of its destiny to find solutions of the social problems of life so the Hebrew race was conscious of God. That sense of God which in other races was secondary, sometimes incidental, often acknowledged shamefacedly if at all, with the Hebrews stood in the forefront, avowed with a passionate unreserve. Religion is and ever must be the deepest sentiment of mankind, all covering up, all half-hearted confession to the contrary notwithstanding. The Hebrews differed from most others in that they did not attempt to conceal from themselves nor from anyone else, their absorbed interest in this primal passion. From the sallying forth of their first adventurer down to the travels of their great missionary, the Hebrews carried wherever their wanderings led them the consciousness that God was in that place. Whither should they go from his presence? Whatever else they might do either good or bad, the characteristic of their national life was that they made religion the serious business of life.

Being uppermost in life, religion became uppermost in their records and memoirs also; just as the keynote of the memoirs of other races might be the artistic, the philosophical, or the legal. It is the uniqueness and intensity of the religious element of these records, including especially their continuation in the New Testament, that constitutes them the repository of religious experience to all ages. Experiences with God; life from the point of view of the presence of God and of conformity to his will—this is what life was to them. The national ideal was to know God. "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the rich man glory in his riches: but let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me." Sowing and reaping, buying and selling, ruling the nation, caring for the helpless, marrying and being born, living and dying—everything was done with reference to the presence and wish of the Deity. The rough sanctity of the tribal god roughly maintained;

the coarse facts of defilement coarsely and effectively kept in evidence; the intoxicated ravings of early wandering bands of seers and soothsayers; the over-lordship of God painfully learned by self-imposed exactions to support the institutions of religion; misconceptions and unworthy views gradually passing into the loftiest spirituality—such as this made up the life of Israel. A gallery of prophets and sages any one or two of whom would give luster to the annals of a nation, contributed each his experience of God: Isaiah, undaunted confidence; Jeremiah, the secret of personal converse; Hosea, the possibilities of God's forgiving mercy; Deutero-Isaiah, the service of God by self-devotion on behalf of one's fellows; Jonah, learning that the compassion of God knew no difference between Hebrew and heathen; the book of Job maintaining even to impiety a titanic revolt against the literalistic orthodoxy of the times that the good man is rewarded by the favor of God and may be known by a count of herds, while the "visitation" of disaster is the sure sign of sin; the social conscience growing from the point where a man was nailed to the doorpost a slave forever if he loved wife and children too much to leave them, up to where slavery becomes forever impossible. And, finally, the culmination of the race and of the utterances of their scriptures in Jesus of Nazareth, the prophet of the infinite love of the Father and of self-sacrificing love and brotherhood among all men.

I conceive that this evolution throughout the Scriptures, by toilsome and painful steps, from superstition to spirituality, paralleling the evolution in material nature, constitutes them the world's great book of religion: yet that the truth attained was wrought out in Judea in the same way as in India, or China, or America, by experience and observation, by the use of the mental and spiritual faculties with which all men are endowed. Not speaking now of the Christ, if the men of Judea gained more of truth it is because they used better their resources. If it is asked, Why were resources used better in Judea than in China? it may be enough to ask again, Why more of the sense of beauty, more philosophy, or more law, in one nation than in another?

The authority of the Scriptures on the mission field, as elsewhere, if they were in the rabbinical sense a written communication from

God, would be that of God's audible voice. The advantage to the missionary, if he can have at command a series of divine utterances applicable to every subject and emergency, is obvious. To obey scripture is to obey God. To disregard scripture is to defy God. To follow reason when it leads to results differing from scripture is free thought and is impious. Energies must be directed toward establishing the text of the original documents and ascertaining their exactest shade of meaning; this may be difficult to find, but when found it is the *Kol Yahwé*, the Voice of God. Reason, to which Paul appealed to prove all things, must come down from her throne and give meek ear, like the penitent at Canossa, receiving as her own messages spoken to other men, in other ages, amid circumstances the most we know of which is that they were widely or totally different from those of the present day. When we read of a prophet's bones bringing dead men to life, reason may not intimate that the narrative may be a pious legend. When we are told how the archangel Michael and the devil disputed over the dead body of Moses, we may not say it is an old wives' fable. We may exercise ourselves only in finding some "sense" in which the impossible may conceivably be true; for true it must be, otherwise it were not in Holy Writ. The question can never be, Is a certain thing true? Does it harmonize with the highest ideals of life and thought? Or does it, on the other hand, awaken the repugnance and revolt of mind and spirit? The sole question competent for us to ask is, What is the teaching of scripture? That found, nothing remains; God has spoken, who shall make the reply?—even if we fail of being convinced that the sound we heard was really his voice. An officially authoritative pope does not more effectually play the usurper over men's minds than does a mechanically authoritative book. Living religion is the presence of God in the heart of man. A mechanical scriptural authority tends to sap the life of true religion, telling us that the familiar formula, "thus saith the Lord," certifies the veritable mandate of God. It saves trouble, indeed, to repose upon authority, either of pope or of book. But the repose is stupefying and tends to forgetfulness of the real presence, the God within. May God speak to the soul of man? In other times he did, and in the Holy Land; theoretically he may now; but if the things he would communicate

to me have already been committed to a pope or a book, then let me go to pope or book. Such a course is obvious and easy. But bringing the soul face to face with a book is a poor substitute for bringing it face to face with God. When the religion of authority is given the place of honor the religion of the spirit relapses into silence or is relegated to enthusiasts and fanatics. Yet God is not absent. He needs no viceroy and has appointed none. He can himself speak, and does speak, in the hearts of men. The deepest message of the Bible is that he desires to communicate with us personally.

The function of the scriptures is not one of authority, in the external use of the term. The seat of authority is already held by the conscience, the inner light, the divine within the human. Jesus did not speak with a weight of compelling force, bearing down opposition. His authority was the voice of the divine within him awakening the divine within his hearers, deep calling unto deep. The authority possessed by the Scriptures is of the same kind, in virtue of their recording the words of Jesus and of others of like spirit. The Scriptures thus give voice to God, in the true and sole way possible, not by a vocalization as of mechanical records, but by the living utterance of a thousand spokesmen, each repeating the message registered in his own spirit. The men of the Bible have trodden well-nigh every path and sounded well-nigh every note, of religious experience. They are to us for example, good or ill, for warning, exhortation, for inspiration, that we may be allured to duplicate their experiences, or warned to flee them.

Why should it be thought that the Scriptures can be strengthened by ascribing to them an authority more divine than this? The proposed ascription weakens rather than strengthens. The sun shines by its own light. When a soul recognizes a Bible message as being a word of God, to that soul it is a word of God. Until thus discerned it is not authoritative and there is no means by which it can be made so. The Scriptures need no *imprimatur*. Each writer speaks for himself. If his message is weighty with the thought of God, the soul recognizes its divinity. If it be a thing of straw, the soul knows that also. Decking in the robes of authority is needless in the one case, and in the other it is useless—unless with the ignorant and the somnolent, those who prefer to save trouble by

delegating their thinking. If with Luther I hold a certain scripture to be straw, any person may convince me of the authority of the passage by exhibiting the divine thought which I failed to discern; and to whatever degree the divine thought is shown to that degree my spirit recognizes its supremacy. But lacking such demonstration it cannot appeal with the voice of authority to me.

Those have surely an inadequate conception of the majesty of scripture who think to support by their certification of authority its superiority to other religious literature. There is more of personal communion with the divine in a chapter or paragraph taken at random from Jeremiah or John than in all the Dialogues of Plato; more sense of the defilement of sin inculcated in a chapter of the levitical purgations than in all the lustrums of Rome; a deeper sense of personal guilt in the fifty-first psalm than exists in modern literature.

It is piteous to scan the list of hindrances that restrain spiritual adherents of the ethnic religions from giving adhesion to Christianity. Sometimes it is the extra-cosmic conception of God exhibited in the Genesis creation stories; sometimes a difficulty with the Incarnation; or a theory of the Trinity; or of Redemption; or doubts about the miracles. Almost all are traceable to false and indefensible conceptions of the meaning or the nature of the Scriptures. When we can cast ourselves on the truth that religion is not adhesion to doctrine, but is God's life in the human spirit, made more abundant through Jesus; and on conceptions of scripture that give freedom of thought without imposing the sanctions of supernatural authority, obstacles will be removed that hinder the interpenetration of the world with the influence of Jesus Christ.

PRAGMATISM AND KNOWLEDGE

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Time was when both science and religion claimed to know things, and when both knowledges enjoyed equal indubitable validity. Subsequently there arose a division of labor, a compact according to which science knew one set of things and religion another. An unhappy period then ensued in which science denied the availability of religious knowledge in the sphere of science, and doubted its validity, certainly its verifiableness, even in the region of religion. Henceforth only symbolic significance was to be accorded to religious ideas. Now the function of a symbol is not to report the reality and nature of an object, but to express the feelings of a subject. Thus religion ceases to know things, since cognitive capacity is denied to its system of ideas. In my opinion, the most serious question of the hour is whether religion stands or falls with the affirmation or denial of cognitive function to the ideas which faith possesses. So far it does not appear that religion, as it has been hitherto understood, can endure the negation of the cognitive function and the capability of its ideas. But the interesting point in the present situation is that science, which once urged, then allowed, finally denied, the cognitive function of religious ideas, now disclaims such function for her own ideas and concepts and formulae. "Why do you find fault with me any longer for my attitude to your knowledge, declining to avail myself of it, or to admit your right to do so, since I assume the same attitude to my own knowledge? If you do not know your reality neither do I mine," says Science to Religion. A chemist of note has recently said that he would as little think of calling a chemical formula "true," as he would of calling it "blue." He also indicates that he would occupy the same position with reference to all the so-called "laws" of which science speaks. Formula and law alike are devices for the manipulation of phenomena and the achievement of practical results—in a word, for orientation of the self in the world of phenom-

ena, and not for the intellectual apprehension of reality. Scientific facts, and, even more so, laws, are *artificial* creations of the scholar. Therefore, science can teach us no sort of truth. It can only serve us as instrument and guide in our conduct.

It is evident, therefore, that, from the standpoint of this pragmatic epistemology, the philosophy and apologetics of religion must do their work all over again. Either they must show that religion does not need to know things, or they must undertake the novel task of compelling science to assume a cognitive function; for if science is going to practice such cognitive asceticism and self-effacement religion must abandon her cognitive indulgence and assertiveness. If these things are done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry? A genial man once said: "If my wife does not do what she wants to, I make her!" This is what must be done to science, or else religion must abdicate the cognitive function too.

But for the present let us see if we can understand a little further this new tack in the ever-troubled ocean of thought.

It is evident that the philosophic theory above confessed comes under the head of what the late Middle Ages called Nominalism. As such, the theory is not wholly false. One must render to this philosophic Caesar the things that are Caesar's, but one must not allow it to transcend its own kingdom, and claim the things that are God's.

But the doctrine in question is not simply Nominalistic. Its main feature is its anti-intellectualism. There is reality only in our changing and fleeting impressions, and even this reality vanishes as soon as one touches it.

And yet it is not skepticism. If our philosopher holds that the understanding is immutably impotent, it is but to accord a larger place to other sources of knowledge—to the heart, for example, to the feeling, to instinct, or to "faith."

Admitting the talent of our new philosophers, the acuteness of their theory, the cogency and importance of their protest against the primacy and tyranny of the intellect, there yet seem to me to be some reasons why we cannot entirely agree with them.

They complain because they are so frequently held to be skeptics. It cannot well be otherwise, although this charge is probably not justified. Appearances are against them. They are Nominalists

as to doctrine, realists as to heart, and they can escape absolute Nominalism only by a desperate effort of faith. Does not an anti-intellectualistic philosophy condemn itself to being incommunicable, untransferable? Is it not an essentially "inner" philosophy—or, at least, is not that which is transferable only the negative judgment? If this be so, it is not surprising that the philosophy looks very like skepticism to the "innocent bystander."

Here, it would seem, is the weak point of this philosophy: if it remains consistent with itself, it exhausts its total energy in a negation and an ejaculation of ecstasy. As a maximum of achievement, every philosopher can repeat this negation and this ejaculation, and *change its form without adding anything thereto*.

In which case, would it not be more consistent to keep still? Big books are written. To this end one must still employ words. Is not one much more "discursive," "dialectic," in this way, much more "abstract," and consequently so much the farther removed from "life" and "reality" than the animal who lives quite simply, without philosophizing? Is not the animal the true philosopher? It is most "concrete" and zoölogical, if not "biological."

From the fact that no painter ever painted a portrait that was a "perfect likeness," may we conclude that the best painter is the painter that does not paint at all? If a zoölogist dissects an animal, he thereby changes it of course; dissecting it, he is thereby condemned to only partial knowledge of it. But if he did not dissect it at all he would be condemned to much less knowledge and, consequently, presumably to much less talk!

Certainly there are other powers and functions in man than the understanding. No one was ever so foolish as to deny that. Those other powers are active. The philosopher must speak of them. To this end he must know at least some part of the little that one can know of them; he must therefore observe their activity. But how? With what eyes, if not with the eyes of his understanding? The heart, the instinct, can guide and determine the understanding, but cannot make it superfluous; it can direct the look, but not displace the eyes. One may say—I am among those who do say—that the "will" is the toiler and the "intellect" the tool of the toil, although the word "tool" is not quite happy. But evermore the intellect is an

instrument which, if it can be dispensed with in action (conduct), *is nevertheless indispensable in philosophizing*. Therefore a really anti-intellectualistic philosophy is impossible. Perhaps we must conclude to the superiority of activity—I do so conclude—even so, it is the understanding which so concludes. This, too, is a superiority not to be despised.

Science is only a rule of action, a device for getting results for life—this is Pragmatism. We are not capable of *knowing* anything, and yet we are implicated in life; we establish rules of action; the totality of these rules we call science.

Equally so, men have established regulations for their pleasure, regulations which, with even more right than science, can claim universal assent. So, too, compelled to choose, yet not in a position to choose, you flip a penny to decide this way or that. The rule of backgammon or whist is of course a rule of action, like science from the pragmatic point of view. But is there no difference? The rules of gaming are *arbitrary* agreements; and if agreements just the opposite of those that were made had been made, conceivably the rules would not have been less “good” (=useful). *Science* is a rule of action with a result—at least in most cases—*while the opposite rule would have had no result*. The opposite of H_2SO_4 would do just as well as a rule of some game; but not as a rule of conduct where the reality thus signalized is involved. If a chemist says that to produce hydrogen he must let an acid act upon zinc, he states a rule which has a result. He could have said: Let filtered water act upon gold; but it would have had no result.

If, therefore, scientific recipes have value as rules of action, that value consists in our knowing that they are resultful, at least in general. But to know this is already to know *something*. How, then, can one say that we know nothing? Science forecasts, and on that account alone can be “useful” and serve as a rule of action. Of course, this forecasting is often refuted by the result. But this proves that science is imperfect; and if I add that science will always remain imperfect, I am sure that *this* is a forecast which never can be refuted. Does the scientist err less frequently than the prophet? Progress is slow but steady, so that scholars, though they become bolder, are ever less frequently befooled. This is little, but it is something.

The errancy of science is often supposed to be proved by an appeal to the changes which science makes in method and conclusion. No conclusion stands, no conclusion true, no truth—that is the *descensus Averni*. Some victory, but mostly defeat: science is resultless thus.

But if science were resultless, it could not serve as rule of action. Whence its worth then? In our experiencing it? That is, in our loving it and believing in it? Alchemists had recipes for making gold; they loved the recipes and had faith in them. Yet our recipes are better because they have results, though our “faith” is less lively.

There is no way to escape the following dilemma: *either*, science is not competent to forecast—but in that case it is worthless as a rule of action; *or*, it is competent to forecast, in a more or less imperfect manner—but in that case it is not worthless as a means of *knowledge*.

I even doubt if it is “true” (we do sometimes have to use that word still) to say that action is the sole and exclusive goal of science. May we turn down all studies concerning Sirius, because it is objected that we shall probably never exercise any influence upon this star? In (pure) mathematics is not knowledge the goal and action the means? Did Copernicanism spring from a sense of practical need only, or rather from cognitive curiosity also? Has the age-long idea of the love of knowledge partly for its own sake been all wrong? Is the love of art for its own sake—or of one’s wife for her own sake—immoral? If we do indeed rejoice in science in developing industry, is not this joy partly due to the fact that such service strengthens the scholar’s faith in himself? As a matter of fact, functional psychology implies that the mind is an organism; but, since in an organism nothing is *mere* means and not also end, the knowledge function cannot be degraded to a mere menial in the economy of the soul, but must be accorded dignity and worth on its own account. Pragmatism may not be allowed to substitute its new Absolute of Utility for the old Absolute of Knowledge. We must have democracy within the psychic as well as within the social. Unlike either Absolute, pluralism must be confraternal.

Turning to another item our philosopher says, *science makes the facts*. It may be that he means that science creates the *scientific* facts, not the *raw* facts. This is a good distinction, at all events. But

to draw it accurately—there is the rub. Yet the idea of pragmatism is that raw facts are not scientific, are outside of science.

Is it true that science—the scientist—*freely creates* the scientific facts, while the raw facts are a donation to him? Atom is a scientific fact, we are told. Is the atom a sample of a *fact*? There cannot be science without scientific fact, nor scientific fact without raw fact. Scientific fact is but a translation, so to speak, of raw fact. Does the scientist create scientific fact? Even so, *not out of nothing*, but out of raw fact. Therefore he does not do it *freely*, his freedom being conditioned and limited by the properties of the material with which he works. An eclipse at nine o'clock will not wait till ten at the behest of the will of the creative astronomer. Indeed, there is no sharp distinction between raw and scientific fact—*only*, the expression of one fact is more raw or more scientific than of another. But if there are raw facts, then the relations between them and the laws of this relationship are not the total creations of the scientist for utilitarian ends. In a less degree indeed, the same remark may be made concerning relations and laws of scientific facts. They are realities in existence, that is, *true*, and not simply devices of the pragmatist to serve as supernumeraries in the serio-comic play of human life. And, as to the world of religion, let any functional psychologist try to act upon the idea of God, no matter how it arose, and at the same time disbelieve in his existence; he will find that no action will follow, if *ontological* reference be denied to the idea.

After all, the total humanization of reality is an audacious and unwarrantable proposition. The whole race of us men, from the beginning until now, living and dead, could be comfortably congregated in the state of New York. We are but an episode, the whole posse of us, in the transitory life of an insignificant planet, a grain of sand, as it were, on the shore of the infinite sea. This modern anthropocentric Humanism and Copernicanism are mutually exclusive. It may well be that the statement of the Whole Reality in terms of the human is not a tribute to Its wealth and strength, but an insinuation of Its poverty and weakness. It may well be that there are more things in heaven and earth than we dream of in our new philosophy.

SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF RUSSIAN CHRISTIANITY

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I

In current discussion of the Russian situation there is a disposition to ignore the religious factors in the case. Yet no historian would think of treating the political upheavals in England in the seventeenth century or the revolt of the American colonies or the French Revolution without giving large place to the religious elements in these movements. And if the factor of religion looms so large when men look back upon such national crises, it is probable that we shall not rightly understand the progress of the greatest revolution of our own generation if we disregard this factor. For, doubtless, as Tolstoy has intimated, the course of the Russian revolution and its ultimate outcome will in the end be seen to have been largely determined by the religious history and character of the Russian people. The religious and the patriotic emotions have always been closely related, and even social and industrial reforms go forward but haltingly until they can form an alliance of some sort with the religious sentiments. At least in Christian lands, no crusade or great social revolution excites popular following and enthusiasm, till men are led to believe that "God wills it."

There are those who interpret Russia's present struggle and forecast her future purely upon ethnological grounds. Of these writers there are two classes. One affirms that the Russian people are so largely Mongol in blood and Asiatic in spirit that they are incapable of appreciating or adopting the civilization of the western world. These indorse the adage: "Scratch a Russian and you find a Tartar;" by which they mean that the semblance of western civilization that the Russian wears is a veneer so thin and fragile that it breaks off under the least rough handling, and shows the oriental savage underneath. These insist that it is as vain to expect the Russian to enter

the brotherhood of western nations as his near relative the Turk. He is predestined by ineradicable race-characteristics to remain alien and oriental. Aspirations after representative government and western social and industrial life are exotic and incapable of naturalization among the mass of the Russian people, to whom an oriental despotism and a less complex industrial organization are by nature more congenial. On the other hand, there are those who deny that the Finnish and Tartar blood in the Russian materially affects his character. They declare that the Sclavic elements in him so largely predominate that he is to be regarded as brother by blood to the Celt and the Teuton, and heir to the heritage of the Aryan peoples, certain to share in their common destiny. And as the youngest member of the Indo-European family of nations, he has scarcely begun his career or disciplined his energies. Greek and Roman, Celt and Teuton, have each in turn ruled the world. It is the Slav's turn next. The future belongs to him. In the Russian peasant, living in patriarchal simplicity, in close contact with the life-giving earth, with energies fresh and vitality unimpaired by an artificial civilization—in him, these see the coming man, the successor to the Teuton in the domination of the world's progress. The steady eastward march of Russian conquest to the shores of the Pacific, and the Pansclavonic movement, which sought to organize all the peoples of Sclavic blood under the hegemony of Russia were regarded as the first steps in her far-sighted project of world-supremacy.

It must be admitted that the dreams of the Russophiles and the apprehensions of those afflicted with Russophobia have both been dissipated by Russia's crushing defeat in the recent war. The demonstration of the utter inefficiency of her army and navy, the exposure of official corruption of the oriental type, and the revelation of her chronic industrial prostration have made it quite evident that the Russia which so excited fear and expectation was but an imposing shell, a tremendous sham, a cleverly maintained bluff, with neither organization nor moral enthusiasm nor popular intelligence nor available material resources to support its pretensions.

And as for the contention of those who would explain Russia's present and predict her future upon ethnological grounds, it would appear that the facts which should constitute such grounds are them-

selves the subject of dispute. So far as racial and tribal differences and various stages in civilization are concerned, the present Russian empire is probably the most heterogeneous nation that has ever existed.

This unique mingling and juxtaposition of peoples is graphically displayed by an ingenious device to be seen in the Ethnological Museum in Moscow. Here upon a huge map of Russia are placed, in their appropriate districts, groups of life-sized figures representing the stature and color and physiognomy and dress of the various races and tribes that constitute the motley population of the empire. There among many others, are the Europeanized Russians of the western provinces and the cities, the Eskimo-like tribes of the Far North, the yellow-skinned, oblique-eyed Mongols of the southern steppes, the Tartar peoples of the Ural region, the Kurds and Armenians and Circassians on the southern borders, beside the more familiar and typical peasant-groups of the central provinces. A visit to this museum or a study of an ethnographical map of Russia will lead to the conclusion that there exists no such thing as a Russian people, but that the population of Russia is composed of representatives of all the peoples of eastern Europe and northern Asia—as yet very imperfectly assimilated and nationalized. And it is this fact that makes the predictions as to Russia's future, made by the ethnologists, so diverse. If one confine his attention to European Russia the problem becomes less complex, but by no means simple. It is no easy matter to determine the racial composition of the western Russian. Pure Slav he certainly is not, for he has too many points of difference from the Poles and Bohemians and other Slavic peoples. Nor can these points of difference be explained by the peculiar physical environment of the Russian since he became separated from his Slavic relatives.

Russia is a great level plain unprotected by bold mountain ranges; lying thus wide open to invasion, it has offered an easy highway for the innumerable migrations from Asia into Europe. In prehistoric times it was crossed by the earliest Aryan migrations. In historic times Scythian, Goth, Bulgarian, Petcheneg, and Tartar are among the peoples that have occupied it for periods long or short, and have left deposits that constitute elements in the present population of the southern steppes. "Out of the apparent chaos of Russian ethnology,"

writes Leroy-Beaulieu, "three main elements, Finn, Tartar, Slav, clearly emerge, the last having by this time in a great measure absorbed the other two." First in their occupancy of the country stand the Finns, a Turanian or Mongoloid people of Asiatic origin, tall of stature, dolichocephalic, and reddish blond. In civilization they belonged to the Stone Age. At the opening of the ninth century they occupied nearly all of European Russia, but already the Slavs, entering it would appear, from the southwest, had become their masters in the western part and were pushing conquest and amalgamation northward and eastward. In the southeast, between the Black Sea and the Ural Mountains, were Tartar tribes of various names, with which the neighboring Finns had freely intermarried. During the next three centuries the Slavs extended their conquests eastward to the Volga, and, except along the Baltic and in the case of "racial islands," here and there submerged the aboriginal Finns.

But Russia was to receive a further infusion of Asiatic blood. In the thirteenth century she suffered invasion and conquest by the Tartars, and under their domination she remained for more than two hundred years. While the Tartars did not attempt to occupy Russia, but ruled it from the eastern border, yet they affected the racial composition of the future Russian by extensive intermarriage with the Finnish Russians, who were their neighbors. Such, in brief, are the relations of the three main elements in the population of European Russia. It is to be noticed that beside adding another strain of Asiatic blood, these centuries of Tartar domination affected the Russians injuriously by checking the natural advance of their civilization and breaking off their close connection with the nations of Europe. They caused Russia to face toward Asia, turned her back toward the barbarism of her conquerors, and permanently retarded her national development. The backwardness of Russia becomes the more marked if we contrast her with other Slavic peoples, such as the Bohemians and the Poles, who, pure in blood, and under the tutelage of the Roman Catholic church and in close contact with the other nations of Europe, achieved, centuries ago, a high degree of civilization.

These facts as to the racial composition of the Russian people and their retarded development are of the utmost importance in under-

standing their religious condition. For Russian Christianity today is explicable only in the light of the origin and history of the nation.

It is important also to notice that Russian national life and Russian Christianity began at the same time. Until the latter part of the ninth century, the territory of European Russia was occupied by independent tribes of mingled Finnish and Sclavic blood. There was no governmental center, no feeling of racial unity, no sense of common destiny, in other words, no Russian nation as yet. Two agencies were to weld these independent and sometimes hostile tribes into national unity. The one was a military conquest from the north, from Scandinavia; the other a religious conquest from the south, from Constantinople. Norman military adventurers invaded Russia as they did France and England and gradually became masters of the country. The establishing of the leadership of Ruric in 862 is popularly regarded as the beginning of the Russian nation. These Norman princes chose Novgorod and later Kief on the Dnieper as their capital. They carried their expeditions of conquest even to the gates of Constantinople.

The one great missionary accomplishment of the Byzantine church was the evangelization of the Sclavic peoples. How early this began it is difficult to ascertain, but by the ninth century Christianity had been established among the Slavonic Moravians, and some converts had been made among the tribes of southern Russia. There was a Christian church in Kief, which was a chief shrine for the worship of Perun, one of the most prominent divinities in the native religion of the Slavs.

But the weak and struggling missions among the Russians underwent a complete change with the establishment of the rule of Ruric and his followers. Partly no doubt from political reasons these Norman princes soon adopted Christianity. They also formed matrimonial and political alliance with the Byzantine monarchs. The formal Christianization of Russia may be said to date from 988. In that year Vladimir married a Byzantine princess and was baptized; and as was often the case, the conversion of the ruler meant the conversion of the nation. On returning to Kief, Vladimir took with him Christian priests and sacred vessels and relics from Constantinople, with the purpose of making his capital a center for the propa-

gation of his newly adopted faith. He planned a dramatic spectacle which should impress his subjects with the fact that they were to transfer their allegiance from their old gods to the God of the Christians. The wooden image of Perun was publicly dishonored and flung in to the Dnieper. Then all the people of Kief gathered on the banks of the river and at an appointed signal waded into the water, which had been consecrated for sacramental purposes, and, as the prince knelt and the priests upon the shores read the baptismal service, the people immersed themselves, and came up out of the river Christians. Similar scenes occurred elsewhere, and Christianity became the acknowledged religion of the new nation. Vladimir and his immediate successors followed up this formal conversion of their subjects with measures more calculated to render them worthy Christians. They invited missionaries from Constantinople, they built churches and monasteries and schools, they encouraged the translation of Greek theological works into the Slavonic, which recently, through missionary agency, had been developed into a written language.

Thus it appears that as soon as these Norman rulers felt themselves secure upon their new throne, they introduced a new religion, which should be a support to the throne, a basis of alliance with Constantinople, and an agency in the introduction of the Byzantine civilization. Nationality and Christianity began together in Russia, and state and church have stood in the closest relations ever since. They have been regarded as but different aspects of the Russian people. Among no other people of modern times have the national and religious interests been so closely identified. This is indicated by the use of such a term as "Holy Russia," and the disposition of Russian historians to give a religious coloring to every important event, and to draw parallels between the life of Russia and that of the Hebrew theocracy.

It is to be noted that it was not the primitive Christianity of the Apostolic Age, but the formal and petrified Christianity of the Byzantine empire of the tenth century that was introduced into Russia. It consisted of a system of doctrine to be believed, and a code of morals to be adopted—but much more obviously to the barbaric Russians, it consisted of rites and ceremonies to be observed, festivals

and fasts to be kept, saints to be revered, and dues to be paid. The discipline of these no doubt had their value in the religious education of a rude people, but they tended constantly to usurp the place of the essential truths of Christianity, and, by engrossing the attention of the unlearned worshiper, to obscure the real meaning of the gospel. In the Roman Empire pure, primitive Christianity displaced the classic polytheism, which, in spite of imperial attempts to revive it, was already moribund. But in Russia a less vital type of Christianity, under government patronage, sought to displace a living, growing native religion. The result was what one might expect. While the decadent polytheism of the skeptical Roman affected the Christianity of the Roman Empire but slightly, the vital paganism of the simple-minded Slav colored his conception of every Christian doctrine and rite. It constituted the background against which he saw the new religion. It gave form and to some degree content to the new doctrines. By its analogies he explained the meaning of the Christian sacraments and ceremonies. And this was true not only of the Christianity of the first generation of Russian Christians, but, because of the immobility of the Russian nature, this condition became to a large degree permanent. So careful a student of Russia as Leroy-Beaulieu says of the Russian peasant of today:

Christianity has indeed succeeded in obliterating from his soul the names and memory of the heathen gods, but it has not been so successful in stamping on it its own dogmas and belief. The old paganism and the new teaching form two distinct layers, which are clearly distinguishable to this day. It is not alone that heathen rites have been preserved in places—the very spirit of paganism is alive still, under a coating of Christianity.

Because of these undeniable survivals of paganism in Russian Christianity, it is necessary to glance at the native religion of the Slavs. Like that of the other Aryan peoples, it is an outgrowth of nature-worship; but it presents a much more primitive form than that of the other branches of the family. It is a rude polytheism, in which the deities plainly represent the forces and activities of nature. It contains as yet no philosophy, no ethics, and a cosmology which is purely mythical. The two most ancient gods, like those of the Greeks, represented the earth and the sky. When it came into contact with Christianity, the Russian religion included belief in a long list of

gods and demigods. These we may believe took their distinctive character from the aspects of nature with which the people were familiar, the soil, the climate, the landscape, the flora and fauna. Most prominent in the pantheon was Perun, the god of fire and the fabricator of the lightning. There were solar deities, some of them bearing some resemblance to Apollo, a goddess of fecundity, and gods of the winds and rivers. Beside such deities, representing the personified forces of nature, there were demigods, giants, and ogresses, and sacred trees, plants, and animals. In addition to these, there were good and bad elves and fairies and water-sprites, and ghosts and goblins. While these were, perhaps, not objects of worship in the strictest sense, they were nevertheless not to be disregarded, as they might bring good or bad luck to the farmer or the hunter or the housewife. Concerning these there are still endless folk-tales which beguile the long winter evenings in the peasant's cabin and afford the children an ecstasy of fear and delight. The prevalent belief in witches and malevolent spirits offers illustration of a darker side of the Sclavic religion, and was to give to the Christianity of Russia a strange alliance with witchcraft. It is beyond doubt that the Sclavs, like the other Aryans, possessed the hope of a future life; whether it was to be endless or not, is difficult to decide, but it was to be a life like the present one. The undeveloped character of their religion is further indicated by the fact that they had no priestly caste, no temples, no fixed system of sacrifice or worship. The father of the household or the chief of the clan acted as priest. Sorcerers and wizards, as was noticed, abounded, and, by affording a means of communicating with the gods might, it was believed, avert disaster. Such, in barest outline, was the faith of the Sclavs in the tenth century, and with this, in a most grotesque combination, they joined the doctrines and usages brought to them by the missionaries from Constantinople.

The readiness with which the Russians adopted Christianity is indicative of their superficial understanding of it. They did not see its essential hostility to their old faith, and resist it as did the Romans and Saxons. The Russian church received no baptism of blood, it did not pass through martyrdom to triumph. At the command of Vladimir the nation submitted to baptism. The old polytheism seemed suddenly to pale and vanish before the new faith. But the

victory of the gospel was easy because it was shallow. The Christianity which the Russians received did not sufficiently disturb their old ideas or change their modes of thought or manner of life to excite determined resistance. So little did they comprehend its nature that they adopted the forms of Christianity while remaining pagan in thought and feeling. It has been suggested that the vague and undeveloped state of their native religion made it easy for them to merge it into another faith more developed in doctrine and ritual. The early Russians may have imagined that they saw in the complete system of Christianity an elaboration of their own ill-defined religious notions and rites. In any case, the result was a kind of pagan Christianity, largely polytheistic as to its substance, though Christian as to form.

And such, to a large degree, it has remained till today among the peasantry—and the peasantry constitute more than 80 per cent. of the Russian people. A recent writer states it thus: "All who have studied the Russian peasant have been impressed with this duality in his religion. It still survives after all these centuries, in his songs, his traditions, his folk stories, his imagination."

This latent, unconscious paganism in the Russian peasant crops out in most interesting ways. One of the most common is the transference of the characteristics of the old deities to the Christian saints. Perun, the god of fire and thunder, reappears as St. Elijah, whose fiery chariot, driven about in the heavens is believed to cause the thunder. Velos, the Russian Apollo, survives under the guise of St. Blasius. Many of the notions concerning Lodo, the Russian Venus, were transferred to the Virgin. The god who was the patron of agriculture and the protector of children reappears in St. Nicolas, the most popular saint in the calendar. Of him it is popularly said that "he is to succeed God when God grows old." The ancient demigods have survived in SS. George and Michael and Dimitri, the heroes of martial adventures. Thus the old polytheism lives on in the saint-worship which constitutes such a large feature of the religion of the Russians. But as Christianity offered no substitute for the minor deities, the spirits of the woods and fields and fireside, the elves and fairies and goblins, these remain, implicitly believed in by the peasantry. To propitiate them, ceremonies are performed sometimes on the sly, sometimes publicly and with the sanction of the

church. On some occasions, after the priest has performed the rites of the church, the peasants will secretly perform traditional pagan rites, so as to propitiate all parties. Many conjurations designed to avert calamities exist in two forms, Christian and pagan, the one addressed to Christ or some saint, the other to the nature-deity concerned. But perhaps the most striking illustration of pagan feeling among the Russians is seen in their belief in magic spells and witchcraft. Almost every village has its wizard, and the peasants often pay him to say his incantations over their cattle or crops, after they have been blessed by the priest. Wallace affirms that many of the Finnish Russians have never come to distinguish religion from magic. The mass and other rites of the church they regard as a preferred and legitimate form of incantation designed to avert evil and bring good luck. Leroy-Beaulieu states that:

to the peasant the priest is, first of all, one who knows the sacred forms of invocation with which to influence the heavenly powers. Christ appears to him as the mightiest and most benevolent of all conjurers, and God as the Supreme Magician!

The persistence of pagan ideas among the Russian peasantry is further made manifest by the ease with which, when they are colonized among the heathen tribes along the Siberian frontier, they adopt the religious customs of their neighbors. They will worship in Buddhist temples, and place heathen idols beside their icons, and this without giving up their Christian usages or experiencing any lively sense of inconsistency. "It looks," says one, "as if the peasant, only half emerged from paganism, is always ready to relapse into it if there is no strong hand to hold him back."

Long after Christianity had become the recognized religion of the nation, Russia remained a missionary field for the patriarch of Constantinople. The monks and priests whom he sent there were not only teachers of religion, but also pioneers of civilization. They taught milder manners and better laws to the rude Sclavic tribes. In this respect, though with less success, they repeated the noble work done by the missionaries whom the popes sent to the Teutonic nations. But while each step in the organization of the Teutonic churches served to establish a stronger bond of ecclesiastical dependence upon Rome, the stages in the organization of the church in Russia were so many steps toward her complete independence of Constantinople. This

fact has been fraught with the most far-reaching consequences. And yet this gradual separation from the mother-church has not been accompanied by alienation. Each step toward ecclesiastical independence has been sanctioned by the patriarch. The missionary stage of the Russian church lasted for centuries. During this period all her metropolitans and many of her bishops and priests were Greek, and the Russians did little better than reproduce in a semi-barbaric way the life of the Byzantine church.

But the occupancy of Constantinople by the Latins during the first half of the thirteenth century, and the succeeding centuries of Tartar domination in Russia tended to interrupt communication with Constantinople and so assist the Russian church in attaining autonomy. The consecration of the metropolitan, Jonah, in 1448, not by the patriarch as heretofore, but by a synod of Russian bishops, and the fall of Constantinople, which occurred soon after, mark an epoch in the development of the church's independence. This independence became complete when, in 1589, the patriarch of Constantinople, on a visit to Russia, was induced by the Czar to raise the metropolitan of Moscow to the rank of patriarch, and empowered the Russian Synod to elect and consecrate his successors. In obtaining a patriarch the Russian church not only acquired complete ecclesiastical autonomy, but she completed her hierarchical development. Moscow was now spoken of as "New Rome," and her patriarch was regarded as having taken the place of the patriarch of Rome, who was believed to have become hopelessly heretical. Thus in the theory of the eastern church, the original number of patriarchates (five) was restored.

It is worthy of note that the development of the Russian monarchy out of the confusing mass of half-independent principalities and appanages and republics that constitute the Russia of the Middle Ages, must be traced largely to the influence of the church, whose priests of Byzantine origin or training slowly taught the Russian people, originally fond of liberty, the Byzantine ideals of autocratic monarchy. It was the church, also, that saved the nation from utter barbarism and ruin during the long Tartar domination, and later aided her to resist the encroachments of Poland.

An interesting parallel may be drawn between the relations of the pope to the Holy Roman Empire, whose monarchs, with his encour-

agement, assumed the title, "Kaiser," and the Eagles of the Caesars and the relations of the patriarch of Constantinople to "Holy Russia," whose rulers with his encouragement assumed the title, "Czar," and the Imperial Eagles. The two great rival ecclesiastics developed their missionary fields into two great rival monarchies. For the Holy Roman Empire and "Holy Russia" appeared as claimants for the distinction of being the true successor to the Christian empire of Constantine and Justinian. It is also worthy of notice that the Tartar domination of Russia, which, beginning in the thirteenth century, lasted till the sixteenth, not only put a check upon her material and political development, but, by cutting her off from free contact with the civilizing influences of Constantinople and the nations of western Europe, caused her to adopt Asiatic ideals of life and government. As a consequence Russia was uninfluenced either by the Renaissance or the Reformation. These mighty convulsions which ushered in the modern age scarcely caused a ripple in the life of Russia. Her retarded development becomes strikingly apparent when we realize that the barbaric monster, Ivan the Terrible, was contemporary with Queen Elizabeth.

II

Nothing is more characteristic of the Russian church than its utter dependence upon the civil government. It is a state church in the most extreme sense. The ideal of the relation of the church to the monarch was derived, like so many other things in Russia, from the Byzantine Empire. The popes have never been so subservient to the western emperors as were the patriarchs of Constantinople to their despotic monarchs. And the czars believe that they occupy a place in their national church similar to that occupied by Justinian or Leo the Iconoclast. This fact has been especially evident since Peter the Great. One of the results of his residence in western Europe and his study of European history was the determination that the rivalry between emperor and pope, which forms such a conspicuous feature in the story of the Middle Ages, should not find repetition in Russia. The powerful patriarch, Nikon, had for a time quite overshadowed Peter's weak and vacillating father and had boldly asserted the superior rights of the church. Taking council from history and his father's experience, Peter decided to forestall the

appearance of any ecclesiastical rival in the government of his empire. He was not content with half-measures. To prevent the patriarch from ever coming into a contest of power with the czar, he abolished the patriarchate, and in 1721 established the Holy Governing Synod. As he appointed the members of the synod and announced himself as its "supreme head," no one could have doubted that in everything but name the czar intended to succeed the patriarch. In fact, at the inauguration of the Holy Synod, Peter is reported to have said: "I am your patriarch," And yet so abject was the spirit of the Russian clergy that there was no general resistance of this abuse of imperial power. That the Czar today regards himself as the God-appointed head of the church, and hence as possessing a quasi-sacerdotal character, is beyond dispute. In a famous address to Alexander II in 1887, occur these words: "The Law of the Lord teaches us that sovereigns are appointed and consecrated by God himself. . . . The sovereign is the image of God on earth!" This claim is equivalent to that of the pope that he is "the vicar of Christ on earth." It is significant that the present Czar was not crowned by any ecclesiastic, but he himself placed the crown upon his head and then turned and crowned the Czarina. Originally the Holy Synod consisted of twelve members, but now the number is not fixed. It is composed almost wholly of bishops of various rank, most of whom are chosen for a term, a few for life. The metropolitans of Kief and Moscow and St. Petersburg and the exarch of Georgia are, ex-officio, life-members of the Synod. Among those serving for a fixed term are prominent archbishops and bishops and archimandrites, the czar's confessor, and the chief chaplain of the army and of the navy. It is significant that at the head of the table about which the Synod gathers is a throne for the czar. On all ordinary occasions he is represented by the chief procurator, who is a layman, sometimes a military officer. The Synod has no power of free initiative. Beside some routine business its work consists in solemnly authorizing acts already decided upon by the monarch in consultation with the chief procurator. But although the policy of church administration is altogether in the hands of the czar, dissatisfaction with it is always directed against the procurator, just as criticism of a political policy is likely to focus not on the monarch, however absolute, but on his ministers. No

doubt in the case of the recent procurator, Constantine Pobedonatseff, this was amply deserved. For beside being a most uncompromising reactionary, it is notorious that he has had a powerful personal influence over the present Czar and his father, and without doubt has really shaped the policy of the church. The administration of the church for centuries has been of one piece with that of the state—arbitrary, tyrannical, cruel. The knout has been applied to the back of many an offending priest, and the monastery prisons have swallowed up those who ventured to show signs of recalcitrance. Terrorism has been the approved policy in the ecclesiastical, as in the civil, government. Each of the seventy Russian dioceses has its own consistorial council, modeled after and subordinate to the Holy Synod. The Bishop's court has little independent authority; it is mainly a bureau for the record and transmission of the details of the life of every humblest priest and parish. But its power to begin the prosecution of an ecclesiastical offender makes it an effective agency for terrorism and blackmail. The councils and courts of the church constitute a great bureaucracy; everything is subject to the review of the Holy Synod; and no important business can be transacted or appointment made in any part of the church without its consent.

✓ The Russian clergy are divided into two classes, the monastic and the secular, or the black and the white, as they are popularly called. The explanation of these names is to be found in the fact that the dress of the monk is a black gown reaching from chin to heels. He wears also a high, black cylindrical hat with a long veil of the same color attached to the back of it. The secular or parish clergy may dress in other colors, though they always wear a distinctly priestly garb. Both the black and white clergy wear their beards and hair long. In the Russian church, as in oriental Christianity generally, every parish priest must be married and every bishop or other member of the hierarchy must be celibate. The policies of the Roman Catholic and the Protestant churches with reference to their clergy are consistent with their different views as to the sanctity of the married state. But the Russian church, holding to the special sanctity of celibacy, requires it of her bishops, but permits or rather requires the great mass of her clergy to marry. This arbitrary arrangement has far-

reaching results. There is not, as in the Roman church, a regular line of promotion from the humblest parish to the very highest ecclesiastical positions. To enter the parochial clergy means to remain there for life. There is no room for a wholesome ambition. The only path to ecclesiastical advancement and enlarged influence leads through the monastery gate. Every student for the priesthood has to decide whether he will choose the delights and cares of family life and the quiet, laborious existence of a parish priest, or will sacrifice to ambition the prospect of love and home, and find a compensation in the career open to the monkish clergy. This choice causes an early separation between the priesthood and those destined for the hierarchy, and prevents the growth of that mutual understanding and sympathy which should exist between a bishop and his clergy.

The importance of monasticism in the Russian church arises not only from the fact that the hierarchy is monastic but from the distinguished rôle that the monasteries have played in the protection of the religion and nationality of the Russians from ruin through foreign conquest. Many of the older monasteries are citadels, and behind their embattled walls, in times of national crises, kings and princes sought shelter and the purest patriotism found a rallying-place. It is noteworthy that the most impressive monuments of Russia's past are not castles or palaces or cathedrals, but her fortress-like monasteries, some of which inclose a whole village within their strong walls. The nation's most sacred shrines and most precious miracle-working relics and icons are in these historic monasteries. And Peter the Great thought it a political necessity to establish a great monastery and deposit some especially sacred relics at his new capital on the Neva. The number of men entering the monastic life has declined rapidly during the last two centuries, till now there are scarcely more than 10,000 monks in the entire realm—or one sixth as many in proportion to the population as in France. Although the government assists in planting new monasteries on the frontiers of the empire to aid in the Russianization of newly conquered peoples, yet it has ruthlessly confiscated the property of unnecessary monasteries elsewhere. So that now there are less than 400 monasteries, or barely half as many as there were two centuries ago. In earlier days men of noble blood sought the monastic life, and many kings ended their

days in the quiet of the cloister; but of recent years the monasteries have found their recruits almost wholly among the sons of priests and merchants and artisans. This fact has naturally tended to lessen the prestige of the hierarchy. The contrast between Russian monasticism and that of the West is most striking. The ideals of the former were derived from the early cenobites of the East. Their life is mainly one of worship and contemplation and idleness. The few who attain to the position of bishop or archimandrite or hegumen have abundant administrative duties, but the other monks lead a life of physical inactivity and mental stagnation. While the western monasteries of the Middle Ages were hives of varied industry and schools of varied learning, the chief service of Russian monasticism has been the protecting and conserving of the church. But western monasticism, being in no wise responsible for the government of the church, has stood beside her as her critic, and has started and provided champions for every great reform and revival that has renewed Latin Christianity. A further contrast appears in the fact that while Russian monasticism is homogeneous and has never developed beyond the simple rule of St. Basil which it inherited from the Byzantine church, western monasticism under St. Benedict adopted a rule suited to its genius and service, and, not content with this, has from time to time modified its organization to meet the exigencies of its growing life. Instead of remaining homogeneous, it has, in its effort to render special lines of service to the church, become subdivided into almost innumerable orders, and has offered perhaps the most heterogeneous expression of the religious life to be found in Roman Catholicism. Nearly all the great scholars of mediaeval Europe were monks, but the drowsy atmosphere of the Russian monasteries has not been conducive to scholarship. In the regulations of the monastic life established by Peter the Great, while the monks were encouraged to study the Scriptures, they were forbidden upon pain of corporal punishment to write books or even to copy extracts from them. They were not permitted to have paper and ink in their cells. Peter explains this stern repression of authorship among the monks by saying that "nothing so disturbs the tranquility of monastic life as senseless and unnecessary scribbling." The immobile and unintellectual character of Russian monasticism, and the fact that it provides the church with

her hierarchy and controls the education of the entire clergy and is the object of a profound veneration by all classes, makes any immediate progress in the Russian church appear very improbable. It is a curious fact that while the number of men entering the monastic life grows constantly less, the number of women who seek the shelter of the cloister is increasing somewhat; and although the monasteries outnumber the nunneries two to one, yet there are nearly twice as many nuns as monks.

The Russian clergy partakes of the nature of a hereditary caste. It constitutes a distinct estate in society, separated from other classes by traditional barriers of sentiment and an actual insulation due to birth and education and professional exclusivism. This has not always been the case. Once the clergy was recruited from all ranks in society, but gradually the bishops adopted the custom of appointing the sons of the priests to vacant parishes, sometimes because they were the only young men to be obtained who had any acquaintance whatever with the duties of the priesthood. Later the bishops organized schools for the education of the sons of the clergy, and these naturally proved a convenient source for the supply of young priests. Political influences tended in the same direction. With the beginning of serfdom in the sixteenth century the peasants became attached to the soil, and a peasant's son was not free to enter the clergy, nor could the son of a noble do so without renouncing his property and class privileges. Peter the Great went farther, and, in order to give stability to each class in society, prohibited those of the non-clerical classes from entering the clergy, and forbade the sons of priests from seeking a secular career. This made the clergy a kind of Levitical tribe, whose special function was to serve the nation in the performance of the ceremonies of religion as the nobles served it in the army and government. Thus, as one has said, the clergy became as much attached to the altar as the peasantry to the soil, and thereby likewise lost their freedom. Although Alexander II, who in 1864 liberated the serfs, revoked the above law regarding the clergy, yet so great is the inertia in Russian society that the clergy remains still a sacerdotal caste, and the son of a priest finds himself seriously handicapped if he undertakes to enter any other profession. As there are special schools for the education of the children of the priests, and the boys on leaving

them go directly to the theological seminaries, they do not have the great advantage of contact with youth of other parentage. Consequently their education tends to confirm their prejudices and narrow their sympathies. During the plastic years of childhood and youth they have no contact with those in non-clerical classes. It is true that the theological course is in many respects an admirable one and shows plainly the influence of the German *gymnasia*. But it undertakes to cover too wide a field and its results are rather superficial. In language the course includes Greek and Latin and Church Slavonic and either French or German. Much attention is given to mathematics and the physical sciences. The fundamental principles of farming and of medical practice are also taught. Then upon this foundation there is built a superstructure of history, philosophy, and the various branches of theology. Such a course of training ought to lead to a liberal education. But as the teaching is indifferently done, the methods and books antiquated, and the scientific spirit of free investigation utterly absent, the course often fails to rouse the mind of the student to vigorous or independent thought. And later, his exacting parochial duties, the fact that he is not expected to preach, and the consciousness that he has no possibility of promotion, unite to discourage him from consecutive study, and he suffers mental deterioration. Following the young "seminarist" as he graduates from the theological school, we find that before he can be ordained his bishop must find him a parish and a wife. For not least among the duties of a bishop is the delicate task of conducting a clerical matrimonial bureau. Usually the young priest will take some parish left vacant by death of its former occupant. If he has left a marriageable daughter she will become the young priest's wife and the other children and the mother will make their home in the manse, as before. Or if he can afford it, he may buy out their rights in the buildings and furniture and implements connected with the glebe and pension his father-in-law's family. For the family of a deceased priest has a certain claim both upon the bishop and the parish. The use of the glebe lands belongs to the new priest, but often most of the buildings and other fixtures belong to his predecessor, and in any case his family must be provided for. Although it would seem that neither party in these marriages of convenience has much freedom of choice, yet the home

life of the priest is ordinarily as happy as his poverty and social isolation will permit.

The position of the average priest is certainly not an enviable one. In the first place he can hardly be regarded as free in the choice of his profession. The priesthood was his fate, the career to which he was born. It would have been well nigh impossible for him to follow any other. Some priests no doubt acquire a proper enthusiasm in their work, and most of them are marked by a creditable professional fidelity. But they cannot give themselves wholly to their pastoral duties. They must be farmers as well as priests, and in certain seasons of the year the care of the cattle and crops on their small glebe takes most of their time and strength. Moreover, they know that upon the success of their farming most of their meager income depends. But this is not the most trying feature in the situation. The priest is conscious that the insufficient returns from his labor as a farmer must be supplemented in ways that lessen his self-respect and expose him to the danger of being regarded by his parishioners as something between a mendicant and a tax-gatherer. For aside from what he may raise on his little farm, and his small government stipend—if he is fortunate enough to receive one—the priest must rely for the support of his family and other dependents upon fees collected from his people for special services rendered them. Every sacrament is paid for, or is expected to be paid for; for the fee is in the nature of a semi-compulsory gratuity. And that is the most exasperating form of tax. As there is no fixed tariff, the amount given will depend upon the liberality of the parishioner, and there is often much haggling even over wedding and funeral fees. Peasants have been known secretly to bury their dead in unconsecrated ground to avoid paying for the funeral services. But besides pay for performing the sacraments, the priests have other perquisites, fees for such special services as blessing the fields and waters and cattle, expelling possible demons from newly built houses, dedicating factories and other places of business, and giving the annual blessing to the houses of their parishioners. Sometimes a priest insists upon rendering these services that he may put his reluctant parishioners under a kind of obligation to pay him the customary fee. And, as a consequence, his people come to regard the whole performance as a species of clerical

blackmail. There can be no doubt that the inadequate support of the Russian priesthood and the means by which they endeavor to enlarge their income are both injurious to their popularity and to their moral influence, and efforts are being made to displace the fee system by a liberal government stipend. Not the least unpleasant feature of the priest's life is the attitude of his ecclesiastical superiors. His bishop has never been a priest and does not understand the difficulties and deprivations of his laborious life. He is often harsh and overbearing in his treatment of the helpless priest, who upon any charge of irregularity may be haled before the nearest ecclesiastical court where bribes will be quite as necessary as innocence in gaining release. But beside their poverty and their circumscribed life, the family of the priest is haunted by a double peril. If the father dies, the family income stops, the home may have to be vacated, and the mother has little chance of remarriage. If the mother dies, the case is even worse, for the father must leave his parish and enter a monastery. This casts the children upon the mercy of their relatives and the bishop. No doubt the greatest hardship which the priest and his family have to endure is their conscious unpopularity. They well know that as a class they are neither respected nor beloved; but on the contrary, that the upper classes despise or tolerate them, while the lower classes regard them with ill-concealed dislike mingled often with superstitious fear. Almost all students of Russia agree that the Russians are, in their own way, a very religious people. Outside the sophisticated few, they have not yet been touched by doubt or chilled by religious indifference. They throng the churches and stand devoutly through the tiresomely long services. They scrupulously keep the exhausting fasts and observe the sacraments. Hundreds of thousands of them annually make long pilgrimages. Unquestionably they love their church. But this does not prevent them from despising and hating their clergy. To us Protestants to whom the personal acceptability of the minister means so much, the situation appears utterly anomalous. But in the Russian nature religion and love of the church are so deeply rooted that they are not at all dependent upon the priest's being *persona grata*. In a semi-official report recently addressed to Grand Duke Constantine by an "orthodox" Russian, the following remarkable statements occur:

The people do not respect the clergy but pursue them with derision and reproaches, and feel them to be a burden. In nearly all the popular comic stories the priest, his wife, or his laborer is held up to ridicule, and in all the proverbs and popular sayings where the clergy is mentioned it is always with derision. The people shun the clergy and have recourse to them not from the impulse of conscience but from necessity.

The report goes on to state that the reasons for this unhappy situation are: the social isolation of the clergy, their bad education, their perfunctory performance of their duties, their lack of interest in the spiritual welfare of their people, their mercenary spirit, and the occasional reports of their sacrilegious and immoral conduct. We may well regard this indictment as somewhat exaggerated. But, pitifully unpopular the Russian priesthood certainly is. And the reasons would seem to be these: Their caste spirit isolates them and they have very little social contact with their parishioners to whatever class in society these may belong. The peasants, not without reason, regard them as a species of government official, a kind of religious police. The unfortunate fee system, which they themselves heartily dislike, costs them the respect of all classes. And beneath all this there is a feeling hard to explain that unnecessary intercourse with a priest or his family will bring bad luck. To unexpectedly come upon a priest on the street is regarded as an ill omen. The priest and his family have no social standing, and their presence casts a cloud over a festal occasion. Everybody breathes freer when they have gone. The priestly families form a social circle of their own. One can but regard this social alienation between the priesthood and their people as a grievous misfortune to both parties. It must suppress the better impulses and deaden the nobler ambitions of the clergy. For no man conscious of hopeless unpopularity can do his best work. And the ill effect of this alienation upon the people is most obvious. Before the Russian church can have a wholesome, happy life, some more normal relation must be established between priest and people. And the abolition of the obnoxious fee system will certainly assist in bringing this about. The introduction of preaching would doubtless contribute to the same end.

Probably there is no other church which attaches such extreme importance to the rites and ceremonies of religion. The formalists

of our Lord's day could not have been more punctilious in the mint and anise and cummin of religious observances. This is partly to be explained by the fact that in their domestic and social life the Russians have an almost oriental love of conventionality and ceremoniousness. And the Christianity that they received from their Byzantine teachers had already developed an impressive ritual and an elaborate system of religious observances. No doubt as Christianity was presented to the early Russians it seemed, not so much doctrine and ethic, but primarily ceremonial. Two circumstances have combined to perpetuate this misapprehension; the illiteracy of the people, and the absence of preaching. Denied religious instruction either from the printed page or the pulpit, the Russian peasant has continued to identify religion, to a large extent, with the visible and audible ceremonies that he witnesses from time to time. This, of course, has fostered the superstitions which constituted his native religion, and has not infrequently resulted in a divorce of religion and morals. The punctiliousness of the Russian in the matter of religious form has had some tragic illustrations. When a rumor became current that there had been some irregularity in the preparation of the sacred oil to be used in the church, the people rose in fury and threatened a revolution. Rather than permit any changes in the wording of the service-books, though the changes restored their meaning to otherwise unintelligible passages, several millions of peasants withdrew from the church and endured a generation of persecution. The idea of many doubtless was that the liturgy is a species of religious incantation, and that any change in its wording would break the spell and render it ineffective.

The liturgies used in the Russian church are translations into Old Slavonic of liturgies derived from Constantinople. The one in most common use is attributed to St. Chrysostom. The Church Slavonic as it is called is archaic Russian, and is only partially intelligible to the people. It is somewhat as if our church services were rendered in the English of Chaucer's time. The service consists, not only in the things said or sung by the priest and the deacon and the choir and the people, but in symbolic acts and postures and processions. In this way the gospel truths are in a sense dramatized and are made to appeal to the religious emotions through the eye. The congregation,

mostly of men, stands reverently through the incredibly long services, and accounts fatigue an acceptable service to God.

The groundplan and divisions of the Russian churches resemble those of Constantinople, and the absurd bulbous dome which appears above their churches is a barbaric deterioration of the noble vault of Sancta Sophia. The Iconoclastic Controversy was over before the evangelization of Russia, and the eastern church had decided to banish all religious statuary and confine her decorations to paintings and mosaics. It is related that the sacred pictures of the missionaries made a profound impression upon the early Russian converts. This was but a prediction of the unique place that the icon, or sacred picture, was to have in the nation's religious life. For a passion for the sacred picture, not as a work of art, but as a stimulus to devotion, is one of the most distinctive traits of the Russian Christian. It is, however, a characteristic which he shares to a large degree with other Sclavic peoples. In many Russian churches not only all the wall-space but the surface of the columns as well, is completely covered with scenes from the Bible or the lives of the saints or religious heroes. And outside the churches one encounters the icon everywhere, in the place of honor in the right hand corner of every living-room, on street corners, over gateways, in hotels and railway stations and steamships, in public buildings and offices. Generals are often presented with elaborate icons as they start upon a campaign, and the poorest soldier has a small rude picture of the Virgin or some saint, which he carries in his knapsack. These are believed to assist in gaining victory and in protecting the bearer from injury. The most ancient icon, Our Lady of Vladimir, has been for nearly a thousand years a veritable palladium, and the nation's most precious treasure. It is believed to have wrought the deliverance of Russia in many a desperate crisis, and is reverently carried in procession on all great national occasions. Some icons are famous for their miracle-working qualities and are the goal of pilgrimages in which hundreds of thousands participate. It is well-nigh impossible for us to conceive of the devotion of the Russian to his icon. If it be in a church he kneels before it and reverently kisses it; if it is in a house he salutes it on entering the room. He carries it with him on his journeys, he sets it before him in his devotions. It is more to him apparently than the

Bible to the Protestant or the crucifix to the Roman Catholic. The religious art of Russia was derived from the Byzantines and has naturally undergone deterioration. Like the religious art of ancient Egypt it has little aesthetic value. Its aim is not to minister to sensuous delight, but to excite the religious emotions through suggestion. For the icons are to be regarded as symbols rather than pictures. There is little beauty in any of them; they show plainly the influence of monasticism. Our Savior and the Virgin and the Apostles and the saints all appear as starved, joyless, lifeless ascetics.

Every traveler in Russia is impressed by the solemn grandeur and beauty of the singing in the churches. There is no instrumental accompaniment, and the choirs are composed entirely of men and boys. Says one: "There is nothing that can be asked of the human voice that these Russian choirs have not achieved. They attain by turns angelic sweetness and delicacy and terrifying grandeur, sweeping through all the registers of religious feeling. The choirs of the large churches have not their equal in Europe." This superiority in the one art of singing is attributable to the Slavic genius for music, the unusually fine singing voices of the Russians of all classes, and the fact that from its beginning the church has assiduously cultivated singing, and encouraged the training of the clergy in that art. In order to prevent inferior or secular music from finding its way into the churches, there is a committee of the Holy Synod that passes upon every composition before it can be used.

Three principles are said to have guided the reactionary policy of the Russian government in recent years; autocracy, nationality, orthodoxy; which explained, means the resistance of all movements toward a representative government, the Russianization of the Finns and Poles and other distinct peoples in the empire, and the forcing of all the Christian subjects of the czar into the national church. The difficulties of the last undertaking are not generally understood. For in spite of nearly two centuries of intermittent effort on the part of the government to secure religious uniformity, the Christianity of Russia remains heterogeneous in the extreme. Beside the Lutheran Finns and the Roman Catholic Poles and the adherents to the Armenian church, there are innumerable sects. These sects, which during the last two hundred years have broken away from the

national church may be said to represent the native or Sclavic type of Christianity, in somewhat the same sense in which we speak of Protestantism as the Teutonic form of Christianity. Some of these nonconformists hold all the doctrines of the state church; but many of the sects are so heretical that they can scarcely be called Christian. Of the former class are the Old Ritualists. They withdrew from the church because of the correction of errors in the service books and a revision of the Bible undertaken by the scholarly patriarch Nikon. And they were confirmed in their alienation by the reforms and foreign customs introduced by Peter the Great. Though they have suffered persecution, they remain patriotic, and are usually more intelligent and prosperous and moral than the adherents to the state church. One branch of this sect has no priesthood. Wallace describes another sect whose doctrines and organization reminded him of those of the Presbyterians. The number of the heretical sects is legion, and their tenets and practices illustrate all the vagaries known to church history, beside presenting some idiosyncrasies in doctrine and usage peculiarly Russian. The Dukobors, who may be described as Russian Quakers, have already come to public notice in this country, and other unheard-of sects may be expected to appear here with the increase of Russian immigration.

As we have seen, Russia's civilization has been retarded by her infusion of Mongol blood, by her exposed position on the Asiatic frontier, and by her centuries of Tartar domination. Until Peter the Great, she faced toward Asia and had little intercourse with western Europe; and today, with the exception of the comparatively small proportion of her population that have been educated along modern lines and have gained the world-outlook, she is still mediaeval in industry, in social organization, and in thought and feeling.

The development of the religious life of Russia has been retarded by the same influences. And her present religious condition will appear less anomalous and unintelligible if we think of it as mediaeval—as a transitional stage between the ancient Christianity that she derived from Byzantium and the ultimate form that her Christianity will assume, when her national genius shall have freely wrought over its elements into that form and proportion best suited to the peculiar intellectual and moral needs of the Russian nature.

The points of resemblance between the Christianity of the Middle Ages in western Europe and that of Russia today are many and impressive. Prominent among them is the domination of the ascetic ideal. The Russians have two fast-days each week and four Lents; and the rigid observance of these fasts disqualify them at times for work. Pilgrimage, which was such a prominent ascetic practice in the Middle Ages, shows increase rather than diminution in Russia; the government encourages it by offering special railroad and steamship rates to pilgrims to the national shrines or to Palestine. The fanatical ascetics such as the Flagellants have their representatives today in sects bearing the same name and in the White Doves who effect a heroic conquest of the flesh by emasculation, and in a small sect that seeks heaven through a death by fire.

The missionary methods of the Russian church are more like those of Charlemagne than like our own. Her missions are auxiliary to her policy of conquest, and her missionaries form a rearguard to the Cossacks. The recent outrages upon the Jews are but a repetition in our own day of the barbarities that that unhappy people suffered repeatedly in the Middle Ages. The mediaeval disposition to objectify every religious thought and feeling is very noticeable among the Russians. And the remnants of their native paganism which survived among the Christians of western Europe till swept away by the Reformation, still, as we have seen, constitute a large element in Russian religious feeling. And the childlike spirit of quick enthusiasm and uncalculating devotion, which marked the mediaeval man and made possible such enterprises as Chivalry and the Crusades, and which so easily ran into religious frenzy with its ghastly consequences, still remains in the fresh unsophisticated nature of the Russian peasant.

And just here is at once the point of opportunity and the point of danger. The Russian peasant is at that stage of intellectual and religious development when the conviction that "God wills it" will impel him to uncalculating devotion to any desperate enterprise. We have had recent illustration of his devotion to the abstract principle of representative government, but without the dynamic of religious conviction. If the Russian peasant is once convinced that it is his religious duty not to support the government of the Czar, but to obtain his industrial and civil liberty, we shall witness an outbreak of revo-

lutionary frenzy unparalleled in modern history. If such a spirit of God comes upon this blind Samson, instead of being longer the sport of those who have exploited him, he will in revengeful and suicidal fury overthrow the pillars of state and bring the whole social fabric to ruin. In the French Revolution, the parish priesthood espoused the cause of liberty and fanned the flames of insurrection. If the Russian clergy were to assume a similar rôle we might expect violence and anarchy as much more horrible than "The Reign of Terror" as the long-pent-up passion and remorseless fury of the earnest Russian peasant is more to be dreaded than the fickle frenzy of the Parisian mob. It certainly is fortunate that the Russian priest, unlike his French brother, has a wife and family to consider, and has something of the conservatism that belongs to a hereditary class.

However hard his present lot, he will hesitate long before he ventures to use his professional influence to bring down the avalanche of revolution, which might overwhelm him and his family and the church in a general ruin. On the other hand, as against the conservative influences of the clergy of the national church, we shall find among the leading spirits in the sects men much more hospitable to revolutionary ideas. The sectarians are less strongly attached to the government, which instead of patronizing has persecuted them. They are more progressive and prosperous than the adherents to the state church, and they number perhaps twenty millions. In some sects the leaven of revolt has been working for generations. And it is among them rather than the national clergy that we may expect a man to arise who will give the sanction of religion to the hitherto wavering movement toward the overthrow of autocracy.

REDEMPTION FROM THE CURSE OF THE LAW

AN EXPOSITION OF GAL. 3:13, 14

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Few passages in Paul's epistles present more difficult problems of grammatical and logical exegesis than the third chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians, and few of equal length are more important for the understanding of Paul's conception of the significance of the death of Christ and of its relation to atonement than the thirteenth and fourteenth verses of that chapter.

Χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξηγόρασεν ἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νόμου γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα, ὅτι γέγραπται, ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ κρεμᾶμενος ἐπὶ ξύλου, ἵνα εἰς τὰ ἔθνη ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ γένηται ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, ἵνα τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος λάβωμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως.

For the interpretation of this passage it is of fundamental importance that one have a correct understanding of the apostle's use of the word *νόμος*. If it has for Paul but one meaning and reference, this of course determines at once its use in the present passage. If it has a variety of meanings, its use in this passage can be determined only on the basis of a full and clear exhibit of the several meanings with which the usage of the period gives us reason to believe Paul might employ the term. Our study must therefore begin with a study of—

I. THE USAGE OF THE WORD *νόμος*

An exhibit of the meanings of *νόμος* possible to Paul must of course be itself based upon a discriminating interpretative and inductive study of the Pauline usage; taken, however, not in isolation, but in relation to the previous history and contemporary usage of the word. The ultimate test of the correctness of such an exhibit must be its satisfaction of all the conditions of the problem, its accounting for all the facts of usage. In submitting, as a preliminary to the

interpretation of Gal. 3:13, 14, a tabulation of the usage of *νόμος*, I must, for lack of space, pass over all discussion of the historical antecedents of the New Testament usage in general or the Pauline usage in particular (though I have not neglected them in my own study), and for convincing my readers that I have dealt justly with all the data, must rely upon the evidence of the exhibit itself that it satisfactorily accounts for all the New Testament instances of the word and justifies itself by that fact. This middle course, neither on the one side confining the tabulation of uses and vouchers to the letters of Paul, nor on the other side extending it to include all available data, is the more justifiable because of the large number of instances furnished by the New Testament and the wide variety of usage which it presents.¹

The arrangement is in the main that which is suggested by genetic relations. The first meaning, though of comparatively infrequent occurrence in the New Testament, is probably closer to the original sense, both of the Greek *νόμος* and of the Hebrew *תורה*, than those which follow. But it is the second meaning that is the real starting-point of New Testament, and especially of Pauline, usage. To Paul *ὁ νόμος* was, save in exceptional cases, the revealed will of God, and the primary reference of the term was to the revelation of that will in the Old Testament. To this meaning and reference all others are subordinate.

1. A single statute or principle, ethical, religious, or civil. (Cf. Pind. I, 10, 52; Exod. 12:49; Lev. 6:9, etc.) Rom. 7:2b, *ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός*, "from the statute concerning marriage;" Rom. 7:3; Heb. 8:10; 10:16.

2. Divine law, the revealed will of God in general, or a body of statutes, ordinances, or instructions expressing that will. Under this

¹ If any reader approaches such a tabulation of usage with a presumption in favor of finding, in Paul at least, but one meaning of the word, rather than a variety of meanings, such presumption ought at once to be overthrown by an examination of such passages as Rom. 3:21; 7:23; 8:2, 3, 4, in each of which Paul clearly sets law over against law; or by a comparison of Rom. 2:13 with Rom. 3:20 and Gal. 2:16, in which formally contradictory assertions are made about law; or again by comparison of Rom. 6:14; 7:4 and Gal. 2:19; 5:1 with Rom. 8:4 and Gal. 5:13, 14, which disclose a similar antithesis of statement concerning law, which can be resolved only by recognizing that Paul uses the term *νόμος* in different, if not even antithetical, senses.

head fall the great majority of all the New Testament instances of the word. But for the purposes of the interpreter, it is of the highest importance to discriminate between those different usages which arise through different conceptions of what constitutes the revealed will of God and how it is to be understood. It is to be remembered also that a writer's own view on this point does not determine his usage of words; he may often have occasion to employ terms in a sense that is given to them by the view of his opponents. New Testament usage requires the recognition of four specific modifications of the general sense above stated.

a) Divine law, expression of the divine will, viewed as a concrete fact, or as a historic régime of which such expression is the characteristic feature. The expression may be mandatory, or condemnatory, or approbatory, since will may be expressed in any of these ways. In this use the term is colorless as concerns the distinction between general principles and specific statutes, and as respects the qualification of the statutory system by any other elements of divine revelation; it refers simply to divine revelation as a concrete historic fact without further definition of it. Most frequently it is the law of the Old Testament, or more specifically, the Mosaic code that is referred to, and this reference is indicated by the prefixing of the article designating the well-known or previously mentioned law. So in Matt. 11:13, πάντες οἱ προφῆται καὶ ὁ νόμος ἕως Ἰωάννου ἐπροφῆτευσαν; 12:5; 22:36; 23:23; Luke 2:22, 24, 27, 39; 10:26; 16:16; John 1:17, ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωσέως ἐδόθη; 7:19a, b, 23, 49, 8:[5], 17; Acts 6:13; 7:53; 15:5; 18:13; 21:20, 24, 28; 22:3, 12; 23:3; Rom. 2:18, 20, 23b; 3:19a, b; 4:16; I Cor. 9:8, 9; 14:34; Heb. 7:5, 19, 28a, b; 9:19, 22; 10:1.

When the reference to the Old Testament law is indicated by the addition of Μωσέως or Κυρίου the article is sometimes omitted. See Luke 2:23 (cf. Acts 13:39, which, however, probably falls under c); Heb. 10:28.

When the law viewed simply as a concrete fact or historic régime is spoken of qualitatively so that while the thing chiefly or even exclusively in mind is the Old Testament law, yet it is thought of not specifically as the Old Testament system but simply in its character as law (historically or concretely viewed), the article is omitted:

Heb. 7:12, 16; 8:4; 10:8.² Naturally examples of this usage occur in close connection with instances with the article.

It is this sense of *νόμος*, concrete, objective expression of the will of God, qualitatively thought of, that underlies both clauses of Rom. 2:12, *οσοι γαρ ανωμως ημαρτον, ανωμως και απολουνται, και οσοι εν νωμφ ημαρτον, διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται*. It is law in this sense that the gentiles lack and the Jews possess. It is in the same sense of *νόμος* that the gentiles are described in vs. 14 as *τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα* and *νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες*. This is also the most probable sense in 2:17, 23, and in 3:31a,b.³ But the context of 2:12, 14 in which of those who are described as *νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες*, it is immediately affirmed, *ἐαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος*, shows clearly that Paul could also use the term *νόμος* without including the idea of concrete, objective expression, as in a code. This broader use of the term once recognized as demanded for this passage is seen to be required for others also. Hence we recognize as a second specific sense of *νόμος* denoting divine law—

b) Divine law in general, the will of God made known to men,

² It might seem as if these and the previously cited examples from Hebrews properly belong under c), "law viewed as a purely legalistic system," since the author evidently has specially in mind the sacrificial and ritual elements of the law and in 7:16 characterizes it as a law of carnal commandment. But since there is in this epistle no antithesis between different conceptions of law, such as is so clearly marked in Paul, it is gratuitous to assign to the author of Hebrews those specialized meanings which are demanded in the case of Paul; it is truer to the point of view of the author of the [Epistle to] the Hebrews to assign all these instances to the category of law viewed simply as a concrete historic régime.

³ It would be easy to judge that Rom. 5:13, *ἔχρι νόμου*; 5:20, *νόμος παρεῖσθαι*; Gal. 3:17, 23, should be classed here on the ground that these passages clearly refer to the law as a concrete historic fact. That they do refer to the concrete historic fact is undoubtedly true, but not to it *simply* as such. A careful study of the context makes it clear that the apostle is thinking not of the whole institution of law, inclusive of all the elements of the system, and of this whole simply as a historical fact, but only of what we may term (see below under c) the legalistic element and aspect of the system, of law isolated from all other elements of divine revelation and set over against these other elements. These instances therefore belong not here but under c).

It is noticeable that the use of *νόμος* in the concrete historic sense, frequent in other parts of the New Testament, is infrequent in Paul. It was a natural result of the controversies in which Paul was engaged and in connection with which he had chief occasion to use the term that when he spoke of the law or of law it was with some special aspect of the law in mind—either that which his own thought emphasized or that which his opponents made prominent.

but without reference to the manner of its expression, inclusive therefore of law as a historic régime, and of any other less objective forms of expression of the divine will.⁴

As in the preceding usage, so here also the term may be used with the article and be definite, or without the article, and in that case be qualitative or indefinite: Rom. 2:13, οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ [τῷ] θεῷ, ἀλλ' οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται. This sentence, introduced to establish the assertion of vs. 12 respecting both ὅσοι ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον and ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον, evidently uses νόμος in a sense in which its possession can be ascribed to both classes. The qualitative force of the term without the article can be expressed in English by translating: "For not the law-hearers . . . but the law-doers, etc." Here belongs also, as indicated above, Rom. 2:14d, ἐαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος. In 2:14b, τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιοῦσιν, it is impossible to tell with certainty whether τοῦ νόμου means the concrete historic law (of the Jew), the requirements of which the gentile meets, though ignorant of the fact that they are so required, or more generally the law of God, without reference to the form of its presentation. In τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου, vs. 15, the latter is quite clearly the meaning, and from this it may perhaps be inferred that the meaning is the same in 14b.

Since meaning *b*) is simply *a*) with the elimination of the idea of concrete objective promulgation, it is easy to pass from the one sense to the other, and sometimes difficult to decide in which sense the term is employed. This is the case in Rom. 2:25a, b, 26, 27a, b. Yet it is probable that in all these cases the term represented in the apostle's mind the more generalized conception, and so that these instances fall under *b*).

The extreme of generalization of the conception of the law of God is represented in Rom. 3:27, διὰ ποίου νόμου; and though in the answer to this question, ἀλλὰ διὰ νόμου πίστεως, the content of the law is indicated by the word πίστεως, in both question and answer νόμου itself is wholly colorless as respects mode of expression.

⁴ It is important to observe that this use of the term does not designate law without concrete historic expression, as the law of conscience or of the mind; concrete historic expression is not denied of the thing referred to, but is eliminated from the definition. The relation of *a*) and *b*) is illustrated, not by the categories, "black horse" and "not-black horse," but by "black horse" and "horse."

Similar to this latter case is Rom. 9:31, where νόμον δικαιοσύνης signifies a law through which righteousness could be achieved, but the word conveys no intimation *pro* or *con* respecting definite promulgation of such a law in a concrete system.

The two preceding usages, differing by the inclusion or exclusion in the concept of the idea of concrete historic expression, are alike in that both ignore the distinction between general ethical principle and specific statutes. From these we pass then to two uses to which this latter idea is of fundamental importance, and which are distinguished from one another precisely in that one emphasizes statutes and the other principle. The first of these reflects most strongly the influence of Pharisaic thought, of which Paul's defense of his own conception compelled him to take account.

c) Divine law viewed as a purely legalistic system made up of statutes on the basis of obedience or disobedience to which men are justified or condemned as matter of debt without grace; the law detached in thought and distinguished from all other elements or aspects of divine revelation, whether it be the ethical principle that underlay it, or the covenant that preceded it and qualified it, or the ethicalism that is demanded by the facts concerning the law written in the heart of the gentile. All the instances of the word in this sense occur in the Pauline epistles. The occasion for such a use of the word by Paul, seemingly involving in its very use a contradiction of the apostle's own view of God and his will, is undoubtedly in the controversies in which he was engaged. The possibility of its occurrence, as representing a reality and not merely an idea, lies in the fact that there are in the Old Testament certain passages which taken by themselves and strictly interpreted are expressive of pure legalism. The apostle might perhaps have challenged the strictly legalistic interpretation of such passages as Deut. 27:26, which he quotes in Gal. 3:10: "Cursed is everyone who continueth not in all the things that are written in the book of the law to do them." He chose rather, admitting and even insisting upon the strictly legalistic meaning of these passages, to take, in effect, the position that such legalism was but one element of the revelation of the divine will, citing against it the Abrahamic covenant (Gal. 3:15 ff.) and the utterance of prophecy (Gal. 3:12) and the psalmist (Rom. 4:6 ff.).

Thus admitting the existence of law in a purely legalistic sense, and its divine authority, but treating it as one element only of divine revelation, he could deny that God actually ever dealt with men on principles of legalism, excluding mercy and grace. Hence there arises by the side of other uses of the word, and as representing a real historic thing, the purely legalistic sense.

But now it must be observed that while to Paul *ὁ νόμος* in this legalistic sense was but an *element* of the revelation of the divine will and indeed not the distinctive or controlling element, to others, at least as their view appeared to him, it was if not the only, yet certainly the controlling factor in divine revelation, through which all else must be looked at and interpreted. Thus Paul, using the term in a sense which represented his understanding of the thought of his opponents, and admitting that it stood for a reality, yet differed from them *toto coelo* as respects what the term covered, and what was the relative significance of that which it designated. Yet this fact does not forbid Paul's use of the term in arguing with his opponents, because he employs it for the most part qualitatively, and therefore without reference to the extent of that which it covered, and when he employed it specifically, he might use it either for that to which he and his opponents would agree in applying the term in this sense, or with reference to whatever might be so defined, without definition in the matter of extent.

Used with the article (occasionally with other defining qualifications), the word in this sense refers to the legalistic element in the Old Testament, or to the Old Testament or any part of it, looked at as Paul's opponents looked at it, as through and through legalistic. Without the article it is qualitative, designating law as such legalistically understood, usually no doubt with special thought of the legalism of the Old Testament or of later Judaism, yet without strict or exclusive reference to these.

That instances of the word in this legalistic sense should occur in close connection with other usages, and that it is sometimes difficult to determine with certainty the meaning in adjacent instances, is not strange, since the entity referred to is in any case in part or in whole the same, and many assertions could be made of law in more than one sense of the word. Especially is it the case that the definite

and the qualitative uses occur in close connection. The following list avoids a confusing minuteness of classification by citing all examples without further subdivision: Acts 13:39; Rom. 3:20a, b; 3:21a, 28; 4:13, 14, 15a, b; 5:13a, b, 20; 6:14, 15; 7:4, 5, 6, 7a, b, c, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16; 8:2b, 3; 10:4, 5; I Cor. 9:20a, b, c, d; (cf. also *ἀνομος* in vs. 21) 15:56; Gal. 2:16a, b, c, 19a, b, 21; 3:2, 5, 10a, b, 11, 12, 13,⁵ 17, 18, 19, 21a, b, c, 23, 24; 4:4, 5, 21a, b; 5:3, 4, 18; Eph. 2:15; Phil. 3:5, 6, 9; I Tim. 1:8, 9. Of this long list of examples, a few will suffice to illustrate the usage: Gal. 3:10, *ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσὶν*; 3:11, *ὅτι ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ δῆλον*; Rom. 3:21, *νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται*; 10:4, *τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι*. These passages clearly show that in them Paul is speaking of law in quite a different sense from that which he has in mind in Rom. 2:13, 16, *οἱ ποιεῖται νόμου δικαιωθήσονται . . . ἐν ᾗ ἡμέρα κρίνει ὁ θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, or from that which is before his mind when in Rom. 8:3, *ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα* (cf. also Gal. 5:13, 14), he distinctly indicates that the law is to be fulfilled in and by the Christian. These latter passages indeed fall under no class as yet named, and bring us at length to that usage of the word which expresses most clearly Paul's own conception of the law as a revelation of the divine will.

d) Divine law conceived of as consisting in ethical principles, or, more exactly, in an ethical principle. The distinguishing characteristic of this usage is that the law is centralized in and reduced to an ethical principle—that of love. The will of God is conceived to be not that men shall obey a body of specific statutes, but that the life shall be controlled by and conformed to one all-inclusive ethical principle, and to statutes not as such, but only incidentally and in so far as conformity to them results from conformity to the single ethical principle.⁶ The real law of God, the revealed

⁵ For the sake of completeness the passage under discussion is included in the list, but provisionally, subject to the discussion that follows.

⁶ Conformity to this principle even is, in Paul's view, the result not of obedience to it in a strict and legal sense of the word "obedience," but of an impulse and power from within, begotten and maintained by the Spirit, by the indwelling Christ. But this element of the apostle's thought does not strictly belong to his idea of law. Love viewed as law is a divine requirement that must be fulfilled.

will of God rightly understood, is simply this: Love. This use of the word is by no means exclusively Pauline. It is found also in the gospels and in James. When the reference is to the Old Testament law looked at as embodying the great ethical principle, to which it is indeed reducible, or to the law of God inclusively viewed, without reference to the mode of its expression, the word is used with the article. When the law is qualitatively viewed the word is without the article.

This is clearly the sense of *ὁ νόμος* in Matt. 7:12, *οὗτος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται*. Not less certainly is this the meaning in Matt. 5:17, 18; Luke 16:17, if these words come from Jesus,⁷ since it is beyond question clear that Jesus regarded many statutes of the law as invalid or no longer valid, and only the central ethical principle of the law as of perpetual force. This is likewise the probable meaning in Matt. 22:40. Gal. 5:14, *ὁ γὰρ πᾶς νόμος ἐν ἐνὶ λόγῳ πεπλήρωται, ἐν τῷ Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν*, and Rom. 13:8, 10, are clear vouchers for this usage in Paul, and clear expressions of his view of the fundamental meaning of the law. It is difficult to say with certainty whether Rom. 7:22, 23^b, 25^a; Gal. 5:23; 6:2, 13, should be classed here or regarded as examples of the more general sense indicated under *b*).⁸ Here also belong probably all of the instances in James: 1:25; 2:8, 9, 10, 11, 12; 4:11. But into the difficult question whether some, or possibly all, of these examples might better be referred to *b*), it is not necessary to enter here.

To recapitulate these four varieties of the principle usage of *νόμος* in the New Testament, we observe that in all of them it is the same entity in whole or in part that is spoken of. But in *a*) this entity is looked at in its character as a concrete historic fact, a definitely

⁷ The chief argument against accepting as correct the gospels' ascription of them to Jesus is removed when one clearly recognizes this usage of *ὁ νόμος*.

⁸ The discrimination between the instances of these two usages is peculiarly difficult, depending on the question whether the writer is thinking of the law as unified in a single central requirement, or is speaking of what God required without reference to the question of such centralization. It should be observed that it is only this idea of centralization, not centralization in the principle of *love*, that strictly speaking belongs in any case to the meaning of the word. Of the law viewed as a principle it is predicated that its content is love. But this is strictly speaking a synthetic, not an analytic, judgment.

promulgated code; this we may call the concrete historic sense. In *b*) there is an elimination of the idea of concrete objective expression in a code, yielding the conception of divine law without reference to the mode of its expression; this we may for convenience call the abstract historic sense. In *c*) the thought is directed to the legalistic element in the Old Testament system, which for Paul was the law within the law, an element of the revealed will of God, but a subordinate one, while for his opponents it was the whole of the law, or at least the controlling element which gave character to the whole. Since the term does not in itself distinguish these quantitative differences of conception it designates for Paul a reality, yet represents at the same time the, to him, wholly false conception of his opponents. This is the legalistic sense of the term. In opposition to the legalistic conception, *d*) designates the law conceived of as summed up in a single ethical principle. This we may call the ethical sense. As concerns the relation of these four, Paul would have said that of either *a*) or *b*), *c*) was an element, but a subordinate one; that *d*) constituted the true interpretation of either *a*) or *b*).

Of the remaining usages of the word *νόμος* it will suffice to speak briefly.

3. By a metonymy due to the prominence given by the Jews to the law of the Old Testament *ὁ νόμος* designates the books that contain the law even when they are thought of without special reference to the law which they contain, but simply as scripture. Hence *ὁ νόμος [καὶ οἱ προφῆται]* becomes a name either for the books of Moses or for the Scriptures in general without restriction either to the books of Moses or to the mandatory portions of other books: Luke 24:44; John 1:45; 10:34; 12:34; 15:25; Acts 13:15; 24:14; 28:23; Rom. 3:21*b*.

4. By elimination of the idea of the divine authority of law, which indeed is not intrinsic in the word, but an acquired element of its meaning as usually employed in both Old Testament and New Testament, *νόμος* comes to mean law as such without reference to its source or authority. The thing actually spoken of may be Jewish or Roman law, or law without discrimination, but in any case without thought of its character as divine or human. It may be spoken of generically or definitely with the article, or qualitatively or indefi-

nately without it: John 7:51; 8:17; 18:31; 19:7*a, b*; Acts 18:15; 23:29; 25:8; Rom. 7:1*a, b*; 7:2*a*.

5. By metonymy, a force or tendency, which, tending to produce action of a certain kind has the effect of law, may itself be called νόμος: Rom. 7:21, 23*a, c*, 25*b*; 8:2*a*.⁹

II. THE ARGUMENT OF GAL. 3:13, 14

If with this survey of the meanings of νόμος before us, we turn to the task of interpreting Gal. 3:13, 14, it is unnecessary to occupy space in advancing arguments to show that the law of which the apostle is speaking in this passage is not that which is represented by 1, or 3, or 4, or 5. For though completeness of discussion would require this, the intelligent reader will easily supply the arguments for himself. It is evidently of law as the revealed will of God that Paul is speaking. Which of the various phases of this meaning, whether *a*), *b*), *c*), or *d*), can be best considered in connection with the question what Paul means by the phrase, ἡ κατάρα τοῦ νόμου.

1. This expression may conceivably mean the curse which the law as a concrete historical fact—the historical Mosaic code—pronounced on all those who did not meet its requirements.

2. It may conceivably mean the curse which the law of God, viewed without reference to any particular concrete historic embodiment, pronounces on the evil-doer; the curse, in other words, which, according to Rom. 2:6-16, falls on those who though they may be hearers of law are not doers of it and who obey not the truth but obey iniquity.

⁹ It might seem that τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἀμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου of Rom. 8:2 must by the connection and the similarity of phraseology refer back to νόμος ἀμαρτίας in Rom. 7:25, and so be assigned here instead of to *c*); or else that 7:25 and with it 7:21, 23*a, c*, be assigned to *c*). It is undoubtedly true that the fuller phrase in 8:2 does refer to the shorter one in 7:25; but a careful study of the passage will, I am persuaded, lead to the conclusion that this reference does not involve identification of the things referred to. Speaking in 7:21, 23, 25, of that force for evil which in vs. 17 and 20 he calls ἀμαρτία, and designating it as a νόμος because it stands opposed to the νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ (vs. 21, 22), with such a turn of words as the apostle delights in he substitutes for it in 8:2 its companion in bringing failure and defeat, the law in its legalistic sense. If, as is possible, we take τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἀμαρτίας καὶ θανάτου as designating the same thing spoken of in 7:25*b*, then the change in the reference of νόμος will come in between vs. 2 and 3; for τοῦ νόμου in vs. 3 must evidently mean the law in the proper sense of the term, that which is spoken of in the first part of chap. 7.

3. It may mean the curse which the law, viewed legalistically, pronounces on those who fail to conform to its statutes legalistically interpreted. This meaning, however, divides itself into two, according as the law is taken in a narrower or a broader sense, referring (a) to the law as distinguished from the rest of the Old Testament, the latter being assumed to be not legalistic, but broadly ethical in the sense of the Old Testament prophets, demanding not conformity to statutes, but righteousness in conduct and character, or (b) to the Old Testament legalistically interpreted, or, what comes to the same thing, the Old Testament law so interpreted and made determinative for the understanding of the whole Old Testament. If this latter be the meaning, the curse of the law is that curse which the Old Testament if it is really a legalistic book must pronounce on every man, if, as Paul in Rom., chap. 3, maintains, and in the context of the present passage implies, there is none that doeth righteousness; or in still other words the curse which every legalist, if he accepts the full consequence of his legalistic reasoning, must recognize to rest upon himself as well as on every other man.

4. The curse of the law may conceivably mean the curse which the law of God (whether thought of as disclosed in the legislative portions of the Old Testament or in the Old Testament as a whole, or in whatever way it is revealed), understood as consisting in a single ethical principle, pronounces on him who does not fulfil it by living in accordance with this principle: in other words, the curse of God on him who does not live in accordance with the principle of love.

Before endeavoring to decide in which of these senses Paul uses the expression *ἡ κατάρα τοῦ νόμου* here, a moment's attention must be given to *ἐξηγόρασεν* and *ῥύμης*.

The verb *ἐξαγοράζω* found in late writers only, from the LXX (Dan. 2:8 only) and Diod. Sic. down, is used in two senses: (1) To buy up, or, figuratively, to secure (by adroitness), Diod. Sic. 36. 1.; and (2) to redeem, to deliver at cost of some sort to the deliverer. The middle occurs once in Ephesians and once in Colossians in the former sense in the phrase, *ἐξαγοράζεσθαι τὸν καιρὸν*. The active occurs in the same sense in Dan. 2:8. The active is found in the second sense in Gal. 4:5, *ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμου ἐξαγοράσῃ*. The

meaning here is evidently the same as in 4:5, to deliver, to secure release for one, probably with the implication conveyed in the etymological sense of the word (the simple verb, ἀγοράζω, means to buy, and is frequently used in this sense in the LXX) that such deliverance involves cost of some kind, effort, suffering, or loss, to him who effects it. To insist upon the question to whom the price is paid or what the price was is without warrant unless these are expressly indicated in the context.

To aid in determining to what event or fact the term here refers, three facts may be noticed: (1) The deliverance is spoken of as accomplished by Christ on the cross. It is therefore achieved potentially at least once for all, not separately for each man. (2) The purpose of the redemption act was that the blessing of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles. (3) The antithesis of ἡμᾶς in vs. 13 to ἔθνη in vs. 14, together with the use of the article with νόμου, a fact which favors the reference of τοῦ νόμου to the Old Testament law in some sense, rather than to law qualitatively thought of, makes it practically certain that ἡμᾶς, referring to Paul and others in some sense associated with him, designates him and his fellow-Christians, but especially those *Jews* who like him had accepted the message of God in Christ. Thus the deliverance of Jews from the curse of the law has for its purpose the achievement of a result for the Gentiles. All three of these considerations favor the view that the redemption here spoken of is thought of by the apostle as a historic epochal event, to be compared in this respect with the ἀπολύτρωσις of Rom. 3:24, rather than with the λύτρωσις of I Pet. 1:18. Thus it appears that Paul here speaks of the death of Jesus as an epochal event by which through the deliverance of the Jews (who accept the divine message) from the curse of the law, the door of faith and of Abrahamic sonship was opened to the Gentiles.

With these facts in mind we may return to ask what the apostle meant by the curse of the law.

Against the view that he meant the curse which the law, taken as a concrete historical fact, or in the abstract historical sense, or in the ethical sense (cf. 1, 2, 4, above) actually pronounces on the individual evil doer for his failure to meet the requirements of the law so defined, are two weighty considerations:

a) Throughout this passage Paul is speaking of law legalistically understood, law as a body of statutes for failure to obey any of which men are under a curse. This is especially clear in vs. 10, in which Paul argues that all who are of works of law, i. e., who are depending on obedience to law, are under a curse, because it is written, "Cursed is everyone that continueth not in all the things that are written in the book of the law to do them." In other words the law demands perfect obedience to the statutes, and pronounces its curse on all who fail to render such obedience; no one (this is self-evident and does not even require to be stated) renders such obedience; therefore all who are under law are under a curse. This strictly legalistic view is stated again in vs. 12, "The law is not of faith (the two principles are mutually exclusive), but says, He that does the commandments shall live by them." It is law in the legalistic sense that Paul is discussing. To be sure, an abrupt change to law in another sense is not in itself impossible. It might easily occur if the change of sense were made evident, as it is in Rom. 3:21 and in various other passages, or if the argument were such and the two meanings so related that the logic of the passage would be but little affected whether the meaning be retained or changed, as in Rom. 2:12, 13. But in the present passage these conditions do not exist. The continuity and validity of the argument depend on the word in the present verse meaning the same as in the preceding verses. Indeed there is no place in the whole chapter for a break in the meaning and reference of the word *νόμος*. Perhaps we are not justified in assuming that Paul's logic never limped. But we are surely not warranted in ascribing to him a limp when this can be avoided by retaining the same meaning of his word throughout, and he has given us no intimation of a change of sense.

b) Since, as above pointed out, Paul is here speaking of an epochal event by which the whole status of the Gentiles in respect to salvation was affected, that event itself, the redemption from the curse of the law, cannot be the forgiveness of individuals releasing them from the penalty of their personal sin. And this is made the more improbable by the fact that *ἡμᾶς* refers particularly to Jews. Nor is it easy to explain the transition from *ἡμᾶς* in vs. 13 to *ἐθνη* in vs. 14, if the apostle had in mind even the potential justification of the individual

from his sins through the death of Jesus. This transition indicates as pointed out above, that in vs. 13 the apostle had in mind an event by which a result achieved for the Jew affected the Gentile by establishing a principle that was applicable to him also. This points to redemption through the revelation conveyed in the epochal event, rather than to the deliverance of individuals through release from penalty.

As concerns the two views suggested under 3. above, according to the former of which Paul refers to the curse pronounced by the law of the Old Testament legalistically interpreted, as distinguished from the rest of the Old Testament, and the latter of which understands him to speak of the whole Old Testament viewed as law and legalistically interpreted, or of the law of the Old Testament made determinative for the interpretation of the whole Old Testament, there is much to be said in favor of supposing that Paul is here speaking of the law as distinguished from the rest of the Old Testament. In this very chapter Paul refers to the law as coming four hundred and thirty years after the promise, and on the other side contrasts it with the period of faith which was introduced by the coming of Jesus, thus bounding off law chronologically from that which preceded and that which followed it. In vss. 11, 12, also he cites law as against prophet. It seems clear therefore that Paul is here speaking of the law of the Old Testament, not of the whole Old Testament, and that he is looking at this law legalistically.

Is he then setting up the law as a legalistic system over against the rest of the Old Testament as representing a non-legalistic system, the two thus being of equal rank, but mutually exclusive? To this view there are serious objections.

If we assume that Paul conceived that the law as distinguished from the Old Testament was really a legalistic system with divine authority, then since the rest of the Old Testament is on this view non-legalistic, the Old Testament is divided against itself. But this cannot be in the sense that faith or an ethical system was in force till Moses, since whose time legalistic Mosaism holds sway; for this view Paul expressly repudiates in vs. 17: "The law which came four hundred and thirty years after doth not annul the covenant." Nor can it be in the sense that the two systems were in force side

by side, both having divine authority and men having their choice between them; for not only is there no substantiation of such a view in Paul's language, but it involves a series of consequences which are wholly foreign to Paul's thought. Thus if these two systems existed side by side, both with divine authority, each supreme in its own realm, like two provinces of an empire, over which the same king ruled but with different constitutions, then it was always possible for the Jew to betake himself from the law to the non-legal province; and in that case the law was not really binding on him; indeed he was really bound not to be under it, since only by leaving it could he secure God's favor. In this case it would seem also that Paul must have confessed that Christ died in vain, since he redeemed men from a curse from which they could at any time have redeemed themselves by simply stepping out of law into the non-legal portion of the divine revelation. Surely it is improbable that Paul not only in this fashion divided the Old Testament, but that he who maintained that God is one and, being one, must deal with Jews and Gentiles on the same principle, at the same time conceived of God as being toward the Jews themselves a two-constituted monarch.

Nor can we solve the problem by supposing that Paul, dividing the Old Testament against itself and interpreting the law, i. e., the statutory portions of the Old Testament, as essentially legalistic yet denied either to the law or to the rest of the Old Testament divine authority, since he expressly says on the one hand that the law is holy and just and good (Rom. 7:12), and confirms this as his view by his whole attitude toward the Old Testament; and on the other hand appeals to the other portions of the Old Testament for substantiating his doctrine, especially as against the view of his opponents concerning law.

But if the term refers to the law as distinguished from the rest of the Old Testament, and to this law legalistically interpreted, and to this law as of divine authority, yet not in conflict with the rest of the Old Testament revelation, what can the apostle mean by the curse of the law? The answer is clear, when we observe that while Paul isolates the law from the rest of the Old Testament and puts upon it a strictly legalistical interpretation (see again vss. 10-12), he yet clearly indicates that it did not displace the revelation of faith that

preceded it, was not therefore given full possession of the field, never constituted the sum total of the basis on which men stood before God. It existed, indeed, side by side with the covenant of faith and grace, both were of divine authority, but were not supreme each in its own territory; the law was subordinate to the covenant of grace that preceded it. The curse of the law was not therefore an actual curse in the sense that the man on whom it fell was accursed of God; it was the verdict of law, of pure legalism; it was a disclosure to the man of his status before God on a basis of merit estimated by actual conduct and achievement; it was not a revelation of God's actual attitude toward him. That attitude Paul maintains was determined by other considerations, as the man's faith (vs. 6), his aspiration, his striving, the fundamental character of his life and conduct (Rom. 2:6-11).

In what sense then can Paul speak of Christ as delivering us from this curse? Obviously in that he brought to an end the régime of law, ushering in that of faith, which the law had not indeed displaced, but for a time modified. Such a redemption fulfils the conditions indicated above as required by the context. It accords with Paul's thought as expressed in Rom. 10:4, and with his thought as expressed in the present chapter, vss. 23-25. A redemption in the sense of the deliverance of the individual from the penalty of the law (legalistically interpreted) by the act of another, Paul shows in this very passage he did not regard as necessary; for under the Old Testament régime he finds it asserted that the righteous man shall live by faith. And this expression in turn suggests in part how the law itself was brought to an end, viz., by a clearer disclosure than had previously been made of what God's attitude to men is. The law comes to an end not because God has changed, but because his attitude and character, themselves unchangeable and in part disclosed in the Old Testament, are now so fully made known that the law no longer serves a useful function. Thus the deliverance from the curse of the law through the termination of the régime of law is in deeper truth redemption through a disclosure of God's character which itself sets the law aside—redemption of the race from the curse which the law announced against all who did not fully meet the law's statutory requirements, by a disclosure of the truth

that the law taken by itself and isolated does not express God's full and final judgment of men; or to follow the apostle's thought more exactly, redemption of the Jew from a false conception of God's attitude toward him; that so upon the Gentile also there might come the blessing of Abraham.

But it remains to consider the further elements of the sentence and to inquire how they are related to the initial proposition and whether they confirm or refute the interpretation of the initial statement. The expression *γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα*, "having become a curse for us," raises two questions: what is the meaning of the word *κατάρα* as applied to Christ? What is the logical relation of this participial phrase to the preceding assertion? As respects the first of these, *κατάρα* is literally a curse, an execration, an expression or sentence of reprobation. But there is evidently here a metonymy. A person cannot become a curse in a literal sense. Such metonymy is not uncommon in Paul. II Cor. 5:21: "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf, that we might become righteousness of God in him." I Cor. 1:30: "Who became wisdom to us from God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption." The interpretation of such a metonymy evidently depends in part on the rest of the phrase whether, e. g., this be "to us" or "on our behalf." Thus in I Cor. 1:30, he became to us wisdom from God, and righteousness and sanctification and redemption, means that through him there is imparted or accredited to us wisdom and righteousness and sanctification and redemption. In II Cor. 5:21, he became sin on our behalf, the meaning is certainly not that he became actually sinful but that he in a true sense took the place of a sinner, endured the effects of sin. So here doubtless the meaning is that he became in some sense *κατάρατος*, accursed. In what sense Paul meant to say that Jesus became *κατάρατος*, as also what is the logical relation of the participial phrase to what precedes, can best be answered after considering the quotation which the apostle here introduces.

The expression, *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, on our behalf, expresses the thought that the act of Jesus in which he became a curse was for our benefit. Whether he was our substitute, and if so in what sense, must be determined from the context, not from the phrase.

The words, *ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ κρεμόμενος ἐπὶ ξύλου*, intro-

duced by *ὅτι γέγραπται*, are a quotation from Deut. 21:23. They are quoted to prove that Jesus became a curse. The original passage refers to the body of a criminal which after the man had been put to death was hanged upon a tree. In such a case, it is said, "Thou shalt surely bury him the same day; for he that is hanged is accursed of God (literally in the Hebrew, 'the curse of God'); that thou defile not the land which Jehovah thy God giveth thee for an inheritance." The quotation of this passage in which *κατάρα* is replaced by *ἐπικατάρατος* confirms the view that *κατάρα* is to be taken by metonymy for *κατάρατος*. What light does it throw upon the question in what sense Jesus endured the curse? Conceivably the apostle meant: (1) That Jesus was the object of God's wrath personally as himself an object of abhorrence to God; (2) that Jesus was the object of God's wrath personally and really, yet vicariously, enduring this penalty of sin for others; (3) That Jesus was experiencing in himself God's wrath against sinners, not as himself the object of divine wrath, but by reason of his relation to men; (4) That he was the object of human execration, or was looked upon by men as the object of divine execration.

The first of these views may be dismissed with the naming. Paul maintains that Jesus knew no sin (II Cor. 5:21); his death was an act of obedience, not of sin (Phil. 2:8). The curse of the law falls, he says, upon those who fail to do the things that are written in the law (vs. 10). The God whose judgments are according to truth (Rom. 2:2; 3:4) cannot be thought of by Paul as actually abhorring Jesus, who knew no sin.

The second view is open to two objections: (a) It assumes that Paul thought *ἀντί* when he wrote *ὑπέρ*. This is not impossible; for the thought which would be expressed by *ἀντί* in the passage is includible under that expressed by *ὑπέρ*; if Jesus died in our stead he also died on our behalf, though the converse is not necessarily true. But it is an objection to this view that it substitutes for Paul's thought as he has expressed it, *one* of the several specific forms which that thought might take, without proving that this rather than some other was Paul's thought, or explaining why if this was Paul's thought, he did not express it as he might so easily have done by using *ἀντί*. (b) It attributes to Paul in the introduction of the quotation the

argument that because the law, speaking of a criminal who for the exceptional wickedness of his crime was not only put to death, but afterward hanged, says that he that is hanged is a curse of God (presumably at least not because he was hanged but because of the crime for which he was hanged), therefore Jesus, who, though he was sinless, suffered himself in obedience to God's will (see Phil. 2:8; Gal. 4:4) to be hanged on a tree, was also the object of the divine wrath. Such an argument is perhaps not impossible. If the apostle means that in the fact of Jesus' being hanged on wood there is a direct *proof* that he was the object of God's wrath, this is mere word-juggling such as we should not attribute to him until we have at least inquired whether there is not some explanation of his language which makes it more rational. But if he means to find in the mode of Jesus' death a symbol or expression of the attitude of God toward him, then the reasoning is not so far, simply as concerns the use of the Old Testament passage, uncharacteristic of his times or of him. There remains, however, even in that case, the difficulty of the thought itself that Jesus, though sinless, is the object of divine wrath, and this, together with the use of *ὑπὲρ* already spoken of, leads us to seek another interpretation of his language.

Between the third and fourth views it is impossible to choose without involving the question of the logical force of the participle, *γενόμενος*. Into all the complex possibilities of interpretation it is impracticable in this article to enter. Setting aside various interpretations by no means to be lightly dismissed, but on the whole untenable, we may restrict ourselves to the comparison of the two following. We may understand the participle *γενόμενος* as a participle of means, and suppose that Paul takes *ἐπικατάρατος* as it is taken in the Old Testament, as meaning accursed of God; or we may take the participle as a participle of accompanying circumstance, and understand *ἐπικατάρατος* as meaning execrated by men. In the former case the endurance of the curse of God is the means by which men are delivered from the curse of the law; in the latter case the endurance of the execration of men is an accompaniment of the deliverance, naturally thought of as a part of the cost at which Christ delivered men. The thought in this latter case is similar to that in Heb. 12:2, "endured the cross, despising the shame." If we adopt

the former interpretation we shall have to ask in what sense Jesus was accursed of God and how his endurance of the curse delivered men from the curse of the law. As respects the former question, judging for reasons already given above that Paul cannot have meant to say that God actually looked with abhorrence upon Jesus in his death, just as it is impossible to understand him in II Cor. 5:21 as meaning that Jesus became veritably sinful on our behalf, we can put no other interpretation on his words than this, that by reason of his relation to men and his mission in the world, Jesus experienced in himself the consequences of God's reprobation of sin, either in that, entering sympathetically into relation even with sinful men he felt for them God's anger at their sin, or in that in his life and death he experienced the awful consequences of human sin that brought him to his death and made that death terrible. On this interpretation it will remain to be inferred without definite statement how this suffering of Jesus redeems us from the curse of the law. Yet it is obviously suggested that men are redeemed from the curse which the law, legalistically understood, pronounces on everyone who has not fulfilled every statute of the law, by their perception that in the death of Jesus it is the innocent that suffers, not the guilty, and so that God is not a God of legalism, whose curse falls upon everyone who fails in obedience to any statute of the law (cf. vs. 10), but a God of love, who desires the salvation of men and who gives even his Son to deliver sinful men. Cf. Rom. 8:31 f.

If we adopt the interpretation that makes *γερόμενος* a participle of accompanying circumstance and understand *ἐνικατάρατος* of human execration, we shall have no statement of the means by which Jesus redeemed us from the curse of the law, but only a reference to one of the consequences that it involved, i. e., that he was execrated of men.

On the whole the fact that the thought yielded by this latter interpretation is rather vague and inharmonious with the rest of the passage, and though not inconsistent with the thought of the apostle as elsewhere expressed, yet is less consonant in tone with it than the former interpretation, makes, perhaps decisively, for the view which takes *γερόμενος* as a participle of means and finds in the sentence the thought that Jesus delivered us, believing Jews, from the

curse of the law, by his endurance on the cross of the consequences of other men's sins, whereby he manifested to them God's true attitude toward them.

The purpose of all this the apostle states in two final clauses. In the first of these, *ἵνα εἰς τὰ ἔθνη ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ γένηται ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ*, the blessing of Abraham must be understood, in the light of vss. 8, 9, as the blessing of justification by faith, which according to Paul's interpretation of Gen. 12:3 (cf. Gen. 28:4) was promised beforehand to the Gentiles, and which they shared with him. This blessing came to the Gentiles in Christ Jesus in that it was through him that the purpose of God to accept men by faith was revealed, and that through faith in him they enter into actual participation in the blessing. In the second clause, *ἵνα τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πνεύματος λάβωμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως*, the promise of the Spirit is a metonymic phrase meaning the promised Spirit. The implied subject *ἡμεῖς* must refer to Christians as such rather than to believing Jews as in vs. 13; for it is impossible to see how the reception of the Spirit by the Jews could be conditioned upon the Gentiles obtaining the blessing of Abraham. Obviously also it cannot refer to the Gentiles only. And this fact in turn makes it necessary to take the second *ἵνα*-clause, not as dependent upon the first, but as co-ordinate with it. Christ's redemption of us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, had as its co-ordinate ends the opening of the door of faith and justification through faith apart from works of law to the Gentile, and the bestowment of the promised Spirit on those that have faith. The adaptation of means to end as respects the second final clause seems obviously to lie in the fact that the redemption of men from the curse of the law by their enlightenment as to God's true attitude to them carries with it the revelation of faith as the means by which men become acceptable to God, and that through such faith they receive the Spirit. Cf. vs. 2; also vss. 24-26 and 4:6. These final clauses, therefore, with their double statement of the purpose of Christ's redemptive work, confirm the conclusions already reached that the redemption from the curse of the law was an epochal event, having its significance and its redemptive power in the revelation which it conveys of the true attitude of God toward men.

We may then sum up the thought of the passage in the following paraphrase:

From that curse which the law of God as set forth in the Old Testament, if that law be isolated from the Scriptures as a whole and given a legalistic interpretation, pronounces on us because we have not continued in all the things that are written in the book of the law to do them, from that curse, which in fact never represented God's attitude toward us, since law so understood never was the full disclosure of his attitude and will, Christ redeemed us, when in his death on the cross he made it evident that so far from it being true that God deals on principles of legalism with men, condemning everyone who continues not in all the things that are written in the book of the law, he desires the pardon and redemption of men, and permitted the consequences of sin to fall even upon his beloved Son, the innocent suffering for the guilty, that men might therein see the love of God for sinful men, and thus the shackles of legalism being stricken from the Jews, it might become clear that the Gentiles also, though without law in the legalistic sense, may in Christ enjoy the Abrahamic blessing of justification by faith, and that all who believe might through faith receive the promised Spirit of God.

CRITICAL NOTE

THE FUNCTION OF HISTORY IN THEOLOGY

In the *Hibbert Journal* for January, 1907, Professor Lovejoy of St. Louis makes a vigorous protest against what he calls "the entangling alliance of religion and history." It is indicative of the revolutionary spirit of the article that the criticisms passed upon the historical character of the Christian religion as it has been, are put into the mouth of "a visitor from another planet." This imaginary critic, in complete abstraction from the social situation in which the Christian religion has developed, is filled with wonder that a religion claiming universal validity should be so intimately bound up with particular facts of history.

Now it may be granted that the discussion of this topic of the relation of theology to history is most timely, and that the article referred to suggests very forcibly how great a mistake it is, even from the standpoint of apologetics, for the theologian to take up a position which he would be required to abandon in order even to face fairly the questions of historical criticism. But the writer does not give sufficient consideration to the question *why* the historical has occupied so central a place in the Christian religion, *why* it has been felt to be so essential to it. Considerable pains are taken to describe the *process* whereby the "entangling alliance" in question grew up, but the question of the *function* of the historical in the religion and theology of the Christian is scarcely discussed, except in a negative way. How the appeal to the historical has hindered faith is ably set forth, but how it has helped religion is scarcely touched upon. And when it is suggested that the life and personality of Jesus are more useful religiously when taken as poetry than when regarded as historical, one cannot but feel that the Christian consciousness will almost universally protest against so extreme a position.

One would suspect that Professor Lovejoy's primary interest is in the philosophical rather than in the historical. He contends for a place for metaphysics in theology, but says that in matters of history honest agnosticism is the logical position. He maintains that upon religious, moral, and even broadly metaphysical questions, man's inner light of reason and general experience are guides, but when specialists in history disagree, what opinion upon historical questions, he asks, can the average man hold which will be certain enough to satisfy his religious needs? If now our

author had happened to be primarily interested in history rather than in philosophy, might he not have been quite as zealous in contending for the place of the historical in Christian theology, and might he not have been expected to say that in matters of metaphysics honest agnosticism is the logical position?

What shall we say to these things? Is the anti-historical, metaphysical theologian correct, or is the anti-metaphysical, historical theologian on the right track? Or should both history and metaphysics be excluded from theology, which would then be limited to a dogmatic expression of our religious values? Or may it be that both history and metaphysics have at least an auxiliary function in theology?

The question of the function of history in religion and theology thus opens up a larger problem, viz., that of the nature of religious knowledge. In theological construction one is chiefly interested in what has religious value; in historical investigation the interest is primarily centered in the actual occurrence of alleged events. But the question here is, Are some of the values of religion located in historical matters of fact? Is the content of theology made up in whole or in part of facts, or is it composed exclusively of values? This brings up for discussion the common classification of judgments into judgments of fact (or existential judgments) and judgments of value. In entering upon this larger question, we shall leave for the moment the particular question with which we started, but after a treatment of the more general principles of religious knowledge and of theological method, the question at issue will be more easily answered.

To begin, then, with this common, elemental distinction of existential and value-judgments, examples of each may be given. The following are existential judgments, or judgments made as judgments of fact: "The rainbow is caused by the refraction of sunlight through drops of rain;" "Judas betrayed his Master;" "Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary." Examples of value-judgments are, "The rainbow is beautiful;" "Judas did wrong;" "Jesus is divine." Of these, the judgment "The rainbow is beautiful," is an aesthetic value-judgment; the judgment, "Judas did wrong" is a moral value-judgment; the judgment, "Jesus is divine," is a religious value-judgment. In the existential judgment a statement is made as to what is taken to be a fact. In the value-judgment there is a statement as to the value of the fact or object with reference to some interest, aesthetic, moral, religious, or other. It seems clear then that all judgments are either judgments of fact or judgments of value.

But while this is doubtless a very serviceable distinction, it may also be maintained that the distinction between existential and value-judgments is

not absolute but relative only. All judgments are existential. All judgments are also valuational.

In saying that all judgments are existential, our meaning is that all judgments are intended to be expressions of fact. Not all of these supposed facts have been critically or scientifically tested, but from whatever motive and upon whatever basis the judgment is made, the subject of the judgment is taken as a reality in so far as something is asserted about it, and the result of the judgment is a more completely known object or part of reality. That this is so may be shown by the fact that any judgment whatsoever, e. g., *a* is *b*, may be put into the existential form thus: That *a* is *b* is true, is real, is a fact. Thus all judgments that enter into theology, whatever else may be true of them, must be judgments of fact.

But not all facts enter into theology. Only those judgments which have direct value for the religious life are material for theology. This leads us to consider those judgments which are called religious value-judgments. It has been said above that all judgments are valuational. By this is meant that in every judgment, while the subject, being taken as something real, shows that the judgment is intended as a judgment of fact, the predicate shows the value which that subject has for the person who makes the judgment, and so the judgment is a value-judgment. For example, in the case of Peter Bell,

A primrose by a river's brim
A yellow primrose was to him,
And it was nothing more.

That is, in his judgment, "This is a yellow primrose," the predicate shows the full value of the thing for Peter Bell. But for a poet like Wordsworth that same little flower has more value; it can give him "thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears," and these values he might at least partially express in judgments. All judgments are judgments of value, but they express value for different interests. Those made under the impulse and guidance of the economic interest are economic value-judgments; those under the scientific interest, scientific value-judgments; those under the aesthetic, social, moral and religious interests are aesthetic, social, moral and religious value-judgments. These religious value-judgments then, which are none the less made as judgments of fact, are the material of theology. The content of theology is made up of facts; the content of theology is also made up of values.

What may perhaps be called the first stratum of apologetics will consist in a defense of the relative independence of these religious value-judgments. It will vindicate the right of the religious interest to express itself

in religious existential value-judgments. This, if I mistake not, is the *locus* of Kaftan's and Schultz's apologetics. But this first stratum is not the only one, as we shall see.

As has been allowed for, many of the judgments made as judgments of fact turn out upon critical examination and testing by experience, to be not facts at all, and so are no longer made as judgments at all. The question is likely to arise at any time, Will our religious value-judgments, made as judgments of fact, stand the test of criticism? Are they really judgments of fact? So long as this question is entertained and not satisfactorily answered, our religious ideas are subjective, uncertain, hypothetical. If the reply is made that these judgments are necessary to the religious life and are made as expressions of religious faith, that they are our religious evaluations rather than facts, we are landed in a dualism of fact and value which makes subjectivism chronic. This, it would seem, is the impasse into which extreme Ritschlianism is led, whenever there is an apparent contradiction between one of our religious judgments and any other judgments which we feel compelled to make.

Whenever any religious judgment is rendered subjective and questionable, we are compelled to take that judgment as an hypothesis and seek to verify it by a critical examination of all available experience which is at all pertinent. If it is verified, even to the extent of having the difficulty removed, then, under the impulse of the religious interest it can again be made as a judgment of fact; it emerges from the state of subjectivity and uncertainty into that of objective truth or real fact.

In this process of criticism and verification it will be found (and here we come within sight of the problem with which we started) that our material divides into three principal divisions, viz., metaphysical, historical, and psychological. When our religious judgments concerning God meet with difficulty in the face of our scientific or other necessary judgments, our critical procedure must be metaphysical. This does not necessarily mean that we are to employ the old metaphysical method of dogmatic a priorism, analyzing a concept and insisting that the result must be true of reality, whether in accord with experience or not; the method should be inductive, using speculative propositions as mere hypotheses, except in so far as they are verified by their harmony with all judgments which we are compelled to make. This metaphysical procedure, together with the historical and psychological to be described later, constitutes the second stratum of apologetics. It is an attempt to present Christian judgments as rational (reasonable) and involves a fusion of apologetic and systematic theology which is typically exemplified in Origen, and against which Kaftan raises a protest.

If it can be shown that Christian faith is vitally interested in the historical Jesus, then Christian theology will contain propositions concerning Jesus. Now any judgments which faith makes as religious evaluations of Jesus must be subject to historical criticism; and in so far as the judgments deal with the relation of Jesus to God, they are subject to metaphysical criticism as well. In so far as Christian faith expresses itself in judgments concerning Christian experience, such as assertions of regeneration by the Spirit of God, sanctification, etc., the criticism and verification will be necessarily psychological first, and ultimately metaphysical. Thus where dogmatic theology affirms anything about God, the second stratum of apologetic-systematic procedure will be metaphysical; where it is about Jesus, it will be primarily historical; where it is about the Holy Spirit and Christian experience, it will be psychological.

It remains to ask, Is Christian faith vitally concerned with the historical Jesus? Professor Lovejoy would answer, No. The voice of the Christian consciousness in the past and present, it seems to me, would answer, Yes. To be sure, if we may recognize degrees of importance, the *main* thing in Christian theology is the Christian view of God, rather than the Christian view of Jesus. And while it must be admitted, that we get our characteristic Christian view of God by regarding his character and attitude toward us as being revealed to us in the spirit and life of Jesus, still this view of God has come to have a very definite content; our Christian God is a God of holiness and love. And it may be asserted that if we could keep this Christian faith in God absolutely unimpaired, we should have a basis for practically all of the more essential elements of Christian faith and theology, including the postulate of personal immortality, even if we were forced to lose faith in the historical Jesus. To this extent Professor Lovejoy's contention is no doubt justified. But this is just the question. If we were to lose faith in Jesus, would our Christian view of God and faith in him remain unimpaired? I think not. It is a distinct support to our faith to know that the God whom we need to believe in, if we are to live the best moral and religious life, is the God Jesus believed in, the God whose reality his moral and religious nature affirmed, the God by faith in whom his moral and religious life was sustained. We are helped by this because we hold Jesus to be the best that has come into human experience; morally and religiously, he is the highest we know. Therefore we attach great value to his essential affirmations in the moral and religious sphere. Christian faith is discipleship to Jesus. The authority of Jesus in morals and religion, not the authority which coerces and burdens and crushes, but the authority which we can fall back upon in our time of spiritual need, the authority

which sustains and strengthens and inspires—this is what gives to the Christian view of Jesus its place in faith and in theology. It fortifies us in the faith which we need in order to live at our best, to know that this is the faith which Jesus had, whose life was the best—the faith without which he could not have lived as he did. Our faith in the historical Jesus sustains our faith in the Christian God and in Jesus' own gospel of eternal life. If this Christian belief concerning Jesus is challenged, it can be defended, not by calling attention to the relative independence of the religious value-judgment or of Christian faith, but only by a process of historical criticism which shall be *absolutely honest*. It is a part of our faith in Jesus that he will stand this test.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA

The publication of this great work¹ is an event noticeable for more reasons than one. First of all, it bears impressive testimony to the growing importance of the Jewish community in the United States, and to the interest of American Jews in their own religion and history. In the second place, the work is an invaluable repository of information for things Jewish. Whoever seeks information concerning Jewish customs, institutions, and the experiences through which the race has passed, will find it here. Jewish scholars, statesmen, artists, literary men, and those not of Jewish birth who have been concerned in the history of this people, are here commemorated. For these reasons the work must long remain a source of information of the first rank.

It is not, however, the purpose of the present paper to examine or criticize the work in these respects. We are concerned especially with its significance in the theological world. The question that interests us is: How far are Jewish thinkers affected by the theological thought of today? This question easily resolves itself into two others. The theological thought of today is characterized by the critical method, and by a more adequate historical apprehension than has prevailed in earlier periods. The result has been a larger toleration within the boundaries of the individual denominations, and a greater variety of thought, some would say confusion of thought, in each of them. It will be of interest to examine the work before us with reference to these tendencies, and then to ask specifically for its attitude toward Christianity.

For critical views and method it is significant, first of all, that the editors do not propose to enter into competition with Hastings' *Bible Dictionary* or the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. To this extent they indorse these works, both of which treat biblical topics from the critical point of view. Moreover, they say in so many words:

Among Jews as among Christians there exists a wide diversity of opinion as to the character of the revelation of the Old Testament. There are those who

¹ *The Jewish Encyclopedia: A Descriptive Record of the History, Religion, Literature and Customs of the Jewish People from the Earliest Times to the Present Day.* New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1905. Twelve volumes. \$6 each.

hold to the literal inspiration, while others reject this view and are of opinion that the circumstances under which the various texts were produced can be ascertained by what is known as the Higher Criticism.

The cautious wording of the statement is perhaps intended to indicate that the editors themselves are not to be held responsible for the critical views which they introduce to their readers. But the assumption of the passage is certainly that the critical views are of such importance that they cannot rightly be withheld from readers of the *Encyclopædia*. That critical methods are therefore fully recognized as legitimate must be evident.

The critical method, then, is recognized on the part of Jewish scholars, as is evident from the way in which biblical subjects are actually handled in the body of the work. In the more important articles the biblical data are first given by themselves; then follows a section recounting the rabbinical material, to which in some cases the traditions of Islam are added; finally comes the critical view. This last is usually the work of a Christian scholar. In some instances it is thought sufficient to give the biblical data without comment, and where the critical view is presented we sometimes find an apologetic remark added designed to conciliate the adherents of tradition. Thus, after the analysis of the Book of Genesis is given (taken from Holzinger), we learn that there are in the book "no anachronisms, no repetitions, and no unnecessary doublets," and that it is "not compiled from various sources." Similarly the article "Pentateuch" gives the critical analysis on the basis of Carpenter and Battersby, and then tells us that this analysis is based on two assumptions, both of which are against the evidence from the analogy of other religions. Under the title "Deuteronomy" we have, besides the biblical data, *two* critical theories presented, one by a Christian, the other by a Jewish scholar. On the other hand, the article "Isaiah" is by the competent hand of Cheyne, and of course is critical throughout.

It can hardly be denied that the effect of thus combining two divergent points of view must sometimes be puzzling to the reader. And the occasional apologetic defense of tradition may even go against his moral sense. Jacob's substitution for Esau, for example, is affirmed to be according to the divine purpose—a kind of defense to which we are accustomed enough in Christian circles. It is, in fact, probable that in this respect even conservative Jewish scholarship is freer to take a really historical view than is a certain type of Christian scholarship. To the Jew the books of the prophets always have been inferior in importance and in inspiration to the Pentateuch. It is with respect to the latter—the divine law—that the editors show most sensitiveness. Yet even here, as we have seen, the

critical view is fairly presented, works of Christian scholars are freely cited, and Christian collaborators are engaged to give their views. The occasional *caveat* which is entered scarcely breaks the force of the real historic presentation.

Our second point of interest is the breadth and variety of the views held within the bounds of Judaism. Here we have abundant light, not only from the phenomena just considered, but from others even more striking. The Christian inquirer who approaches his book with the desire to know what Judaism is will receive a double answer. The discussion of the "Dietary Laws," for example, will tell him first from the conservative point of view that "the laws are divinely inspired and the rejection of them is tantamount to a rejection of a belief in Israel's deliverance from Egypt," and further that any discussion "regarding the historical development of these laws is obviously excluded from the standpoint of traditional Judaism; the dietary laws are exactly the same now that they were in the days of Moses." But the same article gives us also the reformed point of view which (after a half-hearted adoption of W. R. Smith's explanation) affirms that these laws have a merely temporary character. The theologian of the old school—the man of vigor and rigor who wants no quibbling or evasion—will here step in and demand a categorical answer to the question: Are these laws then of the essence of Judaism, or are they not? One or the other must be true, he will say. But in Christian theology we have learned that there are some questions which cannot be answered by a direct yes or no. It may be that Judaism, like Christianity, allows its adherents to give various answers to such questions, according to different degrees of light and knowledge. Toleration and comprehension may be of more importance than a strict adherence to tradition.

The breadth of Judaism is manifest from some phenomena of special interest. It is taken for granted by all historical students that the institution of circumcision has existed from prehistoric times among the Israelites. To this extent the Bible is right in attributing it to Abraham rather than to Moses. Its importance in the view of the biblical writer is attested by his express declaration that every male who is not circumcised shall be cut off from his people. The post-biblical view is sufficiently indicated by the Book of Jubilees, which declares that whoever is uncircumcised belongs to the sons of Belial and is the child of doom and of eternal perdition. Yet a large and influential body of Jews in our day has declared that the child of Jewish parents is a Jew though he be not circumcised, and converts to Judaism have been received into the synagogue in this country without being obliged to undergo this rite.

The difference here, it should be noted, is not a difference of opinion only; it is a difference of observance, and in Judaism observance has always held the first place. We naturally inquire why so radical a divergence has not resulted in a schism, such as came in earlier days when the Samaritans became a separate communion, or such as the Middle Ages witnessed when the Karaites were excinded from the Jewish body. The reason seems to be that the sense of nationality has endured, while the ecclesiastical organization has grown weaker. The sense of nationality needs no comment. For centuries the Jews have regarded themselves as sojourners among peoples of alien blood. This was emphasized by the attitude of the other peoples, no doubt, but it was also their own view. Early in the last century the rabbis of Poland and Hungary declared that the Jews did not wish to be admitted to the rights of citizenship in the lands of their residence. In our time, moreover, there has been a distinct revival of national aims and ambitions among the peoples of the world, resulting in pan-Germanism, pan-Slavism, pan-Islamism, perhaps to be supplemented by pan-Mongolianism. The editors of the work before us are quite correct, therefore, in saying:

The Jews have a twofold character: as representatives of a nation they have kept alive their Hebrew tradition, and as cosmopolitans they have taken part in the intellectual life of almost all cultured nations.

The art of preserving their nationality while thus partaking of the intellectual life of the other nations has been learned through a long and sorrowful course of training. It is not to be wondered at that the habit has become ingrained, and that the Jew is conscious that he is a Jew after he has put off all that is distinctively Jewish. Zionism is advocated by many who have no faith in the restoration of the Temple and its services, just because the sense of nationality remains strong after the religious conviction has disappeared. This it is which preserves the unity of Judaism in the wide divergence of doctrine and observance.

And, on the other hand, there is no strongly organized central authority which can excind the reforming party. The government of the Jewish churches is what we know as congregational. The community in any particular place has the power of enforcing discipline on its own members, and in the Middle Ages the judgment of the community had terrible power. Excommunication meant exclusion from the means of livelihood and from human companionship. But the authority of the rabbi did not extend beyond the bounds of his own congregation, and when a considerable number of men became infected by the modern spirit, it was within their

power to organize themselves into a congregation of their own. There is no central authority to pronounce such congregations schismatic or to deny them the right to call themselves Jews.

From the work before us, then, we get the picture of a progressive movement in Judaism, such as is going on in the Christian church, though without the breaking-up into a number of separate denominations which is so sad a feature of church history. One difference, however, should be noted: In Christianity the revolt has been from elaborate *creeds* imposed by church authority, while in Judaism it was from an elaborate set of *regulations* whose observance was found to be increasingly difficult in modern conditions. Some will think the difference more apparent than real; for acceptance of the creed of the church was supposed to involve obedience to the regulations of the church, while in Judaism life according to the law presupposed belief in certain truths. If we try to think of what a Jew would be who did not believe in the existence of God, we shall see that a certain amount of dogmatic faith is a necessity. Historically we may recall that Spinoza was excommunicated from the synagogue because he denied the real existence of angels and the individual immortality of the soul. It is interesting to notice also that the need of a creed as a declaration of principles is felt among American Reform Jews today.

While, then, Judaism has never imposed a creed by ecclesiastical authority, it has not been indifferent to theology. We are interested to read, under the head "Articles of Faith," of the various attempts that have been made at systematizing the beliefs of Judaism. The situation until recently was what it was in New England Congregationalism during the first two hundred years of its existence. The belief of the different congregations was of a common type, though not imposed by any central authority. In Judaism the articles which have enjoyed general acceptance are those of Maimonides, which may be briefly summarized as follows: God is One; he is the Creator; he is incorporeal; he is eternal; no other being is to be worshiped; all the words of the prophets are true; Moses is chief of the prophets; the law now in our hands is the genuine law of Moses; this law is unchangeable; God knows the hearts of men; he rewards the good and punishes the evil; the Messiah is to come; there will be a resurrection of the dead. It is almost superfluous to point out how nearly these articles agree with the fundamentals of Christian theology as usually construed.

The agreement is also strikingly brought out by the article "Theology," which is written from the point of view of a conservative Jewish thinker. This begins by saying that certain teachings are supernaturally revealed; that this revelation has taken place only at certain times in the past; that

the truths thereby made known are not to be supplemented or annulled. They are mainly contained in scripture, but in part are found in the oral law revealed to Moses. They include the affirmation that God is Creator and Ruler of the universe, that he is incorporeal, unique, omniscient, immutable (but not in such a way as to exclude the possibility of repentance and prayer on the part of men). He reveals his will in the Pentateuch, which is the Torah of Moses. This law is unchangeable, including the oral law. In reference to man the doctrine asserts his freedom and responsibility, God's providential care of him, retribution for his actions, the immortality of the soul, bliss or punishment in the other world, and the resurrection of the dead. Finally, as to the destiny of Israel it is believed that the Messiah will come and gather the scattered Jews to the land of their fathers;

there they shall form an independent kingdom and reawaken to independent national life. Then all nations shall go to Palestine to study the institutions of a state founded on love and justice. From Zion shall the peoples be taught how they in their own state institutions may realize the ideals of justice and brotherly love. . . . The mission of salvation, however, is only an indirect aim; the direct and first aim is to compensate the Jewish nation for all the sufferings it has endured through its years of exile.

It follows, of course, that the nation must not by ill-conduct, irreligious actions, and anti-national endeavors frustrate or make difficult its redemption (Vol. XII, p. 136).

The objections of Christian thinkers to this system would lie against only two of these articles—that concerning the unchangeableness of the law, and that concerning the Messiah and his work. Even the one concerning the Messiah, if interpreted of the Second Advent, would be assented to by many Christians. The reforming Jews, it is interesting to note, object most strenuously to just these articles. The first conference of Reform rabbis in this country declared that the messianic aim is not the restoration of the Jewish state, and that the sacrificial system is not to be reintroduced—that is, the law is not unchangeable. It is not to be wondered at that they heard the reproach with which we are familiar in Protestant circles, namely, that they were merely negative and destructive in their tendencies—a reproach brought also by Roman Catholics against the whole Protestant movement. The answer in all the cases is the same: Where a long tradition has accumulated there must be some tearing-down before we can build up. And again: Where there is liberty we must be prepared for diversity.

The attitude of Reform Jews, therefore, is that of progressive Christian

scholars. Life (they believe) is growth and movement; stagnation is death. What is outgrown must be sloughed off, or it will interfere with the health of the organism. But growth should take place within the bounds of the religious community in which one finds himself. Otherwise the history of each communion will be a series of a schisms and the indefinite multiplication of sects.

Reform Judaism holds that all the legalistic definitions and restrictions of religion are no longer the true expression of the religious sentiment, or of the will of God as manifested in the consciousness of the Jew (Vol. IX, p. 330).

The emphasis is here laid on the legalistic definitions, but in fact it is the creed statement of the unchangeableness of the law which is objected to. In Christianity the progressive theologian objects directly to the subtleties of the elaborate confessions of faith. The attitude is the same.

And that the attitude is not in either case negative and destructive must be evident. The test applied is "the true expression of the religious sentiment." In other words, the interest of progressive thinkers, in Judaism as in Christianity, is directed toward *religion* rather than *theology*. A leader of the Jewish reform movement sixty years ago said: The only purpose that should be kept in mind is to strengthen the religious spirit of the present generation. He was speaking, to be sure, of the public service which needed especial attention in Judaism. But his words have a wider application. The purpose of worship is edification. The public service is not something done to please God merely because he commanded it by revelation or tradition. It must appeal to the religious sentiment and must further right living. On the part of Christian theology we may make the wider application—not the public service alone, all the activities of the church on the part of her preachers and thinkers, must be such as appeal to the religious sentiment and further right living. In taking this attitude and emphasizing religion, both Jews and Christians are going back of the law and taking up anew the ideas of the Hebrew prophets. Not sacrifice, but righteousness, is what God desires, says the reformer, adopting the words of Hosea as they were adopted by Jesus eighteen hundred years earlier.

In thus adopting prophetic as distinguished from legalistic ideas the more advanced Jewish thinkers are at one with Christians. The mission of Judaism becomes the same with the mission of the church—to propagate a pure ethical monotheism. Judaism, says one author, by its idea of a divine kingdom of truth and righteousness to be built on the earth gave to mankind a hope and to history a goal for which to live and strive through the centuries (Vol. VII, p. 363). The kingdom of God thus conceived is

as far from the priest-state of the Pentateuch as it is from the millennium of Christian apocalyptic vision. Its perfection will not consist in the exalted temple on Zion to which all the nations shall come to learn what is ritually permitted and what is forbidden, but in the universality of justice, purity, and truth, in the prevalence of joy and hope and love throughout the world. So far as this ideal is adopted, we shall have in Judaism a theistic church entering into friendly rivalry with the Christian churches in educating men in righteousness and benevolence. It is not impossible that such a church may find increasing opportunity for usefulness in this composite American society, and that by the simplicity of its creed, by its moral earnestness, and by its breadth of view it may attract to itself many gentiles who do not find satisfaction in the other churches.

It seems to the Christian thinker who studies the phenomena that advanced Judaism must more definitely divest itself of some Jewish traditions. It is possible that in this we are mistaken. Even progressive Jews complain that "a just and unprejudiced estimate of Judaism is found nowhere in modern Christian writings," and the author goes on to say:

The fact of the matter is that Judaism, while representing the guardianship of universal religious truths for humanity, surrounded the Jewish people as the priestly people of the world's Only God with laws and rites of a specific national character in order to keep these truths forever intact, and at the same time to invest the guardians of them with the sanctity of the world's priesthood (Vol. VII, p. 365).

Historically we apprehend very well what is meant by this sanctity of the world's priesthood. The ideal of Ezekiel and of the Pentateuch was to keep the people from everything unclean, that the Temple might not be defiled. This ideal may be called both national and ecclesiastical. But when the Reform Jew abandons the Pentateuch as his infallible code and takes his stand with the great prophets, does he not thereby give up the aloofness and distinctness of his people? Now that by his own confession the gentiles have come to the knowledge of the God of Israel we can understand the exclusiveness which he retains only as a survival from the earlier stage of thought. But even here it is fair to point out that the conditions are similar to those in the church, where men who no longer accept the historic confessions of faith in their natural and intended sense insist on retaining them as the constitution of the church.

In one point, indeed, the complaint we have just considered may be well taken. Following Pauline tradition it is probable that we Christians exaggerate the bondage imposed by the law. The observance of six hundred and thirteen rules of daily conduct, together with the traditions intended to

hedge them about, seems to us an intolerable servitude. But in justice to sincere and earnest Jews we must admit that they do not find it so. This is sufficiently evident from the delight which the authors of many of the psalms find in the law of God. Use doth breed a habit in the man, and many lives have found obedience to the law a necessity and a custom which made it as natural as the air they breathed. The joy of submitting oneself to the will of God, whether it involve the sacrifice of the intellect to a revealed creed, the denial of the appetites in the life of the monk, the punctiliousness of the strict legalist, or the self-abnegation of the settlement worker, is something we must always take account of in religious history. Our parallel between Judaism and Christianity might be extended to these various manifestations of the religious life.

But we must give a little space to our final question: What attitude do Jewish thinkers take toward Christianity, as shown by the work before us? Considering the amount of suffering the Jews have endured from professed Christians in the past, we should not be surprised to find a harsh judgment pronounced. What we find, in fact, is a temperate estimate, and the polemic, where there is any, is in the best of temper. It is frankly recognized that Christianity is based on a belief in the God of Israel and in the Hebrew Scriptures as the Word of God. The welcome goes so far as to claim certain Christian documents for Judaism—the Epistle of James and the Didache in its earliest form. Here, as is well known, the precedent has been set by Christian scholars. The article which treats of Jesus finds in the Founder of Christianity a magnetic personality, whose teaching is in some respects more Jewish than Christian. The Lord's Prayer is declared to be only an excerpt from the Synagogal Eighteen Benedictions. The author goes on to say:

A great historic movement like Christianity cannot have arisen without a great personality to call it into existence. Jesus of Nazareth had a mission from God; and he must have had the spiritual power and fitness to be chosen for it. The very legends surrounding his life and his death furnish proofs of the greatness of his character and of the depth of the impression which it left upon the people among whom he moved (Vol. VII, p. 167).

The article on Christianity also says that Jesus was truly the redeemer of the lower classes (Vol. III, p. 50). This article, however, bases its criticism of Christianity too much on the Anselmic theory of atonement—a mistake similar to that made by Christian scholars when they identify Judaism with Talmudism. By what we must regard as a serious misapprehension the *descensus ad inferos* is said to have taken place that Christ might liberate his own soul from the pangs of eternal doom (Vol. III, p. 55).

Almost the only criticism made on Jesus is that he was harsh and distinctly unjust in his attitude toward the ruling and well-to-do classes. Whether this objection is valid we may well doubt. The attitude of Jesus was the attitude of all prophetic teachers from Amos down. The man who took the fatherhood of God seriously, and who put the command to love one's neighbor as oneself alongside of the command to love God with all the heart, must have been shocked at the neglect of the plainest duties of brotherhood on the part of the wealthy. That an aristocracy of priestly claims, like the Sadducees, or an aristocracy of learning, like the Pharisees, should show the arrogance of all aristocracies toward those beneath them, is according to analogy. What else is the meaning of the scorn visited on the *Am ha-aref* throughout the history of Judaism? It was this which called out the fierce denunciation of that prophet who was indeed the redeemer of the lower classes and who based his claim on the fact that he preached the good tidings to the poor.

In conclusion, we may advert to what has been mentioned by other reviewers—the attitude of the work toward the apostle Paul. The article devoted to him ("Saul of Tarsus") does, indeed, admit that his view of life, of man, and of God is a profoundly serious one.

The entire conception of religion has been deepened by him because his mental grasp was wide and comprehensive, and his thinking is bold, aggressive, searching, and at the same time systematic (Vol. XI, p. 80).

But with this appreciation we find the not uncommon conception that Paul's theology is a system of belief which endeavored to unite all men, but at the expense of reason and common-sense. What is meant is that Paul's *faith* was an intellectual assent to certain alleged truths. No other construction can be put upon the following sentence:

He substituted for the natural childlike faith of man in God as the ever-present helper in all trouble, such as the Old Testament represents it everywhere, a blind artificial faith imposed from without, and which is accounted as a meritorious act.

Elsewhere in the same article it is said that salvation according to Paul was not righteousness nor even faith—in the Jewish sense of trust in an all-loving and all-forgiving God and Father—but faith in the atoning power of Christ's death which in some mystic or judicial manner justifies the undeserving.

Doubtless the view of Paul's system here presented is the one often held by Christian theologians, but it is erroneous nevertheless. Faith according to Paul was just this trust in God as the all-loving and all-forgiving Father. The trust was in his view mediated by the death of Christ, because that event was the crowning proof of God's love, and the pledge of his forgive-

ness. In other words, faith with Paul was not the intellectual assent to a theory of atonement; it was a thoroughly religious appropriation of the love of God, based on a profound personal experience of the apostle himself. The things which we find strange in Paul are for the most part the very things which he took from the Judaism of his day. It would be interesting to show this in detail, but space forbids.

Paul was no doubt a revolutionary. He saw, or rather he experienced in his own person, the insufficiency of the Judaism of his day. The break was inevitable, just as the break of Luther with the Roman Catholic church was inevitable. We may regret the violence of the leaders in such movements, but this ought not to blind us to the fact that, humanly speaking, there could have been no advance without the boldness of their words and their acts. Even the recognition of this fact does not enable the conscientious Roman Catholic to understand Luther. Perhaps it is as difficult for the conscientious Jew to understand Paul.

Although the Christian scholar will find reason to dissent from the details of the article just discussed, it has been made clear, I trust, that he will find much in this work which will command his hearty approval. The days when the Christian thought of the Jew as a blinded and hardened rejector of the Messiah, and when the Jew looked upon the Christian as the idolatrous follower of a renegade and rebel, are long past. On both sides there is appreciation of each other's sincerity, sympathy for each other's aims, agreement as to scientific method. Great problems await solution. There seems to be no reason why we should not unite our efforts for the advance of the truth, to the end that reason and the kingdom of God may prevail.

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NEW YORK CITY

BUDDE'S HISTORY OF HEBREW LITERATURE

In the absence of ancient Hebrew MSS of any except biblical books, and in the total failure of excavation thus far to bring to light any literary monuments of Israel, the subject-matter of a book like this cannot differ much from that of the familiar Introductions to the Old Testament. If we except a fringe of apocryphal and pseudonymous writings, comparatively late in date, on the whole lightly esteemed by the Jewish scribes, and preserved to us for the most part in translations, Old Testament and ancient Hebrew literature are at present synonymous terms. Professor Budde¹ explains the limits of the field in the sketch of the Old Testament Canon,

¹ *Geschichte der alt-hebräischen Literatur*. Von Karl Budde. Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen von Alfred Bertholet. Leipzig: Amelang, 1906. xvi+433 pages.

with which his book opens, and gives reasons at various points for the belief that the Canonizers included substantially all the ancient literature that had come into their hands. Ancient Hebrew literature, as known to us, and apparently as known to those who compiled our Old Testament, was religious literature, and has been preserved through its history by the religious interest. It is not new material, but the way of dealing with familiar material, that gives attractiveness and value to Budde's book. The newer generation admits only the historical method in historical discussions. The development of literary form, and of the ideas embodied in it is a primary question. A real history must show the connections of things. This is Budde's endeavor. He begins with the oldest poetry, follows this with the early historical writings, is led naturally to the prophets of the Assyrian period, and passes over from these to the written laws and their origin. Deuteronomy, the Books of Kings and the later prophets come thereafter, followed in turn by the priestly law code, the narrative Midrash and historical works affected by the Midrashic habit, the later lyrics, the didactic poetry, and the apocalyptic tendency embodied in Daniel. The volume ends with Bertholet's chapter on Jewish books whose authorship rested on no recognized tradition or was fictitiously assumed, and which found no entrance into the Jewish Canon—a competent bit of work for which, in the present brief review, this mention must suffice. The volume is successful in avoiding the two extremes which would have been equally fatal to its large usefulness—that of over-elaboration, and that of superficiality. The former danger is for a scholar the more imminent, but the latter is perhaps more familiar to us, in the literature of the subject, since popularization, especially in America, has been left so much to half-trained men. Budde expresses no opinion for which he is not prepared to give a reason, and in fact he gives reasons in sufficient fulness. It is an intelligible, consistent picture of literary development which he draws for us. But his pages are not overburdened with argument. Details appear for illustration, but there is no attempt at exhaustive treatment. Nor does he undertake to cite, much less to refute, differing opinions. He has rightly conceived the purpose of such a book—to present a readable and living account of the growth of Hebrew literature from the point of view of a careful student of that literature. No two students agree at all points. Many things are obscure and susceptible of differing explanations. There is a place for elaborate and exhaustive discussions, but there is a place also for a comprehensive survey by a single practiced eye. An intelligent reader of Budde's volume will gain an admirable impression of the development of thought and the utterance of it through the Hebrew centuries. The

movement in its full sweep passes before him. He is not hampered and distracted by long investigations of particular points. He is introduced to a quiet, varied, and harmonious landscape. Three classes of persons, especially, will find this guide of notable service: Those who are entering upon special studies, and desire a general orientation before they proceed to the patient minute labor which is of course the condition of mastery; those who have been long occupied with such minute examination, and crave the refreshment of synthesis—the observation of the living process; and those who are not specialists and do not expect to be, but who wish to gain a distinct and sound apprehension of Old Testament literature. All of these will find in the book what they seek. It is written with the independence and freshness of one who sees things for himself, and is able therefore to suggest new points of view. His own opinions are moderate and reasonable, lacking extravagant novelty, and maintaining themselves sturdily over against the insistent views of extremists. One may instance his judgment as to the authenticity of Jeremiah, and the possibility of pre-exilic Psalms.

One is tempted to call attention to more points than the compass of this review admits. Some of the most characteristic ones have been developed by the author elsewhere. Some are noteworthy not from their originality, but from the vividness with which they are set forth. I mention, almost at random, the sketch of the Canon, the compact account of the beginnings of the legal literature, the explanation of the arrangement of Ezekiel's material, and the plausible hypothesis that this book served as model for the editors of other prophets, the welcome discussion of the laws of Hebrew poetry in connection with the ancient songs, which were not only the earliest Hebrew poetry, but also, as far as we can judge, the earliest literary product of this gifted and influential race.

In another place, and for a different purpose, mention might be made of questionable points. I think the author sets the beginning of written Hebrew laws too late, or at least that his argument is inconclusive. It is indeed wholly probable that the first of such laws would have been laws of worship. But Budde thinks the earliest written laws of worship were designed—like the earliest Christian creeds—for the use of new converts—in the use of Hebrew laws for the instruction of Canaanites adopting the Hebrew religion. If, however, as he rightly holds, a substantially new religion was instituted by Moses, there can hardly have been in the whole history of the people a more important epoch for the definite fixation of usages of worship than the time when that religion was instituted, and some written memoranda of such usages may therefore have been quite early. I am not yet convinced that the Elihu chapters belong to the original book

of Job—indeed Budde himself does not seem to insist on this quite so strongly as in his *Commentary*. But there is no reason for multiplying points of this kind. The purpose of the present review is to describe and heartily to commend the book as an admirable specimen of a very useful type. It is fitted both for instruction and for stimulus. A book in English of the same sort would do great good.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

*The Historical Bases of Religions: Primitive Babylonian, and Jewish*¹ is a well-written but misleading book. It is the product of wide reading rather than of close study or original investigation. Its aim is to eliminate from the religion of Israel all that is lovely and of good report and to leave it steeped in barbarism, cruelty, and fanaticism, and by implication to involve Christianity, in so far as it is an outgrowth of Judaism, in the same condemnation. Judaism is contrasted with the glowingly described Assyro-Babylonian civilization on the one hand and with the tolerant serenity of imperial Rome on the other. How utterly one-sided the book is may be inferred from the fact that only three casual references are made to Deutero-Isaiah (pp. 230, 237, 263), and no reference to Jonah. But such references could hardly be expected in a work whose theme is the bigotry of Judaism. The scholarship of the book may be judged by the fact that the Passover is derived from the Babylonian festival of Zagmuk (pp. 99, 173), that the Sabbath in Israel was celebrated *exactly* as in Babylon (p. 173), that Israel probably introduced child-sacrifice into Canaan, that Christ was an Essene (p. 274), and that this sect borrowed its literature from Buddhism (p. 273). The book has its uses however. It is sometimes good for the complacent adherent of conventional religion to see himself at least as *some* others see him.

Professor Vernon's little book² is in striking contrast to Mr. Brown's. Both accept the critical position but through its means Mr. Brown can extract only wormwood, whereas Professor Vernon "sucks out the sweet pith of the Scriptures." He writes with the fervor and enthusiasm of one

¹ *The Historical Bases of Religions: Primitive, Babylonian, and Jewish*. By H. C. Brown. Boston: Turner, 1906. 314 pages. \$1.50.

² *The Religious Value of the Old Testament*. By Ambrose White Vernon. New York: Crowell, 1907. 81 pages. \$0.90.

who believes heart and soul in the contribution which modern criticism makes to spiritual religion. The emphasis is placed upon the prophetic tendencies in the Old Testament, as contrasted with the priestly tendencies, and upon the element of personality. The ethical side is emphasized at the expense of the miraculous, the experiential at the expense of the dogmatic. For example, the older view of the Old Testament establishes the divinity of Christ by emphasizing prophecy and miracle, the newer view "affords the presuppositions that are indispensable to apprehend the *character* of Christ" (p. 66), while the relationship of Jesus to God and to man is left a secret (p. 74). Those who agree with the author will thank him for setting forth what they feel, with such eloquence. To those who are hesitating between the older and the newer views the book will make a strong appeal through its spiritual earnestness and suggestiveness. But what will its effect be upon those who love the old wine of the "Infallible Word"? To them many of its epigrammatic expressions will appear irritating. They will not like to be told that "the greatest evil of an infallible Bible is the worship of a trivial God" (p. 22). And yet for them also it should have the value of a *personal confession* of one who is steeped in the Bible as critically interpreted, but who still finds it an immortal book of religion "destined soon to be a part of the sacred book of mankind."

Professor Vernon well says that "the great literary power of the Bible will be lost to us unless its religious power may somehow be retained." This truth is tacitly recognized in the exceedingly suggestive contribution of Professor Gardiner to the study of the Bible as English literature.³ Professor Gardiner's appreciation is not simply aesthetic. The uniqueness and significance of the Bible as literature is explained out of the underlying moral earnestness of the men who wrote it and translated it. The absolute simplicity and objectivity of its narrative, the analogous lack of the power of representation in its poetry—the power "to pass beyond the point of expressing the writer's own emotions to the point where he could imagine himself into the feelings of other persons whether real or invented"—these seeming limitations are the real secret of the power of the Bible as literature. There is no "make-believe" in it. "It has power over our feelings because it is dead in earnest." Job is instanced as an illustration of this fact. I have often felt myself in studying this book that the author is Job in a real sense. The feeling is too poignant to be simply the imagined feeling of another. Perhaps the most interesting and theologically sugges-

³ *The Bible as English Literature*. By J. H. Gardiner. New York: Scribner, 1906. 402 pages. \$1.50.

tive section of Professor Gardiner's work is that devoted to the Wisdom literature and the New Testament epistles. In form the Wisdom books are poetical. They partake of the main characteristics of biblical poetry. They are concrete, not abstract, emotional, not ratiocinative. The language of these books, like the language of the narrative and poetry, is unmarked by transitional particles. There are no involved periods and no connected reasoning (cf. Proverbs and Ecclesiastes). The comparison of the lack of arrangement in Ecclesiastes to the lack of arrangement in Proverbs is a happy one and the legitimacy of the attempt to find consistency in Ecclesiastes through analysis into sources is rightly doubted. There is, however, a more closely knit argument in the main portion of Job than Professor Gardiner appears to allow. It is a pity that the church did not long ago draw the important conclusion of Professor Gardiner from the obvious character of the Wisdom literature that, "having no abstract reasoning, its literature could have neither science, nor philosophy, nor theology." This conclusion is almost equally valid when the New Testament epistles are examined, which are usually supposed to furnish the proof-texts of dogmatics. The style of the Pauline epistles, Hebrews, and John, undoubtedly shows a great advance toward abstraction and the power of analysis over the Old Testament Wisdom literature and the Synoptic Gospels, as Professor Gardiner shows us at length. But after all, St. Paul is a poet and a mystic, rather than a scientifically exact thinker. "He trusts to the emotional implications of things, rather than to the cool and abstract inferences drawn from them by rigidly logical processes." In I Cor., chap. 15, for example, "the great truths lie rather in the connotations of the words, in their implications, associations, and uplifting suggestions, than in the literal meaning and if these clouds of feeling were stripped away the value and stimulating power of the passage would fall dead." But this is not to underestimate the worth of such emotional argument, for "it is only by virtue of the deep infusion of feeling which always goes with the knowledge attained by intuition that the human mind can soar to the eternal and the infinite." Space forbids more than the mere reference to the suggestive treatment of prophecy and Apocalypse and the valuable study of the Authorized Version. Professor's Gardiner's enthusiasm for the Authorized Version, however, leads him to claim that on the whole the custom of printing the poetry of the Old Testament as prose is better than the recent fashion of printing it as poetry (pp. 109-113). This claim the present reviewer cannot admit.

In his judgment the adherence to the custom of the Authorized Version in this respect is the one weakness of the otherwise excellent translation of

Jeremiah recently prepared by Dr. Driver.⁴ The aim of Dr. Driver's book as he tells us is "to assist an ordinary educated reader to read the Book of Jeremiah intelligently and to understand the gist and scope of its different parts." To this end a new translation is given which aims to be "idiomatic, dignified, accurate, and clear." This aim is attained. An introductory sketch of the life of Jeremiah and a characterization of his style is given and brief notes at the foot of the page and in an appendix supply the most needed elucidations of the text. The book is a good illustration of the author's well-known caution in the matter of literary and textual criticism. It is his caution in the latter respect that has prevented him from exhibiting the poetic form typographically. But should the very justifiable hesitation of Dr. Driver to whip Jeremiah's poetry into metrical regularity in the brutal fashion of recent critics lead him to the other extreme of presenting it as prose?

Professor Brown's translation of Jeremiah⁵ is published "as a collateral text to his contribution to the *American Commentary on the Old Testament*." It is only a translation without notes. But through its system of heavy-faced type, brackets, etc., it records the author's critical conclusions. It has the merit of exhibiting the metrical character of Jeremiah's prophecies to the eye. The translation modernizes more than Professor Driver's and loses somewhat of the dignity and rhythm of the latter. Judgment upon the full value of Professor Brown's translation and arrangement must await the appearance of the forthcoming larger work. It is a pity that a work of such real worth as that of Professor Brown should be defaced by such an unfortunately executed frontispiece.

The hot debate over the Essence of Christianity has been accompanied by an equally hot debate over the Essence of Judaism. This was to be expected since in many respects Christianity is in conscious antithesis to Judaism. Especially of late has the debate over Judaism become acute through the discussions of such men as Bousset on the one hand and Perles on the other. In *Prophetenideal, Judentum, Christentum*,⁶ Professor König enters into these debates. After a brief sketch of the prophetic ideal, the development of the *Law* and the *Promise* is traced from the time of Ezra-Nehemiah through the Apocryphal Books, the pre-talmudic

⁴ *The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah*. By S. R. Driver, New York: Scribner, 1906. xiii + 382 pages. \$1.50.

⁵ *The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah*. A New and Critical Translation. By Charles Rufus Brown. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1906. 48 pages. \$0.50.

⁶ *Prophetenideal, Judentum, Christentum*. Von Eduard König. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. 92 pages. M. 1.40.

authorities as represented by the pairs of scribes, the Pharisees and Sadducees, the Pseudepigraphs, Philo, the Essenes, the Minim (identified after Friedländer with Jewish heretics in the earlier references) and finally the 'Am-ha-'ares. The results of the review of these various sources are practically the same. The Law predominates and the Promise either retreats into the background as in the Apocrypha, or is materialistically conceived as in the Pseudepigraphs, while the interesting observation is made that the proclamation of a new covenant in all this mass of material is almost totally ignored (p. 79). There are incidental discussions of the etymology of Essene (the derivation from the Aramaic *chaschaim*—*the silent ones*, preferred), of the credibility of the Gospels as exponents of contemporary Judaism (against Perles), of the meaning of Son of Man (a Messianic title, against N. Smith), etc. While instructive as Professor König's work always is (his encyclopedic knowledge is a constant marvel to the present reviewer), the impression left by this monograph is that the author has attempted to cover too much ground in too small a compass. For example, the discussion of the significance of the doctrine of the resurrection as against Gunkel's positions (p. 28) hardly seems adequate.

The pamphlet of Dr. Engert¹ is interesting in itself but also and especially because of its symptomatic character. It is a Roman Catholic discussion of the principles of biblical interpretation and an application of these principles to the first chapter of Genesis. In a preliminary discussion of inspiration the positions adopted by Leo XIII in the famous encyclical "By divine Providence" are cited, only to be rejected. "The words of the encyclical are so clear that it would be labor thrown away to attempt to reconcile the hermeneutical principles of the encyclical with the rules of a historical criticism." Fortunately for Catholic scholarship the encyclical, as Engert points out, while claiming for itself respect and obedience, is not an *ex cathedra* decree. The exegetical method is next defined. Not even the literary and critical method is sufficient. "The exegete must be at the same time a *Religionshistoriker*. Genesis, chap. 1, is accordingly interpreted through the mythological background out of which it developed. The interpretation follows that of Gunkel in the main. The perplexing order of the fourth day's work is interestingly explained as due to the fact that in the original tradition upon which P is supposed to have relied the heavenly bodies were thought to be alive. Hence the order of creation—creation of heaven, creation of earth (with plants), creation of the inhabitants of heaven (the luminaries), creation of the inhabitants of the earth

¹ *Die Urzeit der Bibel. I. Die Welterschöpfung.* Von Thad. Engert. München: Lentner, 1907. 53 pages. M. 1.20.

(men and animals). Although the view-points are for the most part not new, there is a freshness and originality in the method of their presentation that makes pleasant and profitable reading.

A far more important contribution to the mythological interpretation of the Old Testament than that of Engert is Hans Schmidt's monograph⁸ on the fish-motif in the Book of Jonah. That this motif was borrowed from an original solar myth is the thesis of this fascinating study in comparative mythology. There are two main groups of fish myths, the first in which the hero is at war with a sea-monster, the second in which he is saved by a fish. To the first group belong the myths of Hercules and Hesione (especially in the version of Lykophron, according to which the hero springs into the sea-monster and then hews his way out) and of Perseus and Andromeda. That the latter is only a variant of the former is seen in the fact that in Lykophron's version the hero is again swallowed by the sea-monster and hews his way out. The Perseus-Andromeda version is localized at Joppa by one set of traditions, and in Aethiopia by another set of traditions, which is located on the shores of the Erythraean sea by Schmidt; i. e., this motif came to the Greeks from the Orient. Its original meaning is clear when the legends of the Solomon Islands and New Zealand are studied. Here the same motif appears and is directly connected with the sun setting into the sea. Schmidt has collected an astonishing number of parallels from Livonia, the Cook Islands, Torres Strait, Barclay Sound, the Northwest coast of Canada, etc., which agree not only in the main fact of the hero being swallowed by a sea-monster, but also in many curious details, with the Greek legends. He suggests that it was a migratory myth originally at home in the Indian Ocean from which it spread eastward and westward,⁹ till it was localized at Joppa from which place it became the common property of Greeks and Israelites. In the second group of fish myths we meet with the numerous Greek accounts of dolphin-riders saved from the plots of sailors or from shipwreck by dolphins. All the heroes of these adventures are more or less directly connected with the sun, and the accounts are traced back with great probability to the Tyrian Melkart who rode on a sea-horse accompanied by a dolphin. The meaning of this myth is again clear. It represents the disappearance and reappearance of the sun. This series is therefore very closely connected with the first series, a view that is confirmed by the statement of Aeneas of Gaza that the solar hero, Hercules (Melkart), was saved from shipwreck by being

⁸ *Jona: Eine Untersuchung zur vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte*. Von Hans Schmidt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1907. 194 pages. M. 6.

⁹ In this direction mediated by Babylon (cf. the Marduk-Tiamat conflict).

swallowed by a fish. This idea of the rescue of the hero by being swallowed is again illustrated by a large number of legends of which those from India afford some of the most striking parallels to the biblical story. The last part of the book is devoted to a discussion of the use of the fish as a symbol in the early church, which is explained as an adaptation of the old myth, of the use of the sea-monster as a symbol of sheol and of the possible influences of the myth upon the later conception of the descent into hell. Whatever judgment may be passed upon some of the details of the work (the exceedingly interesting discussion of the relationship of the Marduk-Tiamat conflict to the creation story will no doubt occasion debate) the main thesis of the book would seem to be established beyond question. The remarkable series of Jonah-pictures (39 of them) would alone make the book a significant contribution to the literature of the subject.

But we must know when *not* to apply mythological interpretations and it is refreshing to observe that Saul, David, and Solomon are still real, historical personalities for Professor Beer¹⁰ with immense significance in the history of Israel. Much legendary material there is in the histories of these men, many traits due to the common ancient-oriental view which the modern historian cannot accept, many tendency-alterations in the tradition. But for all that, these kings are not to be resolved into shadowy figures by being incorporated into a mythological system. Professor Beer's attitude is marked by a large measure of faith in the simple wording of the sources. It may be noted that Solomon's marriage with an Egyptian princess, not a Musri maiden, is accepted.

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HOLTZMANN'S HISTORY OF NEW TESTAMENT TIMES

We welcome the second edition of Holtzmann's *History of New Testament Times*¹ and congratulate the author upon his success. He has so thoroughly revised his former work for this new edition that it has become an entirely new book. The plan has indeed remained the same, but there is no paragraph which has not been retouched and expanded. The book has grown to well-nigh double its former dimensions, and the contents are thereby enriched. Where the first edition presented in many places a rather dry skeleton, it has now been clothed with flesh. The reader is every-

¹⁰ *Saul, David, Salomo.* (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher.) Von Georg Beer. Tübingen, Mohr, 1906. 80 pages. M. o. 50.

¹ *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.* Von Oscar Holtzmann. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 2te Aufl., 431 pages. M. 7.

where furnished with abundant information from the sources. The new presentation is very readable, a fact due in part to the relegating of a large number of references to footnotes. The work of revision has extended even to the genealogical tables and to the indices at the end. The only important change made in the arrangement of the contents is the breaking-up of the long concluding paragraph of the introduction, which contained the information concerning the sources, and its distribution in three different places: The historical sources for the political history of the Jews (I–III Macc., Josephus, Philo's historical writings) are correctly placed at the beginning of Part I (chap. i, § 4); the religious literature is found, partly in so far as it deals with apologetics and propaganda, at the end of Part II (chap. v, "Judaism outside of Palestine," § 30, Relations with the Pagan World), partly by way of introduction to the especially revised and enlarged Part III (§ 31, The Religious Literature of Judaism).

■ The conception of *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte* has not yet become quite definite. O. Holtzmann does not intend to give as Hausrath and, in a different way, Shailer Mathews did, a history of the period of the New Testament, i. e., the history attested by the New Testament, expanded by the relation of contemporaneous events: nor does he intend to delineate the world to which Christianity was given (Schneckenburger), or out of which Christianity came (Schürer); he rather looks upon the history of New Testament times as an aid to interpretation (analogous to lexicon and grammar). It is to present all the historical material, knowledge of which is necessary for an objectively correct understanding of the New Testament. This he presents to the reader in three parts: I, The Historical Background of New Testament Literature; II, The Life of the Jewish People in New Testament Times; III, The Jewish Religion in New Testament Times. Part I presents besides the history of Palestine from the death of Alexander the Great to the end of the Jewish state: in chap. ii, the political geography; in chap. iii, coins and measures; in chap. iv, chronology.

Here immediately arise two serious doubts, as to whether under this limitation of the material real justice can be done to the task, which Holtzmann has—we think, correctly—assigned to the history of New Testament times. (1) Is the historical background of New Testament literature the history of Palestine only? Does it not include that of the Roman Empire also? Holtzmann has given consideration to this idea, as he shows by including in his treatment of political geography in the New Testament, (chap. 2) first Palestine (§ 9), then the Roman provinces (§ 10), and in particular, Italy and Rome in the New Testament (§ 11). In this connection too, questions concerning the constitution of the empire, the position

and relative rank of provincial officials, the meaning of Roman citizenship and the like are broached. But it is questionable whether in this way justice is done to the task. These things have a right to independent treatment in a history of New Testament times. The history of the Roman emperors from Augustus to Domitian (or better still to Hadrian) is more necessary to the understanding of the New Testament than all the wars of the Diadochi upon the ground of Palestine, of which § 5 treats in such detail. And to dwell for a moment upon external matters, how important for the spread of Christianity was the whole network of roads, the system of traffic by land and water, travel, commerce, possibly conscription for the army also. Consider, too, the social conditions, the mingling of nationalities in the great seaport towns of the Aegean Sea, etc. And then recall the mental culture of the Graeco-Roman world and its religious conditions! All this is surely background of New Testament literature, more so in fact than the land of Palestine, in which perhaps not one of our New Testament writings was produced.

We certainly do not wish to underrate the importance of the fact that Palestine and its less Hellenistic Judaism is the native soil of Christianity. Recent criticism rightly lays more and more emphasis on the fact that the various lines of tradition concerning the life of Jesus all point back to Palestine as the place of their origin, that the language also and the ideas of men like Paul and John show more traces of Palestinian education and culture than of Hellenistic influence. But it is quite as certain, that for none of the writings preserved to us can Palestinian origin be certainly proved. Nor do we wish to underestimate the importance of the Judaism of the Diaspora as a factor in the first spread of Christianity: it had prepared the soil into which the seed of the gospel was cast; but though the authors of most of the New Testament writings were certainly Jews, yet it cannot be shown that the majority of their readers had gone through the stage of Jewish proselytism. Holtzmann abides by the tradition which limits the history of New Testament times to Judaism, and in particular, to Palestine; but after all, Schürer's feeling was correct, when for his second edition he changed the title of his book and wrote *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*. This, however, demands as its complement a history of the Graeco-Roman world at the time of primitive Christianity. Not, of course, as though the task were to present here the whole political history, all of the cultural and religious conditions of that time; the necessary limits are prescribed by the meaning which these things have for Christianity—by the ultimate aim, the understanding of the New Testament. Not until at some future time a supplement of this nature

shall be given to us, shall we be in possession of a complete history of New Testament times, such as Schneckenburger long ago sought to attain.

The second objection concerns the temporal limitation. Holtzmann begins with Alexander the Great and ends with the destruction of Jerusalem (332 B. C.—70 A. D.); This is quite intelligible, when one is writing a concluding part of a history of Israel, such as Holtzmann in collaboration with Stade gave us (1887–88). But for the understanding of the New Testament the times which precede the Maccabaeen uprising (in any case, the Syro-Egyptian wars, which are here narrated with confusing exactness) have but very indirect significance. Again the destruction of the Jewish state in the year 70 was not at all epoch-making for the New Testament; nor even the destruction of the Temple and the discontinuance of its cult. One need but recall in this connection the discussions concerning the date of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But a large number of New Testament writings, according to the more and more generally accepted dating, cannot be understood at all without knowledge of Domitian's time. Indeed, even Trajan and Hadrian must be taken into account. Not the year 70, but rather the Bar-Cochba uprising (which is here mentioned only in connection with the coins, § 12 I) puts an end to Judaism as a power and throws it into that isolation which makes it appear of no import to the further development of Christianity. In the treatment of scribism also Holtzmann adopts the same temporal limits: I cannot agree that "with the destruction of the Temple a new period of scribism begins, which does not concern us here." Men like Jochanan ben Sakkai and his contemporaries, who had lived to see the destruction of the Temple, are exactly contemporary with the New Testament and quite as important for our purpose as are the apocalypses of Esra and Baruch; Gamaliel II, also, and even Akiba contribute more to the understanding of New Testament problems than those half-mythical characters of Hillel and Shammai. It would be a most profitable undertaking to establish once for all the impression which the fate of the Jewish people, especially the loss of the Temple, made upon the Christians. I believe that many modern opinions on this point, e. g., the assertions of Wernle, would undergo great modification.

But let us look a little more closely at Holtzmann's book. It is to be remarked first of all that the author has given up the chronology which he had presented in 1895, although it was championed at the same time by Blass and soon thereafter by Harnack: the recall of Felix is now dated not as formerly 55, but—correctly—60; the newsolution of the Cumanus problem too (pp. 64, 135) deserves mention. Holtzmann accepts too confidently the dating of the death of Jesus on April 7, 30 (pp. 141, 413), although on

p. 130 he admits as evidence only Preuschen's interpretation of the dating in Clemens of Alexandria, not Achelis' calculation; the assertion that the fifteenth of Nisan was always placed upon a Sabbath is still rather precarious, in spite of § 20 III. Wholly doubtful, finally, is the computation which fixes the date of the so-called Apostolic Council at 48 A. D., thus placing it before the first missionary journey to Cyprus, Pisidia, and Lycaonia; it is no commendation of the South Galatian theory that it becomes tenable only by such violent transposition.

In Part II, §§ 19 and 20, on the priesthood and public worship, have undergone much revision. The detailed account of the celebration of the Passover will be especially welcomed. In chap. ii, "Synagogue and Scribes," we mention as most valuable the collection of the haggadist touches of Josephus (pp. 190 ff.). With these one must compare what is given from the *Book of Jubilees* (pp. 275 f.), from the *Book of Enoch* (pp. 290 f.), and elsewhere from various sources, to obtain a vivid impression of how motley a picture biblical history presented to the minds of pious Jews of that time and in consequence to the minds of the New Testament writers also. Only thus can one see clearly to what extent canonical tradition was overgrown with legendary traits. The portrayal of the parties is noteworthy because of the fact that Holtzmann keeps the sources strictly separated. The various possible views are thus well brought out. In chap. iv, on "The Constitution," we must record the new conjecture that the *βουλή* of which Joseph of Arimathea was a member, was not the Sanhedrin, but a separate body, viz., the city council of Jerusalem; this is not in accord with ancient modes of thought. Chap. v, on the Diaspora, treats in great detail of the Greek and Roman opinions concerning the Jews, of Aristobulus' hellenistic exposition of the law, and of an anthology from pagan poets, which is thought to have been used by Aristobulus and which later became the source of Paul's knowledge of profane literature.

By far the most important division of the book is Part III: The Jewish Religion. This has been completely rewritten. In chap. i ("Legal Piety") an exposition of good works has been added to the section on the system of the law; in chap. ii, on the doctrine of angels and spirits, we find an additional paragraph dealing with the Jewish belief concerning God. These are two very important emendations. Where formerly "the Hellenistic Influence" was treated, chap. iii, we now read the title: "The World Beyond and the World of the Future." This is indeed commendable improvement. In addition thereto perhaps a fourth, or even a fifth, chapter might have been devoted to the religion of Hellenistic Judaism. Here some of the things now read alongside of the literature in §§ 30 and 31

might have found a suitable place. In detail we call attention to the original and highly instructive display side by side of the "Mishna," i. e., the interpretation of the law, as found in Philo, Josephus and the Talmudic Mishna. This bit of work brings out a characteristic of the book: presentation of the facts from the sources—this is its great merit. If thereby the general view of the whole, the insight into the moving forces of religion, is occasionally lost sight of, that is a mistake which frequently accompanies close adherence to the sources, and is much less dangerous than its opposite, genial superficiality. Very interesting, even though perhaps assailable in detail, are the discussions on Jewish customs in prayer, and on fasting and alms. The presentation of the belief concerning God, for which Holtzmann had made preliminary studies in a monograph (1905), is exquisitely done. A motley picture of the manifold eschatological hopes of late Judaism concludes the whole: Clearness was not a virtue of Apocalyptic.

Holtzmann gives few references to modern literature. Shailer Mathews' excellent little handbook, Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, the new edition of Hauck's *Realencyclopaedie*, as also Ramsay's works, might have been mentioned in § 3; on p. 268 we miss Geffcken's edition of the *Oracula Sibyllina*, and on p. 290 Flemming and Radermacher's edition of the *Book of Enoch*. But here also it is true: the lack of modern literature may well be endured, when the sources are given such plentiful opportunity to speak. May the book find many attentive and sympathetic readers, who will be led thereby not only to the understanding of the New Testament, but to the study of the late-Jewish sources also; the scientific study of the New Testament itself will thus be advanced.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON MATTHEW'S GOSPEL

In a preface which is too personal and lengthy, Mr. Allen has explained his naïve conception of what a commentary ought to be. "I have myself often felt the need of a commentary on this gospel which would tell me . . . what the words of the gospel meant to the evangelist, that I might form my own conclusion as to the value of that meaning." Such a commentary he has set himself to write, and he demurs to any reader requiring fuller or further information upon any passage of Matthew than an acquaint-

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to St. Matthew.* By Willoughby C. Allen, M. A. The International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners, 1907. xcvi + 338 pages. \$3.00.

ance with what was probably in the mind of the author. Nevertheless many readers will object to this curious definition of a commentator's duty. Here is a New Testament scripture, which is one of the most important books in the Bible, written, Mr. Allen holds, between 65 and 75 A. D. (The arguments for this date, by the way, are inconclusive, pp. lxxxiv, lxxxv.) It describes the mission and message of Jesus the Christ in Galilee and Judea some fifty years before, and describes them from a special standpoint of early Christian belief in Palestine. But, says Mr. Allen, you must not ask me to take you behind 65-75 A. D. You may know what the Palestinian circle of the early church believed about Jesus, and the literary methods by which one writer composed a narrative of his sayings and deeds. You may try to know this anonymous writer's mind, but you must not be so unreasonable as to expect a commentary to throw light on the mind of the person whose great figure fills the pages of the book in question, or upon the precise historical content of its narrative. The practical outcome of such a conception is not encouraging. It reduces the pages of a commentary, so far as any harvest of historical appreciation of the gospel is concerned, to a bare heath or a field of poppies—the reader is treated either to arid and minute details of synoptic literary criticism or to what are after all secondary if not irrelevant speculations about the intellectual and religious prepossessions of an unknown early Christian. In a word, this commentary hardly answers to its title. It is not so much a commentary on Matthew as a piece of conscientious and competent synoptic analysis, examining the trees and brushwood but failing to depict the great forest with the wind of the gospel astir in its leaves. Also, it is critical rather than exegetical. Fortunately Mr. Allen seems to have relented before he finished his work. He offers to his readers a few tardy pages upon the value of Matthew's gospel, "as a contribution to a knowledge of the life of Christ." But even this is flung reluctantly to them "I would willingly have spared myself a task like this, which necessitates an excursion beyond the territory of concrete fact into the mist-covered land of individual judgment and conjecture." Does Mr. Allen really think that even the synoptic discussions with their philological and literary data on which he has built his book, can be described as "concrete fact"? And however hazardous the task of weighing the historical element in a gospel, what else justifies a critic in attempting to write a "critical and exegetical" commentary upon it? Individual judgment may be misty. But a mist is preferable to a blank.

Turning from this disappointing side of the edition, one is free to welcome in it excellent features. The sections of the Introduction upon the style and construction of the gospel are specially full and painstaking. Mr.

Allen adopts the "Two-source" theory, holding that the Matthean Logia were composed in Aramaic but used in a Greek version by the author of Matthew, who had also access to Mark's gospel. He inclines to toy with the idea that Luke made some use, however slight, of Matthew's gospel, but adduces no more satisfactory argument for this unsatisfactory theory than B. Weiss and Titius have already presented. His few swallows of proof make up a very poor summer of evidence. On the other hand, the section on the theology of the gospel (pp. lxvi-lxxix) lays stress rightly upon its anti-Pharisaic tendency. Fortunately Mr. Allen does not use this, as Belser has done, to date the gospel *ca.* 42 A. D., during the coalition of Herod Agrippa I and the Pharisees against the Christians of Jerusalem (cf. Acts 12:1). It is surely a note of the divine irony that one whom the Pharisees of Palestine despised as unworthy to be classed with any one except *sinner*s, should have lived to be the means of setting these very churchmen in the pillory of history.

The scattered and scanty paragraphs upon the original meaning of passages in the gospel reflect a mixture of frankness and caution. Mr. Allen wisely, I think, refuses to break up Matt., chaps. 1, 2, as a literary unit. But he does not seem to see the strong case for regarding its tradition as originally subsequent and inferior to that of the primitive traditions reflected from Matt. 3:1, onward, and the paragraphs in defense of the Virgin birth (pp. 20 ff.) are inadequate. On the other hand, the general estimate is fair. Due allowance is made for the influence of Palestinian anti-Pharisaism upon the tradition of Christ's words, for the artificial arrangement of the discourses, and for such secondary features in Matthew as his chronology and prophetic fulfilments, all of which render Matthew's representation of Christ's teaching occasionally local and one-sided. I am glad also to note that Mr. Allen admits Matthew's use of a Greek *florilegium* of messianic quotations from the Old Testament, and that he agrees (pp. 270 f.) with those who hold the synoptic chronology of the Passover, on which Matthew and Luke both depend, to be erroneous (Mark 14:12),

so certainly corrupt that no inference ought to be drawn from it as to the chronology of the succeeding narrative. And, apart from it, nothing is more clear than that the crucifixion of Christ did not take place on the fifteenth.

Hence the Passover eaten by Christ and his disciples was not the technical meal. It anticipated the proper Passover, and served them as such.

At some points Mr. Allen might with advantage have taken his task more seriously. One is the problem of the Papias passage; another is the relation of some of the gospel narratives and parables to the Ahikar midrash. A third is the text. Here the writer's desire to eschew the details

of modern criticism has led him to overlook some useful contributions which the ordinary reader might be glad to see noticed, particularly those of Halévy and Chajes. Thus, to give only one instance, the latter conjectures plausibly that *ἐν σαββάτῳ* (24:20) means the sabbatical year when, owing to the absence of agriculture (Lev. 25:6), food would be scarce (cf. vs. 7); while Halévy² argues that the Aramaic original כַּסְיָא (= *kasīa*, *μῶνος*) was miswritten כַּסְיָא by a scribe (= *ἐν σαββάτῳ*), Matthew adding the *μῆδε*. Numerous suggestions of this kind have been made, and a sifted discussion of them would have been at least more relevant than the interminable quotation of synoptic parallels, which is food neither for man nor for beast. Mr Allen has wisely remembered that his readers will have access to a dictionary of the Bible and a grammar, but he has forgotten that they also may be presumed to possess a synopsis in Greek or English. To say this is to end as I began, with the somewhat ungracious note of complaint. Yet what can one do? The sheer merits of the book only sharpen one's sense of disappointment with the voluntary humility which has beguiled the writer to do less than justice to himself, his subject, and his readers. As one of Terence's characters observes, *nec nihil est nec omnia quae iste dicit*. Mr. Allen has certainly said something of value on his topic, a scholar of his caliber could hardly fail to do so. But he has prevented himself from saying more; partly owing to its formal defect, the book is lacking in breadth of outlook and religious penetration. Hence he has obliged even his most grateful readers to admit that this edition, while marking a distinct advance upon any English work, cannot be described by any means as a final commentary upon our first gospel. It is, however, a good book for the advanced student to work with. Sound labor has gone to the making of it, and the very sense of problems in the gospel which it leaves on the mind of the reader will be stimulating, if not satisfying.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT AND ITS THEOLOGY

THE RELATION OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS TO ONE ANOTHER

It is the conviction of Dr. Adolf Müller¹ that the canonical Gospel of Mark cannot be a source for Matthew and Luke. In that opinion he finds himself established, in large part, by the results of the studies of

² *Revue sémitique* (1900), pp. 145 f.

¹ *Geschichtskerne in den Evangelien nach modernen Forschungen: Marcus und Matthäus*. Von Adolf Müller. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1905. xi + 144 pages. M. 3.

Wrede² and Weiss.³ Dr. Müller does not attempt an original analysis of the material in Mark, but devotes liberal space to setting forth successively the conclusions of Wernle,⁴ Wrede, and J. Weiss, on the basis of which he decides that definite results in the estimate of the individual character of the Second Gospel are not easily attainable. This lack of unanimity is to be charged, he believes, to the fact that recognition enough has not been given to the indications that Mark is not a unified work from one hand and with, as a consequence, one standpoint. It is not true, for instance, that Mark pictures the personality of Jesus as less supernatural than does Matthew, for witness the Markan narratives of the baptism, the temptation, and the miracles. Confusion is lessened if the canonical Gospel of Mark be regarded to have passed through stages in its history. Perhaps it may be held that John Mark narrated his recollections of Peter's story of Jesus' life in Aramaic. This formed the groundwork for the canonical gospel; the latter was composed in Rome by translating the Aramaic, supplementing the narrative, and adapting the whole to ends to be served in the Graeco-Roman Christian community. John Mark no doubt came under the influence of Paul.

It is mainly in his treatment of Matthew that Dr. Müller reveals the purpose of his review of Mark and states critical conclusions on phases of the synoptic problem that are more or less original with him. The canonical Matthew cannot be regarded as the product of one hand, for within it the limited and the broad outlook, the legal and the spiritual attitude, Jewish only and world-wide sympathies, find expression. There is thus presented the problem of distinguishing the strata in the material of the First Gospel. What shall be the standard? Most naturally that should be regarded as original which expresses the standpoint of monotheistic Jewish Christianity (Matt. 5 : 23; 17 : 24-27; 23 : 2 f.) in the simplest form (Matt. 10 : 5; 6 : 23; 15 : 24; 19 : 23; 23 : 3). Expansions and additions to an original narrative will then be found where conditions in the time of Jesus are presupposed that do not correspond to the beginnings of the Christian community but belong to a later stage in the development. Judged by these standards, Matthew does not yield evidence to support the customary theory of two sources, one narrative (Mark) and the other discourse (Logia). Rather is it true that in the underlying source of the first gospel both kinds of material were mixed. This is evidenced further by the consideration that the discourses when wrenched from their narrative framework lose much of their intelligibility and force. On the testi-

² Wrede, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien*, 1901.

³ J. Weiss, *Das älteste Evangelium*, 1903. ⁴ Wernle, *Die synoptische Frage*, 1899.

mony of Papias we learn of an original Gospel of Matthew; its characteristic probably was that it preponderantly contained sayings of Jesus imbedded in historical situations or framed within narratives. Alongside this original Aramaic Matthew, and not improbably underlying it, there was current the Aramaic gospel by John Mark which ultimately by additions and alterations became the canonical Mark. The Aramaic Matthew contained almost all the narratives and discourses now in Mark. Of the discourses now in Matthew, it is to be held that probably they were not found in the places and in the form that they exhibit in the canonical Matthew; the order and composition is to be traced to the redactor of the Aramaic Matthew. The traditional Logia source for Matthew seems to Dr. Müller to be an illusory fog, for the oriental, who delights in narrative, could with difficulty retain and transmit abstract discourses. While the canonical Mark may early have taken its form for the western church, in the East new portions, especially of discourses, were added to the Aramaic ground material of the narratives, and the whole translated for Greek-Jewish Christians and circulated in their circles in the second century. Upon this enlarged gospel the redactor worked changes and additions, the result being the canonical Matthew, a gospel representing the ecclesiastical standpoint of the time.

In the canonical Gospel of Mark Dr. Wendling⁵ believes that there are to be distinguished three strata of material: M¹—Short, pithy, instructive sayings of Jesus in a scant but perspicuous framework of narrative; M²—Narratives of the miracles of Jesus in circumstantial, in part poetically enlarged, delineation; Ev—Enlargements by the redactor or evangelist, dominated by dogmatic theories and, so far as they contain narratives, in tedious, obscure form. Such is the result; more important is the process and the question of its validity. A fixed basis for operations is found in sections of Mark which it is believed can with certainty be referred to the redactor. In them his mode of work and literary characteristics are observed; the standards thus obtained are utilized to trace the same hand in other portions. Especially notable is the encroachment of the redactor in the chapter of parables (Mark 4:1-34). The old plain narrative of how Jesus, sitting in a boat, spake parables to the people is enlarged to a striking, extensive composition through another scene (pp. 10 ff.), in which a narrow circle of disciples is instructed concerning these parables. This scene is not united with the original scene organically, but is inserted mechanically, so that the word-order of the old text is respected throughout. The redactor

⁵ *Ur-Marcus. Versuch einer Wiederherstellung der ältesten Mitteilungen über das Leben Jesu.* Von Emil Wendling. Tübingen; Mohr, 1905. 73 pages. M. 1.50.

goes on the theory that the parables were meant in a mystical-allegorical sense. A second important interpolation is Mark 3:22-30; here also an old, simple narrative (3:20-21+31-35) is split in two parts, and a situation, otherwise clear throughout, is made complex and obscure through the insertion of a new scene. The content of the insertion consists of sayings which, as testified by Matthew and Luke, stood in the Logia source. This suggests the conjecture that similar series of sayings, which for the most part have an inadequate framework of narrative, found a place in the Marcan narrative first through the redactor. Of this nature are the sayings in Mark 6:7-11; 8:34-9:1; 9:40-50; 10:42-45; 11:23-25; 12:38-40; 13:9-13. Some preliminary support for the theory of interpolation is found in the mechanical mold of the introduction, "and he called unto them," in Mark 3:23; 6:7; 8:34; 10:42; 12:43. Dr. Wendling now presses boldly forward to advance arguments in favor of considering other passages also as interpolations, and, on the basis of the discernible characteristics of the two original narrators and the redactor, the analysis of the gospel is carried through to completion. The results are exhibited by printing the Greek text of Mark in two parts, the first showing M^1 and M^2 together but in different styles of type, the second containing the interpolations by the evangelist. The latter make about two-fifths of the volume of the gospel. Of the original narrative, about five-ninths is assigned to M^1 .

In the "Jowett Lectures" for 1906, repeated by Professor Burkitt as his inaugural course at Cambridge University,⁶ he endeavored less to formulate original theories on the origin of the Gospels than to indicate his attitude toward notions on the subject already the possession of scholars; less to arrest the attention of his fellow-workers in the field than to inform the mind and stimulate the thought of that considerable body of interested Christians whose studies have not necessarily made them familiar with present-day movements in gospel criticism. Yet it is not alone in taking account of the comprehensive, orderly, and suggestive treatment of the chosen theme that the critical reader will have satisfaction; in many portions of the work there will be found strikingly original opinions of greater or lesser scope and significance. It is a book to put into the hands of the non-specialist who desires to know something of what scholars are thinking about the Gospels; yet it is not without its measure of service to one who already has done much reading and reflection on the subject.

⁶ *The Gospel History and Its Transmission*. By F. Crawford Burkitt. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1906. viii+360 pages. \$2.00 net.

Critical work upon the Gospels is justified thus:

It is not to get new ideas of religion or of philosophy that we need a minute and searching historical criticism; rather do we need to test the ideas we already have by the historical facts, and we cannot get at the facts without the criticism. . . . The attempt to "return to the historic Christ" is the only way by which we can escape from the tyranny of the last generation's theories about Christ.

A critical beginning may be had in "the one solid contribution made by the scholarship of the nineteenth century toward the solution of the synoptic problem," namely, that Mark was one of the sources used by Matthew and Luke. No irresistible argument is found for an Ur-Marcus; Mark is not itself based on older literary sources; in one instance only may a written source underlie the Second Gospel, that is, the eschatological discourse (Mark 13:3-37) may have circulated independently as a flysheet. Subjected to the closest scrutiny and most trying tests, Mark conveys the impression still of general historical trustworthiness. What shall be said of Matthew and Luke in this regard? Luke and Acts were surely written by Luke the physician and companion of Paul, probably in his old age, say about 100 A. D. For the former he used Mark and another source; within the latter he incorporated his own diary of travels, the "We-sections," freely recasting. Since he used Mark as the main source for the gospel history, it seems unlikely that he had had much personal intercourse with those who had been the companions of the ministry of Jesus. The author of Matthew is unknown to us; the "Logia" of Papias perhaps was a collection of messianic proof-texts from the Hebrew Bible made by the apostle Matthew; since many of these are embodied in the First Gospel in such form as to indicate their Hebrew source, it may be conjectured that it was by this use that the name of Matthew became attached to the gospel. "Matthew and Luke give us an interpretation of Jesus Christ's life. An interpretation may be helpful, illuminating, even inspired, but it remains an interpretation." There are grave difficulties in the way of considering the narratives of Peter walking on the water, Judas and the pieces of silver, the earthquake at the crucifixion, the guard at the tomb, as serious history.

Matthew greatly disturbed the order of Mark; Luke did not. Probably both treated the other source common to both in the same way. Therefore, if we would reconstruct that source (which Professor Burkitt would not designate as the Logia but, with Wellhausen, as Q) we must subtract from Luke the first two chapters and those sections simply derived from Mark; what is left will represent the approximate order and arrangement of the lost document. As an external test which will give us a general assurance that a saying is really from Jesus and not the half-conscious product of one

school of his followers, we may require the real double attestation that is had where the saying is reported in both Mark and Q.

The study of the Gospel of John is approached with the conviction that "if the history turn out to be no history, it must be because it was intended to teach something to the author more important than history." As for the external testimony to the traditional authorship, it is inconclusive. When internal tests are to be applied the criterion must be the gospel of Mark.

The fact is that the narrative in Mark and the narrative in John cannot be made to agree, except on the supposition that one or the other is, as regards the objective facts, inaccurate and misleading. . . . The evangelist was no historian: ideas, not events, were to him the true realities, and if we go to his work to learn the course of events we shall only be disappointed in our search.

One chapter is devoted to the careful exhibit of the individual characteristics of the First and Third Gospels. The final chapters take up in order the "Gospel Canon," "Marcion," and the "Rivals of the Canonical Gospels." The work closes with this word of commendation for the historical process:

The more we individualize the Figure of our Lord as manifested in action in that long past scene, the better we shall be able to embody the spirit of his teaching in forms appropriate to our own surroundings.

This statement of the view of these scholars suffices to show that the discussion of the problems presented by our Gospels is by no means nearing its conclusion. We are in the midst of the matter. But it is by such investigations and discussions as these that progress is made.

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JESUS' CONCEPTION OF HIS NATURE AND MISSION

Professor H. J. Holtzmann's monograph on the self-consciousness of Jesus' renders an important service in reviewing the situation and formulating what the author accepts as the present outcome of the discussion of this question. The necessity is strongly urged of keeping distinct the two elements in the problem, namely as to whether Jesus regarded himself as Messiah and, if so, in what sense he did this. With reference to the first point it is contended that if historical or exegetical doubt is held to exist in the case of many relevant passages this cannot be affirmed of Mark 14:62. All denial of Jesus' claim of messiahship is disproved by this confession and by the subsequent course of events. It is only in the light of Jesus' con-

¹ *Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu: ein Beitrag zur Leben-Jesu-Forschung.* Von H. J. Holtzmann. Tübingen; Mohr, 1907. 100 pages. M. 2.60.

viction in this particular that the close of his life and the belief in his resurrection become comprehensible.

It remains to discover under what aspect he conceived of his messianic office. Possible uncertainty here will not, however, invalidate the point already established. The desired explanation is to be sought in the titles that Jesus applied to himself. Since there is so much uncertainty regarding the phrase Son of God as a self-designation, chief attention must be given to the title Son of man and the intricate problems connected therewith. The proper point of departure is not from philological considerations, which lead to no certain conclusions, nor from the two or three early passages in Mark, and parallels, where many think to find sufficient evidence to establish the equivalence of Son of man and man, but from the numerous passages following Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi, where the eschatological significance is unmistakable, e. g., Mark 14:62. While Matthew is self-contradictory, and its inconsistencies have given rise to much uncertainty regarding the title, Mark and the Lukan parallels show that it was derived from Dan. 7:13, and was first used by Jesus near the end of his life to express his conception of his messiahship. This finding of the Messiah in himself was not due to accommodation to his age, but to obedience to an inner compulsion. The gradual change from the third person to the first, regarded by Wellhausen as showing how the community gradually overcame its hesitation in using the title, can be transferred to the consciousness of Jesus himself. As is true respecting the Kingdom, so here out of the present, hidden, prophetic Messiah comes the future, ultimately openly proclaimed, apocalyptic Messiah. It is in the first of these conceptions, with its sense of the divine sonship, that Jesus' abiding significance is to be sought. The theocratic sonship of the second was only its temporal expression. Modern theology thus comes to distinguish what in Jesus' self-consciousness was undivided. It was the conception Son of man as the *Christus futurus* that made possible the union of the two.

That Holtzmann's treatment of his theme will be unacceptable to the representatives of the traditional theology, much as they may agree with many of his conclusions, is self-evident. It is not to them that he addresses himself (p. 1), but rather to those who would either deny, ignore, or belittle in Jesus' life the factor of his self-consciousness. Besides establishing its main proposition in a judicious and convincing manner, the book abounds in very pertinent criticisms of recent investigations, notably those of Wrede, Schweitzer, and Merx. There is throughout the monograph the wealth of reference to current literature that is usually found in the author's writings.

The last number in the *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie*

for the year 1906 is by Dr. Erich Schaeder,⁸ professor of theology at Kiel, and bears the title "Jesus' Gospel and the Gospel Regarding Jesus." Did Jesus believe and teach about himself what others believed and taught about him? In opposition to the prevailing tendency to establish a difference between the real Jesus and the Jesus of the apostolic age, Schaeder seeks to prove that this does not exist. Jesus regarded and proclaimed himself as Messiah in the same sense as that in which he is presented by the writers of this later period. Once again we have to do with the question of messianic self-consciousness. The author's arguments are directed particularly against the views of Wrede and Wellhausen. The fact of Jesus' self-consciousness he undertakes to establish, entirely apart from the vexed questions regarding titles, by pointing to the unique power exercised by him in three realms: (1) over the souls of men, as seen in the forgiveness of sins; (2) over the superhuman, as seen in the control of demons; (3) over nature, as is seen in his mastery of its course. To complete the answer to Wrede an explanation must be found for Jesus' veiling his messiahship. In part it was for the old pedagogical reason so often adduced, but a profounder motive was his desire to win men for God's kingdom, so far as possible, before he should assume the judging function that was inseparable from his messianic office.

Against Wellhausen it is maintained that Mark does not contain a double picture of Jesus and, secondly, that through God's spirit Jesus had certain knowledge of his suffering, death, and resurrection. He was not a slave to the course of history, to men and their deeds. Wellhausen's error is in his dogmatism that excludes God as a factor in the situation.

A further important question relating to the present theme has recently found trenchant statement by Tröltzsch. How can we speak of the absoluteness of Christianity when it is an historical product? The historical is dependent, conditioned, relative. The answer is that Jesus was not limited in his absoluteness, either actually or in his consciousness. There was no limitation to his moral absoluteness, and his seeming bondage to the natural course of events was really voluntary. What was true in both these particulars holds for his gospel. We have no apostolic gospel unless we have included therein the gospel of Jesus regarding himself.

In spite of their agreement at important points, the two monographs before us are as unlike in method and temper as they well could be. The

⁸ *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie*. Herausgegeben von Dr. A. Schlatter and Dr. W. Lütgert. Zehnter Jahrgang 1906. Sechstes Heft: "Das Evangelium Jesu und das Evangelium von Jesus (nach den Synoptikern)." Von Dr. Erich Schaeder, Professor der Theologie in Kiel. Gütersloh; Bertelsmann, 1906. 64 pages. M. 1.

first really answers those whom it sets out to refute, whereas those aimed at by the arguments of the second would probably hardly feel that they had encountered any opposition, the reason being that the very premises that they call in question are tacitly assumed. There exists accordingly no common plane of meeting. Even if we cannot commend the method followed in this second work, it is an occasion of satisfaction to find both books reaching, by such different ways, conclusions that are so far in accord.

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The study of the Messianic Consciousness by Streatfeild in his *Self-Interpretation of Jesus*⁹ compels respect by reason of the conspicuous earnestness and sincerity of the author. He enters the lists not because of his confidence in his ability but because his conscience drives him to the defense, as he believes, of Christian faith in her last citadel. He has ample acquaintance with the literature of his subject and writes with candor and constant fairness to opposing opinion. The immediate aim of the book is "to support the belief that the language of self-assertion recorded in the gospels is, substantially, the language of Jesus himself." Our writer sees that the consistency of the unique portrait which the gospels delineate is the best evidence of its substantial correctness. He believes that the "destructive criticism" of the gospels has left as an irreducible minimum the fact that Jesus Christ claimed to be the Messiah and in a unique sense Son of God. His ultimate aim is to show that this self-assertion of Jesus presents to us the alternative that he was "either truly divine or not ideal man." We are confronted with "the dilemma that either Christ was God or that he had no right to speak about himself as he did." If Jesus be not the Christ of the creeds then he is no savior and without any real value for man. The book is fundamentally in error in two respects. The value of Jesus and his message to man is not determined precisely by his peculiar ontological relation to God. And further, the dilemma which the author proposes will not exhaust the possibilities in the light of an honest historical interpretation of the gospels.

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OSHKOSH, WIS.

⁹ *The Self-Interpretation of Jesus Christ. A Study of the Messianic Consciousness as reflected in the Synoptics.* By Rev. G. S. Streatfeild, M. A. New York: Eaton and Mains, 1906. xv + 211 pages. \$1.25 net.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

The first of the books here to be passed in review is Grafe's¹⁰ clear and charmingly written address tracing the process by which the Old Testament became a Christian book. Jesus' attitude is regarded rightly as both critical and conservative and wrongly as *durchaus naiv und ohne Reflexion*. While the early Christians in Palestine held in some sort to the law, Paul, in view of his religious experience, was obliged either to drop the Old Testament or to Christianize it. Choosing the latter course, and winning by dint of familiar exegetical devices a Christian book, he could then prove that Scripture itself pointed not to law but to faith as the religious norm, and that not in the statutes but in Christ, the end of the law, lay the ethical norm of love. After Paul, the ways diverge. For the author of Hebrews, with his perfect and imperfect, the use of the Old Testament is typological. Barnabas gives up history for allegory. Matthew and John find in the Scriptures mainly prophecy. It is an interesting lecture.

Thieme¹¹ writes in the interest of theological ethics. The present volume to be followed later by a second volume, is devoted largely to a study of the mind of Jesus from the point of view of his humility. The style is wooden and not always clear. To follow the argument one must keep in mind a distinction, worked out elsewhere but assumed here, between religious, altruistic, and ipsistic. The latter is the imperative but blameless attitude toward one's self in distinction from the egoistic (p. 32). Most cases of humility however fall into more than one of these groups, and the purely ipsistic rarely occurs. He states the distinction in characteristic style (p. 232): "Wir können aber die Niedergesinntheit, sofern sie auch abgesehen von religiösen und altruistischen Motiven in der Selbstbeurteilung und in der ihr entsprechenden sozialen Selbsteinordnung zur Niedrigkeit, statt zur Geltung des Selbst gewillt ist, als die ipsistische spezifizieren." After an examination of the words (chap. i), he passes to Jesus' exhortations to humility before God and in the estimate of self. The sayings about first and last, great and small, ruling and serving, humbling and exalting one's self are scrutinized with the result that religiously, humility consists in the will to bow before the divine will; altruistically, in the refusal to judge others; ipsistically, in the will not to exalt but to humble

¹⁰ *Das Urchristentum und das Alte Testament: Rede gehalten beim Antritt des Rektorates zu Bonn am 18. Oktober, 1906.* Von E. Grafe. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 48 pages. M. 1.

¹¹ *Die christliche Demut: Eine historische Untersuchung zur theologischen Ethik.* Erste Hälfte: "Wortgeschichte und die Demuth bei Jesus." Von K. Thieme. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1906. xvi + 258 pages. M. 5.60.

one's self, whether in the search after position, or wealth, or honorary titles. Here we learn that the little child is not an example of humility, but is a type of the small among the great. Whosoever wills to become great foregoes greatness by service. Greatness will take care of itself in the future kingdom (chap. ii). The next three chapters examine the humility of Jesus. On the religious-altruistic side, this is explained not as *Leutseligkeit*, the narrower meaning of Matt. 11:29 (chap. v), but as *Niedrigsinnigkeit* evident in service. Service is not to be mistaken for ruling or for helping, but is to be understood, in sharp contrast with the future messianic lordship, as a serving in lowliness and weakness and suffering (chap. iv). On the religious-ipsistic side, there come to view Jesus' sense of power, his agency in revelation, forgiveness, and future judgment, a oneness with God involving sinlessness and apartness from men, but not equality with God. Humility here consists not in the renunciation of worldly power, but in the denial of equality with God. In summing up, Thieme notes that the altruistic humility is the most original element; it was not determined by a feeling of sinful lowliness, as is the case with other men.

Overlooking the niceness of the categories into which the concrete sayings of Jesus are put, we may agree with the main point of the discussion. Jesus, conscious of power, certain that the true value of himself will be recognized in that world where true estimates prevail, chooses to unite in sympathetic service with the people, the outcast, little ones, lowly, poor, oppressed, to the end that they too might share his indifference to this world of misplaced values and might rest content in lowly service, certain that they too would be recognized at their full value in the other world. The humility of Jesus, we might almost say, is that of the aristocrat by birth who becomes a democrat by choice.

Schettler,¹² a pupil of Deissmann, studies *διὰ Χριστοῦ* and its synonyms (33 in Paul, 21 elsewhere), along with *διὰ θεοῦ* (4 in Paul, 2 elsewhere) and *διὰ Πνεύματος* (7 in Paul, 7 elsewhere). *διὰ* with the genitive of a person indicates, as the Septuagint and Paul prove, causal agency, and the phrase "through Christ" points out the activity of the spiritual Christ as agent in creation and salvation, present and future, and as an influence in general, or specifically in the life of prayer or in the official legitimization of the apostle. Like the formula "in Christ," "through Christ" carries us into the deepest experiences of Paul. But unlike "in Christ" which is static, marking the region in which God's saving purpose operates, "through Christ" is dynamic, postulating an activity of Christ.

¹² *Die paulinische Formel, "Durch Christus."* Von A. Schettler. Tübingen: Mohr, 1907. viii+82 pages. M. 2.40.

The discussion is methodical and in the main convincing. I am doubtful however at two points: (1) Schettler insists that "in Christ" and "through Christ" are to be sharply distinguished. Paul's usage does not in my judgment bear out the contention. (2) He holds that "in Christ" is static, "through Christ" alone dynamic. "When Paul uses this formula (i. e., *διὰ Χριστοῦ*) he intends to emphasize the activity of the heavenly Christ, while the formula 'in Christ' regards salvation as a state (*Zustand*) resulting from belonging to Christ, or more accurately from *unio mystica* with him" (pp. 72 f). But Christ's relation to the believer is scarcely passive in Paul. Both these difficulties are due to the full acceptance of the local interpretation of *ἐν*. And both difficulties are removed if we follow the natural hypothesis that *ἐν* and *ἐκ* have their origin in the phrases expressing demoniac possession (e. g., Mark 1:23; 3:30). Control and power are suggested by *ἐν* as well as by *διὰ*, something not static but dynamic. Finally, I am in doubt whether "formula" be not too rigorous a word to use. Or are we soon to have "*Die paulinische Formel, ἐκ Χριστοῦ*"?

Fiebig¹³ writes for the lay reader who has at his side the New Testament of Luther or Weizsäcker or Stage. In six clearly written chapters he notes: (1) that for early Christianity the meaning of the death of Jesus and of a redemption through his blood was clear; (2) that the phrase "redeemed by his blood" suggested to the primitive church the sacrificial cult; (3) that this cult was observed because God willed it so; that the main thing in the cult, the atonement through blood, was unintelligible for both the New Testament and the contemporary Judaism; (4) that Jesus had only the most general notion that his death somehow would be for the good of humanity, perhaps an offering desired by God; (5) that the cult and the interpretation of the death of Jesus derived from it are to be given up today, for we have no cult and the cult expresses no longer our personal and ethical religion; (6) that through the death of Jesus we learn that faith in God the Father solves all the problems of this life and is the victory which overcomes the world.

The book is disappointing. Had Fiebig read G. F. Moore's article on "Sacrifice" in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, he would have saved himself from many a misstatement. To mention only a few points: (1) He tells us that atonement through blood is the central point of the cult. But Heb. 9:22 qualifies with a *σχεδόν*. Indeed the sin-offering might in certain cases be met by an oblation. The scape-goat of the day of atonement is not technically a sacrifice. Furthermore, the whole ceremony, not the blood

¹³ *Jesus Blut, ein Geheimniss?* ("Lebensfragen," No. 14, herausgegeben von H. Weinle.) Von P. Fiebig. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 78 pages. M. 1. 20.

alone, had atoning value. (2) He admits that repentance has a little to do with the efficacy of the cult, but holds the objective act to be decisive. This however does scant justice to Yoma (e. g., 8:8) upon which he relies. (3) But the main difficulty lies in the fact that he forgets that for primitive Christianity the death of the Messiah was a heart-breaking problem, and that they found their interpretation not in the trespass-offering of Isa. 53:10 (which Fiebig takes literally) but in the *παῖς θεοῦ*. Attaching themselves to the current view that the sufferings and death of the righteous for the unrighteous had expiatory value, they looked on Jesus the Messiah as the Servant of God of Isaiah, chap. 53—a Christian, not a Jewish, combination, perhaps suggested by remembered utterances of Jesus (cf., p. 42). Paul in I Cor. 15:3 accepts this interpretation. Had Fiebig seen this, he would not have overlooked the significance of Rom. 5:7 ff., and Col. 1:24, nor would he have considered II Cor. 5:14 and John 10:11 as Greek-mystical. (4) Finally, Fiebig seems to feel no difference between the Epistle to the Hebrews and the rest of the New Testament. He admits that Paul applies sacrificial metaphors to himself and others (Phil. 3:17; Rom. 12:1), but it does not occur to him that the relatively infrequent references to the death of Christ as a sacrifice in Paul may be similarly explained. In Hebrews, the case is different. Perhaps for the first time, the meaning of the death of Christ in the light of the sacrificial system is studied. But here the mode is Alexandrian, and Paul did not write Hebrews.

Fiebig lost a golden opportunity to serve the lay reader. The New Testament as well as the modern world finds the death of Christ a problem, increasingly so as we see God through Christ. The New Testament lays stress on the vicarious sufferings and death of Christ as the righteous for the unrighteous. The latest interpreter, the Johannist, finds the life and death of Christ inseparable factors, for both are vicarious, a point impossible if the blood were all. The ethical interpretation reaches deeper than Fiebig has seen, for it is wrapped up not in the cult, but in the vicarious sufferings and death of the righteous. The modern problem lies in the unexplained statement of the New Testament that the sufferings and death of the righteous expiate. From this point, Fiebig should have started.

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Under the title, *Key Words*,¹⁴ Dr. Robertson discusses: "God the Father," "The Son," "Sin," "The Kingdom," "Righteousness," "Holy

¹⁴ *Key Words in the Teaching of Jesus*. By A. T. Robertson, D.D., professor in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1906. 128 pages.

Spirit," and "Future Life." Professor Robertson's dogmatics have too frequently determined his interpretation. In feeling he is influenced by the idea of the fatherhood of God, but his logic is untouched by it. While asserting that with Jesus "the truth could be turned loose on its own merits without the support of some great name to guarantee its genuineness," he nevertheless distinctly derives the worth of Jesus' message from the divine character and origin of Jesus. And to say that he (Jesus) "was born at all only to die for our sins" seems from any point of view extreme. It would be difficult to use terms more loosely than the author does in his chapter on "The Kingdom." If it represents to him any definite idea, his words fail to indicate what that idea is. In his discussions of "Sin" and "Righteousness," especially the latter, he writes with strength and persuasion. The ethical note is here dominant. For a certain class of readers the book will have a distinct value.

Professor Beecher¹⁵ has given us a serious study, suitable by purpose and execution for lay readers, but not without value for the student. The presentation is fresh, lucid, independent, and in interpretation historical rather than dogmatic. Jesus' distinctive and controlling idea is that of eternal or aeonial life. This begins in the present age and persists into the future age. The terms used to describe it do not connote absolute unendingness but only indefinitely long duration. Eternal punishment is not endless suffering for sin in the present life, but the natural penalty of eternal sinning. The present body will be fitted by change for the habitation of the soul or self in the next world. "Second probation," "conditional immortality," and a general "resurrection judgment" are matters on which a hasty and decisive judgment should not be expressed. They are difficult questions. The book has two serious defects in method. In certain parts of the discussion modern opinions are indicated without expressing any definite decision between them, and what Jesus taught is left to be inferred with little or nothing to guide us in the inference. Also on certain points Paul and other parts of the New Testament are examined and then it is said to be superfluous to adduce proof that they express the teaching of Jesus. The same results might sometimes have been obtained by an examination of Jesus' own teaching; at other times Jesus is quite silent on the point discussed.

J. W. BAILEY

OSHKOSH, WIS.

¹⁵ *The Teaching of Jesus Concerning the Future Life.* By Willis Judson Beecher, D.D. New York: American Tract Society, 1906. 197 pages. \$0.75.

CURRENT ESSAYS IN CONSTRUCTIVE THEOLOGY

Current essays in theology may be roughly classified in two groups: first, those which are seeking for an "essence," a "finality," or an "ultimate principle of unity" which expresses an unresolvable *quantum* in all religion, or "essential religion" seen in its lowest terms; second, those which take current religious doctrines and try to translate them into the terms of the thought-life of today. They ask: What is the meaning or "reality" of this or that doctrine for this age and generation? or, What form will this truth take, consistently with the scientific and philosophical convictions of today?

Both types of treatment of theology are essential for minds like ours; both make valuable contributions to thought. The ever-threatening fallacy of the first method is the abstracting fallacy which is prone to forget the concrete complexity and richness of life, in the abstract search for logical unity. Some impressive "explanations" of this type fail to explain the concrete. Hegel was a great and fruitful thinker; but Hegelianism is a bottomless pit. As to the other type of theological treatment mentioned, its chief danger is the direct antithesis of abstraction. In its attention to the concrete, practical details of truth it makes some articulations which show lack of perspective or of horizon. A broader grasp, and an ability to see details from the vantage-point of "universals" or of the whole, is the corrective tendency needed here. The reader likes to feel that he is trusted and not too narrowly watched. The zest and interest of a book must come largely from its compelling stimulus to think in right lines, and not from being told where to stop.

Professor Beckwith's book¹ belongs to the second class mentioned, and to our mind it exhibits many of the distinctive excellences of the method, and perhaps some of its limitations. The author is not so much seeking to exploit the theoretic finalities of life, as to show the meaning of the abiding practical realities. He is faithful to the title which he has chosen for his volume. We predict that it will not be received as an "epoch-making" book, for it can lay little claim to originality. But it will carry a ministry of mental peace and satisfaction to many earnest thinkers in this field. It is an interpretation of the Christian religion in terminology and thought-units that will be comprehensible to the student of the present generation. It is a book for the transition period in Christian theology.

As to form, the book is somewhat indifferent to the outline and terminology of the conventional treatise on systematic theology. At the same time,

¹ *Realities of Christian Theology: An Interpretation of Christian Experience.* By C. A. Beckwith. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. 401 pages. \$2.

its aim is essentially that of the systematic treatise. The subject-matter forms a reasonably inclusive outline of the perennial "realities" of Christian theology. The style is somewhat marred at times by detailed systematization. A larger, suggestive treatment in place of some of the detailed divisions would have improved the readableness of the book, and produced greater sense of *reality*.

Professor Beckwith's view-point is that of the well-equipped scholar who accepts the scientific emphasis of his time. He regards the teaching of modern psychology and of history not less than the utterances of the weightiest Bible critics. He produces the conviction upon the reader of employing his material discriminatingly. The modern emphasis is unmistakable, but it is employed by one who has mastered its meanings and is not a slave to its method. He speaks to the consciousness of his age as one who shares its view-point and has faithfully worked out its implications for the religious life. Herein, perhaps, lies the great value of the work. Moreover, he gives wise heed to the conservative principle of searching old doctrines for their core of vital meaning, instead of impatiently disregarding them as outgrown, in the spirit of much "smart" reconstruction today. Many theologians will feel that he is too deferential to traditional conceptions. It is a scientific treatise of the realities of Christian theology, and not a manual of dogmatics. But the "realities" are constantly kept in mind, as well as the necessity of clear exposition. Like Professor Clarke's work on theology, it has a religious as well as a mental ministry. Professor Beckwith brings a happy balance of spiritual insight and feeling for religious values, and of philosophic grasp and judicial sense of proportion. This is the essential equipment of the theologian who would address the convictions of an age that demands spiritual and ethical reality in its explanations, as well as logical accuracy.

The plan of the book allows the author's thought to unfold in logical order, and the result is something very like a system of theology. Under suggestive topics are grouped succinctly the various aspects of doctrine which have "reality" for the author. As hinted above, the need of brevity, and the employment of a notation of somewhat detailed divisions and subdivisions, would make the work rather encyclopedic in effect, were it not for the living interest that the book exhibits and compels.

To attempt to characterize the treatment of specific aspects of doctrine would be most unsatisfactory within the compass of a brief review. A hint must suffice. The doctrine of the unity of God and its far-reaching implications for religious thought today are well brought out. Sin is exhibited in the light of evolutionary science and of its ethical turpitude.

The treatment of the christological problem shows a broad grasp of the elements of the problem, and points the convictions of faith as discriminated from the problem of science. Particularly illuminating to the writer of this paragraph is the sane treatment of the meaning of Christ's work. A representative extract illustrates the scope of atonement:

The work of Christ in reconciling men to God must be considered, therefore, from two points of view: (1) as a revelation of God's gracious will to restore sinners to ethical and spiritual union with himself; (2) as such an identification of God in Christ with the evil conditions caused by sin, that, in enduring these, God enters perfectly into the life of sinful man, that he may thus draw man into fellowship with himself (p. 185).

The two chapters treating respectively of the "Beginning" and the "Development" of the New Life grow out of a psychological analysis and a fairness with the Scriptures that will commend them to earnest students of the Christian Life. Pastors and preachers will find directive principles for practical guidance here worked out with conviction and force. The author shows that the old, morbid type of abstract "religion" is giving place to concrete men and women pervaded with the religious spirit, but made only the more human by self-achievement in the life of the Spirit. No one recognizes better than the author that many of his own convictions must be held as tentative interpretations. The changing aspects of doctrine are not identified with the abiding realities of the religious life.

Now, as in the early church, men of equal philosophical training and of equal devotion to the living Christ as the Savior of men will inevitably interpret the realities of faith from different points of view and express their convictions in different phrasings. But, as of old, men are saved by the fact, not by the philosophy of the fact, that God's gracious will was revealed in Jesus Christ, and made real by the influence of the Spirit of God (p. 387).

Various points occur in the reading where the line of reasoning does not seem conclusive, and where the reader may find that his own conclusions differ. When Professor Beckwith affirms that "creation must be as eternal as love," our feeling is that the case is "unproven," and that there is another way out for thought.

If love is eternal in God, then the world is equally eternal with the divine love, and has its perpetual ground in the nature of God. It is his nature eternally to create, and by so doing to provide a form for his self-manifestation, a sphere for his self-impartation (p. 208).

At the same time, he carries conviction in his insistence that "neither the world nor any single part of it is isolated from God"—a principle that

theology needs to heed. A characteristic demand for "reality" in the divine life is expressed as follows:

All the terms which we apply to God—unless they are to be evaporated into meaningless anthropomorphisms—stand for affections in God which correspond with actual needs and conditions in men: fatherhood, compassion, long-suffering, forgiveness, comfort; even anger and wrath represent realities in God, his intense and inappeasable moral reaction against sin. The life of God is different from what it would be were there no sin and waste in human life. Love in God implies a reciprocal relation between him and men. The sympathy of God means that in the divine self-consciousness there is room for the pain and sorrow and agonizing cry of all his creatures (p. 209).

The discussion of the Trinity is not written in the persuasive spirit of one for whom the doctrine brings a relief to the mental life; but is presented in somewhat formal and perfunctory fashion, as though the notion were that of completing the theological gamut. The student of this problem feels a very different spirit in Dr. G. A. Gordon's animated exposition of the philosophic need of the truth to which this doctrine of the Trinity administers (cf. *Ultimate Conceptions of Faith*).

A more explicit attention to the fundamentals of religious epistemology, justifying the religious view of the world, defining faith, showing the relation of faith to reason; and a discussion of such problems as the insufficiency of naturalism, and the implications for religion of the modern doctrine of immanence, would have been illuminating for some readers. Doubtless the author's sufficient reply would be that his plan did not include such treatment, and that they belong to apologetics or religious epistemology.

The book is calculated to carry the leaven of modern thinking into the ranks of serious students of religious problems. Its ministry will be fruitful to those who are bewildered by the transformations demanded by the scientific view-point. It will, possibly, suggest Professor Stearn's fruitful *Present Day Theology* in the vital meaning with which it invests familiar doctrines.

The address of Professor Wobbermin,^a published as a brochure, on Ernst Haeckel and his significance for the Christian world-view, has a value for today out of proportion to its size. Haeckel as a rather lonely survivor of straightforward materialism furnishes an example of mechanism as final explanation of the world which Professor Wobbermin combats. The fallacy of false materialism is well exposed.

^a *Ernst Haeckel im Kampf gegen die christliche Weltanschauung.* Von Georg Wobbermin. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1906. 30 pages. M. o. 50.

He goes straight to the heart of his problem in the opening paragraph:

The Jena zoölogist, Haeckel, is not merely a nature-investigator (*Naturforscher*), and does not wish to be merely a nature-investigator; he is and wishes to be, in addition, a founder and representative of a universal world-view (*allgemeine Weltanschauung*), and indeed a world-view which for religion—at least for the Christian religion—stands in the sharpest and most complete contradiction (p. 1).

It is not Haeckel the scientist, but Haeckel the philosopher, whom he answers.

Haeckel completely and in the most uncritical way mixes two different judgments which must be sharply discriminated; namely, the judgment of genesis which asks after the origin of a thing, and the value-judgment which inquires concerning the abiding being or worth of a thing (p. 10).

The value of the book lies in this distinction which Professor Wobbermin clearly makes. It is the gist of the total problem, and it is the gist of the book. The problem of science and the problem of philosophic interpretation are not to be confused. Only confusion occasions "conflict." There can be no conflict between science and religion, if both would recognize their limitations. Thus the apologetic defense of Christianity at this point is a matter of the problem of knowledge. For the one who has analyzed this problem, mechanical explanation, evolution, the development theory in its most vivid form, have no terrors.

For the Christian faith has absolutely no direct interest in any such scientific problem. Only the old, outgrown theory of inspiration could judge otherwise (p. 16). For the religious judgment the problem is, not *how* man has become, but *what* he is; more exactly, what he *can* be and *should* be (p. 18).

Professor Wobbermin treats this whole problem of antithesis of method and aim in a concrete and detailed fashion. The limitations and inconsistencies of Haeckel's naturalistic account are admirably exhibited in the treatment. The value of the brochure is for apologetics, meeting the false naturalism that pervades our scientific age; or, more broadly stated, it is a concrete essay in the relation of natural science to religious philosophy.

A great value of Dr. Marshall's book³ is its underlying assumption that the problem of knowledge is the fundamental problem for theologians today. As an essay on this problem, the book enforces the writer's conviction that our confusion in the theological field results chiefly from confusion in the field of epistemology. Until we clearly perceive this and do some

³ *Theology and Truth*. By Newton H. Marshall. London: James Clarke & Co., 1906. 304 pages. 5 s.

more definite work here, many theological battles will be inevitable, and at the same time utterly useless—a war of words with no gains for conviction.

Every philosophy has its own theory of knowledge, either implicit or explicit, and that theory conditions its whole world-view. Not that epistemology is the first element which a philosophy elaborates, for, indeed, it often happens that the theory of knowledge is never definitely worked out at all. But it is always there, and always has logical priority (pp. 15, 16).

Clearly the value and meaning of our conclusions will always be relative to the adequacy of our theory of knowledge, so far as we are logical thinkers—i. e., so far as we are consequent thinkers. To clear up the “conflicts” between science and theology, and the various other “conflicts” waged within and without the theological camp, we need to get some vantage-point where we can see the futility of guerilla warfare among thinkers, and outline the issues which engage us. The result ought to be an era of peace and constructiveness for religious and scientific explanation. Dr. Marshall’s discriminating attitude toward the total problem augurs for a friendly reception of his book. We think his preliminary proposition justified.

The critical question of all philosophy is: “What is truth?” And the differences displayed in answers to this question are characteristic of the differences between the various philosophic systems. The first question, then, which we ask of any religious philosopher will be: “What is your doctrine as to knowledge?” And when that has been answered we shall be at liberty to pass on and say: “This being your theory of truth, what are you able to say about the truths of religion? What is your philosophy of religion?” (p. 16).

Again, after characterizing some alleged causes for theological dissatisfaction, he says:

Each of these three explanations of recent theological change has much of truth in it, but the very fact that there are so many plausible explanations suggests that we must look deeper for one which will bring all three causes into line. This deeper cause lies in confusion as to what is meant by “truth.” Theologians have nearly always assumed that when they defended their propositions as “true” they meant just what a scientist means who defends some principle which he has discovered. They have not examined very closely into the nature of religious truth, and the various assailants of orthodoxy have been able to cause dismay to many, mainly because of the confusion which exists as to the nature of truth. Natural science, higher criticism, comparative religion, and the rest, all challenge the truth of religion. And the dilemma of the theologian arises because he neglects a proper theory of knowledge (pp. 21, 22).

The plan of the book is to analyze three typical forms of explanation or world-views, viz., naturalism, objective idealism, and free-will idealism—

which with their "borderland" theories are affirmed to outline the actual philosophical efforts touching religion.

As we proceed to examine these three types of philosophy more closely, we shall notice that they are all three in a sort of "unstable equilibrium," and many members of the various classes do, either logically or actually, pass over from one class to another. There is a sort of borderland separating and yet joining the three groups, much as the sides of a triangle hold apart, and yet unite at its angles. This will prove a not uninteresting element in our discussion of the various philosophies, and will suggest that there is some inherent defect in each one of these typical systems of thought, which makes it impossible for the human mind to find complete satisfaction in any one of them (p. 19).

From the partial failure of all three, and the partial insights yielded, the author essays to outline a consistent view of truth, in which theology justifies itself as holding a place. The discussion of the book centers around the analysis of these typical philosophies, which are treated largely in the concrete with citations from their representatives. The fourteen chapters of the volume show a good deal of research and information. They do not seem to us, however, to outline the philosophies with any great degree of lucidity or originality; and the disinterestedness of the treatment is hardly apparent. There is a teleological movement in the analysis which suggests that the conclusions are in mind when the premises are laid down. The discussion of "Naturalism" and of "Recent Changes in Theology" are fruitful in themselves. But the "Historical Survey of Metaphysical Method" seems to us confused and untrue to history. This confusion is peculiarly regrettable, since the whole constructive effort of the author hinges on his disposition toward metaphysics. There is a deal of confusion in his terminology, resulting from indefiniteness and a variableness of content in use of words. For example, "ideals" is used with a varying content that defies reduction to unity and consistency. Remembering that mind is not a characterless, natureless fact, and that mental processes must be in terms of a fixed nature, we construe the mind's "ideals" as describing this nature. These ideals of course are implicit and authoritative in all forms of thinking, scientific or otherwise. Presently, however, we find that a thoroughgoing distinction is made between the "given in experience" and the ideals; and ideals are confined to the "sphere of action, not of thought." Moreover, we have somehow passed from the conception of an ideal implicit in all mental work to the conception of an ideal that *ought to be* in the moral sense. This shuffle of content is implicit in the whole discussion of the history of metaphysics, and, so far from being a history, it strikes us as being a caricature. The modern analysis of the problem

of knowledge makes mental ideals our only standard, whether in science or any other realm of knowledge. These are ultimate facts and express the nature of intelligence. Surely the author is aware of this, but it does not prevent him from undertaking to show that metaphysics is and always has been an effort to impose our ideals of "what ought to be," and thus confusing it with problems of conduct or of the "normative" sciences. The question here is whether metaphysics, like all knowledge, does not intend to ask: "How *must* we think reality, mind being what it is?" Do the ideals of serious metaphysical inquiry rest upon a less rational necessity of mind than those of science? In both science and metaphysics we intend to ask "What is?" and not, "What ought to be?"

Again, in the matter of "Religion" the whole treatment has a tendency to a narrow abstraction which reminds one of the scholastic weakness. The author does, indeed, put his finger again and again on the nerve of the problem, but, in the analyst's interest to keep things apart, he is guilty of theorizing for an abstract religion that has no counterpart in life. In this way mental classifications are made to seem necessities of actual life, and thus "religion" is kept disengaged from troublesome affinities with other forms of life. Dr. Marshall's confusion here invalidates the conclusions that follow. The constructive part of his discussion emphasizes by illustration the general thesis with which he began—viz., we need better grounding in epistemology, since the value of our philosophy is relative to our theory of knowledge. In a word, our criticism of the essay, aside from the pervasive confusion already noted, is this: The author violates two fundamental conclusions of present-day science—one in the realm of psychology, the other in epistemology. The first is the central doctrine of psychological study, viz., the unity of the thinking agent, and the impossibility of maintaining the traditional compartments. The other is the fact that all forms of knowledge, even the elements of perception, as cognized, are products of mental activity; and consequently express the "forms" or "ideals" of mind. This is the epistemological oversight referred to. These philosophic shortcomings have been made familiar to us by the theorizing of many theologians of the Ritschlian bent.

To let the text speak for itself, we quote a representative paragraph, which seems to us to give point to our criticism, and at the same time to exhibit fairly the spirit and method of the book, while indicating its conclusions:

That process in theology which carefully marks off scientific truth from religious faith must be treated as an element of the general tendency to differentiate the scientific from the metaphysical method by making it the exclusive province of

science to describe things as they are, and by confining the metaphysical method to its proper sphere. This proper sphere is indicated when we have noted that metaphysics is essentially the advocacy of an ideal, and such advocacy has its legitimate function, not in constructing a doctrine of what is, but in determining what ought to be. When we speak of the "proper sphere of the metaphysical method," let there be no mistake as to our meaning. It may be that men will persist in an attempt at the discovery of reality as something distinct from the subject-matter of science. It may be, indeed, that this discovery of the noumenal may be made possible by some future development of the human spirit. Neither of these contingencies is, however, referred to here as a sphere in which the metaphysical method may properly be continued. The metaphysical method, indeed—the assertion that things are of a certain order because our ideals lead us to make them according to that order—is no longer tenable. If adopted, it must, as we have seen, lead to paradox and unstable equilibrium of thought. The proper sphere of the metaphysical method is not within the limits of pure thought any longer. It is not the description of things as they are—which is science. It is, however, something else, and something vastly more important than what has been called "metaphysics." The metaphysical method, in short, is not justifiable as an attempt at the construction of a world-view, but it is justifiable—nay, necessary—to the construction of a life.

We have seen that metaphysical method is essentially the imposition of the ideal upon the given. This may take place in two ways. First, it may be theoretic in the sense that it results in the construction of a "metaphysic," round assertion being made that what is given is the ideal. This we hold to be vicious and improper. Secondly, it may be practical, not consisting of any mere assertion as to reality, but being primarily an effort to impose the ideal upon what is given by the actual manipulation, and violent reconstruction, of the given. This we hold to be the legitimate element lending propriety to the metaphysical impulse. As a matter of fact, all metaphysics is the outcome of the metaphysical stress turned away from its proper sphere by being thwarted in practical affairs. The moralist who longs to be good in life, but finds the inertia of his character too great for him, takes refuge in imposing his moral ideal upon reality in thought. He cannot make his life good, and so he asserts that all life is good, that evil is a mere appearance, that due insight would reveal the goodness of every part of reality—in short, that this is the best of all possible worlds. And so with the other ideals. This, however, is illegitimate as an effort to discover truth. It is mere assertion, not based on reality, but definitely denying the given. It is when the moralist turns his whole attention to the facts of life, and seeks to give free play to the ideal that ought to master him, that the "metaphysical method" really begins to find its proper sphere—the sphere of action, not of thought. (pp. 282-84.)

Religious truth, then, which has been broadly described above, must be distinguished with the utmost rigor from scientific truth within the limits of theology, just as in philosophy the distinction between scientific truths and

metaphysical statements must be observed. Indeed, as has been already said, the two things had better be given distinct names. Religious truth is best termed faith, which "gives substance to things hoped for" and "tests things not seen." It is the reaching-out of the soul after that which is not known, but felt, which is not apprehended, but which apprehends the man. It is the victory of the things that are not—the ideals—over the things that are. It is the imposition of an ideal upon life, upon the given, not ultimately in mere thought, but in conduct. It is the substance of all striving and aspiration. It lends nobility to discontent and even despair; it sends humanity, despite the cold discouragements of knowledge, striding joyously and valiantly toward an unknown goal (pp. 285, 286).

This is inaccurate and confusing. The treatment of metaphysical method is caricature, not history. The easy assumption that "science describes things as they are" is a superficial view of the work of thought. It seems to beg the whole question in the interests of a somewhat naïve theory of knowledge. Science doubtless *describes* things. But the ideals of science and the ideals of metaphysics both express the nature and necessity of the constructing intelligence. We know no "truth" independent of these ideals. To say that science describes things as they *are* is to beg the whole epistemological question. The "proper sphere" of metaphysics is not a matter to be settled by fiat in the interests of a neat and superficial classification. And the matter is in no way helped by the proposed readjustment of the terminology. To *call* the results of science "knowledge" is not to advance the problem, nor to touch the ultimate aspects of the problem. If "truth" expresses objective reality, subjective certainty, and universal validity of the thought-object, we demur from the uncritical deference which the author shows to science as "knowledge." We think modern epistemology finds good poetry, but poor ultimate theory, in Tennyson's line: "Knowledge is of things we see." This is frank pragmatism indeed, if taken literally. Moreover, we raise the question here whether "religion," "metaphysics," "morals," are not used in an abstract way that misrepresents the concrete facts of personal life. For example, "religion" is seen here in a false simplicity which may serve a theory, but not actual life.

It is thus by the ignoring of a consistent psychological and epistemological view-point that we reach an arbitrary and limited definition of "true." Thus "Theology" and "Truth" can be exhibited in their formal relations. And this is the goal of the book. To one who dissents from the author's method in reaching conclusions these conclusions will be totally inconsequent. We have indicated briefly in the preceding paragraphs the gist of our criticism of a thoroughgoing fallacy. The value of the book for students of the problem lies, not in its conclusions, but in its initial emphasis upon the

place of religious epistemology, and in its concrete illustration of one method in dealing with the problem. May it stimulate other efforts in this field!

As concrete suggestion for a method that will bring philosophic satisfaction, this book, by defect, bids us to give heed to a concise and consistent terminology, a scientific psychology, and a tenable epistemology. It bids us, too, to shake loose from the terribly tenacious, abstracting fallacy of scholasticism. Specific problems, like the relation of "intuition and reason," "faith and demonstration," the "real," the "true," our "ideals," the precise meaning of "experience," and a consistent account of metaphysical method as distinguished from both apriorism and conduct ideals—the endeavor to clear up these, and like problems, will bring much added insight into the perplexities of religious explanation.

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SOME TYPES OF NEW THEOLOGY

One of the most interesting movements in the theological world today is the evident renaissance of interest in the constructive problems of religious belief. The period of negation or of uncertainty which prevailed so long as systematic theology insisted on preserving an a-priori, dogmatic method, while all other sciences were adopting the inductive method, is disappearing as men with a vital interest in religion are attempting to construct from empirical data a theology which shall meet the religious needs of the modern man. As an inevitable result of the freedom of method adopted by the new movement, the constructive results are widely different in content; but all preserve the common trait of attempting to correlate religious beliefs with the vital convictions of science or of social life.

The Crown Theological Library has already published several volumes dealing with various problems of modern theological thought. Under the title, *The Religion of Christ in the Twentieth Century*, an anonymous author portrays from the point of view of a liberal Englishman the present status of Christianity, and marks out the path by which he believes it is to advance.¹ He emphasizes the fact that men are weary of disputing over theological terms and formulae, and are eager to engage in the search for vitality. The religion of the twentieth century, therefore, must be one which proves itself so vital to the spiritual interests of men that it needs no external authority to commend it. Unfortunately, the predominating

¹ *The Religion of Christ in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Putnam, 1906. vii + 197 pages.

task of free scholarship in the realm of theology up to the present time has been the intellectual examination of doctrines. Criticism has thus seemed largely negative, because it has denied the validity of many of the older doctrines. This intellectualism is happily vanishing, and the meaning of doctrines is now sought in the historical conditions under which they were formulated. The most striking positive conclusion which the author reaches is that the Christianity of the future will cease to look for supernatural power from another world, but will turn with high expectations to the as yet unrealized resources of this world. Jesus becomes the supreme religious genius to guide life here, rather than the supernatural redeemer to transfer men into blessedness in another world.

Something of the same feeling concerning the unreality of the traditional supernaturalism is seen in Mr. Campbell's much-discussed *The New Theology*.² He, too, repudiates the dualistic view which has prevailed in theology. The universe is not a finished creation, existing apart from God, but is the eternal expression of the divine energy, ever filled with the presence of God. The real distinction to be made is not that between divine and secular, but between perfect and imperfect manifestations of the divine nature. Since love is the essence of the divine nature, all beings which fail to express the highest degree of love are inadequate expressions of God. Sin in man is described as a "blundering quest for God." Christ is the perfect incarnation of the divine nature which in a lesser degree every man possesses. The atonement is the eternal attempt of God to express himself more completely in imperfect man, in order that man may be more godlike. This constant dynamic relation between God and all parts of the universe seems to one who thinks in terms of the old dualistic cosmology to be practically pantheism. And it must be confessed that the strict monism of the system does not seem to make a ready place for those moral distinctions which are essential to Christianity. On this view, the only trouble with the sinner is that he is ignorant. He does not know the right way to seek God. We pity him for his ignorance, but we cannot blame him. Redemption would consist in showing him a better way in which to fulfil his desires, not in seeking to change his desires. All this may be a very satisfactory monistic philosophy, but I doubt whether the sinner himself would recognize the diagnosis of his case.

Mr. Campbell displays a vigorous hostility to traditional theological opinions which will hardly serve to help matters. In many instances, he cannot escape the charge of having caricatured those doctrines in order to

² *The New Theology*. By R. J. Campbell, M.A. New York: Macmillan, 1907 vii+258 pages. \$1.50 net.

cast odium upon them. He can hardly complain if some of his critics retort by caricaturing his own views. Hegelian interpretations of Christianity have always been so different from the historical forms of Christian belief that it has been easy to look down in scorn upon the crude doctrines of the church. Historical Christianity was viewed by Hegel as a lower, popular attempt to express what is more accurately set forth in Hegelian dialectic. The Cairds, with their tolerant spirit, and with their rhetorical facility in putting new content into the old formulae, partially concealed this inevitable difference between historical Christianity and Hegelianism. In Mr. Campbell's book, the antithesis is plainly recognized. It is questionable whether a "new theology" which makes so little use of a sympathetic historical study of Christianity, and which makes the basis of theology to rest upon a monistic philosophy which is far from being universally accepted in our modern world—which is, in fact, being hard pressed by a more empirical method of arriving at foundation beliefs—will prove to be epoch-making in any sense. A much more profound understanding of the psychological basis of religious belief, and a much more sympathetic valuation of traditional beliefs is essential to any theology of permanent value.

A book which starts from the difficulties which have been raised by modern biblical criticism, and which attempts to show that the essentials of the old gospel may be held on the basis of such criticism, has been published by another Englishman.³ The author sees in the modern scientific, philosophical, and critical movements a real "*Praeparatio Evangelica*." Our traditional stereotyped conceptions of Christianity have been dissolved, and the world has been compelled to come back to the New Testament with an inquiring mind. Thus errors in our conceptions are to be removed, and a truer apprehension of the gospel attained. In the center of this new field of inquiry stands the person of Jesus. Former ages approached him with the a-priori judgments of a supernaturalistic *Zeitgeist*. We, on the contrary, work under the influence of a naturalistic spirit. The author, in a few brilliant pages, warns us against the mistake of assuming that our presuppositions are so infallible that the mere collision of the New Testament records with those presuppositions shall be assumed to be sufficient reason for rejecting the New Testament. He shows the dilemma into which a naturalistic explanation of Jesus forces men. If the trustworthiness of the records is assumed while at the same time we insist on a merely human Jesus, then the "noxious exaggeration about his own personality" becomes defect in his character. If the inner sincerity of Jesus is to be retained

³ *Christianity in the Modern World*. By D. S. Cairns. New York: Armstrong; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1906. xv+314 pages. \$1.25.

as the best explanation of the disciples' esteem for him, certain elements of the gospel records must be attributed to the misunderstanding of him by his disciples. But if they were so mistaken, how can we hope through their mistaken reports to arrive at any sure conclusions? The simplest, and as the author believes, the most truthful way out of the difficulty, is to distrust the a-priori antisupernaturalism which dominates such criticism. By admitting a transcendent element in Jesus, we are better able to account for all the facts. There can be no doubt that Mr. Cairns's warning is needed; but his book is by no means free from an a-priori coloring. For example, he wishes to preserve both the accuracy of the gospel records and the infallibility of Jesus. But Jesus predicted his speedy bodily return in triumph, according to the gospels. Was he, or were the evangelists mistaken? Mr. Cairns says, Neither. Jesus used apocalyptic language as a symbolic way of indicating that his death did not mean the end of the messianic hopes, but only Jesus' entrance into a higher sphere of power. The gradual growth of the kingdom to its full consummation on earth was Jesus' ideal. Mr. Cairns thus holds that the evangelists gave a correct report of Jesus' words, but a mistaken interpretation of those words. The author holds that essential Christianity means the brotherhood of the Kingdom, under the leadership of God revealed and potent in Christ. The concluding chapter, which portrays the break-up of the old world, politically, internationally, scientifically, industrially, and socially, shows that the immediate future is to be the most plastic period of history in centuries. The rediscovery of true Christianity ought to give rise to the most mighty evangelical movement the world has ever known.

The volumes of the Crown Theological Library have made English and American readers familiar with many valuable works of German scholarship which would otherwise be accessible only to those who read German. One of the most welcome volumes is a cheaper edition of Herrmann's *Communion of the Christian with God*.⁴ It is exceedingly difficult to translate Herrmann's concise style into readable English, and the volume reflects some of the studied attempts of the translator. It thus lacks the vigor of the original and occasionally misrepresents the thought of the German. In particular the unvarying use of the word "Protestant" for the German word *evangelisch* often diverts attention from the real signifi-

⁴ *The Communion of the Christian with God*. By Wilhelm Herrmann. Second English edition; being the translation by J. Sandys Stanton revised throughout, and enlarged and altered in accordance with the fourth German edition by R. W. Stewart. New York: Putnam; London: Williams and Norgate, 1906. xvii + 356 pages. \$1.50 net.

cance of a statement. But we should be grateful to have Herrmann's message in any form. He fully recognizes the spirit of freedom in modern scholarship. He would release theology from all legalistic bonds. So thoroughly in earnest is he in this regard, that he would not even substitute for the dogmas of the church the dogmas of the historical critic. The Christian is not to begin by accepting on the authority of someone else certain doctrines or certain *Heilsthatsachen*. A faith which rests on a man's determination to affirm the truth of certain theories or of certain alleged occurrences is the product of man's own striving, and not the experience of divine power. For this religious reason philosophical speculation must also be excluded. One is to come into the presence of the New Testament narratives and is to let them freely make their own impression upon the heart. The character of Jesus convinces us of his right to command our allegiance. In moral surrender to him, the Christian experiences communion with the God of Jesus in such a way that Jesus becomes the revelation of God. The experience which Herrmann describes is the typical Lutheran experience of justification by faith. Forgiveness and assurance of God's favor are the primary elements. One is led to question, however, whether contact with the Jesus of the Gospels will give to one so definite a content of faith. May it not be that it will simply awaken a keener loyalty to the content of religious belief which one has been educated to think Christian? But however that may be, the modern world owes to Herrmann a great debt for his unwearied insistence on the central element of communion with God as the primary thing in religion, and for his clear exposition of the fact that Jesus was not primarily a teacher of doctrine or of morals, but an embodiment of a unique God-consciousness, which has immediate significance for the religious aspirations of man.

Another volume of the series gives translations of three addresses delivered before sessions of the Evangelical-Social Congress in Germany.⁵ The first two essays by Harnack bear the titles "The Evangelical Social Mission in the Light of the History of the Church" and "The Moral and Social Significance of Modern Education." The essay by Herrmann will be the most welcome part of the book, although its significance is concealed by the suppression of part of the original title. Why the translator should have omitted so suggestive a secondary phrase as "Their Misuse, and Their Proper Use," from the original theme, "The Moral Teachings of Jesus," is not clear. Herrmann shows that the attempt to make of the

⁵ *Essays on the Social Gospel*. By Adolf Harnack and Wilhelm Herrmann. Translated by G. M. Craik, and edited by Maurice A. Canney. New York: Putnam; London: Williams and Norgate, 1907. vii+225 pages. \$1.50 net.

teachings of Jesus a legal code leads to immorality. On the one hand, since Jesus said nothing about the problems of modern industrial life, men feel that they are followers of Jesus while they are not addressing themselves at all seriously to the moral problems connected with industrial life. On the other hand, the presence of precepts which no one pretends to obey literally leads to hypocrisy on the part of those who profess to be disciples. Moreover, recent historical criticism shows that Jesus lived in a world so different from ours, and held such views concerning the future of the world, that we cannot now share his world-view. Can we, then, find in him a guide for our moral problems? Herrmann holds that what at first seems to separate us from Jesus turns out in the end to be a blessing; for it forces us away from the superficial study of isolated precepts to an attempt to understand the real inner life of Jesus. This inner life brings to us such a vision of complete religious and moral triumph, that it becomes the rock on which we may build in our effort to do in our day what Jesus did in his—see for ourselves the immediate moral issues and directly attempt to bring the moral solution. This essay is a welcome contribution to a problem which is bound to perplex many persons when once the views of modern criticism become familiar.

Professor Jones has already published two or three little books in which his eager desire to make religion a vital matter is evident. His last booklet⁶ builds on the foundations laid in his *Social Law in the Spiritual World*.⁷ The starting-point is his doctrine of the "conjunct self." The older theologies assumed that man is an isolated being, who must become acquainted with an alien universe. God, as the transcendent cause of that universe was even more remote from man. Only by a special revelation could he become known. The new psychology, on the contrary, declares that man is never isolated. His consciousness develops because it is in vital relation to the "wider self" surrounding consciousness. "There must be a spiritual matrix for this living, throbbing, growing social organism in which personal life is formed" (p. 24). Our ideals and aspirations, therefore, are genuine experiences of a vital contact with God. We do not have to devise some extraordinary means of discovering a transcendent, self-centered God. We have only to follow the lead of the spiritual interrelation involved in our mystic and ethical longings to find the immanent God. But the search of man for God in this mutual relationship involves a similar search of God for the inmost being of man. The

⁶ *The Double Search; Studies in Atonement and Prayer*. By Rufus M. Jones, A.M., Litt.D. Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Co., 1906. 124 pages. \$0.75.

⁷ Reviewed in this Journal, Vol. X, January, 1906, p. 167.

atonement represents the divine side of this mutual search, and prayer represents the human side. Both the atonement and prayer are thus made vital aspects of the religious life. Such an exposition will doubtless prove helpful to those who are somewhat familiar with modern psychology. The trained thinker, however, will be likely to ask whether the other side of the conjunct self can be so accurately described. Still, even if one be more agnostic than Professor Jones, there is still the root of vital religious life in the fact of our conjunct relation. The starting-point for theology has been transferred from a God supposed to exist apart from experience to the vital experience of spiritual incompleteness until we find ourselves in the larger whole. The path is open for an empirical development of faith.

From the point of view of one whose training and interest lie in the field of natural science, Dr. Pritchett publishes five capital addresses to students in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.⁸ The man of science is primarily interested in truthfulness. Hypocrisy of any sort seems to him to be the chief sin. The pursuit of scientific studies, Dr. Pritchett declares, ought to equip one to assume toward the problems of life the sanest spiritual attitude. If scientific training does not bear fruitage in spiritual life, there is something wrong either with the science or with the man. The entire emphasis is therefore laid not on the conclusions to which one comes in his religious thinking, but on the inner spirit of truth. In Dr. Pritchett's thinking, the "conjunct self" of the psychologist becomes the "infinite and eternal energy" of Herbert Spencer. In both cases, the anthropomorphic picture of God is gone, and religion means the attempt to come into more intimate relations with the immanent spiritual power in the universe. Dr. Pritchett, however, is more willing than Professor Jones to leave the exact nature of the Infinite undefined. He feels that to attempt to square his thinking with any formulae, even those of the New Testament, would be to encourage a lack of sincerity which would defeat inner spiritual truthfulness. As a wholesome possible starting-point for men who have the scientific spirit, the addresses are admirable. But will even the scientist be content to remain permanently in so agnostic and vague an attitude toward what he calls God? Unquestionably Dr. Pritchett himself would agree that a more definite theology is desirable, provided it can come in a genuinely scientific spirit. The book would be an especially valuable one for those preachers whose religious vision is limited to a technical theological vocabulary.

One cannot but be impressed with the vigor and vitality of these modern

⁸ *What Is Religion? and Other Student Questions.* By Henry S. Pritchett. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. 117 pages. \$1.00 net.

attempts to base theology empirically on verifiable facts. The desire for constructive interpretation of genuine spiritual experience is dominant. It would seem that the cause of religion has little to fear and much to hope for from this new interest in theology.

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MODERN PREACHING

Modern preaching is fundamentally religious. It is not doctrinal, or controversial, or ethical, or sociological, but beyond all these, religious. It is the preaching of God revealed in Christ as the supreme satisfaction of human need. Timorous souls, who fear that the new thinking is destroying religion, should read current sermons. An unusually large number of volumes of sermons is coming from the press, and in all of them there is insistence on faith, intense realization of God, exaltation of the significance of Jesus, and emphasis ever upon the divine sanctions of duty.

*The Eye for Spiritual Things*¹ is the title of the first sermon and of the volume by Professor Gwatkin, who holds the chair of ecclesiastical history at Cambridge. There are twenty-eight short discourses preached in various English churches. A single sentence may give their key: "The unseen is the realm of faith, not the unreasonable." The largest place is allowed for the human reason, but there is a great realm where only faith can enter, and upon this the preacher discourses. These are not great sermons. They have no marked eloquence or beauty. But they are good sermons, the thoughtful presentation of religious truth earnestly and persuasively. The sermon on "Eternal Punishment" is an admirable example of the way to treat a difficult theme.

Professor Hugh Black, who has lately come to the chair of practical theology in Union Theological Seminary, has published a series of sermons from his Edinburgh pulpit entitled *Listening to God*.² The first sermon is an appeal for an open heart that a man may hear what God has to say to him. And all the sermons are alike simple, strong, earnest words of a man of God to his brothers, presenting the great truths of religion, so evident when they are thus clearly put. The sermons are not brilliant, but they are manifestly the expression of the personality and experience of the preacher. And that after all is the only preaching that counts. Some

¹ *The Eye for Spiritual Things and Other Sermons*. By Henry Melville Gwatkin. Edinburgh: Clark, imported by Scribner, 1906. viii+261 pages. \$1.50 net.

² *Listening to God*. By Hugh Black. New York: Revell, 1906. 310 pages. \$1.25 net.

titles may indicate the trend: "Comfort in Temptation," "The Authority of the Will," "The Courage of Consecration," "The Discipline of Change," "The Heroism of Endurance," "The Charm of Goodness."

A volume of sermons upon one central theme is *Through Man to God*³ by Dr. George A. Gordon. It is designedly a protest against Fiske's *Through Nature to God*. "Christianity is the interpretation of the Eternal, not through nature, but through human nature." Or, to quote from the sermon, "The Humanity of God" (a bold, suggestive title): "The greatest thing that we know is man; the greatest man that we know is Jesus Christ," and through him we know God. Dr. Gordon is ever preaching on the true significance of man. The sermon "Personality and the Truth" shows that all our definitions of truth lead up to the definition in terms of personality. "Jesus is the perfect man and therefore he is the final form of the truth." The sermon "Nature and Humanity" is concerned to show that the world finds its meaning in man: a well is a well, but Jacob's well has a different significance. "The Continuities of Life" is a strong discussion of immortality, based on the worth of man: yes, even the worth that is in the worst, which through retribution must be recovered at last. One of the discourses "Belief and Fear," though true and strong in its main thought, is greatly marred by an extraordinary misuse of the text, "The devils also believe and tremble." With the devils for high examples, the preacher discourses on the dignity of faith in what is true and the dread of losing what is precious!

Dr. Gunsaulus, the eloquent preacher of down-town Chicago, has followed his volume of sermons on *Paths to Power* by another on *Paths to the City of God*.⁴ The sermons are highly characteristic. The preacher's poetic and luxuriant imagination plays upon the great ideas with which he deals. He reads the Scriptures as poetry. He preaches on the poetic pictures of the Bible: the Garden in Eden, the City in Revelation, the River in Genesis, in Ezekiel, in Revelation; and his interpretations are poetic. One sermon is "The Treasures of the Snow;" another is "Religion and Art." And the poets he quotes largely. Some will read these sermons and complain that the world needs not poetry, but the gospel, or that practical teachings should be the concern of the pulpit. But such are confusing poetry with prettiness. Dr. Gunsaulus is a poet with the prophet's fire, and passion for righteousness. These sermons are full of

³ *Through Man to God*. By George A. Gordon. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. 395 pages. \$1.50 net.

⁴ *Paths to the City of God*. By Frank W. Gunsaulus. New York: Revell, 1906. 311 pages. \$1.25 net.

moral appeal; and they are evangelistic, leading the soul to the Infinite Father through Jesus Christ.

Dr. Zahn's sermons are welcome in their English translation. *Bread and Salt from the Word of God*⁵ is a happy title for discourses whose aim is religious comfort and inspiration. The Germans leave polemics usually to the academic arena, and, in the pulpit, address themselves to the soul's experience of God.

Perhaps the title of Dr. Charles R. Brown's Yale Lectures, *The Social Message of the Modern Pulpit*,⁶ might suggest that the able Oakland pastor would not bear out the statement that present-day preaching is above all religious. Dr. Brown makes a most earnest appeal for the preacher to concern himself with the social needs of our day, but it is because the minister is the messenger of God and because men are the children of God. The treatment is religious because God's will for man's good is the motive. The method employed in this work is an interesting example at once of expository preaching and of a thoroughly religious social interest. On the basis of expositions of the Book of Exodus, Dr. Brown makes his plea for social justice. When he entitles the Book of Exodus, "The Story of an Ancient Labor Movement," it may be that he goes somewhat beyond true exposition. Yet the great principles of God's justice and of human duty, which are so nobly set forth in Exodus are strongly presented by Dr. Brown as he discusses "The Oppression of a People," "The Call of an Industrial Deliverer," "The Training in Industrial Freedom," "The New Social Order." Incidentally one may remark on the rich variety that is maintained in this admirable series of homiletic lectures at Yale.

Professor Hoyt has produced⁷ a first-class textbook on homiletics. Upon a subject well covered with classic treatises he has written with freshness and originality. It is a virtue of the work that it recognizes the genesis and growth of the sermon in the mind of the preacher, and sets forth clearly for the student the natural steps in the psychologic process. It has a value for the minister, who has long left formal homiletic study behind, but who may well find a thoughtful reading of such a work as this

⁵ *Bread and Salt from the Word of God.* By Theodor Zahn; translated by C. S. and A. E. Burn. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners. 1905. 306 pages. \$1.50 net.

⁶ *The Social Message of the Modern Pulpit.* By Charles R. Brown. New York: Scribner, 1906. ix+293 pages. \$1.25 net.

⁷ *The Work of Preaching.* By Arthur S. Hoyt. New York: Macmillan, 1905. 355 pages. 1.50 net.

at least suggestive, and perhaps corrective. The author recognizes that no one should teach homiletics from a textbook, yet the careful analysis of each chapter of his treatise adapts it to the uses of the classroom.

Perhaps the title is an effort to avoid stereotyped phraseology, but it is scarcely felicitous.

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BRIEF MENTION

HARTZOG, WILLIAM B. *Ancient Masters and Jesus*. Cleveland: German Baptist Publication Society, 1906. 256 pages.

A popular, gossip account of interesting events in the lives of the chief Greek philosophers, and a comparison of Jesus with them. The book is lacking in perspective or in profound discrimination, but abounds in anecdote and interesting information.

LENDRUM, ROBERT A. *An Outline of Christian Truth*. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribners. 1906. 126 pages. \$0.20.

A readable primer of Christian doctrine, written in the spirit of liberal orthodoxy.

LAMERS, W. *Vom Ernst des Lebens*. Dresden und Leipzig: Ungelenk, 1906. 67 pages. M. 0.80.

Three popular sermons, translated from the Dutch.

SPRINGER, R. W. *The Savior's Creed*. Fort Washington, Md.: Privately published, 1905. 40 pages.

An attempt to set forth the essentials of Jesus' teaching on the basis of the Lord's Prayer, supplemented by other references. Unscientific exegesis enables the author to find all elements of ecclesiastical theology taught by Jesus.

GERHARD, JOHANN ERNST. *Handbuch der Glaubenslehre Johann Gerhards*. Erster Teil, Erste + Zweite Abteilung. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906, and 1907. xxix + 350 pages. M. 5. 549 pages. M. 6.

Students who have been compelled to labor through the ponderous Latin volumes of Gerhard's theology will welcome this briefer outline of his system in German. The first volume deals with the first six *loci*, thus containing only the doctrine of God. The second contains the doctrine of the person and work of Christ. Of especial value is the German translation of Gerhard's little treatise, published in 1625, on the nature of theology.

CASE, CARL DELOS. *The Masculine in Religion*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1906. 120 pages.

An interesting popular exposition of certain essential differences between the sexes which demand special attention to the specific needs of men in their religious life. He pleads for a more virile interpretation of Christianity. The book should be fruitfully suggestive to every pastor.

FEI, R. M., *De evangelorum inspiratione; De dogmatis evolutione; De Arcani disciplina*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1906. 113 pages. Fr. 2.50.

A characteristic Catholic discussion of the problem of the relation between a static conception of revealed truth and the evolution of the doctrinal statement of this truth. It consists, in the main, of carefully collected opinions of various authors and scholars on mooted points.

McKIM, R. H. *The Problem of the Pentateuch: An Examination of the Results of Higher Criticism*. With a Foreword by the DEAN OF CANTERBURY. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906. xvii+136 pages. \$1.

This is an attempt to discredit the results of higher criticism, partly by declaring critical methods unscientific, and partly by arraying one critic against another. The arguments of Green, Hommel, Robertson, Möller, Margoliouth, Sayce, Klostermann, *et al.*, are once more brought forward and skilfully deployed against the critical front. Of the three "grievous mistakes" that Mr. McKim charges against critical scholarship, one is found in the fact that Margoliouth has arrayed himself all alone against the critics' view of the date of the Cairene Ecclesiasticus; the second is based upon the claim that the names "Chedorlaomer," etc., of Gen., chap. 14, have been found in Babylonian documents—a claim shown to be doubtful by L. W. King, an indisputable authority on such matters; and the third charge fails to understand the basis upon which present-day critics question the production of literature in the Mosaic period. Those seeking ammunition against the critics must exercise caution in the use of this book.

ROSENAU, WILLIAM. *Jewish Biblical Commentators*. Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1906. 153 pages.

Eight chapters on the leading Jewish interpreters of the Old Testament from the days of the Talmud down to the present, with a brief bibliography and index. The work is popular in form and well written by one thoroughly at home with his subject.

WORK, EDGAR W., *The Fascination of the Book*. Chicago: Revell, 1906. 253 pages. \$1.25.

An attempt on the part of a scholarly pastor to quicken in others something of the same zeal for Bible study that inspires his own utterances. The thirteen chapters are sermon in character and addressed to the average mind. The author does not pose as the representative of any school of interpretation, but contents himself with emphasizing the necessity and value of the study of the Scriptures.

GORDON, W. C. *The Social Ideals of Alfred Tennyson*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906. 257 pages. \$1.50.

To a refined appreciation of beautiful literature the author unites considerable knowledge of modern sociology. The bold and abstract formulations of social ends have need of imaginative treatment by poets in order to give them attractiveness and power, even with the scholar. The bony structure is only part of the body, and philosophical analysis is to most men only a skeleton for a closet. In this book we

enjoy the social ideals in their artistic dress. Literature is a means of social expression; it studies and portrays the past; it brings society to self-consciousness; it embodies highest individual and social ideals. To understand a poet or prophet we must understand his times and the social conditions of his country. From his works we may discover his idea of man, his estimate of woman, his view of social institutions, his interpretation of contemporary movements. The religious ideals of the English bard are sympathetically treated.

THIEME, GOTTFRIED. *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Mäander und das Neue Testament: Eine sprachgeschichtliche Studie.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1906. 41 pages. M. 1.20.

The writer has examined 400 Greek inscriptions of Asia Minor with a view to comparing the language of the inscriptions with that of the New Testament. His investigation tends to show that the Greek of the New Testament writers, with respect to orthography, form, syntax, and lexical usage, was the Greek in common use at that period. This treatise is none the less valuable in that the results are largely confirmatory of what has been already discovered in other inscriptions and papyri. Only such a minute and exhaustive survey of the whole field of the then current Greek will afford a reliable basis for the interpretation of the language of the New Testament. The writer is to be commended for this scholarly piece of work.

FAIRBANKS, ARTHUR. *The Mythology of Greece and Rome.* New York: Appleton, 1907. xvi + 408 pages. \$1.50 net.

Professor Fairbanks has prepared a handbook concerned with the simple statement of myths so as to show their influence on literature, with numerous references to Latin poets and later writers for the purpose of illustration. It is not a part of the author's purpose to theorize concerning the origin of myths, or to trace their development and history, or to interpret them, or to show their influence, except upon later literature. It is to be regretted that the original plan of showing the influence of myths on later art as well could not have been followed. Much material for this is found in the numerous photographs of well-known archaeological remains with which the book is beautifully illustrated. There are maps, an index of proper names, with pronunciation indicated, and some genealogical tables. The book finds its justification in a restatement of myths for the needs of the present generation, and to incorporate the results of investigations of the last twenty years by German scholars like Roscher, Preller, and Robert. The author is progressive, yet conservative and judicious, and has produced a useful book.

VANCE, JAMES I. *The Eternal in Man.* Chicago: Revell, 1907. 240 pages. \$1.

A vigorous and rhetorically effective appeal to higher living, based on the conviction that man is a citizen of the eternal world.

DELTA. *Organic Evolution: A Sketch.* Henry Drummond Memorial. Chicago: Anna Augusta Gaskell, 1907. 281 pages. \$2.

An enthusiastic advocacy of the evolutionary hypothesis as furnishing a scientific basis for a sound theology. The author has read widely, and brings together much

interesting material, but carries her hypothesis somewhat daringly into speculative realms.

DUPIN, ANTOINE. *Le dogme de la Trinité dans les trois premiers siècles.* Paris: Nourry, 1907. 77 pages. Fr. 1.25.

A brief summary of history of the growth of the trinitarian doctrine, giving primary attention to verbal citations of the formula rather than to interpretation. As an objective presentation of material it forms a convenient handbook.

STEIN, E. *Sals und Licht.* Vorträge und Abhandlungen in zwangloser Folge. 15: *Nietzsche's Gottesbegründnis eine Selbstbestattung des Atheismus.* Bar-men: Wuppertaler Traktat-Gesellschaft, 1907. 26 pages. M. O. 30.

SHAW, JOHN BALCOM. *Life That Follows Life.* Chicago: Revell, 1907. 128 pages. \$0.75.

A popular exposition of phases of immortality, marked by a naïve interest in pictorial details.

BROUGHTON, LEN G. *The Second Coming of Christ.* Chicago: Revell, 1907. 158 pages. \$0.50.

A series of popular expositions based on a literal interpretation of the New Testament eschatology.

GRAUE, GEORG. *Die protestantische Lehrfreiheit.* Berlin: Schwetschke, 1905. 32 pages. M. o.50.

A brief address, discussing primarily the limits of freedom in the case of Protestant preachers and theological teachers. Such limits should not be mechanically or technically defined, but should be vitally related to the inner vigor of Protestant piety. A lack of inner sympathy for this latter is the sole ground of condemnation.

BAUMGARTEN, OTTO. *Carlyle und Goethe.* Tübingen: Mohr. 177 pages. M. 2.40.

A volume in the "Lebensfragen" series, discussing with suggestive discrimination Carlyle's indebtedness to Goethe, and showing the fundamental differences between the two great geniuses, concluding with an estimate of their influence on Christian thought.

VON E. G. O. *Inneres Wachstum.* Sieben Aufsätze. Stuttgart: Seifert, 1907. 90 pages. M. 1.50.

Popular expositions of various phases of spiritual life.

THOMPSON, R. J. *The Proofs of Life after Death.* A Collation of Opinions as to a Future Life by Some of the World's Most Eminent Scientific Men and Thinkers. Boston: Turner, 1906. 365 pages. \$1.50.

A rather heterogeneous compendium of the opinions of scientists, "psychical

researchers," philosophers, and spiritualists. The "philosophers" are mainly rhetoricians, including, e. g., William Jennings Bryan.

SIEDEL, ERNST. *Der Weg zur ewigen Schönheit: Lebensweisheit für Jungfrauen*. Dresden: Ungelenk, 1906. 478 pages. M. 3.50.

Sermons addressed especially to young women, representing a somewhat pietistic type of religion.

SAINTYVES, P. *Le miracle et la critique historique*. Paris: Nourry, 1907. 154 pages. Fr. 1.25.

A well-written little volume in the "Bibliothèque de critique religieuse," which sets forth in a fair-minded fashion the principles of historical criticism, and on the basis of such criticism shows the futility of attempting to make miracles the main-stay of religion.

ELDRIDGE, GARDNER S. *The Coming Man*. New York: Eaton & Mains. 196 pages. \$0.75.

This little volume is genuinely Christian in its spirit, and exalts the worth and dignity of personality. It is a message to manhood, literary rather than philosophical, and presenting many noble sentiments in a style that is, at times, pleasing and attractive.

CALMES, LE P. TH. *Evangile selon Saint Jean*. Paris: Lecoffre, 1906. xxviii + 204 pages. Fr. 2.50.

In a prefatory note the author calls attention to the short commentaries on the Synoptic Gospels published in three volumes, under the title *La pensée chrétienne*, by Père Rose, and suggests that his little volume might be supplementary to that series. It is issued separately, however, and bears the general title of a Bible study.

In a short and very readable introduction the author speaks of the differences between the Gospel of St. John and the Synoptists without making any attempt to explain them. The "Incarnate Word" and the "Reign of the Holy Spirit" are themes which are specially characteristic of this gospel. In the body of the book Père Calmes gives a lucid French translation of the gospel, and under the text a running commentary on the main thoughts of the text. Those comments are very suggestive, but, we think, he has introduced rather too much of the critical material to make his book in the highest degree serviceable for popular use. He is not free from his Roman bias in the interpretation of the figurative language of John, and we wonder that he still holds with the older commentators of his church that the kingdom of God is to be realized in the Roman Church.

INDEX

I. AUTHORS AND SUBJECTS

<i>Acts versus Galatians: The Crux of Apostolic History</i>	454
<i>Africa and the Beginnings of Christian Latin Literature</i>	95
<i>An Actual Experiment in Non-Sectarian Missionary Activity</i>	217
<i>An Immutable Absolute or a God Who Strives?</i>	128
ARPEE, LEON, <i>An Actual Experiment in Non-Sectarian Missionary Activity</i>	217
BACON, BENJAMIN W., <i>Acts versus Galatians: The Crux of Apostolic History</i>	454
BAILEY, J. W., <i>Review of: Beecher, The Teaching of Jesus Concerning the Future Life</i>	693
Monteil, <i>Essai sur la Christologie de Saint Paul</i>	330
Robertson, <i>Key Words in the Teaching of Jesus</i>	692
Streatfeild, <i>The Self-Interpretation of Jesus Christ</i>	688
BARNES, CHARLES R., <i>Review of: Schmid, The Scientific Creed of a Theologian</i>	357
Smith, <i>Christ and Science: Jesus Christ Regarded as the Center of Science</i>	356
BARTON, GEORGE A., <i>Review of Jensen, Das Gilgamesch-Epos in der Welt-literatur</i>	519
BECHEL, EDWARD A., <i>Review of Rand, Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters: I. Johannes Scottus</i>	338
BROWN, FRANCIS, <i>Review of Budde, Geschichte der althebräischen Litteratur</i>	663
BURTON, ERNEST D., <i>Redemption from the Curse of the Law</i>	624
<i>Can the Human Character of Jesus Be Called Divine?</i>	290
CARUS, PAUL, <i>Missions from the Standpoint of Comparative Religion</i>	13
CASE, SHIRLEY J., <i>Paul's Historical Relation to the First Disciples</i>	269
<i>Christian Latin Literature, Africa and the Beginnings of</i>	95
CHRISTIE, FRANCIS A., <i>What Has Christianity to Offer to Oriental Nations</i>	25
CLEMEN, CARL, <i>Review of Smith, Der vorchristliche Jesus</i>	327
CLEMENT, ERNEST W., <i>Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on Mission Fields?</i>	205
<i>Comparative Religion, Missions from the Standpoint of</i>	13
<i>Critical Notes</i> 131, 287, 290, 293, 307, 501, 503, 647	647
<i>Divinity of Man, What Is Meant by the</i>	287
<i>Eliakim and Shebna</i> 51	503
<i>Ethical Inwardness in Jewish Thought, The Origins of</i>	228
FAIRBANKS, ARTHUR, <i>Review of Otto, Priester und Temple im hellenistischen Aegypten</i>	325
FORREST, ALBERTINA ALLEN, <i>The Cry "Back to Christ": Its Implication</i>	56
FOSTER, FRANK HUGH, <i>Review of Sheldon, System of Christian Doctrine</i>	164
FOSTER, GEORGE BURMAN, <i>Pragmatism and Knowledge</i>	591
FRAME, J. W., <i>Review of: Fiebig, Jesu Blut, ein Geheimniss?</i>	691
Grafe, <i>Das Urchristentum und das Alte Testament</i>	689
Schettler, <i>Die paulinische Formel, "Durch Christum."</i>	690
Thieme, <i>Die christliche Demut: Eine historische Untersuchung zur theologischen Ethik</i>	689
FULLERTON, KEMPER, <i>Shebna and Eliakim: A Reply</i>	503
<i>Review of: Beer, Saul, David, Salomo</i>	672
Brown, C. R., <i>The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah</i>	669
Brown, H. C., <i>The Historical Bases of Religions</i>	666
Driver, <i>The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah</i>	669
Engert, <i>Die Urzeit der Bibel</i>	670
Gardiner, <i>The Bible as English Literature</i>	676

König, Prophetenideal, Judentum, Christentum	669
Schmidt, Jona: Eine Untersuchung zur vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte	671
Vernon, The Religious Value of the Old Testament	666
<i>Function of History in Theology, The</i>	647
Galatians 3:13, 14	624
Galatians versus Acts: The Cruz of Apostolic History	454
GESSELBRACHT, F. H., Review of: Hardeland, Grabreden	170
Hoffmann, Fastenpredigten	169
Klaveness, Zwanzig Predigten	169
Kühn, Festpredigten über alttestamentliche Texte	170
Langheinrich, Die stille Woche	170
Lülmann, Predigten über Zeitfragen	169
Quandt, Ein evangelisches Osterbuch	169
Reu, Die alttestamentlichen Perikopen	169
Rüling, Beichtreden	169
Christus für uns!	170
Schenkel, Zwölf Weihnachtspredigten für einfache Christenleute	169
Siedel, Konfirmationsreden	169
Storch, Zwölf Sylvester und Neujahrs-Predigten	169
Winter, Apologetische Predigten	169
GIESEBRECHT, FRIEDRICH, The Moral Level of the Old Testament Scriptures	31
GILBERT, GEORGE H., Review of: Wieland, Der Alter der vorkonstantinischen Kirche	336
Feder, Justins des Märtyrers Lehre von Jesus Christus	
GILMORE, GEORGE W., Review of: Funk, The Psychic Riddle	550
Hamilton, Incubation; or, The Cure of Disease in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches	550
Harlan, John Alexander Dowie and the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion	550
God, Three Conceptions of	428
<i>Gospels in the Latin Vulgate, The</i>	501
GREGORY, CASPER RENÉ, John 5:7, 8	131
GULICK, SIDNEY L., Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on Mission Fields?	185
<i>Has Christianity the Moral Right to Supplant the Ethnic Faiths?</i>	1
HERFORD, R. TRAVERS, Review of Friedländer, Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu	524
Historical Studies on Theology, The Influence of	111
History in Theology, The Function of	653
HORSCH, JOHN, Martin Luther's Attitude toward the Principle of Liberty of Conscience	307
HOSTE, D. E., Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on Mission Fields?	193
HULBERT, ERI B., Review of Burrage, The True Story of Robert Browne	346
<i>Human Character of Jesus: Can It Be Called Divine?</i>	290
India, Influence of Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures in	293
<i>Influence of Historical Studies on Theology, The</i>	111
<i>Influence of Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures in India</i>	293
<i>Israel or Jerahmeel?</i>	553
<i>Italy and Pius X</i>	475
Jerahmeel or Israel?	553
<i>Jewish Encyclopedia, The</i>	181, 653
Jewish Thought, The Origins of Ethical Inwardness in	228
John 5:7, 8	131
JOHNSON, FRANKLIN, Review of: Arnold, Weingartens Zeittafeln und Ueberblicke zur Kirchengeschichte	335
Barge, Andreas Bodenstern von Karlstadt	343

De le Roi, Rudolf Hermann Gurland	351
Faulkner, Cyprian: The Churchman	336
Fisher, The Reformation	341
Gerberding, Life and Letters of W. A. Passavant, D.D.	348
Jundt, Le développement de la pensée religieuse de Luther jusqu'en 1517	341
Kirsch, Der Portiunkula-Ablass: Eine kirtisch-historische Studie	340
Koeniger, Die Beicht nach Casarius von Heisterbach	340
Kolde, Die älteste Redaktion der Augsburger Konfession, mit Melanchthons Einleitung	342
Labanca, Die Zukunft des Papsttums: Historisch-kritische Studie	351
Lea, A History of the Inquisition of Spain, Vol. II	342
Lindsay, A History of the Reformation	341
Nippold, Handbuch der neuesten Kirchengeschichte	346
Samter, Judentaufen im 19 Jahrhundert	350
JOHNSTON, CHRISTOPHER, Review of: Budge, The Egyptian Heaven and Hell	324
KEIRSTEAD, W. C., Review of: Djuvara, wissenschaftliche und religiöse Welt- ansicht	168
Kaftan, Jesus and Paulus	533
Gross, Die Bedeutung des Asthetischen in der evangelischen Religion	167
Gwatkin, The Knowledge of God	546
Walcott, Kantian and Lutheran Elements in Ritschl's Conception of God	549
Walker, Christian Theism and Spiritual Monism	548
KENNEDY, H. A. A., Review of: Forrest, The Authority of Christ	150
Ramsay, Pauline and Other Studies	527
Schmiedel, Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung	150
Smith, The Prophet of Nazareth	150
Schweitzer, Von Reimarus zu Wrede: Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu- Forschung	150
Vollmer, Jesus und das Saccenopfer	150
KNOX, GEORGE WILLIAM, What Modifications in Western Christianity May Be Expected from Contact with Oriental Religions on the Mission Field?	569
KÖHLER, WALTHER, Modern Italy and Pius X	475
Law, Redemption from the Curse of the	624
Liberty of Conscience, Martin Luther's Attitude toward the Principle of	307
LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O., The Origins of Ethical Inwardness in Jewish Thought	228
MABIE, HENRY C., The Divine Right of Christian Missions	1
MACINTOSH, DOUGLAS C., The Function of History in Theology	647
<i>Martin Luther's Attitude toward the Principle of Liberty of Conscience</i>	307
MCGIFFERT, ARTHUR C., Mysticism in the Early Church	407
McKIBBEN, WILLIAM K., What Conception of the Scriptures and of Scripture Authority Should Underlie the Work of the Modern Missionary?	580
MEAD, C. M., What Is Meant by the Divinity of Man?	287
MENANT, MILE. D., Influence of Max Müller's Hibbert Lectures in India	293
MILLER, EDWARD WAITE, Some Distinctive Features of Russian Christianity	597
Mission Fields, Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on	185
<i>Missions from the Standpoint of Comparative Religion</i>	13
Missions, The Divine Right of Christian	1
Missionary Activity, An Actual Experiment in Non-Sectarian	217
<i>Modern Italy and Pius X</i>	475
Modern Missionary Work, The Motive of	369
MOEHLMANN, CONRAD H., Review of Grützmacher, Hieronymus: Eine bio- graphische Studie zur alten Kirchengeschichte	352
MOFFATT, JAMES, Review of Allen, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on 1st the Gospel According to St. Matthew	677
MONCRIEF, J. W., Review of: Doumergue, Jean Calvin: Les hommes et les choses de son temps	344

Heussi, Johann Lorenz Mosheim: Ein Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts	345
Valois, Histoire de la pragmatique sanction de Bourges sous Charles VII	340
<i>Moral Level of the Old Testament Scriptures, The</i>	331
MOULTON, JAMES HOPE, Review of: Abbott, Johannine Grammar	157
MOULTON, WARREN J., Review of: Holtzmann, Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu	685
Schaefer, Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie	687
<i>Mysticism in the Early Church</i>	407
NESTLE, EB., The Gospels in the Latin Vulgate	501
Old Testament Scriptures, The Moral Level of the	31
Oriental Nations, What Has Christianity to Offer to	25
Oriental Religions on the Mission Field, What Modifications in Western Christianity May Be Expected from Contact with	569
<i>Origins of Ethical Inwardness in Jewish Thought</i>	228
PARKER, A. K., Review of: Barber, David Hill, an Apostle to the Chinese	367
Blanc, Dictionnaire de philosophie ancienne, moderne et contemporaine	368
Dennis, Christian Missions and Social Progress	362
Eleutheropulos, Das Schöne	367
Hall, Christ and the Human Race	363
Jackson, The Fourth Gospel and Some Recent German Criticism	368
Kurtz, Abriss der Kirchengeschichte	368
Montgomery, Christus Redemptor: An Outline Study of the Island World of the Pacific	367
Religions of Mission Fields as Viewed by Protestant Missionaries	367
Students and the Modern Missionary Crusade	365
PAULIN, WILLIAM T., Review of: Arnal, La personne du Christ et le rationalisme allemand contemporain	177
Rivaud, Le problème du devenir et la notion de la matière dans la philosophie grecque depuis les origines jusqu'à Theophraste	542
Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de Spinoza	544
Schaefer, Die Christologie der Bekenntnisse und die moderne Theologie	179
Schmittbühner, Schillers Stellung zur Religion	545
Shields, Philosophia ultima; or Science of the Sciences	545
<i>Paul's Historical Relation to the First Disciples</i>	269
PORTER, FRANK C., The Sufficiency of the Religion of Jesus	74
<i>Pragmatism and Knowledge</i>	591
PRICE, IRA M., Review of: Cornill, Das Buch Jeremia	516
PRICE, IRA M., AND SMITH, J. M. P., Review of: Cobb, The Book of Psalms	143
Dibelius, Die Lade Jahves	147
Driver, The Book of Job in the Revised Version	142
Duhm, Das Buch Habakuk	146
Engert, Ehe- und Familienrecht der Hebräer	148
Genung, The Book of Leviticus	142
Houghton, Hebrew Life and Thought	150
Kent, The Origin and Permanent Value of the Old Testament	140
Kleinert, Die Propheten Israels in sozialer Beziehung	145
Küchler, Die Stellung des Propheten Jesaja zur Politik seiner Zeit	145
Löhr, Sozialismus und Individualismus im Alten Testament	149
Möller, Die messianische Erwartung der vorexilischen Propheten	145
Raven, Old Testament Introduction	140
Sanders and Fowler, Outlines for the Study of Biblical History and Literature	141
Strack, Einleitung in das Alte Testament	139
Touzard, Grammaire hébraïque abrégée	139
Protestant Episcopal Church, Recent Changes in Theology in the	384
Prussian Religious Instruction, The Spirit and Value of	250

RASHDALL, H., The Motive of Modern Missionary Work	369
RAUSCHENBUSCH, WALTER, The Influence of Historical Studies on Theology	111
<i>Recent Changes in Theology in the Protestant Episcopal Church</i>	384
<i>Redemption from the Curse of the Law: an Exposition of Gal. 3:13, 14</i>	624
Religion of Jesus, The Sufficiency of the	74
RICHARDSON, ERNEST C., Review of: Bauer, Die Chronik des Hippolytos im Matritensis Graecus	121
Leipoldt, Didymus der Blinde von Alexandria	333
von der Goltz, Tischgebete und Abendmahlsgebete in der altchristlichen und in der griechischen Kirche	333
RIGGS, JAMES S., Review of: Reid, Jesus and Nicodemus	534
Scott, The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose and Theology	535
Russian Christianity, Some Distinctive Features of	597
RYDER, WILLIAM H., Review of: Hall, Paul the Apostle as Viewed by a Layman	530
Kölbing, Die geistige Einwirkung der Person Jesu auf Paulus	532
Patrick, James the Lord's Brother	532
Pfleiderer, Christian Origins	531
SCOTT, C. ANDERSON, Review of: Bousset, Die Offenbarung Johannis	540
Swete, The Apocalypse of St. John	540
SHARMAN, HENRY BURTON, Review of: Burkitt, The Gospel History and Its Transmission	683
Müller, Geschichtskerne in den Evangelien nach modernen Forschungen: Marcus und Matthäus	680
Wendling, Ur-Marcus	682
<i>Shebna and Eliakim: A Reply</i>	503
<i>Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on Mission Fields?</i>	185
SISSON, EDWARD O., The Spirit and Value of Prussian Religious Instruction	250
SMITH, GERALD B., Review of: Cairns, Christianity in the Modern World	706
Campbell, The New Theology	705
Harnack and Herrmann, Essays on the Social Gospel	708
Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God	707
Jones, The Double Search: Studies in Atonement and Prayer	709
Pritchett, What is Religion?	710
The Religion of Christ in the Twentieth Century	704
SMITH, HENRY PRESERVED, Israel or Jerahmeel?	553
Review of The Jewish Encyclopedia	653
SMITH, JOHN M. P., Review of: Baentsch, Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus	318
Gressmann, Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie	320
Marti, Die Religion des Alten Testaments unter den Religionen des vorderen Orients	316
SMITH, J. M. P., AND PRICE, IRA M., Review of: Cobb, The Book of Psalms	143
Dibelius, Die Lade Jahves	147
Driver, The Book of Job in the Revised Version	142
Duhm, Das Buch Habakuk	146
Engert, Ehe- und Familienrecht der Hebräer	148
Genung, The Book of Leviticus	142
Houghton, Hebrew Life and Thought	150
Kent, The Origin and Permanent Value of the Old Testament	140
Kleinert, Die Profeten Israels in sozialer Beziehung	145
Küchler, Die Stellung des Propheten Jesaja zur Politik seiner Zeit	145
Löhr, Sozialismus und Individualismus im Alten Testament	149
Möller, Die messianische Erwartung der vorexilischen Propheten	145
Raven, Old Testament Introduction	140
Sanders and Fowler, Outlines for the Study of Biblical History and Literature	141
Strack, Einleitung in das Alte Testament	139
Touzard, Grammaire hébraïque abrégée	139

SOARES, THEODORE G., Review of: <i>Black, Listening to God</i>	711
Brown, <i>The Social Message of the Modern Pulpit</i>	713
Gordon, <i>Through Man to God</i>	712
Gunsaulus, <i>Paths to the City of God</i>	712
Gwatkin, <i>The Eye for Spiritual Things, and Other Sermons</i>	711
Hoyt, <i>The Work of Preaching</i>	713
Zahn, <i>Bread and Salt from the Word of God</i>	713
<i>Some Distinctive Features of Russian Christianity</i>	597
SPEER, ROBERT E., Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on Mission Fields?	212
<i>Spirit and Value of Prussian Religious Instruction, The</i>	250
ST. JOHN, WALLACE, Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on Mission Fields?	209
<i>Sufficiency of the Religion of Jesus, The</i>	74
<i>The Cry "Back to Christ": Its Implication</i>	56
Theology in the Protestant Episcopal Church, Recent Changes in	384
Theology, The Function of History in	647
Theology, The Influence of Historical Studies on	111
<i>Three Conceptions of God</i>	428
TORREY, CHARLES C., Review of Brown, <i>et al</i> , <i>A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament</i>	510
UPWARD, BERNARD, Should the Denominational Distinctions of Christian Lands Be Perpetuated on Mission Fields?	196
VAN PELT, J. R., Review of Kähler, <i>Dogmatische Zeitfragen</i>	355
VON DOBSCHÜTZ, ERNST, Review of Holtzmann, <i>Neutestamentliche Zeit- geschichte</i>	673
WARFIELD, BENJAMIN B., <i>Africa and the Beginnings of Christian Latin Litera- ture</i>	95
<i>What Conception of the Scriptures and of Scripture Authority Should Underlie the Work of the Modern Missionary?</i>	580
<i>What Modifications in Western Christianity May Be Expected from Contact with Oriental Religions on the Mission Field?</i>	569
WRIGHT, HENRY W., <i>An Immutable Absolute or a God Who Strives?</i>	128
Can the Human Character of Jesus Be Called Divine?	290
Review of: Clark, <i>The Philosophy of Christian Experience</i>	359
Guyot, <i>L'infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin</i>	360
Hamilton, <i>The Spirit World</i>	261
Hébert, <i>Le divin expérience et hypothèse</i>	359
Hyslop, <i>Borderland of Psychical Research</i>	361
Science and a Future Life	361
YOUTZ, HERBERT A., <i>Three Conceptions of God</i>	428
Review of: Beckwith, <i>Realities of Christian Theology</i>	694
Marshall, <i>Theology and Truth</i>	698
Wobbermin, Ernst Haeckel im Kampf gegen die christliche Weltanschauung	697

II. RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

Abbott, <i>Johannine Grammar</i>	157
Allen, <i>A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. Matthew</i>	677
Angus, <i>The Sources of the First Ten Books of Augustine's De Civitate Dei</i>	180
Arnal, <i>La personne du Christ et le rationalisme allemand contemporain</i>	177
Arnold, <i>Weingartens Zeittafeln und Überblicke zur Kirchengeschichte</i>	335
Baensch, <i>Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus</i>	318
Barber, David Hill an Apostle to the Chinese	367

<i>Barge</i> , Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt	343
<i>Bauer</i> , Die Chronik des Hippolytos im Matritensis Graecus 121	333
<i>Baumgarten</i> , Carlyle und Goethe	717
<i>Beckwith</i> , Realities of Christian Theology	694
<i>Beecher</i> , The Teaching of Jesus Concerning the Future Life	693
<i>Beer</i> , Saul, David, Salomo	672
<i>Black</i> , Listening to God	711
<i>Blanc</i> , Dictionnaire de philosophie ancienne, moderne et contemporaine	368
<i>Bousset</i> , Die Offenbarung Johannis	540
<i>Broughton</i> , The Second Coming of Christ	717
<i>Brown</i> , C. R., The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah	669
The Social Message of the Modern Pulpit	713
<i>Brown</i> , Francis, et al., A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament	510
<i>Brown</i> , H. C., The Historical Basis of Religions	666
<i>Budde</i> , Geschichte der althebräischen Litteratur	663
<i>Budge</i> , The Egyptian Heaven and Hell	324
<i>Burkitt</i> , The Gospel History and Its Transmission	683
<i>Burrage</i> , The True Story of Robert Browne	347
<i>Cairns</i> , Christianity in the Modern World	706
<i>Calmes</i> , Evangele selon Saint Jean	718
<i>Campbell</i> , The New Theology	705
<i>Case</i> , The Masculine in Religion	714
<i>Clark</i> , The Philosophy of Christian Experience	359
<i>Cobb</i> , The Book of Psalms	143
<i>Cornill</i> , Das Buch Jeremiah	516
<i>Dawson</i> , The Gift of Tongues, and Other Essays	183
<i>De le Roi</i> , Rudolf Hermann Gurland	351
<i>Delta</i> , Organic Evolution	716
<i>Dennis</i> , Christian Missions and Social Progress	362
<i>Dibelius</i> , Die Lade Jahves	147
<i>Djuvara</i> , Wissenschaftliche und religiöse Weltansicht	168
<i>Doumergue</i> , Jean Calvin: Les hommes et les choses de son temps	344
<i>Driver</i> , The Book of the Prophet Jeremiah	669
The Book of Job in the Revised Version	142
<i>Duhm</i> , Das Buch Habakuk	146
<i>Dupin</i> , Le dogme de la Trinité dans les trois premiers siècles	717
<i>Eldridge</i> , The Coming Man	718
<i>Eleutheropulos</i> , Das Schöne	367
<i>Engert</i> , Die Urzeit der Bibel	670
Ehe- und Familienrecht der Hebräer	148
<i>Fairbanks</i> , The Mythology of Greece and Rome	716
<i>Faulkner</i> , Cyprian: The Churchman	336
<i>Feder</i> , Justins des Martyrers Lehre von Jesus Christus	336
<i>Fei</i> , De evangeliorum inspiratione; de dogmatis evolutione	715
<i>Fiebig</i> , Jesu Blut, ein Geheimniss?	691
Pirque'aboth = Der Mischnatractat "Sprüche der Väter"	184
<i>Fisher</i> , The Reformation	341
<i>Forrest</i> , The Authority of Christ	150
<i>Friedlander</i> , Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu	524
<i>Funk</i> , The Psychic Riddle	550
<i>Gardiner</i> , The Bible as English Literature	667
<i>Genung</i> , The Book of Leviticus and the Book of Numbers	142
<i>Gerberding</i> , Life and Letters of W. A. Passavant	348
<i>Gerhard</i> , Handbuch der Glaubenslehre Johann Gerhards	714
<i>Gordon</i> , G. A., Through Man to God	712
<i>Gordon</i> , W. C., The Social Ideals of Alfred Tennyson	715

<i>Grafe</i> , Das Urschristentum und das Alte Testament	689
<i>Graue</i> , Die protestantische Lehrfreiheit	717
<i>Gressmann</i> , Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie	320
<i>Gross</i> , Die Bedeutung des Aesthetischen in der evangelischen Religion	167
<i>Grüsmacher</i> , Hieronymus: Eine biographische Studie zur alten Kirchengeschichte	352
<i>Gunkel</i> , Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher	184
<i>Gunsaulus</i> , Paths to the City of God	712
<i>Guyot</i> , L'infinité divine depuis Philon le Juif jusqu'à Plotin	300
<i>Guatkin</i> , The Eye for Spiritual Things, and Other Sermons	711
The Knowledge of God	546
<i>Hadley</i> , Freedom and Responsibility	182
<i>Hall</i> , C. C., Christ and the Human Race	363
E. H., Paul the Apostle as Viewed by a Layman	530
<i>Hamilton</i> , J., The Spirit World	361
M., Incubation; or, The Cure of Disease in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches	550
<i>Hardeland</i> , Grabreden	170
<i>Harlan</i> , John Alexander Dowie and the Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion	550
<i>Harnack and Herrmann</i> , Essays on the Social Gospel	708
<i>Hartsog</i> , Ancient Masters and Jesus	714
<i>Hébert</i> , Le divin expérience et hypothèse	359
<i>Herrmann</i> , The Communion of the Christian with God	707
<i>Heussi</i> , Johann Lorenz Mosheim	345
<i>Hoffmann</i> , Fastenpredigten	169
<i>Holtsmann</i> , Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu	685
Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte	672
<i>Houghton</i> , Hebrew Life and Thought	150
<i>Hoyt</i> , The Work of Preaching	713
<i>Hyslop</i> , Science and a Future Life; Borderland of Psychical Research	361
<i>Jackson</i> , The Fourth Gospel and Some Recent German Criticism	368
<i>Jensen</i> , Das Gilgamesch-Epos in der Weltliteratur	519
<i>Jewish Encyclopedia</i> , Vols. XI and XII	181
<i>Jewish Encyclopedia</i>	653
<i>Jones</i> , The Double Search; Studies in Atonement and Prayer	709
<i>Jundt</i> , Le développement de la pensée religieuse de Luther 1517	341
<i>Kaftan</i> , Jesus und Paulus: Eine freundschaftliche Streitschrift gegen die Religionsgeschichtlichen	533
<i>Kähler</i> , Dogmatische Zeitfragen: Alte und neue Ausführungen zur Wissenschaft der christlichen Lehre	355
<i>Kent</i> , The Origin and Permanent Value of the Old Testament	140
<i>Kirsch</i> , Der Portiunkula-Ablass: Eine kritisch-historische Studie	340
<i>Klaveness</i> , Zwanzig Predigten	169
<i>Kleinert</i> , Die Profeten Israels in sozialer Beziehung	145
<i>Koeniger</i> , Die Beicht nach Casarius von Heisterbach	340
<i>Kolde</i> , Die älteste Redaktion der Augsburger Konfession, mit Melanchthons Einleitung	342
<i>Kölbing</i> , Die geistige Einwirkung der Person Jesu auf Paulus: Eine historische Untersuchung	532
<i>König</i> , Prophetenideal, Judentum, Christentum	669
<i>Küchler</i> , Die Stellung des Propheten Jesaja zur Politik seiner Zeit	145
<i>Kühn</i> , Festpredigten über alttestamentliche Texte	170
<i>Kurtz</i> , Abriss der Kirchengeschichte	368
<i>Labanca</i> , Die Zukunft des Papsttums: Historisch-kritische Studie	351
<i>Lamers</i> , Vom Ernst des Lebens	714
<i>Langheinrich</i> , Die Stille Woche	170
<i>Leo</i> , A History of the Inquisition of Spain	342

<i>Leipoldt</i> , Didymus der Blinde von Alexandria	333
<i>Lendrum</i> , An Outline of Christian Truth	714
<i>Lightwood</i> , Hymn-Tunes and Their Story	182
<i>Lindsay</i> , A History of the Reformation: I, The Reformation in Germany	341
<i>Löhr</i> , Sozialismus und Individualismus im Alten Testament	149
<i>Lülmann</i> , Predigten über Zeitfragen	169
<i>MacLaren</i> , The Book of Genesis	183
<i>Marshall</i> , Theology and Truth	698
<i>Marit</i> , Die Religion des Alten Testaments unter den Religionen des vorderen Orients	316
<i>McKim</i> , The Problem of the Pentateuch	715
<i>Möller</i> , Die messianische Erwartung der vorexilischen Propheten	145
<i>Monteil</i> , Essai sur la Christologie de Saint Paul	330
<i>Montgomery</i> , Christus Redemptor; An Outline Study of the Island World of the Pacific	367
<i>Müller</i> , Geschichtskerne in den Evangelien nach modernen Forschungen: Marcus und Matthäus	680
<i>Nippold</i> , Handbuch der neuesten Kirchengeschichte	347
<i>Otto</i> , Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten	325
<i>Patrick</i> , James the Lord's Brother	532
<i>Peloubet</i> , Studies in the Book of Job	184
<i>Pfleiderer</i> , Christian Origins	531
<i>Pritchett</i> , What is Religion?	710
<i>Quandt</i> , Ein evangelisches Osterbuch	169
<i>Ramsay</i> , Pauline and Other Studies	527
<i>Rand</i> , Johannes Scottus	338
<i>Raven</i> , Old Testament Introduction	140
<i>Reid</i> , Jesus and Nicodemus: A Study in Spiritual Life	534
Religion of Christ in the Twentieth Century	704
Religions on Mission Fields as Viewed by Protestant Missionaries	367
<i>Reu</i> , Die alttestamentlichen Perikopen	169
<i>Rivaud</i> , Le problème du devenir et la matière dans la philosophie grecque depuis les origines jusqu'à Théophraste	542
Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de Spinoza	544
<i>Robertson</i> , Key Words in the Teaching of Jesus	692
<i>Rosenau</i> , Jewish Biblical Commentators	715
<i>Rüling</i> , Beichtreden	169
Christus für uns: Passionspredigten	170
<i>Saintyves</i> , Le miracle et la critique historique	718
<i>Samter</i> , Judentaufen im 19 Jahrhundert	350
<i>Sanders and Fowler</i> , Outlines for the Study of Biblical History and Literature	141
<i>Schaeder</i> , Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie	687
Die Christologie der Bekenntnisse und die moderne Theologie	179
<i>Schenkel</i> , Zwölf Weihnachtspredigten für einfache Christenleute	169
<i>Schettler</i> , Die paulinische Formel "Durch Christus"	690
<i>Schlossinger</i> , Rashi, His Life and Work	184
<i>Schmid</i> , The Scientific Creed of a Theologian	357
<i>Schmidt</i> , The Prophet of Nazareth	150
Jona: Eine Untersuchung zur vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte	671
<i>Schmiedel</i> , Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung	150
<i>Schmittener</i> , Schillers Stellung zur Religion	545
<i>Schweitzer</i> , Von Reimarus zu Wrede	150
<i>Scott</i> , The Fourth Gospel: Its Purpose and Theology	535
<i>Shaw</i> , Life that Follows Life	717
<i>Sheldon</i> , System of Christian Doctrine	164
<i>Shields</i> , Philosophia ultima; or, Science of the Sciences, Vol. III	545

<i>Siedel</i> , Konfirmationsreden	169
Der Weg zur ewigen Schönheit	718
<i>Slater</i> , The Sources of Tyndale's Version of the Pentateuch	183
<i>Smith, F. H.</i> , Christ and Science	350
<i>Smith, W. B.</i> , Der vorchristliche Jesus	327
<i>Springer</i> , The Savior's Creed	714
<i>Slein</i> , Salz und Licht	716
<i>Storch</i> , Zwölf Sylvester- und Neujahrs-Predigten	169
<i>Strachan</i> , Hebrew Ideals from the Study of the Patriarchs	184
<i>Strack</i> , Die Genesis, übersetzt und ausgelegt	183
Einleitung in das Alte Testament	139
<i>Streetjeild</i> , The Self-Interpretation of Jesus Christ	688
Students and the Modern Missionary Crusade	365
<i>Swete</i> , The Apocalypse of St. John	540
Theologischer Jahresbericht, XXIV. Band, 1905	181
<i>Thieme</i> , Die christliche Demut	689
Die Inschriften von Magnesia am mäander und das Neue Testament	716
<i>Thompson</i> , The Proofs of Life after Death	717
<i>Toussard</i> , Grammaire hébraïque abrégée	139
<i>Valois</i> , Histoire de la Pragmatique sanction de Bourges sous Charles VII	340
<i>Vance</i> , The Eternal in Man	716
<i>Von, E. G. O.</i> , Inneres Wachstum	717
<i>Vernon</i> , The Religious Value of the Old Testament	666
<i>Vollmer</i> , Jesus und das Sacraenopfer	150
<i>von der Goltz</i> , Tischgebete und Abendmahlsgebete in der altchristlichen und in der griechischen Kirche	333
<i>Walcott</i> , Kantian and Lutheran Elements in Ritschl's Conception of God	549
<i>Walker, D.</i> , The Gift of Tongues, and Other Essays	182
<i>Walker, W. L.</i> , Christian Theism and Spiritual Monism	548
<i>Wendling</i> , Ur-Marcus	682
<i>Wieland</i> , Der Altar der vorkonstantinischen Kirche	336
<i>Winter</i> , Apologetische Predigten	169
<i>Wobbermin</i> , Ernst Haeckel im Kampf gegen die christliche Weltanschauung	697
<i>Work</i> , The Fascination of the Book	715
<i>Zahn</i> , Bread and Salt from the Word of God	713

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